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Abstract 
Mystical strategies and performative discourse in the theologia mystica 
of Teresa of Avila: A Wittgensteinian analysis 
Peter Mark Tyler 
The thesis argues that a Wittgensteinian approach to the `mystical' writings of a `mystical 
theologian' such as Teresa of Avila reveals that rather than exhibiting an ontological 
mysticism these writings are better understood as enacting what are termed `mystical 
strategies' or `performative discourse'. The notion that both Wittgenstein and Teresa 
employ what are termed `therapeutic or transformational strategies' to effect change in 
their readers is central to its argument. In this respect the thesis concludes that their 
writing is fundamentally transformational in character. 
After an Introduction, Part One begins with a review of some of the current 
understandings of `the mystical', placing particular emphasis on elucidating the category 
of what is termed `modern mysticism' as it arises in the English-speaking world in the 
late 19th/early 20th century. This is followed by a discussion of the various approaches 
that have been taken to Wittgenstein's writings and how the interpretation of this thesis 
fits into the academic conversation of current Wittgensteinian scholarship. The thesis 
then elaborates the `Wittgensteinian methodology' which is adopted for the rest of the 
exegesis. Part One concludes by elucidating the medieval tradition of theologia mystica 
to which, it is argued, Teresa's writings are heir. 
Part Two begins by setting the context of Teresa's life and writings and showing 
how she became acquainted with the theologia mystica, especially through the writings of 
Francisco de Osuna. The following two chapters take two particular `mystical strategies': 
a `strategy of unknowing' and a `strategy of embodiment', and show how not only 
Teresa, but Wittgenstein too, utilise these strategies in their writings. 
The thesis concludes by demonstrating that Wittgenstein and Teresa share a 
preoccupation with `making pictures' to stimulate a `change of aspect' in the reader's 
way of seeing and acting in the world by use of the `mystical strategies' outlined. By so 
doing, it is argued, this presents an original approach to interpreting the `mystical 
theology' of a writer such as Teresa of Avila. 
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Chapter One. Introduction: A Change of Aspect? 
Much of what we are doing is a question of changing the style of thinking. 
(Wittgenstein LC: 28') 
Wisdom is grey, life on the other hand and religion are full of colour. 
(Wittgenstein VB: 62) 
Towards the end of his life in 1949, whilst walking with his friend Maurice Drury around 
Phoenix Park in Dublin, the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 -1951) 
shared the following remark: 
I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious 
point of view. (Rhees 1987: 79) 
The curious ambiguity of the phrase with its rejection of `religion' but appreciation of a 
`religious point of view' seems to embody much of what the `religious' meant to 
Wittgenstein. Since his death, and in the vast ocean of commentary and criticism that has 
emerged since then, there have been attempts to either co-opt him as a closet atheist, or at 
least a verificationist; or, on the other hand, an avowed and practising Christian. As will 
be demonstrated in this thesis, neither attempt has been wholly successful and his unique 
blend of so many strands of nineteenth and twentieth century thought - idealism, logical 
positivism, existentialism, psychologism and linguistics - stubbornly defies simple 
categorisation. 
It is the contention of this thesis that it is precisely this ambiguity and difficulty 
within Wittgenstein's thought that makes it so helpful in investigating `the religious point 
of view'. In particular, this dissertation will bring a `Wittgensteinian point of view' to 
bear on a vexed and confusing subject of religion - what has been variously referred to as 
`the mystical', `mysticism' or `the mystic'. The thesis argues that this Wittgensteinian 
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point of view can be helpful in elucidating how best to approach the concept in 
discussion and analysis. To illustrate the point one classical writer of Christian `mystical' 
writing will be taken as a case study: the sixteenth century Spanish Carmelite saint Teresa 
of Avila (1515 - 1582) and in Part Two of the thesis this Wittgensteinian point of view 
will be applied to her writings. In so doing it is recognised that her works cannot be 
viewed in isolation from her times and forebears and a central part of the thesis will be 
that her `mystical' writing can best be understood as the inheritance of a medieval 
Christian tradition that is referred to as the tradition of theologia mystica. 
Accordingly, the research question for this thesis can be formulated as follows: 
Can a new approach to problems of `the mystical', as expressed in the Christian 
tradition of medieval `mystical' writers such as Teresa of Avila, be revealed by 
adopting an approach based on the philosophical writings of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein? 
In answering this question the thesis will take the following form: 
It begins with a review of some of the current understandings of `the mystical', placing 
particular emphasis on elucidating the category of what is termed `modern mysticism' as 
it arises in the English-speaking world in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century as an 
ontological tool for describing `the mystical'. 
The second part of the literature review, in Chapter Three, will review the current 
status of Wittgenstein scholarship, in particular the commentaries on his views on 
religion and the `religious point of view'. The chapter will place particular emphasis on 
Wittgenstein's notion of `aspect seeing' in a Weltbild as central to how the thesis will 
approach the writings of Teresa of Avila. The following chapter will refine the 
`Wittgensteinian methodology' of the thesis developing a threefold insight based around 
the move from Saying to Showing to Acting. 
Part One will conclude by using the Wittgensteinian methodology to interpret the 
rise of what is termed theologia mystica as a distinct method of discourse, or language 
1 All abbreviations for Wittgenstein's works are given in the Bibliography. 
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game, arising from the twelfth/thirteenth century Latin revival of the works of Dionysius 
in the Parisian schools. It will be argued that Teresa is heir to this tradition via the 
Victorines, Jean Gerson and Francisco de Osuna. 
Part Two of the thesis will have two aims: first, to apply the Wittgensteinian 
methodology developed in Part One to Teresa's `mystical' writings, in particular to 
delineate what are termed the `mystical strategies' that are used in her works. Secondly, 
to compare the `mystical strategies' used by Teresa with similar strategies used by 
Wittgenstein in his own works. Thus, although the thesis begins by seeking to apply 
`Wittgensteinian analysis' to `mystical situation' - in particular the writings of Teresa of 
Avila - the final result is to produce a tool which can be reflected back on Wittgenstein's 
writing, thus showing his own `mystical strategies'. Ultimately, it will be argued, this 
helps to make sense of his own `mystical' claims in works such as the Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus and perhaps throw light on the famous `Wittgensteinian religious point of 
view' already mentioned. 
1.1 Why Teresa and Wittgenstein? Structure and Aims 
At first sight St Teresa, the passionate Carmelite nun, and Wittgenstein, the austere 
linguistic philosopher, do not seem to be the most obvious conversation partners: 
Wittgenstein, the `tractarian doctor' known for the rigour and spareness of his gnomic 
collections of philosophical reflections and Teresa, the gushing and spontaneous Doctor 
of the Church who travelled tirelessly around sixteenth century Spain founding convents, 
confronting the authorities and scribbling monumental books on prayer and spiritual 
guidance. Yet, although as far as is aware, no such similar study has been undertaken 
before, it is the contention of this thesis that close analysis and comparison of their 
respective works throws light on both authors, and, what will be called the `mystical 
strategies' that they employ. 
Accordingly, in approaching the two writers, the method will be to develop some 
distinctively `Wittgensteinian' tools for analysis. These will concentrate around: 
a) The tools for doing philosophy 
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b) How the mechanisms for philosophy can be applied to spiritual and 
theological questions 
c) The limits of language in addressing these questions. 
Secondly, these questions lead to a particular method. This method can be summarised in 
the line from the Philosophical Investigations (PI: 66) - `Denk Nicht, Sondern Schau! ' 
`Don't think - But look! '. Whilst not being an anti-theoretical philosopher Wittgenstein 
preferred an approach to the subject matter that `consisted in seeing connections' rather 
than being interested in the `occult identities' of metaphysics. 
If such a method is applied to the writings of a sixteenth century Spanish saint 
there are clearly going to be problems. First, Teresa's writings were not written as 
philosophical texts - let alone a reaction to the prevailing philosophical critiques of the 
day. Unlike Wittgenstein, Teresa has an unshakeable belief in the power of God the 
Trinity to direct her actions and the souls under her guidance; such a clear metaphysical 
mandate is clearly unobtainable to Wittgenstein. His God is more a matter of conjecture 
and yet, it is the contention of this thesis, that by applying a `Wittgensteinian' critique to 
Teresa's writings new things can be revealed in her approach to theology. No such 
similar study has been undertaken before and thus it is proposed that this thesis makes a 
unique contribution to our knowledge of both authors. 
When the Wittgensteinian method is applied to Teresa one of the most striking 
discoveries is the light it throws on the late medieval discourse which is referred to 
throughout as the theologia mystica and that by the time of Teresa's writing in the 
sixteenth century already had a venerable ancestry. As part of Cardinal Cisneros's 
reforms in the early sixteenth century a number of texts of the tradition had been made 
available to lay people in Spain. Teresa talks in particular of the TercerAbecedario 
Espiritual, `The Third Spiritual Alphabet' (TA) of Francisco de Osuna. An examination 
of this text shows a clear debt to fourteenth century scholars of the tradition especially 
Jean Gerson, Chancellor of Paris University. Gerson himself makes reference to Hugh of 
Balma ('Hugh the Carthusian' or `Hugo de Palma') and the Dionysian tradition of 
interpretation made famous in the Parisian schools through the work of the Victorines, 
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especially Richard and Hugh of St Victor and Thomas Gallus. It is the argument of this 
thesis that de Osuna and Teresa are heirs to this medieval tradition of `affective 
Dionysianism'. Thus, by analysing the language of this tradition it is possible to talk 
about two `linguistic strategies' of the tradition (what will be called `mystical' or 
`performative' strategies): the strategy of unknowing and the strategy of embodiment. 
The first of these has already been investigated in Michael Sells's Mystical Languages of 
Unsaying (Sells 1994). However, it will be argued that Sells's analysis presents 
something different from the Wittgensteinian approach presented here and the latter 
approach will be used to develop an understanding of what is termed the `mystical 
strategy of unknowing'. It will also be demonstrated that although this strategy has 
normally been associated with Teresa's co-worker, St John of the Cross, she herself uses 
this strategy frequently in her writing. The study will explore this `unknowing' within 
Teresa's writings, rightly restoring this aspect to her approach. 
On the second strategy - that of embodiment - emphasis will be given to Teresa's 
use of desire and pleasure in the strategy she adopts presenting what is termed an 
`epistemology of desire'. This part of the thesis will also show how Teresa embodies the 
Wittgensteinian movement from Saying to Showing to Acting, thus emphasising the 
transformational element in both Teresa's and Wittgenstein's writing. 
By these means the conclusions will be reached demonstrating what a study such 
as this can contribute to how both Teresa and Wittgenstein approach `the mystical'. 
The study, then will have four major aims: 
1. To argue for an interpretation of 'Wittgensteinian methodology' based primarily 
on the notion of the Übersichtliche Darstellung ('Clear Overview') and the 
importance that Wittgenstein gives for a distinction between Weltanschauung and 
Weltbild if his approach to philosophy is to be understood aright. This will be 
complemented by a Wittgensteinian movement from `Saying to Showing to 
Acting'. Wittgenstein famously wrote: `Do not do anything for the reader that he 
can do for himself' VB: 1948). Both Wittgenstein's writings, especially the 
Investigations, and those of Teresa, especially the Moradas, stand in incomplete 
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relation to the reader. It will be demonstrated that at the heart of Wittgenstein's 
approach is a performative strategy, rather than an informative one. Neither 
develop a systematic body of theory or learning and in both the interaction with 
the reader is through various performative strategies. 
2. To see what can be revealed about the writings of the Teresa of Avila when we 
apply these philosophical approaches derived from Wittgenstein much of whose 
later work was concerned with the form of language rather than content. Thus, 
Wittgensteinian analysis will be used to analyse the prevailing form of language 
available to Teresa - what is called the language of theologia mystica. It will 
be 
argued that Teresa inherited the `language game' of theologia mystica using it in 
her works to perform the work she wanted it to do on her readers. In so mapping 
the linguistic strategies of Teresa something will be revealed of the linguistic 
strategies of the theologia mystica. 
3. To compare the linguistic strategies of Teresa and Wittgenstein to demonstrate 
how they both reveal what are termed `mystical strategies'. In particular attention 
will be drawn to two strategies: a `strategy of unknowing' and a `strategy of 
embodiment'. Wittgenstein's movment from `saying to showing to acting' will be 
stressed as will Teresa's claim that contemplation is not an end in itself but must 
lead to action. Both, it will be argued, present texts for action not contemplation. 
We shall investigate here the notion of mystical writing as fundamentally 
therapeutic. 
4. To assess what a study like this can contribute to the ongoing academic debate 
about the nature of mysticism and mystical language. As well as reviewing 
various contemporary academic notions of `the mystical' and giving some of its 
derivation it will be argued that the Wittgensteinian analysis proposed here 
presents a new and original way of interpreting the Christian mystical tradition. 
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1.2 Teresa and Wittgenstein: Changing Aspects 
What is incomprehensible is that nothing, and yet everything, has changed. 
(Wittgenstein RPP2: 474) 
One of the central arguments of this thesis will be that one of the key `family 
resemblances' between Wittgenstein and Teresa is their shared preoccupation with 
`making pictures' to stimulate a `change of aspect' in our way of seeing and acting in the 
world. In this respect it will be argued that their writing must be seen as fundamentally 
transformational in character. 
In his final years Wittgenstein became increasingly interested in what he termed 
`aspect seeing', stimulated in particular by prolonged reflection on Jastrow's famous 
`Duck-Rabbit' diagram: 
In his final remarks written in. the late nineteen forties and published posthumously as 
The Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (RPP 1), Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology (RPP2), Lectures on Philosophical Psychology (LPP) and The 
Philosophical Investigations (PI) he returns continually to the figure and how we `change 
an aspect' in our thought and life. The `incomprehensible' matter that haunted 
Wittgenstein at the end of his life after he had given up his professorship in Cambridge 
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and moved to a solitary hut in Rosro near Connemara in Ireland was how `nothing and 
yet everything' is changed with the change of aspect. As he wrote in 1948 at Rosro: 
We now have a language game that is remarkably the same as, and remarkably 
different from the previous one. Now what follows from the expression `Now I 
see... ' is completely different, even though there is once again a close 
relationship between the language games. (RPP2: 476) 
What is incomprehensible is that nothing, and yet everything, has changed, after 
all. That is the only way to put it. Surely this way is wrong: It has not changed in 
one respect, but has in another. There would be nothing strange about that. But 
`Nothing has changed' means: Although I have no right to change my report 
about what I saw, since I see the same things now as before - still, I am 
incomprehensibly compelled to report completely different things, one after the 
other. (RPP2: 474) 
It will be argued throughout this thesis that both Teresa and Wittgenstein elicit this 
`change of aspect' by what will be referred to as `mystical strategies' or `mystical 
performative discourse'. For both the aim of their writing is not to leave the reader cold 
but to elicit transformational change. 
Clearly for both of them the aim of this change is different. Teresa, as will be 
seen, is a sixteenth century contemplative nun working and writing at a time of epoch- 
making change in the Western church. Her concern throughout is how a Christian can 
keep the necessary stillness and contemplative discernment to allow balanced Christian 
ethical action in the middle of a `world in flames'. 
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is a twentieth century philosopher struggling with 
the various currents of twentieth century thought within which he found himself: 
idealism, verification ism, realism, logical positivism and existentialism. He concluded 
from the midst of a difficult life of struggle and self-reflection that the aim of philosophy 
was to `show the fly the way out of the fly bottle' (PI: 309). We shall return to this 
statement and discuss what he may have meant by this in Chapter Four. However, it is 
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clear that for Wittgenstein philosophy could never be an abstract rarefied discipline, it 
had to have a practical, ethical dimension. For him, the right seeing of true philosophy 
will bring about right action. Thus, a key feature of the `mystical strategies' developed in 
this thesis will be how the change of aspect brought about by those strategies leads to 
action. 
It will also be argued that both Teresa and Wittgenstein often initiate this process 
by means of disorientation and deconstruction. In this respect it will be argued that the 
Wittgensteinian Blick shares many characteristics with the Blick of what is termed the 
theologia mystica. It will be demonstrated that both achieve this objective by inventing 
new similes, new ways of looking at things, turning our assumptions upside down, using 
humour, aporias and irony. Their gestures and comments will nudge us in certain 
directions so that in Wittgenstein's case we can begin to `see the world aright' (T 6.54) 
and in Teresa's be brought into deeper contemplative relationship with God. Their 
strategies interrupt the spontaneous, unselfconscious flow of our ongoing `mental' 
activity forcing us to reevaluate our place in the world and our attitude to it. They will use 
language in unusual and provocative ways and by the means of carefully selected images 
and metaphors suggest new ways of seeing and acting. By sometimes shocking and 
surprising us both authors will bring us back to what we knew already but were unable to 
express in words. Through it we shall return to where we began and see something for the 
first time. 
It will be argued that both understand that for there to be a real life-changing 
`change of aspect' there must be an `apophatic' breaking into the stream of ordinary 
discourse. Once we thus begin to `see the world aright' we can return to the world for 
embodied ethical action. For Wittgenstein the Weltanschauung is not changed by mere 
verbal reasonings (not the arguments of the theologia speculativa of the letrados2) but by 
the presenting of pictures. In PI: 139 he takes the example of how we learn the meaning 
of the word `cube', asking: 
2A term used for the `learned theologians' of Teresa's day, see Chapter Six for a fuller exposition. 
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What then exactly hovers before us ( vorschwebt) when we understand a word? - 
Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it be a picture? 3 
Rather than presenting traditional classical arguments in treatise form, Wittgenstein 
realises (as he did when he wrote the Tractatus) that such shifts of the Weltanschauung 
occur through presentation of pictures rather than systematic argument: 
His acceptance of the new picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a 
given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of 
pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things (Anschauungsweise 
geändert). (PI: 144) 
I wanted to put this picture before your eyes, and your acceptance of this picture 
consists in your being inclined to regard a given case differently; that is, to 
compare it with this series of pictures. I have changed your Anschauungsweise 
(way of viewing). (Z: 461) 
This is precisely Teresa's method in many of her works, especially the Moradas where 
she presents us with pictures to make her argument. As we shall see later the very 
opening passage of the Moradas presents this beautifully: 
While I was beseeching our Lord today to speak through me (por mi'), 4 as I was 
unable to find a thing to say (no atinaba a cosa que decir)5 or how to begin to 
comply with this obedience, what I will say now presented itself (ofreciö)6 to 
begin with this starting point: that we consider our soul to be like a castle, totally 
of diamond or very clear crystal, where there are many abodes ( aposentos), as in 7 
3 My translation, Anscombe in her translation gives: `comes before our mind' ( see reference in 
Bibliography). I have avoided this as it limits the ambiguity of the german vorschweben 4 Peers gives `through', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez give 'for', see Bibliography. S Peers gives `I could find nothing to say', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez "I wasn't able to think of anything 
to say' 
6 Peers: `a thought occurred to me', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez' there came to my mind' 7 Peers 'a rather more pretentious word than the English 'room': dwelling place, abode, apartment', 
Kavanaugh and Rodriguez: 'Teresa uses the Spanish words moradas, aposentos y pietas in approximately 
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heaven there are many mansions. Now if we consider it carefully, sisters, the soul 
of a just person (el alma del justo)8 is nothing else but a paradise where He says 
he takes his delights (El tiene sus deleites). 9 Well then, what do you think such an 
abode would be like where a King so powerful, so wise, so pure, so full of good 
things, takes his delight? I cannot find anything with which to compare the great 
beauty and capacity of the soul; and truly our intellects will no more be able to 
grasp this than they can comprehend God, no matter how keen they are, for He 
Himself said that He created us in his own image and likeness. (M: 1.1.1) 
For both, astonishment, shock and surprise are essential components of the `change of 
aspect' required for their writing. As Wittgenstein puts it: 
Astonishment (Staunen) is essential to a change of aspect. Und Staunen ist 
Denken - And Astonishment is Thinking. (RPP 1: 565) 
Faced, as will be argued, with such performative masters of `shock and awe' certain 
difficulties arise for the academic researcher, and especially the PhD student. As we shall 
see, and has been pointed out by many commentators, neither Wittgenstein nor Teresa are 
concerned with developing a systematic body of theory or explanation. As Stanley 
Hauerwas puts it with reference to Wittgenstein: 
(Wittgenstein) slowly cured me of the notion that philosophy was primarily a 
matter of positions, ideas, and/or theories. From Wittgenstein, and later David 
Burrell, I learned to understand and also do philosophy in a therapeutic mode... 
Moreover, Wittgenstein ended forever any attempt on my part to try to anchor 
theology in some general account of `human experience', for his writings taught 
the same sense; they refer to rooms or dwelling places within the castle... Most people today think of a 
mansion as a large stately home, not what Teresa had in mind with the term moradas. `Dwelling places' 
turns out to be a more precise translation of Teresa's moradas than is the classic `mansions' and more 
biblical and theological in tone. ' 
8 Peers `the soul of the righteous man' Kavanaugh and Rodriguez `the soul of the just person' 9 Peers `He takes His delight' KR `He finds His delight' see also V: 14: 10 and Exc: 7, allusion to Proverbs 
8: 31 
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me that the object of the theologian's work was best located in terms of the 
grammar of the language used by believers. (Hauerwas 1983: xxi) 
Like Kierkegaard, whose writings greatly influenced him, Wittgenstein was not so much 
concerned with `making difficult things simple' for his readers' comprehension but `to 
make easy things difficult' for the sake of his reader's character (See Kierkegaard 
1992: 186). Thus we look in vain in both Teresa and Wittgenstein for systematic 
complexity. Wittgenstein does his philosophy through remarks and aporia, whilst Teresa 
does her theology through image, metaphor and embodiment. As we shall see, both want 
to engage us in conversation and fail in so far as their writing does not `seize us with 
passion' in order to `turn us round'. 1° 
One aim of this thesis is to recapture the original spontaneity and ruggedness of 
the original texts of both Teresa and Wittgenstein. In the case of Wittgenstein the task of 
interpreting this type of approach to philosophy is made more difficult by the range of 
sources and collections to which his disparate Nachlass has been put by his executors and 
interpreters. As will be demonstrated in the Chapter Three, before we embark on our 
study it is necessary to define exactly what we understand by the Wittgensteinian corpus 
and at least have a nodding acquaintance with the various schools of interpretation that 
have consequently grown up since his death. As we shall see there, there have often been 
two opposing trends - to go against Wittgenstein's own words and try to make him a 
systematic philosopher presenting a systematic treatise or, as is increasingly the case, to 
emphasise the `Kierkegaardian' nature of his philosophy and what has been termed its 
therapeutic nature. In the case of Teresa, again as we shall see, there are attempts to 
systematise her writings, yet, like Wittgenstein, she seems always to struggle against this 
and live by the same dangerous littoral of aporia as Wittgenstein. Accordingly, 
throughout this thesis, although an academic argument based on the writings of the two 
authors will be presented it is hoped that something of their spirit of spontaneity, aporia 
and humour can be preserved. 
Proceeding from this question of style is that of methodology to which we turn 
next. 
10 See Chapter Eight for a longer exposition of this. 
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1.3 Methodologies and Background 
As will be clear from the above, when investigating Teresa and Wittgenstein we are 
looking at two writers who do not necessarily conform to the norms of theology on the 
one hand or philosophy on the other. In Wittgenstein's case, as we have seen, the 
aphoristic style of his writing, like Kierkegaard's or Nietzsche's, will often deliberately 
avoid easy and simple classification. Therefore, in Chapter Four below, some time will be 
spent expounding what is termed the `Wittgensteinian methodology or approach' used in 
this thesis. In this respect the thesis will create its own methodology as it responds to the 
strategies of Wittgenstein's texts. Using this Wittgensteinian methodology we shall 
analyse Teresa's texts using key interpretative tools derived from Wittgenstein's thought 
and writings. 
In our investigation of the mystical we shall be covering a variety of approaches 
and angles. Naturally it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the 
deployment of the terms mystic/mysticism/mystical as they arise in all academic 
disciplines, approaches, creeds and contexts. However, the approach that will be adopted 
here could broadly be said to be under the umbrella of what is usefully termed practical 
or pastoral theology, in particular, methodologies derived from the emerging academic 
study of spirituality, especially within the Christian context. I I 
Recent studies (See, for example Astley 2002, Graham 2007, Campbell 2007, 
Lartey 2007, Ballard and Pritchard 2006, Carr 2002, Schreiter 2007) have emphasised the 
multidisciplinary and emerging nature of pastoral/practical theology as it is currently 
being practiced in the academic world. Overall, an emphasis is being made on the process 
of bringing theology into dialogue with other disciplines. In this respect, this dissertation 
fits within the broaderprojet of Practical/Pastoral Theology (See Gagey 2007) as an 
emerging discipline by being a contribution to the dialogue between philosophical and 
theological methods in the academy. Within this broad picture it is also intended to 
contribute to the emerging study of Christian Spirituality as an independent area of 
academic study in its own right. As will be argued, if we follow Wittgenstein and Teresa 
" For a good recent introduction to how the discipline has emerged/is emerging see Burrows and Dreyer 
2005 
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aright, our theology and philosophy inevitably lead to practical action, therefore, the 
thesis accords with much of the present understanding of pastoral theology as practical 
theology. 
1.4 A Note on Sources, Translation and Terminoloay 
Before concluding this chapter with a summary of the dissertation chapters it is necessary 
to note some aspects of the sources, translation and terminology that will be employed 
throughout. 
As has already been alluded to, when studying Wittgenstein in particular, certain 
choices have to be made as to the sources that will be used and how they will be 
interpreted. Chapter Three will go into greater depth about the problems of interpretation 
and sourcing of Wittgenstein's Nachlass, the majority of which lay unpublished at his 
death and some of which is still not published. This thesis draws on both published and 
unpublished material. With published work it has been usual to quote the English 
translation as it appears in the relevant English text. However, there have been occasions 
when it was felt that some phrases needed an altered translation to clarify a point that was 
being made, in this case the author's own translation has been indicated. In the case of 
unpublished Nachlass the full original German wording is given with the author's 
translation. All Wittgenstein's works have been listed as they appear in English 
translation with abbreviations in the Bibliography. References to Wittgenstein's 
manuscripts adopt the classification first used in von Wright's 1969 paper The 
Wittgenstein Papers reprinted in Philosophical Occasions 1912 -1951(P0) pp. 480 - 
510. 
In the case of Teresa the two main English translations of her work have been 
used: Kavanaugh and Rodriguez (1980) and Allison Peers (1946), unless indicated when 
the author has needed to make his own translation. The Spanish sources of the BAC 
edition (De la Madre de Dios and Steggink 1997) and the Burgos edition (Alvarez 1998) 
have been used. Occasional reference is made to other translations which will be given 
where necessary. As with Wittgenstein a complete list of her works with abbreviations is 
given in the Bibliography. 
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Other primary and secondary sources are referenced using usual academic 
conventions and full details can be found in the Bibliography. 
Due to the major problematic of defining the mystical/mysticism/mystic upon 
which so much of the argument of this dissertation depends the three terms are usually 
quoted in italics throughout. 
1.5 Structure 
Accordingly, the subsequent structure and plan of the dissertation will be as follows: 
Chapter Two: 
The Creation of `Modern Mysticism' and its Critics 
The chapter presents a key tool in academic interpretation of `mystical texts' - the notion 
of `the mystic' as a cross-credal, experientialist, ontological category with deep roots in 
perennialism and influenced by orientalist approaches - what will be referred to as 
modern mysticism. In particular, attention will be given to how the category arises in the 
English speaking world, especially the United States and Great Britain, with special 
reference to four writers: Robert A. Vaughan, Ralph Inge, Evelyn Underhill and William 
James. By analysing these four writers it will be demonstrated how the foundations of 
modern mysticism are presented to the academy. 
Having established the category of modern mysticism the contemporary academic debate 
on the subject will be reviewed concentrating in particular on the constructivist critique to 
modern mysticism and the various responses to it. 
Chapter Three: 
Wittgenstein's Nachlass and the Problem of Interpretation 
This chapter will begin by critically engaging with the key Wittgensteinian sources and 
presenting the various schools of interpretation. The aim of this chapter will be to 
expound where the analysis of the thesis fits into the current academic interpretation and 
how this study builds on recent developments. 
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Chapter Four: 
Saying and Showing -A Wittgensteinian Methodology 
Using Wittgenstein's texts the Wittgensteinian methodology of the thesis will be 
presented with which The Mystic will be subsequently investigated. In so doing attention 
will be paid in particular to the writings of the later Wittgenstein especially as to the 
nature of epistemology and ontological expression in mystical discourse. At this point 
attention will be paid to the nature of the mystical discourse or game referring to it as a 
performative discourse or strategy of elucidation. Wittgenstein's later expression of the 
philosophical enterprise as a movement from thinking to seeing to acting will also be 
presented. This will support the contention of the thesis that Wittgenstein's approach is 
primarily transformational in character. 
Chapter Five: 
The Mystical Strategies of the Theologia mystica 
The methodology developed in the previous chapter will now be used as a tool to 
interpret the tradition of theologia mystica in the West. Particular attention will be paid to 
what are termed two key `mystical strategies': the strategy of deconstruction and 
unknowing and the strategy of embodiment and the affective. 
Central to the history of this strategy are the texts of the Corpus Dionysiaca: 
originally Greek texts they made their impact on the West largely through two sets of 
translations -a first group in the ninth Century by the French monk Hilduin, and the 
Irishman Eriugena - and a second group in the twelfth century Parisian Renaissance, 
primarily by the Victorine Sarracenus and the English Bishop, Robert Grosseteste. This 
chapter will concentrate on the mystical strategies of the twelfth/thirteenth Century Latin 
texts and how they were thus disseminated, through Gerson and de Osuna, to Teresa. 
Part Two: 
Applying the Wittgensteinian Approach: The Mystical Strategies of the theologia 
mystica illustrated by an examination of the writings of Teresa of Avila 
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Chapter Six: 
The Form of Language: `Mystical Strategies' in Teresa of Avila 
The second part will use the Wittgensteinian methodology developed in Part One to 
interpret Teresa's writings as an example of `mystical performative discourse'. To assess 
Teresa's debt to the tradition this chapter will chart how the strategy comes to her 
through Jean Gerson via the writings of Francisco de Osuna. 
Chapter Seven: 
Unsaying and Unknowing in Teresa of Avila and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
This chapter will argue that both Wittgenstein and Teresa use the `mystical strategy of 
unknowing' presented in Part One. It will begin by contrasting it with Sells's `mystical 
language of unsaying' demonstrating how the Wittgensteinian `mystical strategy of 
unknowing' is more concerned with a practical `change of aspect' rather than 
constructing a theoretical theology of apophasis. The chapter will then analyse six such 
`strategies of unknowing' in the writings of Teresa and Wittgenstein. 
Chapter Eight: 
`A Transformational Process': Strategies of Affectivity and Embodiment in Teresa 
of Avila and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
As with the previous chapter the `strategy of embodiment/affectivity' will be investigated 
and its importance for both Wittgenstein and Teresa developed. Again, there will be 
differences in emphasis on the purpose of the strategy in both writers, however it will be 
argued here that there is a `family resemblance' between the two that makes such a 
comparison sustainable. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
The conclusions of the thesis will fall into three main areas: 
a) How the the writings of Teresa of Avila can be revealed by this Wittgensteinian 
approach to present language games that encourage the reader to engage in a new 
embodied, apophatic approach that stimulates contemplative prayer in the 
individual's relations to God. 
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b) The debt that Teresa of Avila owes to her `master' de Osuna and what will be 
termed the tradition of theologia mystica to which she is heir. 
c) How Wittgenstein's strategy of the `mystical' reveals that his `religious point of 
view' was expressed through verbal and linguistic strategies that make his 
published and unpublished claims to an interest in das Mystische comprehensible 
within the Western Christian mystical strategy of theologia mystics. 
The conclusion will assess the original contribution that the study makes to the ongoing 
academic debate about the nature of mysticism and mystical language. It will be argued 
that the Wittgensteinian analysis proposed here presents a new and original way of 
interpreting the Christian mystical tradition and an original contribution to contemporary 
Pastoral/Practical Theology. 
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Part One: Establishing a Wittgensteinian approach to the Mystical 
As stated in the opening chapter, one of the chief aims of this thesis is to present a 
specifically Wittgensteinian interpretation of the mystical using the writings of Teresa of 
Avila as a case study. However, before we can embark upon that we need to clarify two 
aspects of the subject by virtue of an extended literature review. First, we need to review 
what has been understood by the mystical and how a Wittgensteinian view will interpret 
this and, secondly, to analyse how Wittgenstein's writings have been interpreted by the 
secondary commentators, especially his writings on religion. Thus, in Part One of the 
thesis we shall begin in Chapter Two by looking at interpretations of the mystical within 
the secondary literature followed in Chapter Three with a review of the Wittgensteinian 
Nachlass and how it has been interpreted. This will then lead to the exposition of our 
proposed Wittgensteinian methodology for interpreting the mystical in Chapter Four 
before we turn to the tradition that influenced Teresa of Avila, especially that based on 
the writings of Dionysius, and apply our methodology in Chapter Five. This will act as a 
basis for examining the Teresian texts with our Wittgensteinian approach in Part Two of 
the Dissertation. We turn first then to current academic understandings of the mystical. 
27 
Chapter Two: The Creation of Modern Mysticism and its Critics 
Sometimes an expression has to be taken out of the language and sent to the 
cleaners. Then it can be re-introduced into service. (Wittgenstein VB: 1940)12 
There are two main aims of this dissertation: to take a methodology based on the writings 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein and apply them to the Christian medieval tradition of theologia 
mystica as exemplified in the `mystical writings' of Teresa of Avila and secondly to 
compare the `mystical strategies' of Teresa of Avila and Ludwig Wittgenstein in order to 
throw light on what he understands by das Mystische and reveal the Sprachspiele that 
Teresa uses in her writing. 
However, this discussion must be embedded in current academic debate regarding 
the mystical, especially in interpretation of writers such as Teresa. This chapter will be 
concerned with contemporary academic understanding of the mystical and will argue that 
this can be seen as reaction and counter-reaction to the proposition of an ontological, 
cross-credal category which we refer to as `modern mysticism'. Accordingly, we shall 
trace some of the key elements in the creation of this category, reviewing the writings of 
Vaughan, Inge, Underhill and James before looking at contemporary academic reaction 
to it. At the end of Part One, in Chapter Five we shall return to the problematic of the 
mystical however at that point we shall look at it through our Wittgensteinian 
methodology of a medieval Sprachspiel of what we will term `theologia mystica'. 
2.1 The Making of Modern Mysticism 
Any thesis wanting to clarify the `mystical speech' of a writer such as Teresa of Avila 
needs to address at some point the definitions of `the mystical' with which it is working. 
A comprehensive literature review of all the usages of the term in every area of academic 
discourse would neither be possible nor desirable, consequently this chapter aims to 
shape the understanding of contemporary academic discourse on `the mystical' by seeing 
12 `Man muß manchmal einen Ausdruck aus der Sprache herausziehen, ihn zum Reinigen geben. - und kann 
ihn dann wieder in den Verkehr einführen. My translation 
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it comprised of two over-arching tendencies: that towards evaluating `mysticism' as a 
quasi-ontological, cross-credal category, what we will refer to as `modern mysticism', 
and a contemporary academic movement which seeks to concentrate primarily on the 
form of mystical discourse at the expense of any content, especially psychologistic 
content, what we shall refer to as `constructivist' approaches. It is the argument of this 
chapter that much contemporary discussion on the issue, especially in the theology 
faculty, is centred around these two movements and reactions to them. By contrast, this 
thesis proposes its `Wittgensteinian methodology' as a way of navigating an impasse 
between these two understandings, presenting `mystical speech' which is neither de- 
psychologised nor overly ontological. This will be the task of Chapter Four. However, 
before we move to that position it is necessary to review this debate and the main 
movements that have created it. 
Before investigating the contemporary critical academic reaction to the mystical it 
is necessary to understand something of its origins and how it arises in contemporary 
discourse. In particular, how its distinctive qualities are developed and maintained in 
Western European discourse. We shall be largely confined here, in what will necessarily 
be a brief survey, to the archaeology of the term in English-speaking context. 13 
Recent scholarship on the archaeology of the term has been dominated by the work of 
Michel de Certeau (1992), Louis Bouyer (1981) and Bernard McGinn (1991) who have 
traced the pre-history and early modem history of the word mystic, la mystique, 
mysticum. From this research and analysis, which is by no means concluded '14 it is 
argued that mysticism, as a distinct category - that is, `associated with distinct religious 
experiences' (Sheldrake 2001: 39) emerges in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries in the cultural and religious exchange between Golden Age Spain and France. 
More specifically, de Certeau favours Bordeaux as the region of `transition ( and 
translation) from sixteenth-century mystic Spain to seventeenth century mystic 
France'(de Certeau 1992: 10). For seventeenth century France is the place `where the 
13 For this reason I have not explored the origins and use of the term by, inter alia, such notable German 
scholars as Heiler, Stolz and Rahner. For a perceptive account of the latter's views on das Mystische see 
Endean 2004. 
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mystic wave breaks' and from here we can `move backward toward the horizon from 
which it came'. 
De Certeau points out, when we speak of `mystics', `sixteenth century authors 
instead said "contemplatives" or "spirituals" ' (de Certeau 1992: 94). He cites traditional 
usage by Bernard of Clairvaux, Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas amongst others, and in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gives numerous instances (de Certeau 1992: 95). 
Regarding Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross, he suggests they both prefer the term 
contemplaciön and, in the case of John of the Cross anyway, `uses "mystical" theology to 
designate the "negative" aspect of infused contemplation in reference to the apophatic 
tradition of Dionysius the Areopagite'. We shall return to this later, and to Teresa's use of 
the term `mystical theology' in Chapters Five and Six suggesting other interpretations of 
the theologia mystica from our Wittgensteinian perspective. 
By this time, argues de Certeau, the adjective `mystical' takes on the aspects of 
the `hidden key', the hermeneutical lodestone or alchemical secret (following Bouyer, it 
returns to its original Greek meaning of mus, hidden or closed). The hermeneutic of the 
esoteric is strongly enforced: `At this point the term "mystical" becomes the proper one 
to qualify any object, real or ideal, the existence or signification of which eludes direct 
knowledge'(de Certeau 1992: 96). He further suggests that the movement that brought 
about this specialised use of `the mystical' also created a new `science of extraordinary 
facts', mystics: la mystique. We shall return to these early modern influences on the term 
shortly. 
2.2 The EiEhteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: The psycholo2isation of Modern 
My ticism - William James 
The analysis of the rise of la mystique as a distinct category of human Wissenschaft is 
complimented by recent categorisation of another movement - that of the 
`psychologisation' of mysticism that begins towards the end of the nineteenth century and 
continues to the present day. Again, this is a large topic and takes in many branches of 
14 Volumes 1- 4 of McGinn's Presence of God series on the history of Western Christian mysticism have 
so far emerged, with two more volumes in preparation, see McGinn 1991,1994,1998a, 2005. 
30 
psychology, theology, philosophy, psychiatry and social sciences. In addition, throughout 
the nineteenth century we see the effects of colonialism on Western European/American 
understandings of the mystical and what has been termed by Said (1978) as `Orientalism'. 
Scholars such as Lash (1988) and Williams (1991) see much of the modern 
psychologisation of mysticism as arising from the influence of William James, in 
particular his groundbreaking The Varieties of Religious Experience (James 1902). 
However, recent work by Leigh Eric Schmidt (2003) has attempted to bridge the gap 
between de Certeau's work on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the later work 
by scholars on James and beyond. 15 As with Teresa of Avila, Schmidt shows that the 
prevailing category in the English speaking world up to the early decades of the 
eighteenth century was again `mystical theology', especially as seen as interpretation of 
the Dionysian tradition. Thus, in 1656, Thomas Blount provided this definition in his 
Glossographia: 
Mystical Theology is nothing else in general but certain Rules, by the practise 
whereof, a vertuous Christian may attain to a nearer, a more familiar, and beyond 
all expression comfortable conversation with God. (Blount 1656: 235) 
As Schmidt points out, Blount's work contains no definitions for mystic or mysticism. 
The older understanding of `mystical interpretation of scripture', ie. a `hidden or internal' 
meaning, seems to have been retained (eg. in Ephraim Chambers's Cyclopeadia of 1738) 
however it is not until the middle of the eighteenth century that the term `mysticism' is 
employed as a substantive in its own right and here it is mainly used in a pejorative sense 
to criticise the enthusiasms and `amorous extravagancies' of `the sects', especially 
Methodists and Quakers. The first usage in this way has been found by Schmidt in the 
works of Henry Coventry's dialogues16 Philemon to Hydapses: Or, the History of False 
Religion. Here he contrasts `the true spirit of acceptable religion' with `the seraphic 
entertainments of mysticism and extasy' (Coventry 1761: 56/60). Religion, rightly 
is De Certeau's perspectives can be criticised as too narrow to allow a full general picture (See McGinn 
1991) and as leaving out developments beyond the French speaking world, with their specific 
characteristics. 
16 Henry Coventry, ca 1710 - 1752 
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practised, is described as `liberal, manly, rational and social institution' (ie. tolerant and 
full of aesthetic proportion and public decorum) and is contrasted with the `deluded 
votaries of mysticism' (Coventry 1761: 44). For Coventry, the great source of such 
mystical `extasies' was `disappointed love': the frustrated passion is `transferred from 
mere mortals to a spiritual and divine object, and love... is sublimated into devotion. ' 
(1761: 47). 
The `mystics' came to be seen increasingly as a small sect or band within 
Christianity, much as the alumbrados had been seen in sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Spain, and the `Molinists' later. '7 Thus, in the 1797 entry for the Encyclopaedia 
Brittanica `the mystics' are defined as: 
A kind of religious sect, distinguished by their professing pure, sublime and 
perfect devotion, with an entire disinterested love of God, free from all selfish 
considerations... The principles of this sect were adopted by those called 
Quietists in the seventeenth century, and under different modifications, by the 
Quakers and Methodists. (1797: 598) 
Schmidt sees the eighteen forties and fifties as the point where a shift occurs in 
definitions of mysticism; from something associated with a small sect or group with 
esoteric characteristics it slowly defines something broader and wider with universalist 
and perennialist elements. Thus in the 1858 edition of the Encyclopaedia Brittanica 
(eighth edition) we find the following: `Its main characteristics are constantly the same 
whether they find expression in the Bagvat-Gita of the Hindu (sic), or in the writings of 
Emmanuel Swedenborg' (1858: 755). This is really the beginning of the modern 
understanding of mysticism which is still with us today. That is, mysticism as a universal 
form of religious experience that finds specific expression in distinctive environments: 
Buddhist mysticism, Indian mysticism, Spanish mysticism, German mysticism and so on. 
The other significant element that arises at this time is the 'orientalisation' of mysticism 
which we will consider shortly. 
" See Tyler 2005: Alumbrados and forthcoming Miguel de Molinos in The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Christianity. We shall return to this theme in Chapter Six. 
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Robert Alfred Vaughan's (1823-57) two-volume collection, Hours with the Mystics 
(1856) as well as comparable publications in French and German18 helped to popularise 
this notion, this being supplemented by orientalist notions of the `mystic East'. 
In 1836 the Transcendental Club was formed in New England from a group of Unitarian 
ministers and intellectuals wishing to discuss philosophical and theological issues. By 
1838 we record them meeting to discuss `the question of Mysticism', in particular 
questions such as `Was Jesus a mystic? '(See King 1985: 5). 
By the end of the century, authors such as Octavius Frothingham in his Ten Great 
Religions (1871-83) were able to imagine a future religion of the United States that was 
liberal and universal without being dogmatic, ecclesiastical, sacramental or sectarian with 
mysticism being its binding glue (Frothingham 1891: 115 -132). Emerging from the Civil 
War period, it seemed that mysticism could provide a unifying influence on a fragmented 
country and the hope of a Universal Religion. This late nineteenth century 
Transcendentalist stream combined with others to create the climate in which William 
James's Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) could fruitfully appear. 
James's father, Henry James Sr had friends amongst the transcendentalists, read 
Swedenborg and had a faith that has been characterised as `an idiosyncratic fusion of 
Calvinism and republicanism' (Levinson 1981: 11). For Henry Sr `the old Theology' was 
`substantially the same in all the sects, from the old Romish down to the modern 
Swedenborgian'. Henry Sr also kept a keen interest in all the new religious movements 
emerging in mid nineteenth century America and his sons' preoccupations reflected those 
of their father in, amongst others, the Shakers, Mormons, Millerites, Spiritualists, 
Swedenborgians and Transcendentalists (see Levinson 1981: 4). As well as these groups, 
James's early years saw the formation in the States of such influential movements as the 
Seventh Day Adventists (1860), Jehovah's Witnesses (1872) and Madam Blavatsky's 
Theosophical Society (1875). During his teens and early twenties James became involved 
with both Epicureanism and Stoicism and maintained an interest in all things esoteric and 
`spiritualist' throughout his life. This would help to form the final shape of The Varieties. 
18 Including works by Johan Heinroth, Joseph von GSrres, Ludwig Noack, Adolph Helfferich and Victor 
Cousin 
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In his articles of 1890 and 1892 for Scribner's Magazine and The Forum reprinted 
in What Psychical Research has Accomplished (James: 1897) James details his 
experiences in the field of psychical research. In view of the definitions of mysticism 
arising in the mid to late nineteenth century it is not surprising, then, that James uses the 
word mystical to describe these `psychic phenomena', ie. `divinations, inspirations, 
demoniacal possessions, apparitions, trances, ecstasies, miraculous healings and 
productions of disease, and occult powers possessed by peculiar individuals over persons 
and things in their neighbourhood'(1897: 300). Mysticism and Mystical Practice are for 
James clearly identified with `practices of the occult' transmitted from generation to 
generation by `this mass of human beings' outside the circles of academe. Further, the 
`mystical mind' is associated with the `feminine', in contradistinction to the 'scientific- 
academic' mind associated with a certain 'manliness" (1897: 301,37). 
By these means, the modern `transcendental' or better `perennialist' understanding of 
mysticism had been born. 19 The characteristics of this type of mysticism being: 
" It is primarily identified in extraordinary states and conditions - occult and 
supernatural practices reveal its presence. It is preoccupied with religious 
experiences. 
" It has an orientalist component 
" It is cross-credal and universal, manifesting in different religions in differing 
ways. 
James's descriptions of the Proceedings of the Societyfor Psychical Research, of which 
he was one-time President, display his methodology as to how to approach these mystical 
phenomena: experiments, surveys and observations can all be used to reveal the secret 
truths of these phenomena. 
We have, then, much of what James will say on mysticism in The Varieties 
already in embryo in these texts. The other significant element that will be explored in 
The Varieties is the role of the `religious genius' in `picking up' these far ends of the 
19 In this respect, see also Sedgewick (2004) 
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mystical spectrum and passing them on to the mass of `ordinary believers'. Such a 
genius, is for James someone who has an innate mental instability (see James, 1902: 7). 
Some, at least, of this appears to be autobiographical and relates to James's own struggles 
in his early twenties with near-suicidal depression. This `melancholy' cast to James's 
character seems to have stayed with him for some time and his struggles with these 
suicidal urges are recounted in his later lecture of 1895 to the Harvard YMCA Is Life 
Worth Living (James 1897: 32) 20. 
By the time, then, James came to deliver the 1902 Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh the 
main planks of his delineation of `transcendental mysticism' or what is called in this 
dissertation `modem mysticism' were in place. This, we argue here, will form the 
cornerstone of `modern mysticism' as it emerges in Western academic discourse: its 
psychologism, perennialism ( influenced by orientalism) and its concentration on unusual 
states or experiences - its experiential ism. All of which will find its way into the final 
version of The Varieties which will do so much to influence the subsequent academic 
climate of discussion of the mystical in the English speaking world. 
Of particular relevance to our discussion here are Lectures Sixteen and Seventeen 
on Mysticism. Much of what we find there can be predicted by what has gone before. 
Thus, his bold assertion at the beginning of the lecture that `personal religious experience 
has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness' will make sense in the context 
of this metaphysic. Briefly reprising some of his original perspectives by references to the 
connection between mysticism and `thought-transference and spirit-return, , 
21 he 
concentrates on defining what characteristics these mystical spirit states will have. In 
particular, that they will have the following four characteristics: 
1. Ineffability: The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as 
mystical is negative. The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, 
that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words... In this peculiarity 
mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect. No one 
20 Reprinted in The Will to Believe, James 1897 21 In view of James's background, an interesting choice. 
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can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in what the quality 
or worth of it consists. (James 1902: 380) 
The mystic, moreover, has a more `musical ear' than most of us, attuned to this silent 
symphony. They have gifts in a special way `more akin to states of feeling than intellect' 
enabling them to engage with James's unseen order: 
Lacking the heart or ear, we cannot interpret the musician or the lover justly, and 
are even likely to consider him weak-minded or absurd. The mystic finds that 
most us accord to his experiences an equally incompetent treatment. (1902: 380) 
James's second quality of mysticism is its 'poetic quality'. In this aspect he deepens his 
previous distinction of the mystical states as `states of feeling' by characterising them 
also as `state of knowledge'. They are: 
States of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They 
are illuminations, revelations, full of'significance and importance... and as a rule 
they carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-time. (1902: 380) 
Both these characteristics, ineffability and noetic quality, relate more to the 
transcendental nature of the `mystical experience', their origins in `another world' and, 
therefore, their peculiar power when manifest in the mystic in this world: a power that 
epistemologically gives them greater certainty than `states of feeling' or the `discursive 
intellect'. 
The third quality delineated by James, transiency, relates more to the 
`experiential ist' aspect of James's agenda than its `transcendentalist' side: 
3. Transciency. Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. Except in rare 
instances, half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond 
which they fade into the light of common day. (1902: 381) 
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Of the four qualities this seems the most 'experientialist' of them all, clearly indicating 
James's understanding of mystical states as discreet, specific experiences. 
With his description of Passivity he returns to his favourite subject which is never 
far below the surface in Varieties: the exploration of the paranormal and extraordinary. 
He refers to the `manuals of mysticism' which prescribe `certain voluntary operations, as 
by fixing the attention, or going through certain bodily performances' which will produce 
mystical states such as `prophetic speech, automatic writing or alternative personality'. 
We immediately recall the New England circles of mysticism that James as a young man, 
and his father, explored and experienced: mysticism here defined, is clearly an esoteric 
and exotic function. From this perspective, his reference in the next paragraph to 
`professional mystics at the height of their development' does not seem so odd after all as 
long as we remember that James's mysticism, in its perennialist-experientialist quality, is 
a specific modern phenomenon born in the late nineteenth century and destined to have a 
vigorous life in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This new understanding of 
modern mysticism with a specific metaphysic, ontology and epistemology, is receiving 
here one of its fullest and first expositions. 
As he also makes clear in this chapter, and again this follows from his earlier 
metaphysical seperation of religious experience from religious institutions and 
organisations, the mystical experience, does not have to be connected with a specific 
religious institution or organisation: 
Single words and conjunctions of words, effects of light on land and sea, odors 
and musical sounds all bring it when the mind is tuned aright. (1902: 383) 
For James, mysticism is the secret heart of religion, the living essence that inhabits below 
the surface and gives life to everything else that follows. Again, of significance for much 
that will follow, James suggests a relation between these states and certain chemically 
induced positions produced by drugs such as nitrous oxide, with which he famously 
experimented (see James 1902: 387). 
The other central innovation of James's chapter on mysticism is its marshalling of 
examples from `other religions': `Buddhists, Hindus, Mahommedans'. Another feature 
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which will be developed in much twentieth century discussion of mysticism - mysticism 
as a cross-credal entity: 
This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute 
is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become one with the 
Absolute and we become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting and 
triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by differences of clime or creed. In 
Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, 
we find the same recurring note. (1902: 419) 
In such terms, the perennialist-experientialist view of mysticism survives intact to the 
present day. James's descriptions in The Varieties presents us with a clear insight into 
certain key characteristics of modern mysticism, namely: 
1. The psychologisation of modern mysticism 
2. Its experientialist nature 
3. Its manifestations of perennialism 
Before we look at the contemporary critique of James and the beginnings of `modem 
mysticism' amongst contemporary writers we shall conclude this survey of the origins of 
`modem mysticism' by looking at three other writers who, with James, were key in 
developing the category: Robert Vaughan, Ralph Inge and Evelyn Underhill. 
2.3 Vaughan, Inge and Underhill: The British Orientalisation of Modern Mysticism 
So far we have considered the processes that went into forming James's Varieties, in 
particular the personal sphere within which James was involved and the milieu of North 
American religious attitudes at the end of the nineteenth century/beginning of twentieth 
century. This thesis is concerned to trace the development of mysticism as a `modern' 
category in the English speaking world. Accordingly, we will now turn to parallel 
developments that were taking place in Great Britain at this time. To do this we will 
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concentrate on three writers, two of whom predate James's Varieties: Robert Alfred 
Vaughan (1823-1857) and William Ralph Inge (1860 -1954); before turning to one 
whose first published work on `mysticism' post-dates the Varieties but was of 
considerable importance in the creation of `modern mysticism': Evelyn Underhill (1875 - 
1941). 
As with James, a significant factor in the development of mysticism in all three 
writers was the interaction with and discovery of non-Christian cultures, especially 
through the colonial power gradient. Whereas James specifically concerned himself with 
the esoteric societies and phenomena he recorded in emerging post Civil War America, 
the three British writers investigated mysticism against the backdrop of British colonial 
empire, especially its dealing with the Indian Subcontinent and the Far East. Vaughan 
devotes a large portion of Hours with the Mystics to `Hindoo, Buddhist and Yogi 
mysticism' (1895: 54 passim) and is very much in the `India, cradle of civilisation' 
school22. Likewise, Inge has no hesitation in branding aspects of Christian history which 
do not fit his thesis as `Oriental'. For example, talking Syrian Christian mysticism he 
comments: 
It is the ancient religion of the Brahmins, masquerading in clothes borrowed from 
Jewish allegorists, half-Christian Gnostics, Manicheans, Platonising Christians, 
and pagan Neoplatonists. (Inge 1899: 104) 
As he makes clear he has no direct study of Indian religion but constructs his 
understanding of it from summaries available, 23 or from reports from colonial 
administrators. 4 
This colonialism and esotericism seems to have influenced Underhill even more 
deeply than Vaughan or Inge, which was no doubt helped from her involvement prior to 
22 As we shall see Vaughan makes numerous references to India and Indian culture. See also his India in 
1857: Historical Parallels in Vaughan (1858) where Vaughan writes in response to the Indian Mutiny/1u 
Indian War of Independence where his brother-in-law was killed and sister involved: `The Anglo-Saxon 
will not accomplish less than the Roman, for his destinies are higher... Our Indian adversaries lack a head 
and act with little concert, the superiority of the West is already not less decisive on the part of Britain than 
of Rome' (185 8: 306-310) 
23 eg p. 113, reference is made to Hunt's Pantheism and Christianity 24 See p. 112, reference to Hon P Ramanathan CMG, Attorny-General of Ceylon 
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writing Mysticism with the Society of the Golden Dawn, an esoteric society that practised 
an eclectic mixture of magic, occult, Kabbalah and Eastern esotericism amongst other 
things, we shall return to this. In her writings she refers to what studies were available on 
Eastern religions and seemed particularly interested in Sufism. 25 
We can therefore extract two elements of their `colonial' critique for our present 
discussion: 
1. How modem mysticism emerged alongside an interest in the `archaic' nature of 
`Eastern' culture, especially Indian culture, when compared with Western culture. 
and 
2. How `Vedic religion' and `Classical Buddhism' became ahistorical yardsticks 
against which all later forms of Indian religiosity could be measured, assessed and 
evaluated. 
It is the argument of this thesis that this British nineteenth century `orientalist' view of 
`the mystic' combines with James's psychologisation to produce the distinctive 
characteristics of `modern mysticism' as a discrete academic category. Before we turn to 
contemporary academic critique of that category we shall briefly review the work of 
Vaughan, Inge and Underhill in turn. 
2.3.1 Robert Vaughan and The Hours with the Mystics (1856) 
Of the three British writers surveyed here Vaughan has been unfairly neglected and to 
date very little academic appraisal has appeared of his writings, including the very 
influential Hours with the Mystics (1856, hereafter HM). Accordingly, for the purposes of 
this thesis, it is worth outlining some of the main elements of his approach. 
25 See in particular Ch 6 of Mysticism where reference is made to works such as Palmer's Oriental 
Mysticism of 1867 and translations of Attar, Al Ghazzali and Rumi. Indeed, in her final Bibliography of 
`Works and Lives of the Mystics' she only lists Christian authors except for three neo-Platonists and seven 
Sufi authors whose works are all cited in English translations then available. 
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Although Underhill and Inge are rather dismissive of Vaughan's Hours, 26 it is 
quite clear that both of them read Vaughan and were perhaps more influenced by him 
than they would like to admit. 7 From the point of view of our study it is a fascinating 
text as Vaughan holds in embryo many of the themes of the emerging study of mysticism 
and at a comparatively early date compared to our other two authors. 28 His attitude 
throughout the text is a largely negative one to this mysticism. Yet, in his text we find 
many of the elements that the later writers would develop. 
In Vaughan's material the four elements of modern mysticism identified above, 
eg. essentialism, perennialism, experientialism and orientalism, are very much in 
evidence, with particular emphasis, it is argued here, on: 
1. An `orientalist' view of an Eastern/Indian arche to mysticism and 
2. The privileging of an extracted `essence' of mysticism, primarily located in 
authorative texts. 
Vaughan begins his exploration of `Early Oriental Mysticism' (HM 51-60) with a 
discussion of the `Bagvat-Gita'(sic), drawing on Charles Wilkins's translation of 1785 
(Wilkins 1785). Wilkins, along with William Jones and Henry Thomas Colebrook, was 
one of the early pioneering orientalists. For Wilkins and Jones the Gita is seen as 
representative of the `grand mysteries' of the Hindu religion as a whole. 29 Jones, for 
instance, states that those who wish `to form a correct idea of Indian religion and 
26 See Inge 1899: 347: `There is something almost offensive in telling the story of men like Tauler, Suso, 
and Juan of the Cross, in the form of smart conversations at a house-party, and the jokes cracked at the 
expense of the benighted `mystics' are not always in the best taste. Vaughan does not take his subject quite 
seriously enough. There is an irritating air of superiority in all his discussions of the lives and doctrines of 
the mystics, and his hatred and contempt for the Roman Church often warps his judgement. ' 
and Underhill 1910: xiii: 'Vaughan's supercilious and unworthy `Hours with the Mystics" 
27 Inge however does state (1899: 348): `I wish to acknowledge considerable obligations to Vaughan, 
whose early death probably deprived us of even better work than the book which made his reputation. ' 28 Born in 1823, the eldest son of a Congregational minister, in Worcester, Robert followed his father into 
the ministry holding posts in Bath and Birmingham. His health was always delicate and his pastoral 
ministry seems to have been somewhat impaired. In 1855 he showed symptoms of tuberculosis and after 
two years living as an invalid in Bournemouth and London he died at the early age of 34 at Westbourse 
Park, London in 1857. Published in 1856 his Hours with the Mystics ran into several editions and until the 
publication of Inge's Christian Mysticism and Underhill's Mysticism remained a key influence on further 
thought on the subject in English speaking countries. See Essays and Remains, 1, ix -cxiv 29 See King 1999: 121 
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literature' should `begin by forgetting all that has been written on the subject, by ancients 
and moderns, before the publication of the Gita'(Jones 1799: 1: 363). 
Vaughan asserts that mysticism has its roots in this Indian arche, but: 
Mysticism, then, is born armed completely with its worst extravagances. An 
innocent childhood it never had; for in its very cradle this Hercules destroys, as 
deadly serpents, Reason and Morality. For the mystical adept of Hindooism the 
distinction between good and evil is obliterated as often as he pleases. (HM: 52). 
Mysticism, then, for Vaughan is not only born in `the East' but is born corrupt and 
perverted. `Western mysticism', on the other hand, `checked by many better influences, 
has rarely made so patent the inherent evil even of its most mischievous forms' (HM: 53). 
Mysticism in the West is bad, but not as bad as that of the East: `the European, mystic 
though he be, will occasionally pause to qualify, and is often willing to allow some scope 
to facts and principles alien or hostile to a favourite idea'. 
Vaughan's mystical ontology is however quite sophisticated. Rather than seeing it 
as a `ready made commodity' which is transmitted from one generation to another, he 
prefers to see it as `a state of thinking and feeling, to which minds of a certain 
temperament are liable at any time or place, in occident and orient, whether Romanist or 
Protestant, Jew, Turk, or Infidel'(HM: 54). A state of thinking which is diseased and not 
a little perverted: `though conditioned by circumstance or education, its appearance is 
ever the spontaneous product of a certain crisis in individual or social history'( a theme 
which recurs in all our four authors - see James above). In Indian mysticism we find the 
`set of features' that `we repeatedly encounter... through the history of mysticism': 
The same round of notions, occurring to minds of similar make under similar 
circumstances, is common to mystics in ancient India and in modern 
Christendom. The development of these fundamental ideas is naturally more 
elevated and benign under the influence of Christianity. (HM: 54) 
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So, although it is not a commodity, it is more a cluster of `fundamental ideas' that keeps 
recurring. Although negative in his understanding of mysticism, Vaughan wants to reduce 
it to a set of essential propositions which he gives as follows: 
1. Mysticism `lays claim to disinterested love as opposed to mercenary religion'. 
2. It `reacts against ceremonial prescription and pedantic literalism of the Vedas. ' 
On this point see above, although, rather than seeing the mystics as worthy 
reformers he comments tartly `in some hands such doctrine might rise above the 
popular morality; in most it would be so interpreted as to sink below even that 
ignoble standard' (55). 
3. It `identifies, in its pantheism, subject and object, worshipper and worshipped. ' 
4. `Aims at ultimate absorption in the Infinite'. Out of this idea for Vaughan arises 
`the monastic asceticism, inertia, trance' 
5. Mysticism ' inculcates, as the way to this dissolution, absolute passivity, 
withdrawal into the inmost self, cessation of all the powers. ' He gives this power 
especially to `the Yogis', likewise ' the monks of Mount Athos, whose mysticism 
was also of this degraded type, substituted, as a gazing point, the navel for the 
nose. '(HM: 57). Here he compares certain of these degenerate `Hindoo practices' 
with similar ones to be found in the writings of Teresa of Avila. 
In the case of the Hindus `stupefying drugs were doubtless employed to assist in 
inducing this state of insensibility'. 
6. `Believes that eternity may thus be realized in time' 
7. `Has its mythical miraculous pretentions'. Commenting on the similarity of 
these states to those of the Rhineland mystics Vaughan states: ' the dregs and 
refuse of mysticism along the Rhine are equal in quality to its most ambitious 
produce on the banks of the Ganges. '(HM: 59). 
8. ' And, finally, advises the learner in this kind of religion to submit himself 
implicitly to a spiritual guide - his Guru. ' Here Vaughan associates the `Hindon 
Guru' with `the Pir of the Sufis, the Confessor of the Middle Age and the 
Directeur of modern France. '(HM: 59) 
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Finally, in comparing the approach of the `Hindoos' with that of German idealism he 
concludes: `The idealism of the Oriental is dreamy and passive; it dissolves his 
individuality; it makes him a particle, wrought now into this, now into that, in the ever- 
shifting phantasmagoria of the universe'(HM: 60). 
For Vaughan, then, the corruption of the passive quietude of mysticism runs 
throughout human history and at all times and places it reveals the same objects. It is to 
be feared and rejected. Unlike the other two writers Vaughan does not advocate a specific 
Christian mysticism, for him, mysticism is universal, eclectic and perennialist (if always 
corrupting) and in his analysis it can manifest itself at any time or at any place: 
Mysticism has generally apprehended religion rather on its divine than on its 
human side. It makes haste to lose humanity, and to be glorified. Grievous 
afflictions have reminded some of the mystical aspirants that they were human 
still. The spiritual pride of others has betrayed them, first to ostentatious sanctity, 
and then to shameful sin. (HM: 353) 
Although he states at the beginning that he sees mysticism as a collection of ideas rather 
than an ontological reality, the impression left at the end of the text is a perception of 
mysticism as a malign thing or influence that enters and corrupts all religions. Eastern 
religions, by their supposed inferior nature, are more susceptible to this infection and at 
various times in the history of Christianity, weaker, decadent or corrupt versions of 
Christianity have likewise fallen victim to this plague: `Romish' Catholicism and 
Orthodoxy, particularly so. It seems only a thorough-going Protestantism (or 
congregationalism) will protect us from this infection. `The best of the Romish mystics' 
he declares, `are questionable Romanists' (355), `Tauler and Madame Guyon were more 
protestant than they were aware. ' Yet, as mentioned above, there is ambiguity in 
Vaughan's text and it is sometimes difficult to pin down his real thoughts on the subject. 
He concludes by stating: 
Mysticism has generally apprehended religion rather on its divine than on its 
human side. It makes haste to lose humanity, and to be glorified. Grievous 
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afflictions have reminded some of the mystical aspirants that they were human 
still. The spiritual pride of others has betrayed them, first to ostentatious sanctity, 
and then to shameful sin... 
The history of mysticism shows us, further, that the attempt to escape all figure or 
symbol, in our apprehensions of divine truth, is useless, or worse than useless. 
(HM: 353) 
From the perspective of this thesis Vaughan's study illuminates two key themes: 
1. We see in his writing, at a relatively early stage, the evolution of a perennialist 
mysticism clearly influenced by mid-Victorian colonial encounters. Quite apart 
from biographical details of Vaughan's life referred to above (and manifest in his 
India in 1857: Historical Parallels in Vaughan [1858 2: 306-310]), the text of 
Hours with the Mystics contains. references to encounters with colonial 
administrators in train carriages trundling through the British countryside. From 
the sketchy reports of early Orientalists, Vaughan uses the narratives of Hindoos, 
Buddhists and Mohammedans to advance his theories. This mysticism has an 
ontological nature independent of all the forms it takes in different religions. 
2. Although Vaughan does not advocate a distinctive Christian mysticism, his study 
lays the groundwork for such claims from Inge and Underhill. In seeing the 
mystical as an element in religion he comes closer to von Hügel's analysis of the 
role of mysticism. 
As stated above, the interest of his analysis is in showing the formation of mysticism as a 
modern category and the role of colonial interaction in producing it. The psychologisms 
of James are not to be found here, but the other three elements we would characterise as 
essential elements of modern mysticism, vis: essentialism, perennialism and orientalism, 
are and will influence later writers in their approaches. 
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2.3.2 Inge and the Creation of Modern (Christian) Mysticism 
Inge's Bampton Lectures of 1899, delivered to Oxford University, took `Christian 
Mysticism' as their theme and in their published form (Christian Mysticism, 1899, 
hereafter CM), like Vaughan's Hours, would go on to influence much discussion of 
mysticism in the subsequent generation. 30 From the point of view of this review his 
writing marks a mid-way transition between the orientalist/perennialist (and largely 
negative) perspective of Vaughan and the psychologism of the James-influenced 
Underhill. Inge's work can be seen an attempt to take a more positive view of the 
category introduced by Vaughan and perhaps baptise it into something more `eminently 
manly and sane' (CM: 305). 
In the forty years since Vaughan's text `Christian Mysticism' seems to have come 
of age. Inge talks of `Christian Mysticism' as an unquestionable entity whose ontological 
substance is not doubted. Although he admits his historical presentation of the theme is 
tempered by `apologetic' considerations (these were, afterall, sermons to be delivered 
from the University pulpit), he nevertheless is in no doubt that there is such a thing as 
`Christian Mysticism' whose development can be traced chronologically through the 
history of Western Christianity. His Platonic background clearly influences his view but 
he also acknowledges contributions from scholars working in diverse areas of `mystical 
scholarship', notably the `German mystics' and Julian of Norwich, demonstrating how 
mystical scholarship was already well developed in Britain at the time. 
Let us return to our points of analysis above to see how they appear in Inge's text. 
From a fringe element or aspect of Christianity, Christian Mysticism has become for Inge 
a clear ontological category whose methods and origins can be traced. His mysticism `has 
its origin in that which is the raw material of all religion, and perhaps of all philosophy 
30 Born in 1860, William Ralph Inge taught classics at Oxford from 1888 to 1905 where he was ordained 
priest in 1892. After some time in parish life he became Lady Margaret professor of divinity at Cambridge 
in 1907 where he continued his studies into the neo-Platonists, esp Plotinus and the English Platonic 
tradition. In 1911 Prime Minister Asquith made him Dean of St Paul's in the hope of reviving the literary 
eminence of the cathedral. Through his published essays and weekly column in the Evening Standard he 
disseminated his views on a variety of topics to a wide public audience. His rather right wing views on state 
provision of health care for `sub-men', bursaries for the children of working class families to enter higher 
education and his ambivalence to Nazism (especially its race theories) made him a controversial figure. He 
died in Brightwell Manor, Wallingford in 1954. See Fox (1960), Grimley (2004) 
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and art as well, namely, that dim consciousness of the beyond, which is part of our nature 
as human beings' (CM: 5). Inge's understanding of `all religion' is of a 
transcendent/immanent variety so that his definition of mysticism: `our consciousness of 
the beyond', immediately privileges those religions which emphasise such categories. He 
also defines it as a quickening or `reforming principle' that animates `religious 
deadness'. 31 Inge, however, is more concerned with promoting a Christian Mysticism 
than any type of perennialist category. His Christian Mysticism is based on the Gospel of 
St John and is the `foster child of Platonic idealism' (CM: 78): `The Gospel of St John... 
is the charter of Christian Mysticism. Indeed, Christian Mysticism, as I understand it, 
might almost be called Johannine Christianity' (CM: 44). From its gospel roots this 
mysticism is nurtured by Platonism and Neo-Platonism to reach maturity. This pure 
Johannine-Platonic (ie. `Western' mysticism), is (as we saw in Vaughan above) 
`corrupted' by influences from Asia. This `Asiatic leaven' which was `mixed with 
Alexandrian thought' in the early church brought unhealthy emphases on `psychical 
phenomena, whether ecstasy or kindred states', finally being passed into `Catholicism' 
(CM: 15). Here we see the process described above, vis: the privileging of an extracted 
`essence' of mysticism, in this case a Johannine-Platonic form, which then stands in 
contrast to the contemporary debased forms of mysticisms in arenas such as Roman 
Catholicism ('the debased supernaturalism which usurps the name of Mysticism in 
Roman Catholic countries' [CM: viii]) or `dabblers in occultism'(ix). 
In his third lecture on `Christian Platonism and Speculative Mysticism' he 
speculates on the origin of this Asiatic `leaven'. In Syria as in Alexandria, Inge finds 
`rampant Orientalism' (CM: 101) and it is not long before Inge reveals the origins of these 
perverse speculations in `the ancient religion of the Brahmins, masquerading in clothes 
borrowed from Jewish allegorists, half-Christian Gnostics, Manicheans, Platonising 
Christians and pagan Neoplatonists' (CM: 104). 
As suggested with Vaughan, the infections from the more archaic East reach the 
West. Supporting his claims he mentions `a native Indian judge' who summarises what 
Inge takes to be Buddhist beliefs in Nirvana/Vedanta. For Inge, from this Asiatic root 
31 Rowan Williams, as we shall see below, adopts a not dissimilar attitude to mysticism to this (see 
Williams 1991: 143 -171) 
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comes the via negativa of Western mysticism: `I regard the via negativa in metaphysics, 
religion and ethics as the great accident of Christian Mysticism' spreading from `Asiatic 
mysticism' which is ' the natural refuge of men who have lost faith in civilisation' (CM: 
115). To support his views on the influence of Pantheism from Eastern sources Inge 
quotes Vaughan: 
Here again we must go to India for a perfect example. "The learned behold God 
alike in the reverend Brahmin, in the ox and in the elephant, in the dog and in him 
who eateth the flesh of dogs". (CM: 118) 
Of course, `none of the writers with whom we have to deal can fairly be charged with this 
error, which is subversive of the very foundations of true religion'. Even Emerson, he 
suggests (like Eckhart and Plato) does not go this far. 
Throughout Inge's text there is a tension between an understanding of mysticism 
that is `eminently manly and sane' (CM: 305) and a debased, degenerate or decadent 
form, the former receiving different names throughout the lectures. At some times it is 
the Johannine/Platonic mysticism of Christianity, at others the `contemplative mysticism' 
of latter day poets such as Wordsworth and Browning. The latter, on the other hand, 
being identified with the negative and quietist elements of `Asiatic mysticism', the 
`deplorably barbarous practices of the Eastern Church' (CM: 125), the `debased 
supernaturalism' of the Roman Catholic Church (CM: viii) or various occult, theosophical 
or `kabbalistic' practices in recent centuries (CM: 273,299). It is the argument of this 
dissertation that such distinctions are doomed to failure. Why so? The main reasons can 
be summarised thus: 
1. As a nineteenth century construction, the category of mysticism as a distinctive 
category is itself suspect. As we have seen, a large part of its nature derives from 
orientalist conceptions of non-Christian faiths (which inevitably retain the 
categories of Christianity) and it has an inherently perennialist structure. 
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2. As a reaction to the eclectic and perennialist nature of this mysticism, we see 
writers such as Inge (and later Underhill), trying to create a distinctive Christian 
Mysticism with the features outlined above and given essentialist claims. 
3. Allied with its perennialist metaphysic Modern Christian Mysticism has an 
uneasy relationship with experientialist/empiricist approaches. It incorporates 
them where they support its assumptions, but is wary of their perennialist 
implications. 
Inge's aim in the Bampton lectures was to develop a manly, English, Christian mysticism 
which would feel at home within the Church of England, a church, he believed (like 
many of his contemporaries) to be uniquely suited to fostering this element -a `sound 
and sober mysticism' as found in St John and St Paul, an apologetic that assigns this 
`special work to the Church of England... which shall be both Catholic and Evangelical 
without being either Roman or Protestant'(CM: 275). 
Although Inge believed he was merely reiterating an ancient truth of mysticism 
(what we can call a `Golden Thread' view of mysticism), we have argued here how, in 
the footsteps of Vaughan, Inge was in fact developing a unique and new intellectual 
conception - the notion of modern mysticism. Which, as in Vaughan's account has a 
concomitant essentialism, orientalism and perennialism. Unlike Vaughan, Inge was 
concerned to develop a unique, and somehow higher or purer form of Christian mysticism 
(his `Johannine- Platonic' belief). However, we have argued that such a Christian 
mysticism, stripped of all orientalist and perennialist elements, is impossible to achieve, 
as Inge's Christian mysticism is the sister of the nineteenth century Modern mysticism 
whose developments we are tracing here, and inextricably shares its orientalism, 
perennialism and essentialism. 
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2.3.3. Evelyn Underhill and the Struggle to Create Christian Mysticism 
We will conclude this survey of what have been classed as the `Creators of Modern 
Mysticism' with one of the most influential in promulgating the notion of `Modern 
Mysticism': Evelyn Underhill. 
As an avid reader of Inge (as well as being acquainted with Vaughan), it was 
inevitable that Underhill would continue Inge's task to create a unique Christian 
Mysticism. Her magnum opus of 1910, Mysticism (Underhill 1910, hereafter UM), 32 
contains the tensions of Inge with perhaps an added urgency following Underhill's felt 
need to reconcile her own perennialist tendencies with her increasing belief in Christian 
doctrine. Unlike Vaughan and Inge, however, she is approaching the subject after 
James's Varieties, so that in many ways her book presents the fullest exposition of 
modern mysticism melding the insights of fifty years of British historico-theological 
(colonial) reflection with the more recent psychological insights of the American school. 
Before investigating Underhill's account it is worth recounting some of the 
circumstances that led to her ambiguous relationship to the perennialist element of 
mysticism that formed that account. Charles Williams records in his Introduction to her 
letters that in 1904 she `joined an occult companionship known as the Order of the G. D., 
and belonged to it for some years. She was not yet impressed by the person of our Lord' 
(Underhill 1943: 12). Armstrong (1975: 36) provides us with further evidence of her 
involvement with the Order of the Golden Dawn through the evidence of two letters from 
her to Arthur Waite concerning her membership of the order and written in 1905. We 
cannot be clear about how long she was involved with the order or what her involvement 
was, although her letters show that she had been initiated into the 13=8 degree', a lower 
level of the Order. Her initiations requiring knowledge of Hebrew, `astrology and fortune 
telling' and she was given the occult name of Soror Quaerens Lucem - lit. `Sister who 
32 Born in 1875 in Wolverhampton to a comfortably off family, Evelyn Underhill was taught at home, 
Sandgate House, Folkestone and Kings College London `ladies department' in Kensington Square. She 
read extensively herself and always had an enquiring nature. She married Hubert Stuart Moore in 1907 and 
spent the rest of her life in London writing and researching, especially on the subject of mysticism. She 
died in Hampstead in 1941. See Greene (1988,1991,2004), Cropper (1958), Armstrong (1975), Underhill 
(1943) 
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Seeks Enlightenment'. 33 Underhill herself writes of her experiences in her A Defence of 
Magic in the Fortnightly Review of 1907 ( hereafter DM). Between this article and the 
completion of Mysticism in 1910 there lies just three years, yet in that time Underhill's 
views evolve again, influenced by conversations with von Hügel and R. H. Benson, as 
33 As all commentators recognise, it is difficult to get exact details about the nature of the `Order of the 
Golden Dawn' and its proceedings. However recent scholarship has given us more insight into its 
workings. Central to its formation seems to be W Wynn Westcott, born in 1848, he qualified as a medical 
doctor in 1871 and became a Freemason in Martock, Somerset in 1872. In 1880 he moved to London and in 
1892 was made Supreme Magus of the Rosicrucians ( see Gilbert 1983: 26). The Rosicrucians seem to have 
separated from the Freemasons sometime in the fifteenth/sixteenth century and developed their own branch 
of esotericism, with occasional cross-overs with mainstream Masonry. Westcott states in his The 
Rosicrucian Society of England (1915) that the `Societas Rosicrucias' was founded in East Anglia in 1865 
with rules stating that ` no aspirant shall be admitted into the Society unless he be a Master Mason... he 
must be a believer in the fundamental principles of the Christian doctrine, a true philanthropist and a loyal 
subject. ' From its beginnings not only was a connection with Christianity acceptable but positively 
encouraged. He seems to have founded the `Society of the Golden Dawn' around 1887 after his move to 
London. Thus we find him writing in the February 1889 issue of `Light' the following response to an 
enquiry: 
`The Order of mystics which gave Eliphaz Levi (Abbe Constant) his occult knowledge and of 
which Johann Falk was at one time the Lecturer on the Kabbalah in London, is still at work in 
England. It is not a Masonic order and there is no distinction between men and women students. 
The greatest privacy is maintained, and some knowledge of Hebrew is essential, but the whole 
course of study and experience is so abstruse and complex that the membership is very limited as 
to numbers, and the proceedings have no public interest. Its true name is only told to initiates, and 
the few outsiders who have heard of its existence only know the society as `The Hermetic 
Students of the GD"(Gilbert 1983: 25) 
It is interesting to note the use of mystic in this context, still retaining that eighteenth/early nineteenth 
century perennialist aura and seeing Christian mysticism as part of that perennialist tradition. 
By March 1890 the `Isis-Urania' Temple of London had 55 members, `Osiris' at Weston-super-Mare had 8 
(surely part of Westcott's old Somerset connections) and `Horus' at Bradford 13. There were 10 grades or 
orders to the Society based on the 10 sephiroth or Emanations of the Kabbalah. Underhill's references to 
her Hebrew examinations seem to have been a central part of this very Kabbalistic society. 
After 1891 various initiation ceremonies were introduced to the Order by Mathers including in the 
`Adeptus Minor Ritual' a symbolic crucifixtion of the candidate. (Waite 1938: 161), it was also at this time 
that many Egyptian, elements were introduced into the ritual. By 1900 various schisms and fracas were 
splitting the society culminating on 17th April 1900 with a fracas at 36 Blythe Rd, Hammersmith over who 
had rights to the premises, involving Mathers, W. B. Yeats and Aleister Crowley dressed in `highland 
dress, a black mask over his face, and plaid thrown over his head and shoulders, an enormous gold or gilt 
cross on his breast and a dagger at his side' (Gilbert 1983: 68). Other scandals would hit the various 
branches, including the abuse and rape of young girls, although it appears that Underhill's chapter under 
A. E. Waite was not involved with this. However, all the groups retained interest in Kabbalah, Alchemy, 
Tarot, Psychic Work and Fortune Telling 
Waite's group continued to meet from 1903 in Mark Mason's Hall, Great Queen St and Staple Inn, London 
and these were presumably the meetings Underhill attended. His group not only included Underhill but 
Algernon Blackwood ('Umbra Fugat Veritas'), a well know playwright, who is perhaps best known today 
for his play A Prisoner in Fairyland set to music by Sir Edward Elgar during the First World War in his 
Starlight Express. 
Gilbert records that the last Temple of `Hermes' in Bristol seems to have closed in 1972 and he writes `my 
own efforts to find it went no further than an accommodation address in the Balls Pond Rd. '(1983: 79) 
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well as her own `mystical experience' during a visit to a convent in Southampton in 
January 1907. She describes the occurrence in a letter to Mrs Meyrick Heath in 1911: 
The day after I came away (Feast of Purification) a good deal shaken but 
unconvinced, I was converted quite suddenly, once and for all by an 
overpowering vision which had no specifically Christian elements, but convinced 
me that the Catholic religion was true. (Underhill 1943: 125) 
Accordingly, her account of `magic' in Mysticism takes up the themes of the previous 
article and embellishes them with this new Christian perspective. Within these two 
accounts the tension inherent in Underhill's project (and the project of creating modern 
mysticism) is at its strongest. 
What is most striking on looking at the text of Mysticism is how many of 
Underhill's earlier ideas in Defence of Magic survive in the later text. It is as though 
Underhill does not want to leave the perennialist insights she has gained from her 
induction into the esoteric societies. Thus in Mysticism we find this passage: 
In magic, whether regarded as a superstition or a science, we have at any rate the 
survival of a great and ancient tradition, the true meaning of whose title should 
hardly have been lost in a Christian country; for it claims to be the science of 
those Magi whose quest of the symbolic Blazing Star brought them once, at least, 
to the cradle of the Incarnate God (UM: 152). 
Which almost exactly reproduces a similar passage in the Defence: 
Yet the real significance of these words should hardly be lost in a Christian 
country; for Magic is the science of those Magi whose quest of the symbolic 
Blazing Star brought them to the cradle of the Incarnate God. (DM: 754). 
In both texts Christianity, especially Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, is seen as the 
natural inheritor of the `magic tradition'. Thus, in the Defence we find: 
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Christianity, heir of all wisdom and truth, is also heir of the Magi... all persons 
who are naturally drawn towards ceremonial religion are in this respect really 
devotees of Magic. Sacraments, however simple their beginnings, tend, as they 
evolve, to assume a magical aspect. Those who observe with understanding, for 
instance, the Roman rite of baptism, with its spells and exorcisms, its truly 
hermetic employment of salt, anointing chrism, and ceremonial lights, must see in 
it a ceremony nearer to the beneficent operations of white magic, than to the 
simple lustrations practised by Saint John of the Baptist. (DM: 764) 
This inextricable linking of the two `traditions', especially in the sphere of 
sacramentology, is carried over intact into the later text, with some added qualification. In 
the earlier texts Levi's views were reported and accepted without much criticism, here 
Levi becomes `certainly heretical' and his statement that `the Christian Church was also 
the heir of the magi' is qualified (UM: 163) before Underhill returns to her earlier 
position: 
Religion, as we have seen, can never entirely divorce herself from magic: for her 
rituals and sacraments must have, if they are to be successful in their appeal to the 
mind, a certain magical character. (UM: 163) 
Thus, although magic and Christianity are conflated, and Underhill wants to retain the 
dissolution of boundaries between the two ('we seem to stand on the very borderland 
between magician and priest' UM: 163, DM: 764) so clearly adopted in the Defence, by 
the time she writes Mysticism she appears to need to appease the demands of orthodoxy 
(perceived or real) by condemning the same statements. The result, as pointed out, can 
often be quite schizophrenic: 
Hence in every period of true mystical activity we find an outbreak of occultism, 
illuminism, or other perverted spirituality and - even more dangerous and 
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confusing for the student -a borderland region where the mystical and psychical 
meet. (UM: 149) 
Her response to the seeming `dissolution of boundary' is to reinforce the character of 
`true' or `genuine' mysticism, which of course is more or less de facto identified with 
`Christian mysticism' - the process described above. In such passages the making of 
modern Christian mysticism is clearly revealed ( with a great debt here to Inge): 
In the youth of the Christian Church, side by side with genuine mysticism 
descending from the Johannine writings or brought in by the Christian 
Neoplatonists, we have the arrogant and disorderly transcendentalism of the 
Gnostics: their attempted fusion of the ideals of mysticism and magic. During the 
Middle Ages, and the Renaissance there are the spurious mysticism of the 
Brethren of the Free Spirit, the occult propaganda of Paracelsus, the Rosicrucians, 
the Christian Kabalists; and the innumerable pantheistic, Manichean, mystery- 
making, and Quietist heresies which made war upon Catholic tradition. (UM: 149) 
This attempt to define `true/genuine' mysticism in contradistinction to 
`spurious/perverted' mysticism is one of the key characteristics of Mysticism. The 
ambiguity of the text (presumably reflecting Underhill's own ambiguity, which judging 
from her background is not surprising) and, we argue, the category itself, means this 
project is already compromised following our observations on Inge above. 
In addition to her struggles with perennialism Underhill has the added challenge of 
responding to James's Varieties. In Chapter Four, The Characteristics of Mysticism, 
Underhill suggests James's `four marks of mysticism' `will fail to satisfy us' (UM: 81) 
and aims to present `four other rules', however her `rules' still remain deeply Jamesian. 
Thus, Rule Two: `Its aims are wholly transcendental and spiritual. It is no way concerned 
with adding to, exploring, re-arranging or improving anything in the visible universe' 
(UM: 81) accords very well with James's view as stated above. 
Summarising her attitude to James, Kripal suggests: 
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One fruitful way to understand Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism is to read it as a 
transitional or ambivalent text struggling, never quite successfully, to reconcile 
these traditional and psychological, these premodern and modem framings of 
`mysticism'... (her) answer in Mysticism is clearly a double, if not duplicitous 
yes... it seems that she wanted to psychologize mysticism, but not too much. 
(Kripal 2001: 34) 
As he points out she had `done her homework' and in the text there are references to most 
of the founding fathers of the early French and American schools of psychology: in 
addition to William James there are references to James Leuba, Edwin Starbuck, James 
Bissett Pratt, Morton Prince, Pierre Janet, Henri Delacroix, Richard Bucke and Henri 
Bremond (although, interestingly, only one reference to Freud, see Kripal 2001: 53, 
Cropper 1958 : 114). 
Like James, she subscribes to the view that the `mystics' constitute a breed set 
apart with special `psychological' characteristics. Their radio sets, as it were, are 
constructed in such a way that they can tune into the `mystical experiences' from the 
beyond more easily, the `mental apparatus' she talks about in chapter three which can 
`escape from the prison of the sense-world, transcend its rhythm and attain knowledge of 
- or conscious contact with -a supra-sensible Reality' (UM: 44). Underhill, however, 
differs from James in two important respects: 
First, she wants to link the two realms of the `immanent' and `transcendent' with the 
emerging categories of the conscious and unconscious/subconscious. In this respect she 
anticipates the work of the later Jung and post-Jungians. The instability of her categories 
does not detract from the originality of this move. 
Her second chief distinction from James is the emphasis on love rather than knowledge. 
This takes us to the heart of Underhill's programme. As Armstrong puts it in his 
biography of Underhill: 
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In fact Evelyn Underhill's greatest book is distinguished by the very qualities 
which make it inappropriate as a straightforward textbook or vade-mecum to 
anything connected with mysticism. This is why it will probably continue to be 
read after numerous so-called objective or scientific treatments of its subject have 
long been replaced and mouldered into oblivion. The spirit of Mysticism may be 
summed up by saying that it is romantic and engaged rather than dispassionate 
and objective, empirical rather than theoretical, actual rather than historical. 
(Armstrong 1975: 109) 
Or, as Underhill puts it in her Third Rule: `the business and method of Mysticism is 
love... it is the eager, outgoing activity whose driving power is generous love, not the 
absorbent, indrawing activity which strives only for new knowledge' (UM: 85). 
2.3.4 Summary: The Creation of Modern Mysticism 
The Modern Mysticism of our three British authors can therefore be seen as an 
interpretative tool that arises, as we have seen, from specific late colonial and European 
circumstances, especially in its orientalist, perennialist and essentialist elements. 
The authors describe it with the following characteristics: 
1. The key narrative for this mystical hermeneutic is historical. The authors want to stress 
the `unbroken thread' that links Gospel and early Christian texts with the present day. 
Again, each varies as to the emphasis they take. Inge, for example privileges the 
`Johannine corpus' and wants to suggest that the mystical strand arises from here. We 
can characterise this as the `golden thread' view of mysticism, ie. an unbroken thread that 
leads directly from apostolic and post-apostolic times, through the middle ages, 
reformation and enlightenment to the present day. 
2. Through the lens of the Dionysian corpus all four authors agree on the Platonic and 
neo-Platonic structure that underlies the Western mystical tradition. Inge, for example, 
calls Plato the `the father of European mysticism' (1899: 78) and this idea would reach 
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broad agreement from the others. As well as Dionysios, the neo-Platonists Plotinus and 
Philo are given due credit for their influence 34 
3. Experientialism such as James's is accepted without much critique. The role of 
ecstasies, locutions and other `supernatural' phenomena are seen by most of the authors 
as aspects of the Christian mystical path. Again, they vary as to the significance and role 
they play. Inge, in particular, is very suspicious and tends to associate them with 
`Romish' understandings of mysticism. 
4. `The mystic' is seen as a genuinely different and `other' person. For James they are the 
`disturbed genius', for Underhill and Inge they are able to `tune into' the sublime waves 
of the infinite. Either way it makes sense to talk of people as `mystics' with special 
characteristics. 
Our authors, then, in their struggle to distinguish a specifically Christian mysticism in 
contradistinction to the eclectic/perennialist/essentialist milieu within which they find 
themselves create an interpretative standpoint - what we call here Modern Mysticism - 
which has these distinctive qualities: 
1. It has an ontological nature, it is essentialist in that its origins and development can 
be traced throughout history as a distinct category of human experience which 
reaches its culmination in Christianity. 
2. It relates to perennialist assumptions as found in much of James and nineteenth 
views of mysticism. The perennialism goes with a certain degree of eclecticism 
3. Like James, our three authors stress the importance of mystical experience in 
their approaches. Although they are not as overtly psychologistic as James (except 
Underhill, who here shows her reliance on James) they share his emphasis on the 
importance of the discrete mystical experience as carrier of much that is of 
importance in the tradition. 
3; See also Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus (1918) and The Platonic Tradition in English Religious 
Thought (1926). For an extended discussion of the role of Plato in the `mystical tradition' see Turner 
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4. Perhaps more so than James, they reveal a stronger orientalist element to their 
hermeneutic of mysticism. This can either be viewed positively (Underhill) or 
negatively (Vaughan). 
Having traced the origins of modern mysticism, concentrating on its evolution in the 
English-speaking, Christian context, we shall now move now to the contemporary debate 
beginning with the constructivist critique of the nineteen seventies. In doing this it is 
apparent that we are passing over many twentieth century writers on mysticism, not least 
Otto, Butler, von Hügel, Heiler and Stace. 35 However, the scope and limit of this thesis 
prevents it from covering each in depth. Rather, we have tried to demonstrate how the 
four authors covered in this chapter develop a way of looking at the mystical which is 
typical of what we term the view of Modern Mysticism. This thesis also maintains that 
until the constructivist challenge of the nineteen seventies such an approach underlay 
much of what the other twentieth century authors imported into their approach to the 
subject, 36 namely, its essentialism, perennialism, orientalism and experiential ism, and it is 
to the critique of these four elements of modern mysticism that we turn to next. 37 
2.4 The Contemporary Academic Critique of Modern Mysticism 
The publication of the collected essays edited by Stephen Katz, Mysticism and 
Philosophical Analysis, in 1978 marks a convenient starting point to summarise the 
contemporary scholarship on mysticism. The authors of the essays in this volume, and the 
subsequent Mysticism and Religious Traditions, (Katz 1983) and Mysticism and 
Language (Katz 1992), especially Katz and Robert Gimello, began the process of 
challenging the notion of mysticism as a cross-credal entity based on the epistemological 
assumption of a `pure' unmediated or uninterpreted experience. For this group, 
(1995) 
35 See, for example, Butler (1926), Heiler (1932), Otto (1957), Stace (1960) and von Hügel (1908) 36 The obvious exception being von Hügel whose characterisation of the `mystical'as an 'element' in 
religion would seem to avoid many of the criticisms developed against the essentialism of modem 
mysticism. However, as shall be argued in the following section, much of von Hügel's approach finds its 
ways into McGinn's analysis so the Baron's ideas can be discussed at that point. 37 `Modern Mysticism' is, of course, still alive and well in the academy despite constructivist challenges. 
We shall return to this later. 
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consequently called 'contextualists' or `constructivists' all experience, including mystical 
experience, is contextually bound and only intelligible contextually. 
As Gimello puts it: 
Mysticism is inextricably bound up with, dependent upon, and usually subservient 
to the deeper beliefs and values of the traditions, cultures and historical milieux 
which harbour it. As it is thus intricately and intimately related to those beliefs 
and values, so must it vary according to them. (Gimello 1983: 63) 
In his study he wants to move away from a more narrowly 'experientialist' view of 
mysticism to one that takes account of the historicity and contextual character of the 
`mystical experience': ' the deep and formative connections between it and the systems 
of concept, practice, discourse and institution which produce and contain it'. (Gimello 
1983: 85). His conclusion being that: 
Mystical experience is simply the psychosomatic enhancement of religious 
beliefs and values or of beliefs and values of other kinds which are held 
`religiously'... mysticism has become fascinating to many of its students exactly 
because it has seemed to them to be an alternative to religion. It has come to be 
viewed as a repository of all that is best and still admirable in religion but one that 
is free from such no longer acceptable elements as dogma, authority, discipline, 
respect for tradition etc. (Gimello 1983: 85) 
Gimello's critique of the creation of modern mysticism assumes many of the points we 
have raised above. Thus he comments on the relative novelty of academic study of 
mysticism citing Underhill, Inge, Leuba Marechal, Poulain, Otto, Von Hügel and 
Massignon as the key figures in its development, 38 the elitism we have noted in both 
Underhill and James and a suspicion of institutional religion. To these three factors we 
can add those mentioned above: 
38 See Gimello 1983: 86 and Gimello 1990 cited in Herman 20Ö0: 99 
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1. The `orientalist' element in the creation of modern mysticism and 
2. The privileging of an extracted `essence' of mysticism located primarily in 
authoritative texts. 
From the constructivist critique it is then possible to de-construct the notion of 
`mysticism' in a writer such as James. Taking him as an example, and many of the 
arguments employed here can equally used against Underhill, Vaughan and Inge, we can 
summarise reactions to his categories of `mysticism' as follows: 
1. Elitism within `Modern Mysticism' 
To contemporary eyes the elitism of James's texts seems rather striking. He is rather 
disparaging of the `ordinary religious believer' whose `religion has been made for him by 
others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by imitation and 
retained by habit'(James 1902: 6). He calls this `second-hand religious life' and feels the 
study of it would `profit us little'. The unbalance such a perspective brings to his study 
would not be worth commenting on were it not for the fact that the investigation of 
religious phenomena within the psychology faculty still too often concentrates on the 
exotic and exceptional rather than the everyday thus skewing results and conclusions, as 
is the case with James. 
2. Anti-institutionalism 
As Lash points out (1988: 56), James's contrast between personal religion and 
institutional religion is not incidental to his argument but essential to it, especially in his 
characterisations of `first hand' and `second hand' religion and his general theory of 
`personal experience': 
Armed with the romantic image of the genius as one charged up with psychic 
energy from some strange source `beyond' the public world of social institutions, 
James exaggerates the pattern setter's originality. Human creativity - whether 
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religious, scientific, or aesthetic - is never absolute. The pioneer is a product of 
the culture and traditions which he or she refashions, often ( admittedly) in 
dramatic and unexpected ways. Without the tradition, the cultural and linguistic 
institutions, of the people of Israel, Jesus could not have had his `personal' 
experience of the mystery he called Father, in the way that he had it, nor could 
Paul have had his `personal' experience of the mystery of Christ. (Lash 1988: 57) 
James dislocation of personal `experience' from context immediately creates problems. 
3. Pure or Private Experience 
As already mentioned, one of the major impacts of James's analysis was to enshrine the 
notion of `religious experience' at the centre of subsequent debate about religious 
phenomena in general and mysticism in particular. Such an 'experiential ist' stance has 
been criticised on many grounds. by many authors. 39 
The notion of `pure' experience (religious or otherwise) divorced of all categories 
of culture, prior experience, tradition, structures, institutions and relationships is suspect. 
Lying behind the concept is a sense of `experience', perhaps, as `conscious mental going 
on' (Swinburne 1979: 244) which betrays a Cartesian metaphysic with a disembodied `I' 
experiencing specific sensations and `experiences'. Lash suggests: 
For human beings, experience, at least in the vast majority of its forms, includes a 
great deal more than mental goings-on. For the Cartesian `ego', on the other hand 
( which being itself not bodily, can only enjoy nonbodily or `mental' experience), 
Swinburne's definition seems entirely appropriate: the little person inside the 
skull observes or notices its body's indigestion. (Lash 1988: 92)4° 
The Cartesian model lies at the heart of all representational paradigms of cognition 
envisaging human knowledge as the inner, subjective representation of an `outer' external 
39 See in particular Lash(1988), Turner (1995), Williams(1991), Ferrer (2002) 
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world (See Ferrer [2002], Rorty [1979] and the following chapter). As Ferrer points out, 
the model is particularly unsuited to the demands of transpersonal or spiritual 
perspectives where the distinction between knowing subject and known object are often 
collapsed: 
In other words, during transpersonal events, the subjective-objective structuration 
of phenomena suffers such drastic inversions that these categories lose their 
descriptive and explanatory value. In transpersonal phenomena, it became 
strikingly obvious, not only what is subjective can become objective, but also 
what is objective can become subjective. (Ferrer 2002: 30) 
As we shall see in Chapters Four, Seven and Eight below, this `anti-Cartesian' critique of 
experientialism has many of its roots in Wittgenstein's approach to the self which we 
shall be exploring throughout the dissertation. 
4. The Empirical Agenda 
James's Cartesian base also implies an empiricist approach to religious phenomena - this 
is underpinned with a reductionist or positivist agenda which privileges the natural 
sciences as a methodological ideal for all other sciences (see von Wright 1971 and Sorell 
1991). The problem with such an approach to the area of spiritual enquiry is that only the 
methods of the natural sciences may be applied (experimentation, replication, testing, 
verification, falsification etc. ). The critiques of Habermas (1971) and Gadamer (1990) 
amongst others have revealed the damaging effects of importing such `scientism' into all 
forms of enquiry. With reference to spiritual enquiry Rothberg (1994) comments: 
To interpret spiritual approaches through categories like `data', `evidence', 
`verification', `method', `confirmation' and `intersubjectivity' may be to enthrone 
these categories as somehow the hallmarks of knowledge as such, even if these 
40 We shall return to this argument when we review Kerr's systematic critique of the influence of Cartesian 
dualism on theology (Kerr 1986) in the following chapter. 
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categories are expanded in meaning from their current Western usage. But might 
not a profound encounter with practices of spiritual inquiry lead to considering 
carefully the meaning of other comparable categories (eg dhyana, vichara, 
theoria, gnosis or contemplatio) and perhaps to developing understandings of the 
inquiry in which such spiritual categories are primary or central when we speak of 
knowledge? To assume that the categories of current Western epistemology are 
adequate for interpreting spiritual approaches is to prejudge the results of such an 
encounter. (Rothberg 1994: 8) 
In Ferrer's words, to apply the scientific ways of verification, experimental evidence, 
replicability and falsifiability to spiritual phenomena `may be equivalent to trying to test 
the flavor of a savory soup with a very rusty fork' (Ferrer 2002: 58). Spiritual phenomena 
require other methodologies than the scientific for their elucidation, this is an underlying 
theme to this study and one we shall return to when we consider our `Wittgensteinian 
methodology' in the following chapters. 
5. Experientialism and the Apophatic 
We shall turn to the apophatic in greater depth in Chapter Seven below. However, in the 
context of our critique of modem mysticism it is worth raising an issue presented by 
Turner (1995) and McIntosh (1998) amongst others. Simply put, even if we accept the 
existence of discrete verifiable `religious experiences' it can be argued that many of the 
writers within the so-called `mystical tradition' may well have cautioned against the 
cultivation of such experiences. Here, Turner in particular is warning us when we apply 
modernist (empiricist, Cartesian) categories to medieval texts, especially those with an 
apophatic bias: 4' 
Put very bluntly, the difference seemed to be this: that whereas our employment 
of the metaphors of `inwardness' and `ascent' appears to be tied in with the 
41 To give James his credit, he largely avoids the apophatic tradition and is more concerned with cataphatic 
events. 
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achievement and the cultivation of a certain kind of experience - such as those 
recommended within the practice of what is called, nowadays, `centring' or 
`contemplative' prayer- the medieval employment of them was tied in with a 
`critique' of such religious experiences and practices. (Turner 1995: 4) 
He concludes: 
Experientialism is, in short, the `positivism' of Christian spirituality. It abhors the 
experiential vacuum of the apophatic, rushing to fill it with plenum of the 
psychologistic. It resists the deconstructions of the negative way, holding fast to 
supposititious experiences of the negative. It is happy with commendations of the 
`interior' so long as it can cash them out in the currency of experienced 
inwardness and of the practices of prayer which will achieve it. (Turner 1995: 259) 
Although, it must be pointed out, there is an equal danger of reading a postmodern 
critique of experientialism back into the tradition as much as a `modern mystic 
experiential ism'. In this respect the approach of the Wittgensteinian methodology 
presented in this thesis aims to tread a `middle way' between these two extremes 42 
6. Supra-credal Essentialism of Modern Mysticism 
One of the defining features of Modern Mysticism, as we have seen, is an understanding 
of `mysticism' as a cross-credal category found in all religions and none. As James puts 
it: `in Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, we 
find the same recurring note' (James 1902: 252). This essentialism which has become a 
central part of modern definitions of mysticism43 has been comprehensively challenged 
by Stephen Katz in his 1978 essay Language Epistemology and Mysticism (Katz: 1978). 
Katz identifies three forms of statement associated with this cross-credal mysticism: 
42 1 am grateful to Philip Sheldrake for this observation 
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1) All mystical experiences are the same; even their descriptions reflect an 
underlying similarity which transcends cultural or religious diversity. 
2) All mystical experiences are the same but the mystics' reports about their 
experiences are culturally bound. Thus they use the available symbols of their 
cultural-religious milieu to describe their experience. 
3) All mystical experience can be divided into a small class of `types' which cut 
across cultural boundaries. Though the language used by mystics to describe their 
experience is culturally bound, their experience is not. (Katz 1978: 24). 
Katz objects to these assumptions on several grounds. First, he disputes the idea that there 
are pure experiences of any type: `that is to say, all experience is processed through, 
organized by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological 
ways. The notion of unmediated experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best 
empty... the experience itself as well as the form in which it is reported is shaped by 
concepts which the mystic brings to, and which shape, his experience' (1978: 26). 
Therefore, the Hindu will experience Brahman, the Buddhist Nirvana and the 
Christian Unio Mystica - all three of which are specific to their categories and context 
and cannot be interposed. He continues by criticising notions of `common core' 
mysticism such as are found in the authors mentioned: 
What appear to be similar-sounding descriptions are not similar descriptions and 
do not indicate the same experience. Choosing descriptions of mystic experience 
out of their total context does not provide grounds for their comparability but 
rather severs all grounds of their intelligibility for it empties the chosen phrases, 
terms and descriptions of definite meaning. (Katz 1978: 47) 
The constructivist reaction to `modern mysticism' as outlined here has produced varying 
counter-reactions which we now review before concluding this chapter. 
43 See, for example, Huxley (1946), Otto (1957), Suzuki (1957), Heiler (1932), Stace (1960) and Smart 
(1958,1962,1967,1978) 
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2.5 The Current Debate 
We have argued so far in this chapter for two `movements' in contemporary academic 
understanding of `the mystical', viz: `modern mysticism' and `constructivism'. To 
conclude this chapter we will now assess the impact of these two movements on the 
current debate using these two signifiers to highlight trends and currents in the present 
debate. 
2.5.1 Reactions to Constructivism 1: The Decontextual ist/Neo-Perennialist Position 
Reaction to the constructivist critique has largely fallen into three categories: those who 
accept the constructivist critique and want to employ it in their work, those who reject it 
and those who seek a `modified constructivism'. I shall take some representative figures 
from each group beginning with Robert Forman as a representative of what has been 
called the `Neo-Perennialist Position'. 
Forman's work presents a nuanced response to the constructivist challenge which can be 
characterised in two strategies (See Forman 1990,1998): 
1. The suggestion that some `mystical experiences', especially those concerned with an 
experience of `pure consciousness event' (PCE) or `wakeful but objectless 
consciousness' (Forman 1998: 7) are part of our `fundamental human 
psychophysiological structure' (1998: 27). This `psychophysiological structure' is not 
created by culture but is part of our common heritage as human beings, it `comes with the 
machinery of being human': `I assume that a fourteenth century Dominican friar must 
have been aware and have tied together his own awareness through time just as I do, and 
also precisely the same way as did an eighth-century Korean. ' (Forman 1998: 27). 
This awareness is always present to the human, it is the matrix within which all 
experience occurs - `to be fully human is to be conscious, in all cultures' (1998: 34). The 
position reflects the criticism of Turner's anti-experientialist mentioned above, ie. that the 
constructivist position in attempts to `de-psychologise"modern mysticism' goes too far 
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the other way. Mysticism without any psychological categories at all risks becoming an 
abstract or dead theoretical concept. When we return to Wittgenstein in the following 
chapters we shall see how his approach allows for this psychological realism to remain 
whilst avoiding the weaker aspects of `modern mysticism'. 
2. The second point of commonality in his cross-cultural perspective is the perspective on 
the means to access this PCE. Different mystical traditions, at differing times and places, 
access this PCE by similar methods: `one realizes consciousness unmixed with 
intentional content by means of a process of letting go, an emptying of self, a forgetting 
of language and sensation. Though the content that we `forget' differs, the capability to 
forget is innate. Thus it is that the processes of coming to mysticism are so strikingly 
similar from era to era' (Forman 1998: 34). The mystical process is primarily a 
transformative process whose key features, for Forman, are `stripping or letting go of 
concepts, attachments, and pictures of one's self and others' -` the process leading to 
mysticism is not like one of constructing images but more like a process of removing 
what we have `seen' or `constructed' until the subject persists alone' (11). As well as his 
cross-cultural consciousness, Forman therefore proposes a form of cross-credal 
deconstructivism. 
Forman's critique presents a reassertion of the perennialist position, but one that 
reacts to the constructivist challenge of which parallels can be found in other authors. So 
then, rather than advocating mysticism as a `cross credal entity' (pace Inge, Vaughan etc) 
he would rather make comparisons between similar `mystical games or strategies'. His 
second point, which emphasises the form (or in Kripal's words, the game) of mysticism 
rather than its content is one that has been adopted by several recent commentators, as we 
shortly see. Rather than concerning themselves with the disputed ontological status of the 
mystical event they have concerned themselves with the strategies, linguistic or 
experiential, of the `mystics'. The commentators vary as to the ontological content they 
want to import into this form. 
The clear criticism of this first point is that he is only describing one `type' of 
mysticism, that of emptying, negation ( or in Christian terminology, kenosis) whereas 
67 
`mysticism' has traditionally encompassed many other forms and manifestations. When 
other decontextualists take up this point, for example, Evans, the result often seems close 
to the Jamesian positions outlined above. Thus, Evans (1989) challenging the neo- 
Kantian metaphysic of the constructivist position, proposes a movement from the 
restriction of `conceptual and linguistic frameworks' to `direct experience of spiritual 
entities' (1989: 58), arguing for `real spritual entities and real structures within a spiritual 
realm'. These `real spiritual entities' seem to rely on a dualistic metaphysic that seems 
close to James's position above. The decontextualist position at such points seem to 
return to the Jamesian, experientialist position. 
As Jantzen and McIntosh point out (Jantzen 1995: 346, McIntosh 1998: 137) such 
favouring of Forman's `pure consciousness experience': 
Plays directly into the hands of modem bourgeois and gender assumptions. It 
keeps God ( and women) safely out of politics and the public realm; it allows 
mysticism to flourish as a secret inner life, while those who nurture such an inner 
life can generally be counted on to prop up rather than to challenge the status quo 
of their workplaces, their gender roles and the political systems by which they are 
governed. (Jantzen 1995: 346) 
This is a theme developed by Carrette and King (Carrette and King 2005) in analysis of 
the contemporary `quest for spirituality' as privatised experience. Lurking behind such 
notions is, as McIntosh states `the premise of a theologically mute, self-transcending 
subject' (McIntosh 1998: 138) - the disembodied `ego' of the enlightenment rational self. 
Despite Forman's attempts to move into a neutral theoretical space to over-view 
`mystical experiences' it seems we are still moving in the perennialist, soft enlightenment 
world of James et al. The neo-perennialist position may react to the constructivist critique 
but it still seems to harbour many `modernist' assumptions that need to be addressed. 
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2.5.2. Reactions to Constructivism 2: The Historical-Theological approach. 
Within the study of Christian mysticism one reaction to the constructivist challenge has 
been to return to the historical/theological matrix of what has been termed `Christian 
mysticism'. Assuming our analysis of the origins of Modern (Christian) Mysticism above 
are correct, and that it does have an inherent essentialism, perennialism and 
experiential ism, then there will accordingly be problems in taking this route. In reviewing 
the work of one of the foremost scholars of this area, Bernard McGinn, this inherent 
tension will become apparent. 
McGinn clearly acknowledges a debt to von Hügel's differentiation of the `mystical 
element' of religion (as opposed to the critical and institutional elements) and thereby it 
appears hopes to sidestep many of the ontological problems encountered in the 
employment of the modern term mysticism. Von Hügel's approach, which we can term 
`historical-theological', did not concern itself with the ontological status of supposed 
`mystical experiences' but only viewed the mystical in its pre-modern guise as an aspect 
(in the case of Christian mysticism) of a particular historical-theological-exegetical 
substratum. Such a view of Christian mysticism would see its unravelling at the dawn of 
the modern era under the processes described by de Certeau in the creation of la mystique 
(see 2.1 above). Likewise, Bernard McGinn's projected six volume series The Presence 
of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism (McGinn 1991,1994,1998a, 2005) 
aims from its inception to be more than just a purely historical description of the course 
of development of medieval mysticism: 
Historical reconstruction, when well done, is more than mere description: it is 
always guided and informed by explanatory perspectives that are at least 
implicitly constructive. (McGinn 1991: xii) 
He explicitly moves away from any experiential definition of mysticism a la James 
relying instead on the written evidence of the texts themselves: 
69 
Mystical masterpieces, which are often close to poetry in the ways in which they 
concentrate and alter language to alter their ends, have all too often been treated 
like phone books or airline schedules, handy sources of confirming what we 
already expect. (McGinn 1991: xiv) 
His plea is for a `more nuanced understanding of the textually and theologically mediated 
nature of all Christian mysticism'. Yet, despite using the term `Christian mysticism' 
McGinn does not really define what he means preferring to wait until the final volume of 
his series before committing himself. Yet he is clear that he is undertaking a `theological 
account of the history of mysticism' (1998b: 13) or a `historical theology based upon 
classic 
, 
texts' (1998b: 18). What he terms his `heuristic sketch' at the beginning of the 
Foundations of Mysticism' outlines his bases for evaluating a text/author as `mystical': 
Mysticism is a `part or element of religion' (1991: xv). 
Here McGinn clearly shows his debt to von Hügel: 
I will argue that there have been mystical elements present in the Christian 
religion from its origins but that the first great tradition of explicit mysticism cam 
to birth when a theory of mysticism first fully laid out by Origen in the third 
century found institutional embodiment in the new phenomenon of monasticism 
in the fourth century (1991: xvi). 
However, although McGinn describes `mysticism' as an `element' his description does 
seem to imply a concrete ontological basis to mysticism as an `entity' here. 
2. Mysticism as a `process or way of life': 
`The essential note - or, better, goal - of mysticism may be conceived of as a particular 
kind of encounter between God and the human, between Infinite Spirit and the finite 
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human spirit' -a `form of union with God, particularly a union of absorption or identity 
in which the individual personality is lost' (McGinn1991: xvi). 
3. Mysticism as `a direct consciousness of the presence of God' 
Inspired here by Joseph Marechal, he concludes his proposal for analysing `the mystical' 
by stating: 
Thus we can say that the mystical element in Christianity is that part of its belief 
and practices that concerns the preparation for, the consciousness of, and the 
reaction to what can be described as the immediate or direct presence of God. 
But once again it seems that the category of `mysticism' in its modern ontological sense 
is shifted to `presence'. Despite his anti-experientialist claims there is a strong element 
of the `modern mystic ontology' in McGinn's methodology. 
However, McGinn's approach also emphasises the comparability of mystical form 
- `the series of verbal strategies in which language is used not so much informationally 
as transformationally, that is, not to convey a content but to assist the hearer or reader to 
hope for or to achieve the same consciousness' (xvii). The schema as presented seems to 
lean too heavily on an understanding of `consciousness' that is far from clear. By 
psychologising the process in this way there is a tendency towards `experiential ism' 
which is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is ruled out by McGinn himself as suspect 
(1991: xvii). 
McGinn's psychological model is of `human consciousness' mediated `both by 
the subject's previous history and by the mediations necessarily found in thought and 
speech' (xx). From the Wittgensteinian critique below we will find it necessary to 
question such forms of `two level' psychologisation. His position leads to the statement: 
`What the mystics are talking about is what lies `between' these necessary mediations, if 
I may express it in this way'. This seems a puzzling statement and, we argue, creates 
unnecessary extra metaphysical layers to `experience'. 
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In his review of McGinn, Simon Tugwell raises questions about imposing 
`modern mysticism' on to medieval forebears (Tugwell 1993,1996). McGinn's reply 
(McGinn 1998: 17) gets to the heart of much of our present discussion on the nature of the 
hermeneutic or `whether it is legitimate to employ contemporary terminology, at least in 
transposed fashion, to understand aspects of past eras which did not employ the terms in 
precisely the same ways as we do' (1998: 17). Acknowledging the problems involved 
here (' "mysticism" is a modern word and may in some cases be laden with jargon') 
McGinn says that he will continue to employ the term `mysticism' for the `mystical 
element in Christianity'. Yet it seems that following our analysis above of the evolution 
of the modem term `mysticism', McGinn (or anyone else for that matter) will run into 
trouble here. It has been demonstrated above that mysticism in its modern sense has 
essentially perennial, essentialist and usually experientialist (as well as empirical and 
possibly orientalist) under- and over-tones which cannot be excluded once the word is 
introduced. Sells makes a similar point in his review of McGinn (Sells: 1993) noting how 
McGinn adopts the position of the early church fathers such as Clement and Irenaeus in 
relation to the `heresy' of `Gnosticism'. As Sells points out this disables a more nuanced 
approach to, for example, a comparison of the Nag Hammadi texts and the early church 
critics of Gnosticism. This programme of `tidying up' the `Christian mystical tradition' 
(we could say, inventing it) is one we have already encountered in Inge and Underhill44. 
McGinn's dilemma is the dilemma that confronts anyone who wants to discuss the 
`mystical element of Christianity' (which, he argues, became `explicit at the time of 
Origen and played a role in the history of Christianity for centuries') in ways that relate to 
the contemporary world and its common verbal coinage of `mysticism' without importing 
some of the problems associated with `modern mysticism' discussed in this chapter. 
44 As he is `hard' on the Gnostics, so McGinn seems rather lenient to Augustine: `It is difficult to conceive 
of Plotinus, or any other pagan mystic, describing a mystical vision that is at once communal and accessible 
to a soul not trained in philosophy, especially that of a woman' (McGinn 1993: 234). As Sells points out: 'a 
Plotinian might point out that women had a role in Plotinus's school and that the Neoplatonic academy in 
Alexandria elected a woman, Hypatia, as its head - in institutional terms the rough equivalent to a woman 
being elected Bishop of Rome. ' (Sells 1993: 397) 
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2.5.3 Reactions to Constructivism 3: The Comparisons of Mystical `Form' 
Following on from Forman's suggestions this section explores how many recent 
commentators have emphasised the similarity of mystical device or strategy rather than 
ontology. The emphasis is on performance rather than ontology. As suggested above the 
writers vary as to the ontology they want to import into their discussions. As this will be 
closest to the strategy adopted in the rest of this study from our Wittgensteinian 
perspective we shall spend more time expounding this third position. A key presentation 
here is by Michael Sells in his 1994 study `Mystical Languages of Unsaying' (Sells 1994) 
to which we shall return in Chapter Seven below. 
Another contemporary who has helped develop this notion of mystical `game, 
strategy or technique' is Jeffrey Kripal 45 In a recent article Kripal refers to his approach 
to the subject as a `mystical humanism' commenting that it is `in effect a version of 
Schwab's integral humanism that brings together the worlds of Western critical theory 
and Asian mystical thought, on the one hand, and those of the Asian philosophical 
traditions and Western mystical thought, on the other hand' (Kripal 2004: 487). He paints 
his scholarship on a wide canvas that incorporates both the Western and Eastern 
traditions (being both a scholar of Western and Hindu mysticism). Building on de 
Certeau's writings on la mystique (see 2.1 above) his position is close to Forman's in 
suggesting an underlying ontological basis to mysticism which is developed in culturally 
specific contexts, he calls this process `comparative mystics', the purpose of which is `to 
expose all doctrinal claims as historically and culturally relative expressions of a deeper 
mystery or ontological ground that nevertheless requires these relative expressions for its 
self-revelation'. In other words `cultural differences and local knowledge are socially and 
politically important but not ontologically important, and that ontological ultimacy - 
which flourishes especially in subversive countercultures or mystical traditions - is the 
45 A key text I shall refer to here is Kripal's recent work Roads of Excess, Palaces of Wisdom (2001). In the 
text he takes five `case histories': Evelyn Underhill, Louis Massignon, R. C. Zaehner, Agehananda Bharati 
and Elliot Wolfson as his subjects and teases out the role of each scholars engagement in the `mystical 
hermeneutic' which shapes the ultimate form of their work: 
`I hope to demonstrate that the phenomenon of mystical experience as it is encoded in the lives and works 
of historians of mysticism can best be thought of as an esoteric hermeneutical process intimately related 
to both the biographical patterns of the scholars' lives and their hermeneutical interactions with the texts, 
people and rituals they set out to study'. (2001: 6) 
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level at which deep communication may be realizable'(2004: 489). This process of 
mystical investigation takes place within the `postmodern' context of the `modern' 
insights of democracy, science, individualism, human rights, capitalism and globalism. 
Again, like Forman (and Williams - see following section) he recognises the 
commonality in mystical technique between the traditions, but rather than 
`deconstruction' he emphasises their `subversive' elements vis-ä-vis their respective 
religions: ` in short, I do not want to lose sight of the fact, so often forgotten, that many of 
these mystical traditions are countercultures that have been persecuted, sometimes quite 
violently, by their own orthodox religious authorities'(2004: 493). 
Ontologically, his category of comparative mystics admits of the modern category 
of experience on the grounds that the constructivist case is itself overstated and flows 
from a relativist epistemology that is not shared by much of mystical literature. Rather 
than concentrating on the objects of study of the Western critical tradition he turns his 
gaze to the tradition itself, regarding that tradition in itself as a `modern mystical 
tradition'. The scholars of religions, themselves, turn out to have often had `profound 
experiences' reading and interpreting these texts which have consequently changed their 
lives (see in particular Kripal 2001): 
Given what is often personally, professionally, and religiously at stake in these 
events, it perhaps should not surprise us that such writers commonly hide these 
secret (mustikos) experiences from their peers and readers through a variety of 
rhetorical and esoteric strategies. Historians of religions, in other words, are often 
closet mystics, if we allow ourselves to redefine mystic in an untraditional - that 
is, modern - way. (Kripal 2001: 508) 
At this point the hermeneutical circle between the mystic writer - the interpreter and the 
reader begins to close : 
There is something genuinely mystical about the work of such scholars, for their 
interpretations and writings issue from a peculiar kind of `hermeneutical union'. 
They do not so much process religious data as unite with sacred realities, whether 
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in the imagination, the hidden depths of the soul, or the very fabric of their 
psychophysical selves. (2001: 5) 
In the words of Jorge Ferrer (2002), the study of mysticism itself becomes `participatory' 
or transformative. We can not engage with the mystical texts as indifferent objective 
`enlightenment' observers, by their very nature they draw us in and they `read' us as 
much as we `read' them. Kripal invokes `the mystical texts themselves, for these are texts 
that invite us into their worlds, call us to take them seriously, and demand from us some 
honest answer to their claims about the most profound issues of life' (2001: xiii). This 
embodiment and affectivity within our engagement with the mystical is a central theme 
of our approach which we will expound in Chapter Eight. 
For Kripal the texts engage in different `rhetorics of secrecy' to hide or 
camouflage the `already textualized `experiences' of their authors in the movements of 
the texts' which then stimulate `meaning events' in the readers of the text. With Don 
Cupitt (see below), he understands mysticism as a `kind of writing' (Cupitt 1998: 9) that 
is traditionally a `very dangerous kind of writing that bypasses institutional channels of 
salvation and `melts down' ontological assumptions and their attending psychological 
structures to produce a euphoric condition of religious happiness in the here and now' 
(2001: 8). 
This `mystical hermeneutics' collapses past and present into a single textual 
process. We, the readers of the mystical text, are as much a part of the `mystical event' as 
the writer or the original `mystical experience' itself which inspired the writing. This fact 
is `not a `problem' to bemoan, a `stain' to remove, or more bizarrely, an act of 
`imperialism' to deny, but the very place of our hermeneutical union with these historical 
human beings an the best promise of our coming to some, always tentative, 
understanding of our shared humanity'(2001: 302). 
From the point of view of this study we shall see in the following chapters how 
our `Wittgensteinian approach' also emphasises such a `participatory turn' in our 
approach to the `mystical text'. 
One final point from Kripal's analysis that has influenced the discussion here is 
his isolation of the role of the erotic in the mystical tradition. Taking his cue from Freud 
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he reiterates the insight built upon by Foucault that ' the primary processes of the mind' 
are linked to `the pleasure principle and its libidinal energies'. The category of the erotic, 
both in the writer and the reader is as essential as the perennial in realising the 
hermeneutical strategy.: 
I am thus arguing for an expansion of what we normally mean by the intellect, 
one as close (if by no means identical) to the Plotinian nous eron (literally, the 
desiring intellect) and medieval Christian understandings of love and knowledge 
(amor ipse intellectus est, `love itself is knowledge') as to modem academic 
models of rationality, linear thought and objectivism. (Kripal 2001: 12). 
Therefore, by `the erotic', Kripal means: 
A radical dialecticism between human sexuality and the possible ontological 
ground(s) of mystical experience. I thus use the category not as a reductive 
category to explain away mystico-erotic experience as simple sexual displacement 
ä la Freud, but as a respectful, ultimately hopeful way of insisting on both the 
sexual rootedness of mystico-erotic events (with all the physical messiness and 
literal fluidity that rootedness implies) and the possible ontic source(s) of those 
same remarkable experiences. (2001: 21) 
Kripal's `erotic' restores the `violence and sexuality and general excess' of the mystical 
tradition to our gaze, from whence it has been displaced by the common core or 
perennialist discussion or the neo-Kantian constructivist debate about the epistemological 
nature of mystical knowing : 
A recurring pattern captured succinctly by one common medieval Latin term for 
the ecstatic rapture of mystical love, excessus - quite literally, the excessive, the 
ecstatic, that which erotically enraptures one out of the normal boundaries of 
egoic consciousness in order to `liquefy' the soul in the male beloved. (2001: 29) 
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Each mode of mysticism, Kripal argues, whether the Gnostic, Tantric, Sufi, Taoist and 
kabbalistic, `sponsors an erotic hermeneutics' (2004: 510) in relation to the prevailing 
dogma of its tradition. `Scholars of comparative religion have grouped these 
countercultures under the heading `mysticism' because they intuit in all of them a not- 
yet-fully articulated or understood form of consciousness that they themselves to some 
extent share - each routinely transgresses the binary categories of its own orthodox 
culture' (2004: 510). 
Therefore the different mysticisms are seen as holding the same hermeneutic 
practice, if not `metaphysical substance'. As well as subversion and transgression, `the 
mystical' then also becomes signified by `the game'. Referring to Ramakrishna's critique 
of Advaita Vedanta, the phenomenal world now becomes a "mansion of fun' in which to 
take delight in the omnipresence and essential bliss of the divine. ' (496); devotion 
(bhakti) and love (prema) become as important as the `metaphysical absolutes of nirvana 
and brahman'. 
Mysticism is dangerous and by its nature it subverts: 
The mystical mind inevitably zeroes in on the orgasmic situation. (2001: 228) 
The erotic is the "door", or, perhaps better, the fluid "stream" (my Freudian slip) 
that links the human and divine worlds. (2001: 183) 
In Chapter Eight below we shall return to some of these notions, however, in our 
Wittgensteinian interpretation of Teresa's texts there we shall argue rather for a `strategy 
of embodiment' rather than `erotic game' as Kripal proposes. Nevertheless Kripal's 
original analysis has shed light on much of the nature of mystical practice and language 
that will be pursued in this thesis, not least the evolution of what we term here the 
`mystical strategies' of writers such as Dionysius, De Osuna and Teresa of Avila. 
As will be apparent there is a great deal of use to our survey in Kripal's work. However, 
he still persists in retaining the ontological perennialism of `mysticism' which, for 
reasons we have already given cannot be accepted by us. Accordingly, although this 
thesis will draw on some of his analysis, especially his emphasis on the game and the 
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libidinal, we will not be relying on his perennialism or ontological status of mysticism. 
For reasons that will be developed in the following chapters the Wittgensteinian 
perspective we adopt here will not permit that particular route. 
2.5.4 Reactions to Constructivism 4: Other Christian Approaches: McIntosh, 
Williams and Cunitt 
To conclude our review of recent approaches to the application of the category of 
mysticism to contemporary scholarship we shall discuss three responses that are primarily 
Christian in orientation: Mark McIntosh, Rowan Williams and Don Cupitt. Although 
they are all writing from within the Christian context their `post-contextualist' positions 
are somewhat different. 
2.5.4.1 Mark McIntosh 
One of the most nuanced Christian responses to the changing academic perception of `the 
mystical' is Mark McIntosh's 1998 Mystical Theology (McIntosh: 1998). McIntosh 
essentially uses a theological/historical-critical approach to justify the return of `the 
mystical' to theological discourse. Throughout his text McIntosh uses the terms 
`mystical/mysticism', `spiritual/spirituality', `contemplation' and `mystical theology' 
interchangeably, sometimes within the same sentence which can sometimes cause some 
confusion 46 However, he suggests that something akin to what he terms early Christian 
notions of `contemplation' better replace contemporary notions of mysticism. He defines 
this `contemplation' as the following key element: 
Contemplation is not like normal thinking, only muddled and tentative, on the 
contrary it is seen as an activity in which the mind is liberated to perceive clearly. 
(McIntosh 1998: 11) 
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Immeadiately realising the problem of introducing the modern category of `mind' into his 
analysis he qualifies the term thus: 
The use of the term "mind" here ought not to suggest that which is exclusively 
discursive, a manipulative rationalism that subjects whatever it encounters to its 
own control. The more classical notion of mind refers to the desire of our whole 
being for deep understanding and relationship with all that is intelligible. 
(McIntosh 1998: 11) 
There is no doubt that McIntosh is aware of the problems of using terms like `mind' 
when referring to the mystical. However he never seems to entirely remove the shadow 
of James's experientialism in his analysis. This leads to him talking easily (like 
Underhill, Inge and Vaughan) of `mystics' and `their mystical experiences': 
The intensity of mystical experience can easily lead to a kind of absolutism that 
oppresses the lives of mystics themselves or of cultures receptive to them. 
(McIntosh 1998: 14) 
It is difficult to make sense of passages like this without employing some form of 
hermeneutic derived from the `modern mystical' approach. Following our exegesis above 
of the evolution of the employment of `modern mysticism' by Christian writers this can 
cause problems. McIntosh employs the category of `the Christian mystics' (eg. 
1998: 113,137) and sometimes comes close to suggesting a distinctive `Christian 
mysticism' which seems close to the `Johannine Christian mysticism' of Inge (see 
above). Yet, as we would expect from our analysis above, the employment of such a 
category will always imply the perennialism/empiricism and experientialism of `modem 
mysticism'. McIntosh is wary of this and takes the anti-experientialist and anti- 
perennialist stance of, amongst others, Lash and Turner (1998: 137). Like Underhill and 
Inge, he is at pains to distinguish his `Christian mysticism' from `perennial mysticism'. 
46 See, for example, p. 136: `My aim has been to suggest the inherent integrity of Christian spirituality and 
theology, and the degree to which the mystical journey underlies and even generates whatever is most 
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The problem with his attempt to do this is that he relies almost totally on writers from the 
apophatic tradition within a framework provided by Sells and Turner (1998: 137). His 
equation (theologically speaking) of the `mystical event' with the kenotic theology of 
Christian understanding of the Trinity and the Paschal Mystery needs this emphasis on 
the apophatic tradition, especially as interpreted by Sells. As he admits himself later, `In 
general then it will be chiefly apophatic traditions of Christian spirituality which help us 
in reflection on this analogy'. 
To take one example, when he refers to St John of the Cross he only uses 
quotations from the Dark Night of the Soul/Ascent of Mount Carmel without reference to 
the Spiritual Canticle and Living Flame of Love. The result will surely be an emphasis on 
the suffering/apophatic side of John to the expense of the cataphatic/erotic 47 
Consequently, his conclusion that in the writings of `the Christian apophatic tradition 
such as Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysios, John of the Cross and Edith Stein... the 
most intimate divine presence is experienced by the human subject as a profound 
darkness, as painful longing, even dereliction' (1998: 191) will seem a bit skewed. 
Yet despite these qualms McIntosh is able to take some of the best of the 
constructivist analysis and apply it to the Christian texts. His chapter on `Theological 
Hermeneutics and Spiritual Texts' comes closest to the analysis of this thesis, where he 
stresses the forms and hermeneutics of `the mystic speech'; an `interpretive framework 
within which the readers of the text may come to recognise and participate in their own 
encounters with God' (McIntosh 1998: 124). Influenced here by Ricoeur's writing (See 
Ricoeur 1996) his notions of the `provocation and performance' of the text are related to 
the themes that will be developed in this thesis. Of particular import in his analysis for 
our thesis here is the notion of the mystical text as an essentially `uncompleted text' that 
lies open for completion by the reader (cf. Wittgenstein `whatever the reader can do for 
themselves leave for them to do'): 
Hence the language of much mystical speech, unlike the discourse of a theology 
text book, is left open and unconcluded... Mystical texts such as these are 
truthful in theological perceptivity. ' 
47 His use of Edith Stein's Science of the Cross may well influence him here 
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linguistic performances, and it is the very patterning of their language which 
allows them to draw the reader into a new perceptivity. (McIntosh 1998: 142) 
One area where this thesis differs from McIntosh's approach is to take the analysis of 
`mystic speech' (what we shall refer to later as the Medieval `language game of theologia 
mystica') back to the medieval texts of Dionysius ( this will be done in Chapter Five 
below). In McIntosh's analysis of Dionysius he is more concerned to illuminate the 
theological, and primarily liturgical, dynamic of the texts. In the analysis we present 
below we shall be concerned with Dionysius's `mystic speech' as form of `performative 
utterance'. 
In conclusion, his book is concerned to relocate `spirituality', that is `Christian 
spirituality', within a Christian (theological) framework: 
This book will develop an understanding of spirituality as a discovery of the true 
`self precisely in encountering the divine and human other - who allow one 
neither to rest in a reassuring self-image nor to languish in the prison of a false 
social construction of oneself... Spirituality as the transformation and discovery 
of self always happens in encounter, it is an activity constantly stirred up and 
sustained by the other who calls one out of one's 'self' nd into the truth of one's 
mission in life, out of provisionality and into the adventure of incarnation. 
(1998: 5-6) 
Drawing, amongst others, on the writings of Von Balthasar and De Certeau he argues for 
a pre-modern continuum of theology-spirituality which theologians must try to return to 
(1998: 67). This is a form of what he calls `intellectual mysticism', quoting in approval 
Gregory the Great's maxim `amor ipse notitia est' - `love itself is a form of knowing' 
(1998: 70). We shall return to this relationship between the affectus and the intellectus 
when we discuss the theologia mystics in Chapter Five below. Suffice it to say for now, 
that McIntosh's position allows for a more participatory understanding of mysticism- 
spirituality-theology very much along the lines advocated by Kripal, Ferrer and others. 
`Mystical language' is not a positivistic report but an invitation into a process. 
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In summary then, McIntosh, drawing on many of the writers we have discussed 
above presents a nuanced and balanced critique that takes the contemporary debate on 
`mysticism' and pitches it into theology's questioning as to its role and parameters in the 
contemporary world, especially in the light of the contemporary interest in spirituality 48 
The result is a participatory view of theology which will surely benefit that discipline. 
2.5.4.2 Rowan Williams 
In a series of articles in the late nineteen eighties and early nineties Rowan Williams 
synthesises many of the strands of thought on mysticism discussed here to present an 
original and helpful contribution to the debate (See Williams 1983,1984,1991). 
Following the constructivist critique of Katz et al he is suspicious of the category 
of modern mysticism, especially its essentialism, experientialism and perennialism (e. g. 
see 1983: 334-5,1984: 209,1991: 144 - 153). 
49 Williams deliberately eschews this more 
`psychologistic' or `phenomenological' methodology, relying instead on an explicitly 
theological methodology to explore the term: in particular, a scriptural, patristic and 
liturgical analysis (see 1984: 198 where he cites Knowles in particular as a model here). 
From this context two approaches emerge. 
Exploring Butler's Western Mysticism (Butler: 1926) in 1984 he considers 
whether we might do better to `avoid the word "mysticism" entirely'(Williams 
1984: 213), a position we have already essayed in respect to McIntosh and the use of 
`spirituality'. He suggests `contemplative discipline' (or later, `contemplative enterprise') 
as a possible alternative, the article focussing as it does on this aspect of the Christian 
tradition as reviewed by Butler. Within his theological context he sees the aim of 
`mysticisms' as distinctly teleological, ie. that through Christian contemplation and 
practice the believer has `the image of Christ formed' in them, `mystical' becomes 
shorthand for: 
48 Space does not allow us to enter into a lengthy discussion of the contemporary category of `spirituality'. 
See references in Introduction above. 
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The deepening and habitual awareness of loss, recovery and transformation in 
relation to the paschal focus of Christian commitment... the capacity for radical 
liberty and trustful responsibility in the face of a world of senseless pain and 
oppression, the bearing of a darkness which challenges all our desires and 
projections, in the confidence that we are taken into a (deeply paradoxical) 
relationship with the source of all meaning, an elusive - if not entirely effable - 
union with "the Father". (Williams 1984: 209) 
The aim of mystical practice is to bring us closer to the persona Christi which we hold in 
potential. This emphasis on mystical form rather than content is refined in the later final 
chapter to Teresa ofAvila (1991). Here, once again, following Lash he is sceptical of the 
essential ist/empirical/experientialist/perennial ist content of modern mysticism and turns 
once again from comparability of form rather than content (as in Kripal and McIntosh 
above). Of Kripal's three categories of erotic, transgressive and deconstructive, he 
mentions the transgressive (1991: 154) and the deconstructive (again, like McIntosh, in 
the context of the kenotic aspect of the Christian message) but leaves out the erotic. The 
element he particularly emphasises, is the `reformative' or `generative' element of the 
mystic. The `mystic' is the one who returns to the original `charism' of the religion - 
whether that be in the life or teaching of a charismatic founder such as Mohammed or 
Gautama Buddha, or the generative terms of a religion such as Judaism or Hinduismso 
Unlike McIntosh, he recognises that the apophatic is unsufficient to do justice to the 
complexity of the Christian foundational story and stresses that `Christian mysticism' in 
its refoundational guise will reflect any one of a number of elements from the 
foundational story: 
There is the story of God's becoming human, the story of that humanity itself, and 
the story of the establishing of the community in faith in Easter and Pentecost. 
What is it that needs to be recapitulated? The movement out from heaven and 
49 `I want to resist the notion that we have anything approaching an uncontroversial, neutral and abstract 
concept of `the mystic' and `the mystical' in psychological terms which we can usefully startfrom in the 
study of religious language and institutions' (1983: 335) 
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back to it? The pattern of the incarnate ministry? Jesus's path to the cross? The 
disciple's experience of the resurrection? (1991: 156) 
Thus, we accordingly have many types of refoundational mystical form within the 
Christian tradition: 
There are many types of passion mysticism.... We have instances - from Richard 
Rolle in medieval England to Tilak in nineteenth-century India - of ecstatic 
devotion to the person of Jesus as exalted Lord... we have also, in the last two 
decades, an unexpected resurgence of the language of a `new Pentecost' - the 
ecstatic recapitulation of what is believed to be primitive Christian experience in 
the Charismatic movement. (1991: 157) 
In these final pages Williams suggests an amalgam of the two responses - that the 
individual `mystics' model themselves on Christ and by this recapitulation of the life of 
Christ in their lives (he takes Teresa as his example) they can assist this `refoundational' 
aspect in the community around them: 
The shape of the fundamental story becomes the shape of this human biography in 
a comprehensive way which may lead to the profound disturbances and 
disorientations of consciousness that the `mystic' characteristically describes. 
(1991: 158) 
In response to Williams's argument two points arise: 
1. There is the possibility of `elitism' arising from his approach. As with James there is a 
tendency towards seeing `the mystic' as a special individual with a special role to 
perform in a particular context. Perhaps the possibility of `ordinary mysticism' is 
so In 1983 this is stated as ` the task of recalling to remembrance their community's commitment to 
holiness, significant and integrated social life. '(1984: 343). See also Inge's views on this point above. 
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discounted. Again, here Williams may be revealing his indebtedness to the basic forms of 
modern mysticism in his analysis. 
2. Williams's critique seems to come from a reformation or protestant context. It seems to 
privilege the `foundational aspect'. However his comments are very pertinent, especially 
his observations on `theologia mystica' within Teresa's writings and we shall return to 
this later. 
Like McIntosh, within Williams's approach there is a tension between holding 
essentialist content (a possible debt to the essentialism of modern mysticism) and a 
psychologically empty but philosophically coherent position (hence the emphasis on the 
deconstructive to the expense of the erotic). However, when we compare their views with 
another Christian writer such as Turner they clearly have more psychological content 
which is to be applauded. Williams, like McIntosh, takes the challenge of constructivism 
and presents a theologically nuanced response. However, as with McIntosh, Williams is 
not so concerned with delineating the specific `language games' of the `theologia 
mystica' which will be the work of this thesis. 
Before concluding this chapter we shall review one last Christian author who, 
unlike McIntosh and Williams, has wanted, in direct response to Wittgenstein, to 
delineate the form of `mystical discourse' - Don Cupitt. 
2.5.4.3 Don Cupitt 
Of all the writers being reviewed here perhaps Cupitt is the one who takes the writings of 
Wittgenstein most seriously. However, it is argued here that he misinterprets 
Wittgenstein and ends up with a position that is probably more unacceptable than that of 
either McIntosh or Williams. 
Cupitt's career has been marked by a concerted attempt to `dissolve' many of the 
boundaries that, in his words, survive from the `modem period' ( roughly `beginning in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' [1998: 12] and ending in the late sixties, 1968 for 
convenience [1998: 1]). We are now living in the `postmodern' period when the 
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`certainties' of modernity are being dissolved or `melted down'. Cupitt's own narrative 
here relying heavily on `postmodern' writers such as Derrida, Levinas, Lyotard, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger etc. helped by traditional Christian `mystics' such as Eckhart 
and Margarete Porete. In this process of dissolution, `modern terms', such as 
`experience', `religious experience', `mysticism' and `spirituality' are likewise being 
melted down and reformed. Much of Cupitt's writing on `experience' reflects the critique 
of James we presented above and it is not necessary to recapitulate. Likewise, his critique 
of `mysticism' reflects our argument above that `modern mysticism' is largely a late 
nineteenth century/early twentieth century creation. 
Cupitt's views have also had a strong impact on Kripal, especially his notions of 
`mysticism' as `a kind of writing' that subverts the established order (see Kripal 2001: 8). 
This view of `mysticism' as `anti-institutional' form we have already noted from James 
and, it could be argued, is very much a Jamesian/'modern' notion. Like McIntosh above, 
it can argued that Cupitt concentrates too much on the deconstructive and apophatic at the 
expense of the erotic and libidinal in the mystic (contra Kripal), in contradistinction, for 
Kripal this is held `in the body': `All mystics, after all, had bodies, which in turn shared a 
set of biologically and culturally shaped sexualities' (Kripal 2001: 332). A view equally 
to be found in the writings of contemporary feminist writers already referred to such as 
Grace Jantzen (Jantzen 1995) and the authors we shall discuss in relation to Teresa of 
Avila in Chapter Eight such as Gillian Ahlgren and Alison Weber (Ahlgren 1996, Weber 
1990). 
This critique of Cupitt's lack of embodiment can be carried to his whole project, 
which in itself is questionable. It seems as though Cupitt wants to remove all ontological 
content from the `mystical game': 
Even language may not give us a rock-solid starting point. It too is secondary. It 
too can be seen as mere construct. We made it up. So, when all proposed 
foundations or fixed starting-points have failed, we find ourselves obliged to 
admit that everything is secondary. There is no pure datum, no primary substance, 
no `absolute', nothing that is always ontologically prior... We are always in 
secondariness. (Cupitt 1998: 7). 
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Although Cupitt invokes Wittgenstein, it can be argued that a radical dis-ontology is not a 
necessary implication of Wittgenstein's critique (as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four 
below). To complicate matters, Cupitt seems to defy his own rigorous disontological 
strictures by introducing a new category of `the fountain'. This `state', achieved through 
meditation, he describes as: 
A one-level floating continuum. Everything, including the self, disappears into 
shimmering oceanic bliss, beginningless, endless, foundationless, secondariness. 
This is the Unitive State, the Spiritual Marriage, "the Real" ... 
I propose that we picture it as the Fountain... The fountain or the falls become 
again a traditional symbol of life's , or time's , perpetual self-renewal, a symbol 
of healing, refreshment and repose. (Cupitt 1998: 133) 
In response we raise two points here: 
1. Cupitt's `oceanic bliss' seems to be the old `Platonic' sense of `at-one-ness' given 
`postmodern' clothes. 
2. Despite his protestations of total `disontology', Cupitt has imported a very real 
ontology with his `Fountain', or as he calls it `The Real'. We shall have more to say on 
this when we look at the ontological implications of Wittgenstein's critique for our study. 
In conclusion, there seems to be much that is of use from Cupitt's analysis. He has taken 
on board the implications for mystical analysis from the constructivists and the role of 
language in the mystical hermeneutic. Although, distinctly `modern' in its emphasis, the 
exploration of the category of subversion/transgression is helpful as is Cupitt's use of 
erotic language. Yet, by placing too much emphasis on the role of mystics as 
`wordsmiths' and over emphasis on the linguistic categories Cupitt does seem to miss out 
a vital element of the `mystical game'. Cupitt seems to forget that writing (and 
expression) requires reference in his hurry to sweep away all `institutional categories'. In 
this `anti-institutionalism' there are also shades of James's `elitisim': the mystic as the 
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wise seer who bravely sees through the lies of institutional religion to reveal its heart as a 
lonely suffering individual 5' 
Like his `modern' adversaries ( Underhill, Inge, Vaughan) Cupitt is not adverse to 
using `orientalist' categories to support his views (see 1998: 62,65) and despite his 
protestations, on these grounds alone, it seems that Cupitt may not be so `postmodern' as 
he would have us believe. 
2.6 Summary 
This has, by necessity, been a lengthy chapter. However, it has been necessary to give a 
comprehensive overview of how the mystical has been used in academic discourse since 
the rise of `modern mysticism' and its consequent critique over the past thirty years. 
The chapter began by stating that we would trace the etymology of the term 
`mysticism' in recent centuries and isolate a particular category that we call `modern 
mysticism'. Also that the understanding of this phrase would be illustrated by using, in 
particular, a critique of the work of William James, Robert Vaughan, Ralph Inge and 
Evelyn Underhill. 
It was argued that for these `makers of modern mysticism' there was a clear 
ontological category of mysticism, which was basically essentialist, experientialist, 
orientalist and perennialist in character, and for James this was filled out by his concept 
of mystical experience. It was further argued that these categories were adopted, largely 
uncritically, by the chief writers on 'mysticism' in the twentieth century, notably Otto, 
Stace and Zaehner and were commonplace assumptions in scholarly discourse until the 
constructivist critique of Katz et al in the late seventies/early eighties. 
Since Katz we have seen varying reactions to the `deontologisation' of mysticism. 
At one end Forman and the neo-perennialists have wanted to restore full ontological 
status to the category of mysticism, at the other end of the spectrum is Cupitt advocating 
(though not necessarily achieving as we saw) a totally deontologised approach. In 
51 See for example p. 108 and Cupitt's contrast of the `priestly and institutional' with the `prophetic and 
charismatic' 
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between, with McIntosh, McGinn, Turner, Williams and Kripal we saw varying levels of 
ontological content imported into the category. 
In the following two chapters we shall return to Wittgenstein's writings where we 
will argue for a particular Wittgensteinian approach to the problem which helps to 
remove some of the problems associated with some of the positions above. However, it is 
important to state that from the review of this chapter the following consequences arise 
for the thesis: 
1. Unlike Underhill, Vaughan, James and Inge we shall not be looking for a cross- 
credal, experientialist, ontological (and possibly orientalist) category called 
`mysticism'. Rather we shall be concentrating on the `mystical form, strategy or 
game' using an approach which will develop from Wittgenstein's writings in the 
following chapter. 
2. From Sells, Cupitt and Kripal we will argue in Chapter Seven for a deconstructive 
element to the mystical/mysticism/mystic. However, in that chapter, applying this 
approach to Teresa of Avila we shall argue for an approach with nuanced 
differences from Sells's. 
3. Following on from Kripal and McIntosh we shall explore the embodied/affective 
element of the mystical as manifest in Teresa of Avila's writings. This will form 
the basis of Chapter Eight. 
4. Recognising the importance of Williams's and McIntosh's contributions to 
understanding the constructivist critique in Christian theological context this 
thesis will be concerned with developing the specifics of `mystical speech', 
especially as `incomplete speech act' in `interpretative framework'. 
Consequently, drawing on the `Wittgensteinian methodology' developed in Chapter Four 
we shall characterise this in Chapter Five as the Sprachspiel of theologia mystica. 
However, before moving into this we shall return now to Wittgenstein's writings in the 
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next chapter before elaborating the `Wittgensteinian methodology' that will be adopted 
for the rest of the thesis. 
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Chapter Three: Wittgenstein's Nachlass and the Problem of 
Interpretation 
One of the difficulties with working with Wittgenstein's writings is that there is no 
general consensus as to how they should be approached. In addition, there have emerged 
differences of opinion as to how his literary legacy - his Nachlass - should be treated. 
This chapter will explore some of the issues around interpretation of the Nachlass and 
explore some of the key schools for understanding Wittgenstein's approach to 
philosophical problems. Whilst not agreeing entirely with all of Daniel Hutto's arguments 
in Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy (Hutto 2003) we have found his division of 
Wittgensteinian interpretation into that of theoretical and therapeutic helpful and will 
adopt a version of this when surveying various interpretations of Wittgenstein's 
approach, especially to the philosophy of religion. 
3.1 The Nachlass 
On Wittgenstein's death in 1951 his literary executors Georg von Wright, Rush Rhees 
and Elizabeth Anscombe thought at first that Wittgenstein's literary legacy consisted of a 
few notebooks that he had in his possession at the time of his death (See P0: 480). 
However as von Wright narrates in The Wittgenstein Papers (in P0: 480 -506) it soon 
transpired that there was an awful lot more material than originally had been thought. In 
his introduction to the Wiener Ausgabe (WA: 1: 5 1) Nedo gives the number of extant 
pages to date as 30,000. Based on von Wright's description in The Wittgenstein Papers 
and his own analysis, Stern (1996: 473) and others suggest that the figure is nearer to 
20,000 pages rather than 30,000. Regardless, the material of the Nachlass accordingly 
turned out to be vast. In his will Wittgenstein had requested that his executors `shall 
publish as many of my unpublished writings as they should think fit' (Stem 1996: 454). 
As he had published so little in his lifetime: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922, 
T), a Wörterbuch for the children of Upper Austria (1926, WB) and a short paper for the 
Aristotelian Society (1929, AS) the executors did not have much to guide them in making 
their decisions as to what was publishable and what not. From the nearly completed 
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Philosophical Investigations (1953, PI) onwards there flowed (and continues to flow) a 
stream of works authorised by the executors (see `Wittgenstein's works' in the 
Bibiography). Although the work of the executors was punctilious and industrious they 
have not entirely been beyond reproach. Various attempts have been made to publish the 
Nachlass as a whole, beginning with the Cornell microfilm facsimile of 1967. Although 
helpful the microfilm facsimile was at times hard to read and certain texts, such as the so- 
called Geheimer Tagebücher (GT), had been deliberately covered over to spare the public 
possible embarrassment from his more personal reflections (we shall return to this later). 
Stern in his paper (1996) charts the unhappy evolution of the Wiener Ausgabe under 
Nedo which is only now just appearing. However, perhaps the fullest and most accessible 
of all the attempts to open up the Nachlass has been the Bergen Electronic Edition (2000, 
BEE) which was produced in 2000 by the University of Bergen in Norway. The 
production of these various editions of the Nachlass has allowed scholars to see the 
shortcomings of some of the editorial decisions made by the original executors (See Stern 
1996, Savickey 1998 and BEE). The chief criticism has been that the executors did not 
provide enough critical apparatus to justify their editorial decisions and why certain 
portions of the Nachlass were published in a certain way and not another. This has 
particularly been the case with collections of Bemerkungen published in collections such 
as Culture and Value and Remarks on Colour. As the editors of the Bergen Electronic 
Edition put it in their introduction to the Edition: 
With the aim of honouring Wittgenstein's intentions, his editors have sometimes 
put together selections from a range of different manuscripts. Unfortunately, 
Wittgenstein's intentions can rarely be established with any certainty. The 
instructions he wrote into his works are numerous and often contradictory. Those 
selections that have been made have secured Wittgenstein a place among the first 
rank of Western thinkers. Regrettable, however, is that his editors do not always 
document their decisions, thus obscuring the relationship between the publicised 
material and its sources. (BEE: Introduction) 
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Along with this lack of critical apparatus commentators such as Stern and Savickey also 
see another more insidious tendency in the editing process: that is, a tendency to `tidy up' 
Wittgenstein's Bemerkungen to produce well-manicured and philosophically balanced 
`texts'. One of the key arguments of this dissertation will be that, like Teresa of Avila's 
works, we tidy up Wittgenstein's works at our peril. Having examined them for the past 
ten years, especially through the lens of the Nachlass editions, it is the author's 
conviction that they can only be read aright as a radical attempt to change our perception 
of philosophical problems. Wittgenstein, like Teresa, was not interested in producing 
finely polished philosophical tracts (notwithstanding the fact that he took great care and 
time to produce the Bermerkungen in an order and form he was happy with52) but rather 
he wanted his texts to `trouble the reader' - `I should not like my writing to spare other 
people the trouble of thinking' - as he writes in the Preface to the Philosophical 
Investigations (PI: vi). Accordingly, it will be argued throughout this dissertation that the 
style and presentation of Wittgenstein's writings (like Teresa's) is as important as the 
substance. 
Having highlighted, therefore, some of the problems involved with established the 
Wittgensteinian corpus we will now turn to the schools of interpretation of his writings, 
especially the commentaries on his writings on the nature of religion. 
3.2 The Wittgensteinian Secondary Literature 
Faced with the vast array of secondary literature on Wittgenstein's writings it has been 
decided for the purposes of this thesis to concentrate on a literature review of those 
commentators who have been particularly concerned to outline his views on religious 
belief. Having illustrated these schools of interpretation the chapter will conclude by 
52 Monk in his biography ( Monk 1990: 319) gives a detailed picture of how Wittgenstein went about this 
process: `Wittgenstein had a peculiarly laborious method of editing his work. He began by writing remarks 
into small notebooks. He then selected what he considered to be the best of these remarks and wrote them 
out, perhaps in a different order, into larger manuscript volumes. From these he made a further selection, 
which he dictated to a typist. The resultant typescript was then used as a basis for a further selection, 
sometimes by cutting it up and rearranging it - and then the whole process was started again. ' 
We have in the Nachlass examples of work at all stages of this process. 
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looking at those writers who have specifically tried to delineate Wittgenstein's views on 
the mystical. 
As stated above, when faced with the overwhelming secondary literature, Hutto's 
distinction between the theoretical and the therapeutic in Wittgenstein's commentators, 
has been found helpful. Accordingly, before turning to the interpretations of 
Wittgenstein's remarks on religion and the philosophy of religion it is necessary to 
outline the context within which this occurs. Throughout this literature review, whilst 
mindful of general movements in Wittgensteinian scholarship since his death in 1951, we 
have tended to concentrate on works published in the past twenty years. 
Reading Wittgenstein: Theory and Therapy 
Surveying the reactions to Wittgenstein's work nearly fifty years after his death, Rorty in 
his essay Keeping Philosophy Pure summed up the position thus: 
Academic philosophy in our day stands to Wittgenstein as intellectual life in 
Germany in the first decades of the last century stood to Kant. Kant had changed 
everything, but no one was sure just what Kant had said - no one was sure what in 
Kant to take seriously and what to put aside. (Rorty 1982: 20) 
In this essay Rorty suggests that Wittgenstein's writings throw down a gauntlet to all who 
read them, especially professional philosophers. The challenge to enter the 
`transcendental standpoint' of the Tractatus and the further challenge of the `twice born' 
to resist this temptation and the challenge to both of the `pure of heart' expounded in the 
Philosophical Investigations that transcends the need to `explain, justify and expound'. In 
tracing this distinction, which Hutto (Hutto 2003) calls the `theoretical and the 
therapeutic', Rorty emphasises the importance of the Tractatus for those who have 
expounded Wittgenstein from the former point and the importance of the Investigations 
for those of the latter disposition. This distinction between the emphasises of the work of 
the `earlier' and `later' Wittgenstein, and this possible distinction between a theoretical 
and an anti-theoretical approach to his writings has been a constant since the voluminous 
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Wittgensteinian secondary literature began to swell. As Pears puts it (Pears 1988b: 218), 
in these later works `he is moving away from theorizing and towards plain description of 
the phenomenon of language. ' Many of these commentators taking as their key text the 
famous remark from PI: 126 on the nature of philosophy: 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For 
what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. 
Consequently, amongst the Wittgensteinian secondary literature we see a split between 
those commentators who see the work of the later Wittgenstein as continuing the work of 
the earlier Wittgenstein and those who see a new anti-theoretical shift in the post- 
Tractatus works. As stated at the beginning of this chapter a lot of this (mis) - 
interpretation arises from the confusion surrounding the publication of the Nachlass. To 
add to the confusion, a recent book, The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations 
Works (Moyal-Sharrock: 2004) has argued that the parts of the Nachlass that have 
appeared charting the latter period of Wittgenstein's life, in particular On Certainty, 
suggest a third interpretation of Wittgenstein that transcends even the position developed 
in the Investigations. 
We are thus left with four possible ways of viewing his works in the authors of the 
secondary literature: 
1. Those who remain with the traditional division between the `earlier' and the 
`later' Wittgenstein and see the later works, especially the Investigations, as a 
critique of the earlier works, especially the Tractatus. Representative of this trend 
would be Peter Hacker whose recent work Wittgenstein: Connections and 
Controversies (Hacker: 2001) makes this point. 
2. The so-called `new Wittgensteinians' (See The New Wittgenstein - Crary and 
Read: 2000) who see a theoretical union between the early and later Wittgenstein 
and reject any notion of a firm break between the two. 
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3. Those who regard the `third Wittgenstein' of the `post-Investigations works' (so- 
called) as presenting a third and more radical departure from the Wittgensteinian 
corpus. 
4. To these three interpretations, we could possibly add a fourth, a growing body of 
Wittgenstein scholars who, following Wittgenstein's own remarks in the latter 
works of moving from the theoretical to the practical, or from saying to showing 
want to emphasise the importance of the biographical elements of Wittgenstein's 
life and use them to gain a more complete picture of what his thought was trying 
to achieve. Again, a key collection of essays, Wittgenstein: Biography and 
Philosophy (Klagge 2001) has acted as a vessel for presenting this interpretative 
strand. 
Each will now be considered in turn. 
3.2.1 The `Two Witteensteins': `The Standard Interpretation' 
Crary (2000: 2) calls this position the `standard narrative' by which Wittgensteinian 
interpretation is guided. By this is meant the notion that the Tractatus and Investigations 
are two separate works, the latter intended as a specific critique of the former. The 
Tractatus represents the culmination of the first phase of Wittgenstein's thinking (broadly 
up to 1918) which is essentially the delineation of the limits of meaning by the 
delineation of the `logic of our language' - the form of language and the form of the 
world will thus reflect each other. This `picture theory of meaning' is rejected in the post- 
Tractatus works, especially the Investigations, in 'a period which extends roughly from 
the early nineteen thirties up to his death in 1951, at which time he was still trying to get 
his thoughts into an order with which he was happy for publication. The `second 
Wittgenstein' is not so much concerned with a theory of meaning that connects the 
meaning of a word to a particular pattern of external reality but rather to one in which 
meaning is derived from the use of the word, often described by a concentration on 
Sprachspiele - language games. The tendency of the first phase is to lead to a notion of 
meaning which is truth-conditional and essentially realist, whereas 
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that of the latter depends on a notion of meaning based around assertibility conditions and 
is essentially anti-realist. The classic exponents of this view are Dummett (Dummett: 
1991), Hacker (Hacker: 2001) and Pears (Pears: 1988), amongst others. For Pears in 
Wittgenstein's later work: 
There are no independent, objective points of support, and meaning and necessity 
are preserved only in the linguistic processes which embody them. They are safe 
only because the practices gain a certain stability from the rules. But even the 
rules do not provide a fixed point of reference, because they always allow 
divergent interpretations. (Pears 1988: 179) 
As well as this tendency to anti-realism, which, as we shall see later, has influenced the 
notion of a `Wittgensteinian' interpretation of religion in such `anti-realist' commentators 
as Cupitt and Phillips, the `standard interpretation' supports a view of Wittgenstein, 
especially the `later Wittgenstein', who was primarily concerned with developing a 
philosophy of language based on such concepts as Sprachspiele and Lebensformen - 
'Language Games' and `Forms of Life'53. Two phrases which, in English translation at 
least, seem to have developed a life of their own in Wittgensteinian scholarship. 
3.2.2 `The New Witt2ensteinians' 
The `new Wittgensteinians' represented in Crary and Read's 2000 collection The New 
Wittgenstein (Crary and Read 2000, including, amongst others, Stanley Cavell, John 
McDowell, James Conant, Cora Diamond and Hilary PutnaM54) share with the authors of 
the `standard interpretation' the notion that Wittgenstein sought in his later writings to 
overturn the metaphysical implications of the `picture theory' of meaning found primarily 
in the Tractatus. Where they differ from the `standard interpretation' is in seeing this 
critique as being present throughout Wittgenstein's writings, even 
53 For a thorough account of the consequences of realist and anti-realist interpretations within the 
`Wittgensteinians' see Insole (2006), Chs 1- 4. 
54 Although the collection includes an essay by Peter Hacker he is dissenting from the general view of the 
`New Wittgensteinians' and would prefer to place his view in that of the `standard interpretation' 
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including the Tractatus. Crary describes this as the therapeutic aspect of Wittgenstein's 
work, a notion we will return to below. One of the chief consequences for understanding 
Wittgenstein's work is to revise interpretations of the Tractatus to include what we can 
call more specifically `therapeutic' understandings of that great work. When we come in 
Chapter Eight below to consider the Tractatus in the light of previously unpublished 
diaries of Wittgenstein from this period (GT) we shall find much that supports this point 
of view. One important influence from the `new Wittgensteinians' that has influenced the 
approach of this thesis is the importance they give to the style of his writings as much as 
his substance. As we shall see later when we compare the means of expression in 
Wittgenstein and in the mystical texts of Teresa of Avila, how things are said may be as 
important as what is said. Thus these interpreters get away from a notion that has often 
haunted the executors of the Nachlass that Wittgenstein's work has to be `tidied up' in 
order to get at a `real' philosophical text. Rather, the fragmentary nature of the collections 
of remarks, including their often contradictory authorial voices should be understood in 
the `therapeutic' tradition of philosophers such as Kierkegaard (an acknowledged 
influence on Wittgenstein) rather than the systematic treatises of, say, a Hegel or a Kant. 
In Crary's words `the dialectical structure of Wittgenstein's writing makes an internal 
contribution to the philosophical instruction it contains' (2000: 7). For this aspect of the 
`new Wittgensteinian' agenda a lot of thanks must go to Stanley Cavell who has long 
championed this notion of the `confessional and therapeutic' within Wittgenstein's work. 
(See, for example Cavell 1976,1979) 
3.2.3 The Third Wittgenstein 
The premise of The Third Wittgenstein - The Post Investigations Works (Moyal-Sharrock 
2004) is to present a collection of papers that argues for the significance to the Nachlass 
of the material published post The Philosophical Investigations, in particular On 
Certainty. Moyal-Sharrock, the editor of the volume, believes that these works do not 
mark a distinctive break with the writing of the Investigations but rather they continue 
Wittgenstein's thoughts in ways that are not so manifest in the 
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Investigations. For reasons given above regarding the difficulty of sorting out the 
publication of the Nachlass, it would at first sight seem odd to give the Investigations a 
cohesion of thought which its unsystematic collation would not seem to merit which is 
why many of the contributors to the volume want to make a distinction between Parts 
One and Two of the Investigations They see the former as largely as Wittgenstein hoped 
it would be published whilst the latter is more akin to the posthumously published 
Nachlass which makes up the bulk of Moyal-Sharrock's `Third Wittgenstein'. In support 
of this von Wright is quoted: 
I lean, myself, towards the opinion that Part 1 of the Investigations is a complete 
work and that Wittgenstein's writings from 1946 onwards represent in certain 
ways departures in new directions. (Von Wright 1982: 136) 
Thus, these later works, beginning with Part Two of the Investigations, are seen as 
launching out in new directions, in particular the examination of the relationship between 
philosophy and psychology. 55 For Moyal-Sharrock the `third Wittgenstein' embraces all 
the works after 1946, consequently published as Part Two of the Investigations, On 
Certainty, Zettel, Remarks on Colour and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. 
From the point of view of this dissertation a key interpretation from On Certainty has 
been incorporated as understood by recent scholarship. This is the work of Judith 
Genova, in particular Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing (1995) taken up by Ivana Dolejsovd 
in Accounts of Hope: A Problem of Method in Postmodern Apologia (2001). Genova and 
Dolejgovä's interpretation of a move in On Certainty from Thinking to Seeing to Acting 
appears a helpful way of understanding the later Wittgenstein as will be explained in 
Chapter Four below. In his essay in The Third Wittgenstein Hutto seeks to show how this 
movement is present in Wittgenstein's philosophy from the Tractatus onwards and is not 
just unique to the post-1946 works. From the point of view of this dissertation we are not 
concerned to make a case for the importance of the so-called `third Wittgenstein' and the 
thesis will draw on Wittgenstein's works from all stages of his development. If it is 
necessary to ally ourselves with any particular `school' of interpretation this thesis would 
55 On this see Kerr (2008) for an excellent summary 
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probably go with those scholars such as Hutto who see a philosophical consistency 
throughout Wittgenstein's work. As argued at the beginning of this chapter the confusion 
whereby the Nachlass has been published has probably contributed to the perception of 
different Wittgensteins with differing aims and intentions. This point was put in a 
conversation with one of Wittgenstein's last pupils in 2006,56 and the author was told that 
if Wittgenstein were alive now his thoughts would have moved on whilst using the same 
methods that he consistently used throughout his life. The concerns of the late nineteen 
forties would not be his concerns today, yet his method would probably remain the same. 
From the perspective of this thesis the recent work on the post Investigations literature, 
especially On Certainty, has perhaps clarified the movement in Wittgenstein from saying 
to showing to acting and an inherent foundationalism that can, as Hutto argues, be found 
in his works well before 1946. In addition, as already presented in the Introduction above, 
the post 1946 works contain some very perceptive work on Aspect-Seeing which have 
been incorporated into this thesis. 
3.2.4 Wittgenstein and Biography 
The unique style of Wittgenstein's writings and his challenges to straightforward 
academic or conventional interpretations of his work, coupled with the problems of 
establishing generally accepted definitions of what constitutes a Wittgensteinian `text' 
have all contributed to the growth of another basis for evaluating Wittgenstein's 
contributions to academic discourse: namely, accounts and interpretations of 
Wittgenstein's life, especially records of conversations with friends, students, colleagues 
etc. From the early nineteen fifties onwards these have regularly appeared. Although we 
seem now to be coming to the end of first hand accounts of encounters with Wittgenstein, 
we still have the formidable body of literature that tries to interpret his philosophy 
through the events, actions and conversations that occurred in his life. Wittgenstein's 
often `larger than life' personality, eccentricities and colourful acquaintances have all 
added to this tendency. From the point of view of our study here two of the most 
important collections of encounters are those by his former pupils Norman Malcolm (in 
56 Conversation of the author with Euan Hill, Carshalton, November 2006 
100 
Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, [Malcolm 2001], first published 1958) and Maurice 
Drury (in Rhees [1987], Recollections of Wittgenstein). In both we find Wittgenstein 
talking candidly about religion in a way that is not often so evident in his written 
remarks. These conversations, especially with Drury, have helped complete the picture of 
Wittgenstein's views on such matters and extend the conversation beyond the written 
texts. This process has been extended by the two excellent biographies of Wittgenstein 
produced in the late nineteen eighties/early nineties: Brian McGuinness's Wittgenstein - 
A Life ( McGuinness 1988) which covers the period up to 1921 and Ray Monk's Ludwig 
Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius ( Monk 1990), the first biography of the complete life 
of Wittgenstein. Again, much extra-textual material has helped to give us a better 
overview of Wittgenstein's life and work, and in particular how the two were often 
seamlessly interconnected. Although, as we shall see in Chapter Eight, the problem of the 
availabity of Nachlass material has also influenced these two projects and the publication 
of, for example, the Geheime Tagebücher 1914 -1916 in 1992 (GT) has brought more 
material to light. 
As is the case with Wittgenstein studies, the biographical information has helped 
open up new lines of interpretation of Wittgenstein's work which are well summarised in 
the 2001 volume Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy (Klagge 2001). As with Teresa 
of Avila, these biographical discussions have helped form a context for interpreting 
Wittgenstein's work. This will be particularly important in Chapter Eight where we use 
the Nachlass entries from Wittgenstein's time in World War One to construct some 
notions of his ideas that influenced the latter parts of the Tractatus. 
3.2.5 Wittgenstein as Therapist 
Before moving onto the secondary literature that discusses Wittgenstein's specific 
contributions to debates about the nature of religion it is helpful to conclude this section 
on his general interpreters by returning to the question of Wittgenstein as therapist as 
opposed to theoretician or logician. The reason for doing this is that many of the 
arguments and interpretations of the mystical presented in this thesis have grown out of 
an examination of this literature in particular. 
101 
As stated above one of the first writers to emphasise the `therapeutic' within 
Wittgenstein's writing was Stanley Cavell (See Cavell 1976,1979). By the time Alice 
Crary's collection The New Wittgenstein (Crary and Read 2000) came out in 2000 it 
seemed as though the notion had influenced a whole generation of Wittgensteinian 
scholars. The authors collected there, Crary suggested, shared an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's work as a) a unified whole and b) broadly `therapeutic' in nature. The first 
point has already been discussed above. The second emphasises the shift in recent 
Wittgensteinian scholarship away from the understanding of his work as largely 
theoretical (or, in Rorty's words, largely concerned with the reactions and concerns of 
fellow `professional philosophers') to an understanding which is built around seeing his 
work as contributing to individual existential development, or as Hosseini calls it in a 
recent work, `the development of wisdom' (Hosseini 2007). For Crary this `therapeutic 
aim' is largely around helping us to see the `sources of philosophical confusion' we hold 
by replacing a need for a metaphysical view of language to a concern with the 
observation of the running of language as a means to solving philosophical confusion. 
Thus, for Cavell, the aim of Wittgenstein's philosophy is to bring us back from 
metaphysical speculation to the everyday discourse of `forms of life' (Lebensformen) 
where language has its natural home. Whereas Cavell et al are primarily concerned with 
the purely philosophical consequences of a reading of Wittgenstein's work other 
contemporary authors have gone further and ascribed to Wittgenstein a therapeutic 
agenda that goes beyond the purely philosophical. In this respect there has been a 
growing movement to connect Wittgenstein's writings with psycho-therapeutic literature, 
beginning of course with his fellow Viennese theorist, Sigmund Freud (1856 - 1939). 
Although Wittgenstein's remarks about Freud are scattered throughout the Nachlass, 
especially the collection of remarks published as Culture and Value and the conversations 
with Rhees in 1942 published as the Conversations on Freud in Lectures and 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (LC: 41 - 52), the first 
systematic survey of the relationship between the two authors was Jacques Bouveresse's 
1995 work Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious (Bouveresse 1995). 57 
37 See also Frank Cioffi's `Wittgenstein's Freud' (Cioffi 1969) and McGuinness's `Freud and 
Wittgenstein' (McGuinness 2002) 
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Bouveresse's work, like others who have followed him such as Levy (1996), concentrates 
more on Wittgensteinian critiques of Freudian notions of unconscious, ego, superego and 
the general Freudian `mechanics of the mind' rather than notions of philosophy as 
therapy per se. More helpful for this dissertation has been Peterman's 1992 Philosophy as 
Therapy which has taken Cavell's ideas of the therapeutic in Wittgenstein and extended 
them beyond the philosophical to the ethical. Its emphasis on the movement from theoria 
to praxis in Wittgenstein's writings seems to be of fundamental importance for a 
balanced interpretation of his work, as we shall see later. In this respect the notion of the 
importance of the confessional has been an important theme in many therapeutic 
interpretations of his work and one that will play a role in this thesis. 58 Finally, it is worth 
noting that the later Wittgenstein saw the value of Freud's work not as a pseudo-scientist 
but in the function of Freudian analysis as `aspect-changing': 
When a dream is interpreted we might say that it is fitted into a context in which it 
ceases to be puzzling. In a sense the dreamer re-dreams his dream in surroundings 
such that its aspect changes... 
In considering what a dream is, it is important to consider what happens to it, the 
way its aspect changes when it is brought into relation with other things 
remembered, for instance. (LC: 45 -46) 
We shall return to this aspect of Wittgenstein's work in Chapter Four below. 
3.3 Wittizenstein and the Philosophy of Religion 
When we turn to Wittgenstein and the religious it might be argued that rather than 
influencing a contemporary philosophical debate, Wittgenstein's writing has produced a 
whole new way of thinking of the disipline, or even developed a new discipline in itself. 
Surveying the many eminent philosophers who have ventured to interpret his contribution 
to the discipline the only thing that can be said with certainty is that there is very little 
consensus amongst them as to what exactly is that contribution and how it should be 
58 See also Wittgenstein's Confessions (Thompson 2000) 
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understood. In a recent collection of essays, Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Religion 
(Arrington and Addis 2004) at least five major strands of Wittgensteinian scholarship are 
apparent and worth looking at: 
1. The role of `Language Games' and `Forms of Life' 
2. Wittgensteinian foundational ism and the influence of On Certainty 
3. `Wittgensteinian Fideism' 
4. `Faith as Passion' 
5. Wittgenstein and the `religious point of view' 
We shall now turn to these before ending this chapter with a review of how 
Wittgenstein's remarks on the mystical have been interpreted by his commentators. 
3.3.1 The Founding Fathers: Language Games and Forms of Life 
Some of the earliest attempts to apply Wittgensteinian approaches to religious issues have 
also been some of the most far-reaching in that much subsequent scholarship in the area 
has echoed the approaches of these early pioneers, in particular the work of Rush Rhees, 
Norman Malcolm, Peter Winch and D. Z. Phillips. 59 
One of the key elements in all four writers, which has become something of a 
neo-Wittgensteinian orthodoxy, is that religious language must not be treated as any other 
language but has its own system of verification that will only make sense within the 
`religious language game'. Such ideas are clearly influenced by those of the later 
Wittgenstein, especially the Philosophical Investigations, and have become something of 
a cliche in interpreting Wittgensteinian views of religious discourse. One of the 
consequences of this, as was seen in the previous chapter, is to have created views of the 
mystical such as those of Cupitt's (See Cupitt 1987,1998) that while purporting to be 
`Wittgensteinian' have an anti-realist character that go far beyond that envisaged by 
Wittgenstein (See previous chapter and Tyler 1993). 
59 See, for example, inter alia Malcolm (1993), Winch (1958,1987), Phillips (1965,1976,1986,1988, 
1993,1997,2001) 
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Such moves have used the importance of Sprachspiele from the investigations to 
make a case for arguing the special importance of religious Sprachspiele. Thus we find 
Rhees writing: 
"God exists" is not a statement of fact. You might say also that it is not in the 
indicative mood. It is a confession - or expression - of faith. This is recognized in 
some way when people say that God's existence is "necessary existence", as 
opposed to "contingency" of what exists as a matter of fact; and when they say 
that to doubt God's existence is a sin, as opposed to a mistake about the facts. 
If you ask, "Well when we are talking about God, does our language not refer to 
anything? ", then I should want to begin, as I have tried to here, by emphasizing 
something of the special grammar of this language... 
You might think that I meant that the language about God was just a sort of 
beautiful pretence; or perhaps that it was just part of the formality of ceremony, 
like after-dinner speeches. I do not mean anything of the sort, of course, and if I 
wanted to avoid that I might say that the language about God certainly does refer 
to something. But then I should want to say something about what it is to `talk 
about God', and how different that is from talking about the moon or talking 
about our new house or talking about the Queen. How different the `talking about' 
is, I mean. That is a difference of grammar. (in Phillips 1997: 49) 
Even in this passage Rhees seems to realize the anti-realist implications that arise from 
just such an emphasis on the `grammar of language' at the expense of a putative object of 
reference. An issue we will return to in the following chapter when we discuss our 
approaches to the `Wittgensteinian methodology' for approaching the `mystical'. As well 
as the consequent anti-realist philosophy of Cupitt, these approaches have also led to a 
strain in `Wittgensteinian' interpretations of the philosophy of religion that emphasises 
`the ceremonial' in the religious. Gareth Moore's approaches come to mind here (See 
Moore 1996) and Clack's doctoral dissertation on the Remarks on Frazer's Golden 
Bough published as Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion (Clack 1999b) which likewise 
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explores the importance of the ceremonial for an understanding of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy of religion whilst avoiding the pitfalls of anti-realism. 
Winch's contribution to the debate has been to emphasise how the methods of the 
natural sciences cannot be applied wholesale to the study of human affairs, such as 
religious belief. 60 Common to many of these approaches of the `founding fathers' of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion has been the importance they ascribe to 
Wittgenstein's dictum to look at description rather than explanation in our approach to 
the phenomenon of religion citing in particular Wittgenstein's remark in PI: 109: 'We 
must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place'. Thus 
Winch suggests we cannot understand what is happening in a monastic community by 
applying purely naturalistic theories without also taking into account the underlying 
beliefs that motivate such a community. What they all have in common is the appeal to 
take the religious Lebensform seriously if we are to approach any serious formulation of 
religion as a fact of human affairs. In the following chapter we shall see the consequences 
of this for our analysis of the mystical, in particular, looking at the Sprachspiele of `the 
mystical' without seeking any `occult entities' of explanation. 
In his summary of what he calls the `neo-Wittgensteinian analysis of religion', 
(Clack 1999a: 81) Clack sees the idea that `religion (or magic) constitutes a specific 
"category of behaviour" and that it is "conducted according to considerations of its own"' 
as the key point which unites so many of these views of what are termed here the 
`founding fathers' of a `Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion'. As he puts it: 
The idea here that rather than there being one monolithic account of truth, 
meaning and rationality common to all human institutions and practices and by 
means of which each practice can be evaluated, there are instead an infinitely 
extendable number of distinctive modes of social life, each of which can be 
evaluated only on its own terms. (Clack 1999a: 81) 
Winch calls these `modes of social life' with their own set of rules, whilst others prefer to 
use the phrases from the Investigations: Lebensformen or Sprachspiele - normally 
60 See, for example, The Idea of a Social Science (Winch 1958 
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translated into English as `Forms of Life' or `Language Games'. One of the chief 
consequences of this approach has been to foster a seemingly invulnerability of the 
`religious form of life' which is not open to criticism. This has been characterised as 
`Wittgensteinian Fideism' to which we turn next. 
3.3.2 Foundationalism and Fideism 
In addition to key approaches developed in the Investigations such as the Lebensformen 
and Sprachspiele it is possible to isolate another cluster of Wittgensteinian interpretations 
that take for their starting point what we have already characterised as the `third 
Wittgenstein', or the post-Investigations writings, especially On Certainty. This has led to 
the development of a form of `Wittgensteinian Foundational ism' that seeks to defend 
religious propositions as `properly basic' (See in particular Phillips's work especially 
Phillips 1988). Such approaches use the arguments of On Certainty that certain 
statements are `properly basic' to make the point that this is particularly the case with 
religious statements. Such notions, however, do lead to the idea that religious categories 
may be beyond criticism, either from empiricial approaches or reductionist theories that 
seek to reduce religion to particular psychological, sociological or other explanations. 
This was a favourite approach of the neo-Wittgensteinian thinker D. Z. Phillips who did so 
much to shape subsequent Wittgensteinian discourse. Thus in his Religion without 
Explanation of 1976 he criticises Frazer, Freud, Durkheim and Feuerbach for failing to 
take into account the importance of the foundational nature of belief for the believers 
themselves. Again the emphasis is on the description of the actual use of religious 
language, rather than the search for explanation: 
Instead of stipulating what must constitute intelligible uses of language, one 
should look to see how language is in fact used... The philosopher's task is not to 
attempt to verify or falsify what he sees, for that makes no sense in this context. 
His task is a descriptive one; he gives an account of the use of language involved. 
(Phillips 1976: 41) 
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A position largely held to by Phillips throughout his long and fecund philosophical career 
and basically restated in one of his last books Religion and the Hermeneutics of 
Contemplation (Phillips 2001). 
One of the consequences of approaches such as Phillips's was the criticism 
developed by Kai Nielsen in his article Wittgensteinian Fideism of 1967 (Nielsen 1967). 
Essentially, Nielsen argued that what writers such as Phillips and Rhees were producing 
was the latest variety of `fideism' - ie. the notion that religion does not need to be open to 
rational defence. The Wittgensteinian element being that as `form of life' religion needs 
no defence and is justified in itself. Nielsen particularly took issue with `Wittgensteinian 
fideism' for, first, the idea that only the believer can fully understand the nature of 
religion. Nielsen argued that just as an anthropologist visiting a tribe could understand 
their beliefs without necessarily adopting them so the scholar of religion could 
conceivably understand a religious practice without adopting it. Secondly, Nielsen 
objected to the `compartmentalisation' of human life that seems to be entailed by talking 
about specific language games for this and for that. Third, Nielsen argues that just 
because we have a religious `language game' it does not mean that it should be 
invulnerable to critique and verification. He argues that just as once we used to talk about 
fairies and witches and no longer do so (presumably from empirical critique of these 
notions) so religious notions should be open to similar critique: 
That a language-game was played, that a form of life existed, did not preclude our 
asking about the coherence of the concepts involved and about the reality of what 
they conceptualised. (Nielsen 1967: 208) 
Since 1967 this charge of `fideism' has been thrown at successive waves of 
Wittgensteinian scholars, most notably D. Z. Phillips. Phillips's first rebuttal of the 
criticism occurred in his 1986 book Belief, Change and Forms of Life (Phillips 1986) a 
task that continued until the end of his life and which was revisited in one of his last 
works, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Phillips: 200 1). Phillips's 
ripostes largely consist of clarifications of his own remarks to show how Nielsen's 
original remarks were a misunderstanding. 
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Regarding the idea that religious beliefs can only be understood by believers, 
Phillips rejects this as a straightforward distortion of his works and claims that from 1965 
he always maintained that religious truths must be open to sceptical discourse. In their 
1998 reader Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (Rowe and Wainwright 1998) 
Rowe and Wainwright state that Phillips `thinks religious belief should not be assessed 
by the rational criteria used in science, traditional metaphysics, or our commonsense 
reflections about the world, or by other external standards'(Rowe and Wainwright 
1998: 132). Again, Phillips responds to this accusation by pointing out that it does not 
take into account the subtlety of his arguments regarding the nature of'rationality'and 
really sidesteps the issues that Wittgensteinian scholarship has raised for the foundational 
nature of religious belief (Phillips 2001: 28). 
On the issue of religious concepts as being `cut off' rom other spheres of human 
life, Phillips makes it quite clear that from The Concept of Prayer (1965) onwards he had 
never maintained this idea, rather, seeing religion as `not cut off from the common 
experiences of human life: joy and sorrow, hope and despair' (Phillips 1965: 40). 
In addition to these two main charges of `fideism' based on Nielsen's readings, 
there is one more characteristic of `fideism' as it is usually encountered in the literature 
which we have already touched on above and will return to later. Basically, that religious 
belief can only be determined by religious language and that meaning cannot be found 
from an objective standpoint. Phillips distances himself from this, although this idea 
which is essentially anti-realist can be made against against Cupitt's work which we 
examined in the previous chapter. 
Before leaving the `fideism and foundationalism' debate, which over the past thirty years 
seems to have generated more heat than light, it is worth mentioning one Wittgensteinian 
scholar who seems to get closer to the heart of the matter. This is Fergus Kerr, whose 
1986 Theology after Wittgenstein (Kerr 1986) is a classic account of how a study of 
Wittgenstein's work can inform the study of theology61. In his discussion of `fideism' 
Kerr makes the key point that a lot of the discussion is based on an essential 
misunderstanding (or even mistranslation) of Wittgenstein's somewhat technical phrases 
61 See also Kerr 1982,1983,1984 
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Lebensformen and Sprachspiele. The notion, he argues, that `religion' can be equated 
with a Wittgensteinian Lebensform is essentially a misunderstanding of how Wittgenstein 
used the term. Likewise, a Wittgensteinian Sprachspiel has a technical sense which 
cannot be applied to `religion' tout court. Ascribing such a view to Wittgenstein is also 
backed up by evidence from Wittgenstein's own journals and correspondence that he had 
no such view of religion. A point we shall return to in the next section. As Kerr goes on 
to suggest, one of the reasons for the emergence of the criticism of `Wittgensteinian 
fideism' may have been the influence of the `founding fathers' themselves. He quotes 
Malcolm: 
I do not wish to give the impression that Wittgenstein accepted any religious faith 
- he certainly did not - or that he was a religious person. But I think that there 
was in him, in some sense, the possibility of religion. I believe that he looked on 
religion as a `form of life' (to use an expression from the Investigations) in which 
he did not participate, but with which he was sympathetic and which greatly 
interested him. (Malcolm 2001: 60) 
Kerr concludes `it is sad that Wittgenstein's name is now associated, perhaps irreversibly, 
with a position in the philosophy of religion that rests upon radical misconceptions of two 
of his most inventively liberating expressions' (Kerr 1986: 31). In this respect we will be 
at pains throughout this dissertation, especially in Chapter Four, to locate Wittgensteinian 
terms such as Lebensformen and Sprachspiele in their original context as they arise in his 
writings. 
To summarise this section so far. It seems that the initial response to Wittgenstein's 
writings from the `founding fathers' was to create a sense of Wittgenstein as a respondent 
in the classical pursuit of the `big questions' of the philosophy of religion. This in turn 
seems to have created the Shibboleth of `Wittgensteinian fideism' which seems on 
examination to be neither Wittgensteinian or fideist. Yet, as Kerr remarks. it has skewed 
the reception or value of Wittgenstein's writing for the study of religion to such an extent 
that many students and scholars do not proceed beyond this smokescreen. 
110 
Drury, Wittgenstein's friend and pupil, once told Wittgenstein that he had been 
reading F. R. Tennant's Philosophical Theology to which Wittgenstein replied `a title like 
that sounds to me as if it would be something indecent' (Rhees 1987: 90). This response 
perhaps indicates the direction we should take in applying Wittgenstein's writings to the 
study of religion, pace the work of the `founding fathers'. Some of the most interesting 
recent writing on the consequences of a study of Wittgenstein's writing for the study of 
religion seems to begin at this point, trying, as it were, to begin with what Wittgenstein 
(quoting Kierkegaard) calls the `passion of religious belief. Of all the writing reviewed 
here this has been the most influential on the approach to Wittgenstein that has been 
adopted for this thesis and will be elaborated in later chapters. We turn to this next. 
3.3.3 Faith as Passion62 
As we shall see throughout this dissertation and will return to in depth in Chapter Eight, 
Wittgenstein was always buffeted by the passion of faith. As we have seen, the 
publication of the Nachlass by his executors tended to isolate Wittgenstein's remarks on 
faith and religion from his remarks on logic and mathematics but as we shall see in 
Chapter Eight this is not always how the remarks appear in the Nachlass. The diaries we 
quote from later (some of which have not been published) show that Wittgenstein was 
constantly searching for religious certainty and essentially saw religious faith as a passion 
(Leidenschaft) -a phrase he borrowed from Kierkegaard -a search which was to 
preoccupy most of his adult life. We have mentioned above the importance of 
understanding the Wittgensteinian biography for the comprehension of his philosophy. In 
the case of understanding his attitude to religious belief this is perhaps even more 
important. One of the key texts for throwing light on Wittgenstein's attitude to religion 
were the recollections of his pupil Maurice Drury (in Rhees 1987). Drury had originally 
gone up to Cambridge to study for the Anglican priesthood at Westcott House. However, 
after he had come under the influence of Wittgenstein he abandoned his ordination 
training and spent two years working with unemployed people in Newcastle and Merthyr 
62 `Weisheit ist leidenschaftlos. Gagegen nennt Kierkegaard den Glauben eine Leidenschaf : Wisdom is 
passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion' (CV: 53e) 
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Tydfil. With Wittgenstein's encouragement he began to study medicine in 1934 and 
qualified in 1939. The most important period of his recollections of Wittgenstein date 
from the period after the Second World War when Wittgenstein was living in Ireland and 
Drury working in St Patrick's Hospital in Dublin. After Drury's death in 1976 his 
recollections were collected and published by Rhees. Commenting on the reason for 
publishing the remarks Drury stated: 
The number of introductions to and commentaries on Wittgenstein's philosophy is 
steadily increasing. Yet to one of his former pupils something that was central in 
his thinking is not being said. 
Kierkegaard told a bitter parable about the effects of his writings. He said he felt 
like the theatre manager who runs on the stage to warn the audience of a fire. But 
they take his appearance as all part of the farce they are enjoying, and the louder 
he shouts the more they applaud. 
Forty years ago Wittgenstein's teaching came to me as a warning against certain 
intellectual and spiritual dangers by which I was strongly tempted. These dangers 
still surround us. It would be a tragedy if well-meaning commentators should 
make it appear that his writings were now easily assimilable into the very 
intellectual milieu they were largely warning against. (Rhees 1987: xi) 
Many of the key themes of Wittgenstein's writing which will be explored in this 
dissertation are contained in this quote: the difficulty and oddness of Wittgenstein's 
writing and how it stubbornly resists easy (or sloppy) academic assimilation; the notion 
of certain `intellectual and spiritual temptations' that his philosophy helps us to 
overcome; the existential relevance of the passion of his philosophy and the challenges it 
presents. His philosophy, so Drury suggests, should not leave us cold: 
Christianity says that wisdom is all cold; and that you can no more use it for 
setting your life to rights than you can forge iron when it is cold. (CV: 53e). 
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As Frederik Sontag points out in his Wittgenstein and the Mystical (Sontag 2000), to 
which we will return in the next section, one of the key influences on Wittgenstein's 
notion of religious belief was his encounter with Tolstoy's Gospel in Brief (Tolstoy 1895) 
which he had first come across whilst he was a soldier in World War One. McGuinness 
and Monk tell the strange story of how shortly after arriving in Galicia during his war 
service in 1914 he walked into a bookshop which only contained one book - Tolstoy's 
Gospels. At this time he was feeling particularly low and in Monk's words he was quite 
literally `saved by the word' (Monk 1990: 115). He carried it with him wherever he went 
for the rest of his service and became known to his fellow troops as `the man with the 
gospels'. In later life Wittgenstein would tell Drury (Rhees 1987: 86) that there were only 
two European writers of recent times who had anything important to say about religion: 
Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. In the book Tolstoy calls Christianity `a very strict, pure, and 
complete metaphysical and aesthetic teaching above which human reason has not risen' 
(Tolstoy 1895: 384). Churches, as well as universities, for Tolstoy, do not expound it and 
it is found through following the `passion of conscience' very much in the way advocated 
by Kierkegaard. `Simple language', a theme we shall return to later, `the language of 
millions of simple, unwise men' (Tolstoy 1895: 4) for Tolstoy, is better than any fine or 
fancy language for getting this truth across. A common ground, as we shall see later 
between Wittgenstein's and Teresa of Avila's style. 
The zeal and passion of the Tolstovian Gospel stayed with Wittgenstein 
throughout his life, tempered as we have seen, with the passion of Kierkegaard which he 
read avidly during his `break from philosophy' in the nineteen twenties. This slightly 
idiosyncratic faith, mixed with a dash of Tagore, perhaps explains his later remark to 
Drury with which we began the thesis and was to so influence Malcolm and many other 
Wittgensteinian commentators: `I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every 
problem from a religious point of view' (Rhees 1987: 94). 
Thus it is possible to interpret the later remarks found, for example in Drury, as a 
commentary on Wittgenstein's belief in the importance of faith as passion whilst 
remaining sceptical as to religious institutions and behaviour tout court. Thus if we are to 
make sense of Wittgenstein's contribution to the philosophical problems arising from 
religious faith we would do well to look at his conviction of the passion of religious faith 
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as much as the `logical structure' of any supposed religious `language games'. As has 
been already said, this is an approach that has been favoured by several recent 
commentators, 63 and one which has influenced this dissertation to which we will return in 
Chapter Eight when we will explore its consequences in more depth. 
3.4 Wittgenstein and The Mystical 
The final passages of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus completed whilst Wittgenstein 
was on active service in World War One and a prisoner in Monte Cassino, Italy, contain 
his most consistent, and some would say notorious, comments on das Mystische: 
6.44 Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern dass sie ist 
Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is. 
6.45 Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als - begrenztes 
- Ganzes. 
Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische. 
The view of the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a limited whole. 
The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical. 
6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer. 
6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. 
6.522 Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich , es ist das Mystische. 
There are indeed, things that are inexpressible. They show themselves. That is the 
mystical 
63 As well as those referred to see also McCutcheon 2001, Kallenberg 2001, Tanesini 2004 
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7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 
As has been apparent throughout this chapter and a theme we shall return to throughout 
this thesis, one of the difficulties with coming to terms with Wittgenstein's texts is the 
deliberate ambiguity and difficulty of his remarks. As we shall see later, when Frank 
Ramsey went to Austria in 1923 to help with the English translation of the Tractatus he 
wrote back to his mother: 
Some of his sentences are intentionally ambiguous having an ordinary meaning 
and a more difficult meaning which he also believes. (LO: 78) 
Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that this somewhat gnomic style, especially in these 
remarks on das Mystische coming at the end of what purported to be a thesis on logical 
form, should mystify his earliest commentators, not least Bertrand Russell. Although his 
former mentor and friend paid fulsome praise to the work in his preface ('a book no 
serious philosopher can afford to neglect') he did not accept the conclusions, especially 
the references to `the mystical'. Consequent commentary has often sided with Russell 
(and most members of the Vienna Circle) in finding the `mystical remarks' a sideshow 
or hindrance to the main action of the Tractatus which is seen as primarily concerned 
with logical form or the nature of meaning. Another approach has been to co-opt 
Wittgenstein's remarks into a wider search for the `mystical' as an ontological, cross- 
credal category - something, again, which does not seem to be Wittgenstein's purpose 
and that we shall return to in the following chapter. 
Of commentators in recent years perhaps Cyril Barrett ( See Barrett 1991 and his 
article in Harris and Insole 2005, pp 61 -75) had come closest to recognising the full 
import of the final paragraphs of the Tractatus for a wider understanding of 
Wittgenstein's approach to faith, belief and what he himself called `the problem of life', 
in the contemplation of which, Barrett claimed, Wittgenstein's own philosophical heart 
lay. For Barrett: 
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Wittgenstein's lasting message is first, the inexpressibility of religious belief, 
ethical principles and aesthetic judgements in empirical terms and hence, second, 
the absurdity of attempting to give an empirical account of them. (Harris and 
Insole 2005: 63). 
Barrett wants to stress the importance of silence to Wittgenstein and allies his approach to 
the strategy of pure apophasis that we will return to in Chapters Five and Seven below. 
There, a modified approach to Barrett's notion of complete apophasis in Wittgenstein's 
approach to the mystical will be argued for, stressing as much the importance of desire 
and affectivity in a Wittgensteinian interpretation of the Dionysian tradition. In Barrett's 
opinion, Wittgenstein does not take the Kantian road to the transcendental, but rather 
`returns to Hume and turns him on his head' (Harris and Insole 2005: 64). That is to say 
he agrees that expressions of value and metaphysics cannot be empirically meaningful, 
but `their nonsensicality was their very essence: they are an attempt to say the unsayable 
in order to make sense of the sayable'. 
Of the other (sparse) literature on Wittgenstein and `the mystical' we have already 
mentioned Sontag's 2000 study. Of the writing on this subject his is the most intriguing, 
however the book assumes an understanding of what the author means by `the mystical' 
or `the mystic'. As will be argued in the following chapter, a Wittgensteinian overview 
of the use of the word in all its manifestations in the past two centuries precludes this 
option if we are to take seriously the consequences from Wittgenstein of understanding, 
as much as anything else, the use of the terms `mystical' in a contemporary context. In so 
far as Sontag does define his terms he seems, like so many commentators, to be 
preoccupied with the mystical as an ontological cross-credal entity. As argued in the 
previous chapter this is unacceptable following a constructivist critique of mystical 
essentialism. This is perhaps where most of the philosophers of religion who tackle the 
question of Wittgenstein and `the mystical' become unstuck. 
McGuinness, on the other hand, in his instructive essay on `Mysticism' (McGuinness 
2002) relies upon the characterisation of `the mystical' from Russell's 1914 essay 
64 In this respect, a similar strategy is adopted by Weeks's 1993 work German Mysticism from Hildegard of 
Bingen to Ludwig Wittgenstein (Weeks 1993) 
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`Mysticism and Logic' which was probably not read by Wittgenstein at the time he wrote 
the Tractatus. Russell's account, like McGuinness's, relies on a Jamesian notion of the 
mystical which we have already critiqued. Being imbued with the Jamesian spirit 
McGuinness concerns himself with the somewhat tangential question of whether 
`Wittgenstein is entitled to have a single doctrine of mysticism' (2002: 187), a question 
whose legitimacy has already been questioned. In this respect it is noticeable that 
McGuinness concerns himself with whether or not `Wittgenstein had a mystical 
experience during the war', or as he later puts it `a genuine mystical experience', a 
category in itself that we have already challenged. Using Zaehner and James in an 
essentialist way McGuinness concludes by stating that `we cannot know whether 
Wittgenstein had mystical experiences'. As we have seen such a conclusion is 
unsurprising due to the nature of the category itself. As opposed to Barrett, who grasps 
the full metaphysical implications of the final remarks of the Tractatus, McGuinness 
remains rooted with the question of whether Wittgenstein's so-called `mystical 
experiences' can be verified or not. A question it seems that Wittgenstein's own approach 
rules out as illegitimate. It is precisely to challenge such unhelpful classifications of 
Wittgenstein's so-called `mysticism' that this thesis arises. 
3.5 Summary 
In his survey of various approaches to Wittgensteinian interpretation, Kallenberg 
concludes: 
I suspect that each `discovery' of a supposed central feature of Wittgenstein's 
thought has the grip it does on each author not because he or she has an objective 
grasp on Wittgensteinian truths, but because Wittgenstein has a subjective grasp 
on them as readers; each `discovery' is but a manifestation of their particular 
`cure'. Reading Wittgenstein rightly leads to diverse convictions because 
maladies differ; each author champions the `Wittgenstein theory' that most 
reflects the way that he or she has escaped his or her own fly-bottle. (Kallenberg 
2001: 13) 
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In this regard this chapter has been concerned with stating the difficulties that arise from 
a contemporary study of Wittgenstein's Nachlass and its application to questions of faith, 
and with respect to this dissertation, the implications he has for our understanding of `the 
mystical'. We have isolated two over-riding challenges: first the fragmentary and 
dislocated manner in which the Nachlass has been presented and the difficulty of 
extracting, for such a lebendig philosopher, his written philosophy from his life - hence 
the importance attached to biographical detail for a full understanding of his philosophy, 
especially in its implications for understanding religious belief. 
The other over-riding challenge has been in the nature of the texts themselves and 
how these have give rise to multiple interpretations over the past fifty years since 
Wittgenstein's death. Apart from disagreement about the consistency of his style - Was 
there one consistent Wittgenstein? An early and a late Wittgenstein? Or even a third 
Wittgenstein? - there are the texts themselves that sometimes seem to deliberately trip us 
up and invite ambiguous or contradictory interpretations. This latter question is one we 
shall return to in Chapter Seven below. It has been argued in this chapter that we do 
Wittgenstein a disservice by seeing him primarily as a theoretical philosopher and that 
we distort his work if we remove its therapeutic aspect from the whole. In this respect we 
are close to the open `mystical speech' that we reviewed in the previous chapter. 
All these over-arching problems of interpretation have fed into the assessment of 
the legacy of Wittgenstein's philosophy for understanding questions of religious belief 
and faith. It has been argued that early attempts by `the founding fathers' to make 
Wittgenstein another analytic philosopher of religion have had middling success and, in 
some writer's opinions, failure. As such, co-opting of Wittgenstein into the ranks of 
`philosophers of religion' has meant that some of the passion and awe with which he 
approaches the subject has been necessarily lost. It has been argued that recent 
commentators have attempted to return to the strangely stubborn spirit of wonder that lies 
in Wittgenstein's philosophical writings and harnessed it to unlock some contemporary 
issues of faith. 
Concluding with a review of the literature on `the mystical' it has been argued 
that, with some notable exceptions, much of the literature has held onto a largely 
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unexamined view of the category which would have been current, say, fifty years ago. 
The extent to which these Wittgensteinian scholars have failed to keep abreast of recent 
developments in the study of `the mystical' as analysed in the previous chapter detracts 
from the validity of their conclusions, especially if as is done in this thesis, we use a 
Wittgensteinian methodology to approach these same questions. 
Accordingly, in the following chapter we turn to the proposed Wittgensteinian 
methodology of this thesis for approaching the writings of St Teresa of Avila. 
119 
Chapter Four: Saying and Showing -A Wittgensteinian Methodology 
4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. 
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. 
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of 
language. 
Propositions show the logical form of reality. 
They display it. 
4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said. ( Wittgenstein: Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus) 
Chapter Two delineated some contemporary academic ways of approaching the mystical 
with their concomitant strengths and weaknesses. At the end of that review it was clear 
that there was much that was helpful in the current debate however it was argued that 
there was room for another approach to be adopted. Consequently, this chapter will 
present the approach to the mystical that will be adopted for the rest of this thesis - what 
we will term the `Wittgensteinian methodology' - based on a reading of Wittgenstein's 
works as delineated in the previous chapter. 
This methodology will be primarily based on the notion of the Übersichtliche 
Blick/Darstellung ('Clear Overview') and the importance that Wittgenstein gives for a 
distinction between Weltanschauung and Weltbild if his approach to philosophy is to be 
understood aright. Accordingly, we shall begin by considering the following areas: 
a) The tools for doing philosophy 
b) How the mechanisms for philosophy can be applied to spiritual and 
theological questions: The Übersichtliche Blick 
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4.1 The Tools for Doing Philosophy 
As argued in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is notoriously 
dense and obtuse, indeed, it could be argued that much of his philosophical method was 
about attacking philosophical method (See Peterman 1992, Genova 1995, Sass 2001, 
Rorty 1982, Fann 1969, Kallenberg 2001). `With the eye of a practiced marksman' writes 
Genova, `he hit his target squarely, rather than rarely, challenging philosophy's emulation 
of science, especially the latter's penchant for theory and faith in progress' (Genova 
1995: xiii). His famous `anti-philosophical' stance, however, is not the whole story, for, as 
he assures us himself, his aims were also deeply philosophical. An anti-method it may 
have been, but Wittgenstein still considered himself a philosopher going about the work 
of philosophy: 
I know that my method is right. My father was a business man, and I am a 
business man: I want my philosophy to be business-like, to get something done, to 
get something settled. (Rhees 1981: 125) 
There is clearly `method behind the madness', indeed as we have seen already, much of 
Wittgenstein's intentional aim seems to have been to re-envisage the aims, goals and 
techniques of philosophy itself; his style itself being part of that revolution. Style, or how 
something is said, determines for Wittgenstein what is said: 
In philosophy it is not enough to learn in every case what is to be said about a 
subject, but also how one must speak about it. We are always having to begin by 
learning the method of tackling it. (RC 111: 43) 
As Genova states: 
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Nowhere in the zillion remarks patiently recorded in his notebooks can one find 
an explicit declaration of his aims and intentions. Instead, cryptic and hostile 
sayings pepper the text... In part, he is reluctant to propound and declare like a 
scientist or prophet. Instead, sarcasm seems a better teacher than sincerity for 
would-be lovers of wisdom. The results, however, are few clues and even fewer 
descriptions of his new way of doing philosophy. (Genova 1995: xv) 
We want very much to `pin Wittgenstein down' but this is precisely what he does not 
want us to do, and he makes it as hard as he possibly can for someone who wants to do 
this, which has presented its own challenges in the writing of this thesis. Many times over 
the past six years there has been the desire to abandon the project, yet ultimately, the 
challenge of putting Wittgenstein's anti-method or anti-philosophy into philosophical and 
theological categories proved irresistible and the result is this thesis. As Genova 
comments on the phrase from Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough: `The crush of 
thoughts that do not get out because they all try to push forward and are wedged in the 
door' (RFGB: 3), saying `After suffering the squeeze for twenty years, I came to the 
conclusion that there is no one, final presentation of his thought, but a variety of 
arrangements, some more perspicuous than others' (Genova 1995: xvii): 
One is always in danger of saying too much or too little. As with poetry, 
wrenching the thoughts from their embodiment invariably does them damage. 
One produces theory, the phenomenon Wittgenstein dreaded most, instead of 
change, the only thing that mattered to him. (Genova 1995: xvi) 
It is on this challenging cusp between avoiding theoretical pronouncements and 
enunciating Wittgenstein's ( and Teresa's) agenda for change that this thesis hovers. 
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The stated aim of this dissertation is to take an approach to mystical discourse 
derived from Wittgenstein's writings and located within the academic debate on the 
subject as delineated in Chapter Two which will then be applied to the Christian tradition 
of theologia mystica as exemplified in the case study of the thesis - the writings of St 
Teresa of Avila. However, as well as applying this Wittgensteinian methodology to 
Teresa it has been found, and will be demonstrated in Part Two of this thesis, that the 
strategies and techniques developed by Wittgenstein are mirrored in the writing of 
Teresa. Faced with the difficulties of Wittgenstein's approach it may be thought that 
Teresa of Avila would present a more systematic, reasonable and coherent approach to 
the soul and the spiritual life. Yet, the more the thesis engaged in conversation between 
the two the more it became apparent that she too was engaged in a similar game; for, as 
with Wittgenstein, there is no one final theological or anthropological position to take on 
her writings and the style is as important as the substance: her goads and sarcastic 
comments are as insistent as Wittgenstein's as we shall see in Part Two below. This, we 
argue in this thesis, is of the nature of `mystical speech', whether encountered in 
Wittgenstein or Teresa. 
Returning, however, to Wittgenstein, we are confronted with the fact that he was 
clearly not intending to view philosophy sub specie aeterni (T: 6.45), ie. to create an 
overriding view of the world, or indeed a `school' or `Fach' in his name (see Rorty 1982). 
Rather, the argument that will be developed in this chapter is that the task of 
Wittgenstein's approach is to cultivate what he calls the Übersichtliche Blick, the aim of 
this Blick being, as we have already seen, to cultivate a `change of aspect' in our way of 
seeing the world. We shall turn first then to uncovering what he meant by this Blick. 
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4.2 'A Way of Seeing'/ Die Übersichtliche Blick : The limits of saving and showing 
How hard I find it to see what is right in front of my eyes! (Wittgenstein VB: 1940) 
In his lectures of 1930 Wittgenstein defines the task of philosophy as one of attempting to 
`be rid of a particular kind of puzzlement. This "philosophic" puzzlement is one of the 
intellect not of instinct' (CLL: 21). From this time onwards he sees philosophy as 
possessing a clear method or as he describes it in the Philosophical Investigations and 
the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough (RFGB), eine Übersichtliche Blick -a `clear 
overview' or, as it is often translated, a `perspicuous view'. For Wittgenstein, what we 
are doing in philosophy is `tidying up' our notions of the world, making clear what can 
be said about the world. From the nineteen thirties onwards Wittgenstein begins to talk 
increasingly about die Übersichtliche Darstellung as a way of `doing philosophy': 
literally, a `way of seeing'. Thus in the Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, written in 
1931, he contemplates Frazer's approach to certain anthropological events and how far 
such an Übersichtliche Darstellung can critique reflections such as Frazer's. He states his 
own position as one which has the form: `Here one can only describe and say: this is 
what human life is like' (RFGB: 121) contrasting it with what he sees as Frazer's 
approach: 
"And so the chorus points to a secret law" one feels like saying to Frazer's 
collection of facts. I can represent this law, this idea, by means of an evolutionary 
hypothesis, or also, analogously to the schema of a plant, by means of the schema 
of a religious ceremony, but also by means of the arrangement of its factual 
content alone, in an Übersichtliche Darstellung. (RFGB: 133) 
This `perspicuous view' is: `of fundamental importance' to Wittgenstein's approach and 
he describes it as that which: `brings about the understanding which consists precisely in 
the fact that we "see the connections". Hence the importance of finding Zwischengliedern 
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("connecting links")' (PI: 133). These Zwischengliedern `do nothing but direct the 
attention to the similarity, the relatedness of the facts'. 
By the time Wittgenstein begins writing the text which will ultimately become the 
Philosophical Investigations (unpublished at the time of his death) the position of the 
Übersichtliche Darstellung has become clearer and more refined. Thus we find the 
following key passage which develops the earlier idea of the Remarks: 
A main source of our misunderstandings is that we do not übersehen (oversee) the 
use of our words. - Our Grammar is lacking an Übersichtlichkeit (overview). - 
The Übersichtliche Darstellung produces the understanding which allows us to 
`see connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing 
Zwischengliedern. 
The concept of the Übersichtliche Darstellung is of fundamental significance for 
us. It designates our Darstellungsform (viewpoint), the way we see things. (Is this 
a Weltanschauung? ). (PI: 122) 
Following this with two important clarifications that point to the nature of the 
Übersichtliche Darstellung : 
A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about". (PI: 123) 
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the 
end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. 
It leaves everything as it is. (PI: 124) 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. (PI: 
126) 
Wittgenstein therefore proposes a methodology, based on the Übersichtliche Darstellung, 
where we simply put `everything before us'. We observe the `language games' or our 
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context while not concerning ourselves with `hidden things', as we have seen already in 
the quote at the head of this chapter, and a consistent part of this thesis. This is nothing 
new to Wittgenstein but already in germinal form in the earlier Tractatus: the notion that 
language does not so much say as show. This being a crucial distinction for Wittgenstein 
and the notion from which the later Übersichtliche Darstellung arises. 
He is concerned that the Übersichtliche Darstellung is not another competing 
Weltanschauung with others in the post-enlightenment/scientific world ( Hence the 
phrase `Is this a Weltanschauung? '). The point is clarified in the remarks from 
Vermischte Bemerkungen: 
Clarity, perspicuity (Durchsichtigkeit) are an end in themselves. I am not 
interested in constructing a building, so much as having a clear view 
(durchsichtig) before me of the foundations of possible buildings. My goal, then, 
is different from the scientist and so my think-way is to be distinguished. (VB: 
459)65 
We have before us the clear view of possible buildings rather than constructing another 
building: conflicting Weltanschauungen can be held before the Übersichtliche 
Darstellung. 
In his last writing, On Certainty, written as he lay dying in Cambridge he clarifies 
the concept by contrasting a Weltanschauung with a Weltbild. In contrast to the 
Weltanschauung, which sees itself as the way of seeing, the Weltbild is a way of seeing: 
It (the Weltanschauung) takes itself too seriously, as the ultimate explanation and 
foundation of our convictions. In contrast, the concept of a Weltbild completely 
avoids the knowledge game. (Genova 1995: 50) 
There are certain propositions that are not open to doubt (OC: 341), they `make 
themselves manifest' but cannot be subject to sceptical deconstruction - `if I want the 
63 Written as a draft foreword to Philosophische Bemerkungen in 1930. See also Zettel 464: `The pedigree 
of psychological phenomena: I strive not for exactitude but Übersichtlichkeit' 
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door to turn the hinges must stay put' (OC: 343). These beliefs form a system that is not a 
knowledge system but `an ungrounded way of acting' (Genova 1995: 5 1). In investigating 
language we cannot, as it were, `step outside language'; our investigation of language 
takes place within the `stream of life' - and language itself. This is the implication of 
Wittgenstein's proposal of the Weltbild. To develop one of Wittgenstein's metaphors, we 
can only, as it were, make repairs on the engine whilst the engine is running, or at least, 
we can only see how the engine works if we investigate when it runs - when it idles we 
cannot make sense of it. The feeling that we can `step outside language' and only then 
make sense of it, is fallacious and ultimately misleading - this is the `picture that once 
held us captive' (PI: 115) and led us to seek an `Archimedean point' from which we 
could survey language from outside, a false assumption: 
"But this is how it is -" I say to myself over and over again. I feel as though, if 
only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I must 
grasp the essence of the matter... 
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our 
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. (PI: 113,115) 
In formulating and developing the notion of the Weltbild Wittgenstein was influenced by 
his reading of Oswald Spengler's work of 1923 Der Untergang des Abendlandes 
(Spengler 1923). In a note amongst the Vermischte Bemerkungen he remarks, inter alia 
that Spengler (as well as Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Boltzmann, Frege, Kraus, Loos, 
Weininger and Straffa) have influenced him (VB: 1931) and Drury notes that in the early 
nineteen thirties Wittgenstein was recommending that he read the work. Although 
rather sprawling and baroque, Spengler's classification, based upon Goethe, does contain 
germs that will later develop into Wittgenstein's Weltanschauung/Weltbild distinction. 
Amongst other things Spengler points out a difference between theorising that `atomises' 
our perspective on the world and theorising that takes a broader picture: 
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The tendency of human thought ( which is always causally disposed) to reduce 
the image of Nature to the simplest possible quantitative form-units that can be 
got by causal reasoning, measuring and counting - in a word, mechanical 
differentiation - leads necessarily in Classical, Western and every other possible 
physics, to an atomic theory. (Spengler 1926: 384) 
This `atomising', scientistic tendency is contrasted with the 'Formgef'ühl und Weltgefühl 
des Erkennenden' - `The Form-feel and World-feel of the knower' (Spengler 1923 1: 494, 
my translation): 
The thinker, in imagining that he can cut out the factor of Life, forgets that 
knowing is related to the known as direction is to extension and that it is only 
through the living quality of direction that what is felt extends into distance and 
depth and becomes space. (Spengler 1926 I: 387) 
From Spengler, then, Wittgenstein clearly takes the notion of `seeing a whole' and 
`forming connections' to make that whole. This is brought out in a passage from Logik, 
Sprache, Philosophie, the work on which Wittgenstein collaborated with Waismann: 
Our thought here matches with certain views of Goethe's which he expressed in 
the Metamorphosis of Plants. We are in the habit, whenever we perceive 
similarities, of seeking some common origin for them. The urge to follow such 
phenomena back to their origin in the past expresses itself in a certain style of 
thinking... 
We are collating one form of language with its environment, or transforming it in 
imagination so as to gain a view of the whole of space in which the structure of 
our language has its being. (Waismann 1965: 80) 
66 See Rhees 1981: 128. Wittgenstein also adds in his conversation: `I don't trust Spengler about details. Ile 
is too often inaccurate. I once wrote that if Spengler had had the courage to write a very short book, it could 
have been a great one. ' 
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The Übersichtliche Darstellung, then, as Wittgenstein comes to formulate it in his later 
philosophy, is influenced by a Spenglerian/Goetherian `taking an overview', what we 
have seen earlier as the observation of a `change of aspect' that allows us to `see the 
world aright'. In creating the distinctively `Wittgensteinian synthesis' he was also, as we 
have seen, indebted to the writings of the nineteenth century physicist, Heinrich Hertz 
(1857 - 1894). Writing concerning the `mysterious' natures of electricity and force Hertz 
compared this mystification with the clarity with which we can speak of gold and 
velocity, saying: - 
I fancy that the difference must lie in this. With the terms `velocity' and `gold' we 
connect a large number of relations to other terms; and between all these relations 
we find no contradictions which offend us. We are therefore satisfied and ask no 
further questions. But we have accumulated around the terms `force' and 
`electricity' more relations than can be completely reconciled amongst 
themselves. We have an obscure feeling of this and want to have things cleared 
up. Our confused wish finds expression in the confused question as to the nature 
of force and electricity. But the answer which we want is not really an answer to 
this question. It is not by finding out more and fresh relations and connections that 
it can be answered; but by removing the contradictions existing between those 
already known, and thus perhaps reducing their number. When these painful 
contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature of force will not have 
been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate 
questions. (Hertz 1956: 7) 
Applying the practice of the Übersichtliche Darstellung, then, to our `mystical 
investigations' here we observe a process of watching or seeing the `Form of Life' 
(Lebensform) through the `language games' (Sprachspiele) that are employed. Our job is 
not to make mystical interpretations of certain Weltanschauungen but to present 
`everything as it is'. The ontological questions no longer concern us (as they did the 
proponents of `modern mysticism'). When Wittgenstein's approach is applied to the 
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spiritual realm then its application is nicely summarised by Drury's remarks concerning 
The Tractaturs: 
For me, from the very first, and ever since, and still now, certain sentences from the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus stuck in my mind like arrows, and have determined 
the direction of my thinking. They are these: 
1. "Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly" 
2. "Philosophy will signify what cannot be said by presenting clearly what can be 
said" 
3. "There are, indeed, things which cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are mystical". (Drury 1973: iv) 
We refer to this passage for two reasons. First, Drury seems to neatly sum up much of 
Wittgenstein's method for approaching philosophy, and secondly he delineated the 
relationship between a) the need to speak clearly - the 
Übersichtliche Blick of the 
philosopher, and b) how this relates to the `unsayable' and the `mystical'. By delineating 
what can be clearly said we also delineate what cannot be said but can be shown. This is 
the role of the philosopher. 
These questions lead to a particular method. This method can be summarised in the 
line from The Philosophical Investigations -'Don't Think - Only Look! ' (PI: 66). Whilst 
not being an anti-theoretical philosopher Wittgenstein preferred an approach to the 
subject matter that `consisted in seeing connections' rather than being interested in the 
`occult identities' of metaphysics. 
We see then how Wittgenstein's philosophy `leaves everything as it is'. Its aim, in his 
words, is `to present everything before us' so that we can have a grasp of the Weltbild 
rather than the Weltanschauung. As we saw in the previous chapter, after Wittgenstein's 
death there has been a tendency to emphasise the importance of analysis of the 
Sprachspiel or `Language Game' as the major outcome from the Übersichtliche Blick. 
Yet, the argument presented here has suggested a rather wider concept of Wittgenstein's 
Weltblick, one that encompasses the Sprachspiel but that goes beyond this to analyse the 
whole nature of the speech/action interface that underlies human communication. For 
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Wittgenstein, we have argued, the philosophical Blick is not simply about a dry analysis 
of `Language Games' (as is often interpreted by contemporary scholars) but a wider all- 
embracing understanding of the act of human communication. Thus the `view' advocated 
here leaves behind the hard ontological realism of `modem mysticism' and its advocates, 
as well as the empty anti-realism of constructivists such as Katz and Cupitt. Rather, the 
Wittgensteinian approach advocated here concentrates the mystic `speech act' in its 
overall communicative intent, that is, through showing as well as saying. This leads to the 
notion we will explore in later chapters of the `performative discourse of mystical 
speech'. 
4.3: The Move from Thinking to Seeinn: Ontological Content of Mystical Discourse 
A consequence of the adoption of the Übersichtliche Darstellung is a move throughout 
Wittgenstein's later work from a `thinking' to `seeing' (or, we can put it, from `saying' to 
`showing') to, finally in the last works such as On Certainty, a `way of acting'. The 
`change of aspect' that accompanies the Übersichtliche Darstellung will also, by 
implication, lead to a change of life and action - the fly will be led out of the fly-bottle. 
As he wrote in 1931: 
A present day teacher of philosophy doesn't select food for his pupil with the aim 
of flattering his taste, but with the aim of changing it. (VB: 1931) 
As is argued throughout this dissertation, at root Wittgenstein's philosophy, like Teresa's 
theology, is basically transformational. 
In the Philosophical Investigations we are exhorted to `Denk nicht, sondern 
schau! - Don't think, only look! ' (PI: 66). We take our material - the `language games' - 
and we observe `similarities, relationships' and `anything common at all'. The aim of 
philosophy, for the later Wittgenstein is: 
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The uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the 
understanding has got by running its head against the limits of language. These 
bumps make us see the value of discovery (PI: 119). 
Understanding is no longer a `mental process' (PI: 154): 
Try not to think of understanding as a `mental process' at all. - For that is the 
expression that confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind 
of circumstances, do we say, "Now, I know how to go on". 
His philosophy: `simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is 
hidden, for example, is of no interest to us' (PI: 126). 67 
We have seen already how elements of such an approach have been adopted by 
commentators such as Sells and Kripal in reference to the mystical discourse, teasing out 
the `mystical games' of deconstruction, subversion and the libidinal. However, in both 
writers there seems to be an ambiguity about the `ontological content' `behind' the 
discourse. In the case of Sells, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, there is `reference' to an 
apophatic `event' behind the apophatic text (3 and 7 in his `Principles of Apophatic 
Language'). Kripal is ambiguous here and seems to be closest to the `ontological 
agnosticism' we are advocating here, although he does not state it in those terms. From 
Wittgenstein's analysis we see that the meaning of a discourse is derived not only from 
the language itself but its context in the `stream of life': `words have meaning only in the 
stream of life. ' (RPP1: 913). 68 Pace Cupitt and the anti-realists, with such a conception it 
is hard to image a language game that does not `have contact with reality' ie. `The stream 
of life'. As Wittgenstein puts it in On Certainty: `The human frame of reference, that 
includes the capability of experience and of judgment, is seen as constitutive for our 
relation to reality' (OC 80.8 1)69 The truth of certain empirical propositions cannot be 
67 cf PI 435 `For nothing is concealed... for nothing is hidden... ' 
68 See also T: 4.031 ` this proposition represents such and such a situation'. 
69 See also LPE: 143. One of the arguments of this thesis is that Wittgenstein's methodology implies an 
ambivalence towards the ontological commitments of his approach, he is not radically disontological as 
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tested, however our understanding of a proposition can be. Applied to mystical discourse, 
the `truth' of these statements cannot be `tested' (pace James and other psychologistic 
and experientialist approaches) by verification, but they can be understood nevertheless: 
`The truth of certain empirical propositions ( like "I am in pain") belongs to our frame of 
reference' (OC: 83) and therefore `the truth of my statements is the test of my 
understanding of these statements. That is to say: if I make certain false statements, it 
becomes uncertain whether I understand them' (OC: 80.81). The `human frame of 
reference' (judgement and experience) is necessary for our relation to reality. To think of 
a `language game' entirely unhinged from `reality', which seems to be the direction of 
Cupitt's analysis, is neither desirable or helpful; our `frame of reference' allows for the 
`truth' of a particular discourse. Mystical discourse does not necessarily have to be 
reduced to empirical statements requiring empirical verification, the understanding of the 
discourse within its framework brings meaning. In Dolejgovä's words: 
No sharp distinguishing line can be drawn between what is constitutive for our 
frame of reference and what is a product of it, what is the capability of experience 
and of judgment, and what are their expressions. Both are expressed in 
propositions, and there is no better way of expressing them. Both propositions are 
part of a kind of "mythology". (Dolejgovä 2001: 269) 
To illustrate this point Wittgenstein uses the famous metaphor of the riverbed of 
`hardened empirical propositions' allowing other fluid propositions to flow in (OC: 95 - 
97). 
We saw above certain attempts to ground the `certainty' of the mystical event: 
1. James's `transcendental-experiential ism' that grounded the mystical event in the 
`mystical experience'. This was to be investigated by empirical means. 
2. The `Modern Mysticism' of Vaughan, Inge and Underhill that emphasised a cross- 
credal ontological entity. 
3. The constructivist emphasis on the `logic' of mystical language. 
implied by Cupitt and Phillips, nor does his approach suggest the `hard' realism of, say, Teresa. We can 
perhaps suggest he opens an ontological door which Teresa, for one, is free to pass through. I am indebted 
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From Wittgenstein's analysis we are presented with another epistemological 
alternative which avoids many of the problems we have seen with these three. We are 
presented with a `methodological non-foundationalism' (Dolejsova 2001: 270) that arises 
from the frame of reference of our (mystical) speech. Wittgenstein presents three 
moments to the communicative act: knowing, believing and acting. Within these there is 
`hierarchy of certainty': ' in the beginning is the deed', acts come first, which provide the 
credibility of belief upon which our knowledge is based. In our analysis of the mystical 
discourse (games) in Part Two of the thesis we will not be looking for a certain extra- 
linguistic category ('mysticism'/'mystical experience' etc) that grounds the discourse and 
gives it certainty (The question `Was so-and-so a mystic or not' is therefore misleading) 
but the certainty that arises from the knower's knowledge in the discourse itself. The 
certainty arises from the discourse: `The truth of my statements is the test of my 
understanding of these statements... If I make false statements, it becomes uncertain 
whether I understand them' (OC: 80,81). It is possible to have a `mystical orientation' 
without a fixed belief system `behind it' (whether this is explicitly ontological in the case 
of Underhill and Inge, or explicity de-ontological in the case of Katz and Cupitt). The 
meaning of the mystical statement arises from its use by the agent, or as Wittgenstein 
states in the Philosophical Investigations: `the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language' (PI: 43). The certainty of mystical discourse is not something to be derived but 
something from whence we start. Consequently, our emphasis here, using our 
Wittgensteinian perspective, will be on the form of mystical language game or what I will 
refer to as performative discourse. 
Wittgenstein's analysis releases the fly of mystical analysis from the mystical fly 
bottle. We are no longer concerned with finding ghostly ('occult', see Z: 605,606) 
`entities' or categories that lie `behind' mystical discourse ('And so the chorus points to a 
secret law' RFGB: 133). Mystical discourse possesses meaning qua mystical discourse. 
Its language games are embedded in a practice or `way of life' that enables reference to 
occur. Rather, our aim is to pursue `a more active kind of practical understanding' in 
to Chris Insole for help in elucidating this point. 
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accord with the general thrust of this thesis which is towards a practical philosophical 
theology: 
An understanding that will allow us to `go on' in an activity in a socially 
concerted and unconfused manner... Instead of seeking something hidden, 
something that will explain a circumstance to us, intellectually and passively, 
(Wittgenstein) provides us with a more active kind of practical understanding. 
(Schotter 1997: 9) 
In summary, it is proposed here that `mystical discourse' be understood as a means of 
`changing aspect' through the Übersichtliche Darstellung. This then frees us up to `see 
the world aright' which will have implications for how we live in a practical way. In 
short, we could summarise our position by suggesting that the meaning of mystical 
speech is found through transformative act. We turn to how this is done through the 
move from seeing to acting next. 
4.4. From Seeing to Acting: Performative Discourses and Strategies of Elucidation 
Worte sind Taten - Words are deeds (Wittgenstein VB: c 1945) 
Language is not a representational structure but a presentational act. (Genova 
1995: 117) 
By the time of the last writings, especially On Certainty, Wittgenstein is supplementing 
the `way of seeing' with a `way of acting': 
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end 
is not certain propositions striking us immeadiately as true, ie. it is not a kind of 
seeing on our part, it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game. 
(OC: 204) 
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The frame of reference of the mystical discourse in the `way of life' is essential: 
What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say -forms of life. (PI: 226) 
We have moved `out of the head' to find understanding and meaning in the wider arena 
of games. Our aim is not to `refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our 
words in unheard-of ways' (PI: 133), there is not one `philosophical method' but 
`methods, like different therapies' (gleichsam verschiedene Therapien). As we saw in the 
previous chapter, this analogy with therapy is telling and relates clearly to the `mystical 
strategies' of a writer such as Teresa of Avila. As we shall see in Part Two, she is not so 
much concerned with enunciating metaphysical theories of theology but providing a 
practical way of acting which will help a distressed person find peace and solace. 
Likewise, Wittgenstein is concerned to move the reader from thinking to seeing and 
finally acting. The reading of his philosophy, as has been emphasised all along, is not a 
passive act but must be an active engagement that challenges the reader to engage with 
the work on all levels. A strategy, as we shall see, he shares with Teresa. As in 
psychotherapy, both Wittgenstein and Teresa involve us in observing the foundations of 
possible buildings rather than trying to build one building - the Weltbild rather than the 
Weltanschauung (See also Tyler 1999). Like a successful therapist, they do not provide 
clever interpretations and interventions but allow the clarity of insight (Übersichtliche 
Darstellung) to be turned on the `foundations of possible buildings'. 
This post-enlightenment way of knowing (therapeutic discourse - to which we 
could add mystical discourse too) requires a more interactive and immediate medium or 
frame of reference than either thinking or seeing provide. Action is the closest activity 
available to language and such activity will be tempered by a necessary vein of humility 
arising from the lack of an overriding Weltanschauug, as we shall see in Part Two, 
humility is a necessary component of the overall `mystical strategy'. 
For Wittgenstein, as with Teresa, change and transformation are paramount. Both 
entice us, excite us, goad us and puzzle us. They are not meant to leave us alone. They 
pose us problems (Wittgenstein's thought games, Teresa's word pictures and challenges) 
which cannot be ignored. By their nature they `subvert', if they do not subvert they have 
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failed in their task. If we play their games with them they re-orientate our perceptions of 
reality, ourselves and our place in the world: hey are primarily performative discourses 
that `show' rather than `say'. In Genova's words they are `elucidations': 
Elucidations are in a class of their own, not quite poem, aphorism or logical 
equation, they resist categorization... They instruct by example, by showing 
rather than saying. (Genova 1995: 108) 
As Wittgenstein states in his preface to the Tractatus, there is what is presented on the 
written page and what is unwritten, and often `this second part is the important one' 
(LPE: 143). 70 Thus, 
Instead of helping us `find' something already existing but supposedly hidden 
behind appearances, (Wittgenstein's) methods help us grasp something new, as 
yet unseen, in the emerging articulation of our speech entwined activities. 
(Schotter 1996: 16) 
Accordingly, when in the following chapter we turn to the Sprachspiele of Teresa and her 
antecedents we shall identify these Spiele as Performative Discourses for Changing 
Aspects. They are discourses out of which action arises and which cannot be viewed 
without their concomitant context of action. 
4.5 Linguistic State2ies: How the Midwife Undertakes Her Work 
Anything your reader can do for himself leave to him. (Wittgenstein VB: 1948) 
As we noted above, one of Wittgenstein's main aims was to let his reader `do their own 
work'. He was primarily concerned for his students to `do their own thinking. ' Euan Hill, 
one of Wittgenstein's last students with whom I recorded a conversation in early 2006 
referred to it as `bootstrapping' from computational theory, ie. you just give enough 
70 cf The Tractatus 4.1212: `What can be shown, cannot be said' 
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programme for the computer itself to go on developing the programme71. Thus we find in 
his writings a variety of subversive or `prompting' strategies to enable him to do this to 
his reader. He is not going to bamboozle us or dazzle us with layers of sophisticated 
theory, rather he will challenge us to wake up and start thinking for ourselves. 
Wittgenstein clearly states that he does not want to spare his readers the trouble of 
`thinking for themselves' (PI: viii). He says of his later philosophy: 
I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and 
having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her key. (OC 532) 
Genova comments: 
Dressed as an old woman (a guise used often by philosophers, eg. Diotima) 
instead of the conquering hero, Wittgenstein pads about his conceptual domain 
seeking what he mislaid, namely, the pictures that free one from the fly-bottle... 
Its goal is pure performance in that once it completes its job, to change the way of 
seeing, it ought to self-destruct. Words ought to dissolve into the attitudes and 
actions from which they came. They are, in the strictest sense of the word, 
"deeds". (Genova 1995: 129) 
Or further, we can say that he disguises himself like Socrates's midwife the better to give 
birth to individual and independent thought in the listener or reader. As Kallenberg has 
stressed, he wants to inspire in the reader the same `passion of subjectivity' as his mentor, 
Kierkegaard, had in himself. 
In such a way of `doing philosophy' our normal conventions of philosophy and 
conceptual discourse dissolve. No longer the systematic introduction, exposition and 
conclusion -these are the requirements of the Weltanschauung; the Weltbild has differing 
requirements. His comments appear as a sequence of numbered remarks, sometimes 
apparently randomly thrown together, yet as we have already seen, we know that he took 
71 Conversation in Carshalton, March 2006 
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great time and trouble arranging and re-arranging their sequence so that the discourse 
would have the desired performative effect on the person who engaged with it: 
They point or gesture towards ends that are somewhat alien to our current 
preoccupations. In fact they are written in the form of "striking similes" and 
"arresting moments" - they have a "poetic quality" their function is to change our 
"way of looking at things" (PI: 144). (Schotterl997: 1) 
As we shall see in the following chapter, mystical discourse adopts similar strategies to 
subvert and elude its reader's expectations - in both cases, the goal is `pure performance'. 
For Wittgenstein, our words become tools, instruments to challenge and wake us up, he 
refers to them as `the levers in the cabin of a locomotive' or `tools in a toolbox'. 
Throughout his writings he uses them carefully and develops and traces his strategic 
elucidations with care and caution. Schotter (1997: 14) isolates four `linguistic strategies' 
adopted by Wittgenstein: 
1. To arrest or interrupt ('to deconstruct') the spontaneous, unselfconscious flow of 
our ongoing `mental' activity. These strategies provoke us into examining 
whether there is `more to it' than we expected. We are shocked into `standing 
back' 
2. To use certain `instructive forms of language' that provoke us to give 
`prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily made us 
overlook'( PI: 132). They are `instructive gestures' which point and show. 
3. To suggest new ways of thinking by the use of carefully selected images, similes 
and metaphors which can help the process giving `first form to such sensed but 
otherwise unnoticed distinctions, thus to make reflective contemplation of their 
nature possible'. 
4. To use the comparison of different `language games' to present `an order in our 
knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one of 
many possible orders; not the order' (PI: 132). 
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His similes, his playful use of metaphors, are there to `show' rather than `say'. They 
recall us to our right relationship to our language, our selves and those around us. In 
terms of mystical discourse, we can talk about a play that reminds us of our right 
relationship with the triune God. Just as the chiropractor hits our bones at certain angles 
to bring the correct alignment back to the body, so Wittgenstein, and our `mystical 
strategists', hit our mental, emotional and spiritual bones at different angles to bring our 
thought, emotions and spiritual seeing back into right alignment. As part of this 
subversive linguistic toolkit, Genova (Genova 1995: 130) isolates four `subversive 
stategies' used by Wittgenstein: 
1. Talking to himself 
2. Contradicting himself 
3. Avoiding arguments and conclusions 
4. Refusing orientating structures 
When we come to investigate the linguistic strategies, or performative discourse, of 
Teresa and the theologia mystica in part two we shall return to these strategies and 
compare and contrast these approaches with those adopted by Teresa. For now it is 
necessary to conclude this chapter with a summary of the argument developed so far. 
4.6 Summary 
Our analysis of the Wittgensteinian performative discourse in this chapter has opened up 
a possibility of exploring the mystical `language games' or `strategies' whilst remaining 
`ontologically agnostic'. Certain key aspects of the Wittgensteinian methodology have 
been isolated which will be adopted. in the rest of this thesis. 
The chapter began by emphasising the adoption of a Weltbild (rather than a 
Weltanschauung) based upon an Übersichtliche Darstellung. It was then argued that 
Wittgenstein sees a change of Weltbild as necessary to `change our aspect' or `way of 
looking at the world'. Ultimately, we argued, this will inevitably lead to a change of life 
or action. Drawing upon Wittgenstein's writings we emphasised the importance of action 
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and performance to his understanding of discourse. We suggested that similar strategies 
can be found in mystical discourse and proposed to search for this performative discourse 
in the theologia mystica of the Western tradition, in particular in the writings of Teresa of 
Avila. In investigating these writings in Part Two from this Wittgensteinian perspective 
the following points will be borne in mind: 
1. We shall not be seeking to find quasi-ontological `mystical entities' in the texts. 
We choose not to adopt this essentialist methodology ( the position of `modern 
mysticism' elaborated in Chapter Two). Following the arguments presented 
above, we shall be observing the Weltbild of the discourse. 
2. Although we shall not adopt an essentialist approach to mystical discourse we 
shall not, conversely, see that discourse as a cold contextualist narrative. We shall 
analyse the discourse from its performative or participatory perspective. That is to 
say we appreciate the transformational , aspect of mystical 
discourse and how it 
leads, in a Wittgensteinian sense, from saying to showing to acting. We are 
concerned with the whole communicative intent of mystical speech as 
transformative act. 
3. It was argued above how Wittgenstein delineates a philosophical method that 
concentrates as much on how something is said as much as what is said. 
Therefore, in applying his methods to the writings of Teresa of Avila we shall 
concentrate as much on how she says something as much as what is said. Thus, 
when we turn to the texts of Teresa of Avila we shall be concentrating on the 
performative aspects of her texts as we compare them with similar strategies in 
the writings of Wittgenstein. 
4. We have isolated a move in Wittgenstein from thinking to seeing to acting. We 
shall show in the following chapters how such a move helps elucidate the 
`mystical strategies' of the theologia mystica to produce a similar move from 
thinking about God to experiencing God through what is termed embodiment or 
affectivity. As well as the `deconstructive strategy' suggested above it forms, we 
shall argue, the second strategy of the theologia mystica. 
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Having argued against using the essentialism of `modern mysticism' and the cold 
linguistic analysis of constructivism to approach the writings of Teresa of Avila, Part One 
of the thesis will conclude with the proposal for analysing her writings from a third 
perspective based on the Wittgensteinian approach outlined in this chapter. Namely, what 
we propose to call the performative discourse of theologia mystica. The final chapter of 
Part One will be devoted to developing this idea and its implications. 
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Chapter Five: Mystical Strategies and Performative Discourse of the 
Tu eologia Mystica 
The rest of this dissertation will concentrate on applying the Wittgensteinian approach 
developed in the previous chapter to the `mystical strategies' of the writings of Teresa of 
Avila. However, before we turn to those writings themselves, which we will do in Part 
Two, we need to clarify one final term we have already introduced and which will be 
used for the rest of this dissertation - namely that of theologia mystica. 
So far it has been argued that both `modern mysticism' and pure constructivism ä 
la Cupitt and Katz are limited as approaches to `mystical texts' such as those of Teresa of 
Avila. In the previous chapter a Wittgensteinian approach was presented which sees the 
mystical text through the Weltbild of an Übersichtliche Blick that concentrates on the 
performative aspects of the discourse. It is this approach which will be taken to Teresa's 
texts in Part Two. However, before that is done it is necessary to explain something of the 
tradition to which Teresa is heir and which will be referred to as the tradition (or 
performative discourse) of theologia mystica. At the beginning of Chapter Two we saw 
how commentators such as de Certeau emphasised the origins of la mystique as a 
distinctive area of humanistic study and that out of this `modern mysticism' would 
eventually arise. In this chapter it will be argued that there is a distinctive pre-modern 
tradition of what we term the `performative discouse of theologia mystica' that arises 
from interpretations of the Dionysian texts in the Parisian schools of the twelfth/thirteenth 
centuries and thence spreads throughout Europe reaching Teresa via the texts of 
Francisco de Osuna (whom she terms `her master') and Jean Gerson. By applying the 
Wittgensteinian Blick developed in the previous chapter, this chapter will concentrate on 
the language game of theologia mystica and highlight two `performative discourses' that 
will be explored in Teresa's writings in Part Two of the thesis. 
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5.1 The Creation of the Medieval Dionysian Tradition: The Corpus Dionysiacum 
Key to understanding the tradition of theologia mystica to which Teresa was heir are the 
writings variously alluded to as the Dionysian Corpus. These writings evolved through 
one thousand years of interpretation and translation to assume, by the late medieval 
period, a unique position in the West's understanding of theological exegesis, becoming 
identified with the tradition of theologia mystica. 
The four works and epistles (Ep) of the Corpus Dionysiacum: the Mystical 
Theology (MT), Celestial Hierarchy (CH), Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (EH) and Divine 
Names (DN) make their first entry in Western intellectual life through the Greek 
manuscipt presented to Louis the Pious, the Frankish king, by the Eastern emperor, 
Michael the Stammerer, in 827.72 Attributed to the Areopagite who appears in Acts 17: 34 
the works retained semi-canonical status throughout most of the Middle Ages until 
Erasmus and Lorenzo Valla began to question the attribution in the early sixteenth 
century. Their doubts were reflected by Luther who used Erasmus's phrase `Dionyisus 
ille quisquisfuerit' (`Dionysius, whoever he was) in his Psalms Commentary of 1519- 
1521.73 Despite this, the apostolic authority of Dionysius continued to be defended into 
modem times, however, scholarly work in the nineteenth century by Stigimayr and Koch 
(1895) demonstrated conclusively the link between Dionysius and the neo-platonic circle 
around Proclus, one of the last heads of Plato's Academy in Athens, the Academy itself 
being closed in 529 by the Emperor Justinian. Accordingly, it looks as though our author 
could not have been writing before the middle of the fifth century and most likely dates 
from the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries. In the words of Andrew Louth: 
n The most recent scholarly edition of the original Greek texts is the Corpus Dionysiacum edited by 
Suchla, Heil and Ritter (Berlin 1990). In this section we shall largely be concerned with the twelfth century 
interpretations of the text that formed the tradition of theologia mystica in the West. Accordingly we shall 
concentrate on the Latin versions of the text found in Dionysiaca (Paris 1937 - 1950), Patrologia Latina 
(Paris 1844), Harrington (Paris 2004) and McEvoy (Paris 2003). For English Translations we shall draw on 
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works trans Luibheid and Rorem (New York 1987), Dionysius the 
Areopagite on the Divine Names and Mystical Theology (London 1920) and Denis Hid Divinity edited by 
McCann (London1924) and Walsh (New York 1988). See Bibliography for full details. 
"Luthers Werke, Weimar Edition 5,503: 9-10 
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Denys the Areopagite, the Athenian convert, stands at the point where Christ and 
Plato meet. The pseudonym expressed the author's belief that the truths that Plato 
grasped belong to Christ, and are not abandoned by embracing faith in Christ. 
(Louth 1989: 11). 74 
Whoever the real author was, and perhaps we shall never know, the texts represent a 
fascinating insight into the world of late paganism and emerging Christianity, suggesting 
as Louth indicates, an interplay between the two forces. 
Early on scholia were written to the texts by John of Scythopolis and Maximus 
the Confessor, 75 the former possibly in close contact with the original author. 76 The 
Dionysian texts are first cited in an ecclesiastical forum at the Council of Constantinople 
in 532 although the scholia were already closely associated with the documents by this 
time (Louth 1989: 112). 
As already mentioned, the documents really entered the Western tradition with the 
gift of a codex from Michael the Stammerer to Louis the Pious in 827.77 Louis gave the 
work to Hilduin, Abbot of St Denis in Paris, to translate into Latin, he went further in 
identifying the author of the texts with St Denis, the bishop and martyr of Paris in his 
hagiographical Passio sanctissimi Dionysil (See Chevallier 1957: 319). Compounded with 
the identification with Dionysius, the first bishop of Athens, (first by Eusebius) the texts 
now assumed an authority that would be unassailable throughout the Middle Ages (Sells 
1994: 34, Pelikan 1987: '21). 
Hilduin's translation (H), made between 832-835, was the first of a long line of 
Thery, who rediscovered and edited it, believed it to be the Latin translations of the text 78 
74 The main works drawn upon for this study of Dionysius are as follows: The article in the Dictionnaire 
de spiritualite (DS), 'Denys L'Areopagite: Doctrine' 3: 244-86 by Rend Roques and his 1954 work 
L'univers dionysien. Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius. A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to their 
Influence (1993). Louth, Denys the Areopagite (1989), McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism, (1991), 
Knowles (1975) and the commentaries and articles found in the texts by Luibheid, Harrington, McEvoy and 
Walsh mentioned in the previous footnote. 
75 See von Balthasar Herrlichkeit: einer theologische Ästhetik, 11. Fächer der Stile, 1. Klerikale Stile. (1962) 
76 See Saffrey (1979) 3 -16, Suchla (1980) 
77AIthough they were known to Gregory the Great who refers to them in Homily 34 on the Gospels (see 
Louth 1989: 121) 
7e Unless otherwise stated, our main source for the Latin translations is Dionysiaca. The Ililduin translation 
was rediscovered and edited by Gabriel Thery in 1932 and reprinted in Etudes dionysiennes, vol 1 (Paris, 
Vrin) 101-42 using the manuscript of the BN 15645. It is reproduced in Dionysiaca 
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collaborative work of three people. This would accord with medieval practices of 
translation as found later in centres of scholarly translation such as Toledo in Spain. In 
both cases one party would read out the manuscript which would then be orally translated 
from Greek to Latin by a second party, and finally written down by a third party. The 
result is highly erratic and has been called unreadable (Harrington 2004: 1), he employs 
up to sixteen different translations for some Greek words and there seems to be little 
understanding of the text being translated. The text was soon superseded by that of 
Eriugena (810-77) made some thirty years later around 862 on the command of Charles 
the Bald, Louis's son. 
John `The Scot' Eriugena was a philosophical theologian in his own right, the 
translation of the Corpus being followed by at least three significant works in the area: 
the Periphyseon or De Division naturae of the 860s, the Commentary on Dionysius's 
Celestial Hierarchy and the Homily and Commentary on St John's Gospel. 79 The 
importance of Eriugena's translation of Dionysius was its ability to have greater 
intelligibility than Hilduin's whilst retaining a lot of the unusual language and 
terminology of the original Greek. Later translations may have been more accessible but 
Eriugena retained something of the wildness and rough edge of the original. For example, 
whenever Eriugena comes across a Greek word with the virep- prefix he simply creates a 
new word with a super- prefix, thus, virepOcc becomes superdeus which we could render 
in English as over-god or hyper-god. The `roughness' of the `mystical text' being a 
characteristic we have already isolated in the previous chapter as part of their 
`performative discourse'. As with Teresa and Wittgenstein it is notable that scholarly 
approaches to the Dionysian texts have been divided between those who want to `tidy 
them up' to produce a coherent theoretical whole, and those who want them to retain their 
`rough edges' and concomitant 'oddness'. 80 
When Eriugena's translation was sent to Rome for approval the reaction of the 
papal librarian, Anastasius, to this seemingly miraculous manifestation of cultural genius 
79 See DS 3: 250, McGinn 1994: 80 -118 B0 As McGinn points out (1994: 80 passim) Eriugena holds three distinct cultural streams in his writing: the 
Latin, Celtic and Greek. The result is a unique synthesis that was to play a significant role in the future 
development of the theologia mystica tradition. 
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from the far flung outposts of `civilisation' was summarised in his letter accompanying 
the manuscipt: 
It is also cause for wonder by what means that uncultivated foreigner (vir We 
barbarus), placed on the borders of the world, ... could grasp such matters with 
his intellect and translate them into another tongue: I mean John the Irishman, a 
man who I know by hearsay is in all things holy. But herein was the working of 
that creative Spirit who made this man as fervent as he was eloquent... For love 
was the master who taught this man what he accomplished for the instruction and 
8 edification of many. ' 
While marvelling at the work he also lamented the shortfalls in Eriugena's approach. Part 
of Anastasius's response to the translation was to complement it with translations of the 
scholia to the corpus which had been attached to it from its earliest appearance and 
associated with John of Scythopolis and Maximus the Confessor (See Harrington 2004: 
16 -18). 
82 Not having to rely on the same (impaired) document as Eriugena held at Saint 
Denis, Anastasius was also able to correct some aspects of Eriugena's translation as well 
as adding some scholia of his own. 83 
This process of annotation and correction, usually in the addition of marginalia, 
would continue for the next three centuries so that by the time the Latin West reengaged 
with the documents in the `twelfth century Renaissance' they were already heavily 
annotated from seven hundred years of commentary. In Harrington's words: 
The thirteenth-century reader came to the text of the Mystical Theology with 
much of the interpretative work already done for him, finding difficult metaphors 
and foreign concepts set within a more familiar Latin framework. (2004: 27) 
81 In PL 122: 1025, translation Mary Brennan Materials for the Biography of Johannes Scottus Eriugena in 
Studia Medievali 3a serie 27 (1986): 431 
82 On the methodology of Anastasius's translation see Neil 1998 
83 eg PG 4: 417.6 Ardentibus: Ardentes quod interpres posuit Graecus on imbutos seu initiatos - id est on 
conscecratos - habet. Er notandum quod allos indoctos dicat et allos non imbutos - 'Firebrands': Where 
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Central to the twelfth century revival of interest in Dionysius was Paris, especially its 
emerging university and the still influential Abbey of Saint-Denis (see Leclercq 1987: 27 
also Haskins 1957, Morris 1972, Knowles 1962). 84 In addition, the group of writers and 
commentators associated with the Abbey of St Victor in Paris took particular interest in 
the Dionysian corpus. The abbey grew with the schools of Paris and was open to the new 
theological developments of the university and from its inception it was concerned with 
questions on the relationship between the intellectus and affectus. The distinctive 
Victorine tradition established there combined `a vigorous program of Bible study, 
serious and creative theological investigation and disciplined pursuit of contemplation all 
set in the context of a community orientated towards liturgical regularity and shared 
experience' (Zinn 1979: 3). The abbey continued to flourish throughout the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, surviving until the French revolution when it was destroyed. 
From the point of view of this thesis, the chief development which would shape 
future interpretations of the Dionysian texts and indeed the shaping of the tradition of 
theologia mystica itself in the late Middle Ages, which was so important for Teresa, was 
this very combination of intellectus and affectus in the understanding of the texts. 
Of the first generation of Victorines, the most celebrated was Hugh of St Victor 
(1096 -1141), probably born in Saxony he moved to St Victor around 1115 being elected 
abbot of the foundation in 1133.85 Hugh's Commentary on Dionysius's Celestial 
Hierarchy was incorporated into the commentaries on the Dionysian corpus circulating in 
Paris and became part of the standard Dionysian edition until the late medieval period 
(See Harrington 2004: 3). 
the Translator puts firebrands' the Greek has 'unimbued' or 'unitiated' - that is, 'unhallowed. Note that 
Dionysius calls some 'untaught' and others 'unimbued' ( Harrington 2004: 63) 
84 The Abbey was founded by William of Champeaux, a master of the schools of Paris and described by 
Abelard as `the first dialectician of his age', founding the abbey after retiring from the schools in 1108. He 
set up a small community at the site of an old hermitage on the left bank of the Seine just beyond the walls 
of Paris. Almost, it seems, by accident a community grew up around William who departed in 1113 to be 
made Bishop of Chalons. His disciple, Gilduin, was elected first Abbot of the community in the same year 
and under his leadership the abbey grew and flourished. Following the Rule of St Augustine, the community 
was at the forefront of clerical renewal through prayer, study and liturgy. 
8$ A prolific writer he combined theology, biblical exegesis, contemplation, philosophy, rhetoric and 
knowledge of the original biblical languages. He seems to have had knowledge of both Greek and Hebrew 
and evidently happy to consult contemporary Jewish authorities on the Jewish sense of the scriptures. 
(Turner 1995a: 265). 
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Recent scholarship has highlighted the complexity of the nature of the corpus 
Dionysiacum as it was taught at the University and disseminated throughout Europe. 86 
To prepare his 2004 edition of the Paris text of the Theologia Mystica, Harrington uses 
two main manuscripts: MS. Paris, Bibliotheque nationale, lat. 17341(C) and lat. 1619 (D) 
(Harrington 2004: 34) both dating from the thirteenth century and held by the Dominican 
convent of Saint-Jacques and the University of Paris respectively. The contents of these 
manuscripts reveal how the dionysian `midrash' had developed by this time. As well as 
the Latin translations of Hilduin and Eriugena there are Hilduin's preface to the whole 
corpus87, Anastasius's letter to Charles the Bald of 23`d March 875 as well as some of his 
scholia, verses of Eriugena and Eriugena's letter to Charles introducing his translation. 
Finally there are the contributions of the Victorines: Hugh of St Victor's prologue and 
commentary, the commentary of John Sarracenus and the paraphrase of Thomas Gallus. 
The Victorines were at the forefront of the reintroduction and re-examination of the 
corpus, introducing innovations that have been referred to as the interpretation of 
`affective Dionysianism' (See Rorem 1993: 216, McGinn 1998c: 84). It is precisely this 
late medieval `affective Dionysiasnism' which will produce the theologia mystica to 
which Teresa is heir. 
Sarracenus produced his version of the corpus in 1166-7, the first full translation 
since Eriugena, some three hundred years earlier. As Dondaine points out (1953: 64), 
Sarracenus used the glosses of Anastasius and Hugh of St Victor to perfect and advance 
his own translation. 88 Generally, as we shall see, Sarracenus in his translation (S) 
smoothes out some of the inconsistencies and hard edges in Eriugena to present a more 
flowing Latin text. In particular, he avoided the strange Greek-Latin hybrid words that 
Eriugena often produced from his straightforward transliterations of Greek terms. Thus 
86 See especially Dondaine 1953 and the editions of Harrington and McEvoy already cited. 
97 This can be found in PL 106 
88 We know next to nothing of Sarracenus himself, it even being unclear whether he was actually a brother 
of St-Victor (See Solignac 1988: 353). We know that he was translator at St-Denys under the Abbot Odon 
between 1162-69 and whilst John of Salisbury was in exile in France between 1164 -70. Solignac suggests 
he may have acquired his nomme de plume `Saracen' during a sojourn in the Middle East during the second 
crusade (1147 - 49), this may also have been an occasion for him to have access to the Greek manuscripts 
of Dionysius whilst in the Byzantine territories. The letters of John of Salisbury (see PL 199: 143-144) 
suggest that he was working in Poitiers after his time under Abbot Odon, possibly one of the `magister 
scholarum' of the cathedral school. Thery having found nothing to give further evidence of his later career 
in either the archives of St-Denis or Chartres (1950: 45). 
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he renders Oeoaocpiaq in MT as divina sapientia (lit: divine wisdom) rather than 
Eriugena's theosophia ( lit: theosophy). However, he does retain the super- terms 
introduced by Hilduin and Eriugena (vntpOcc changes gender from superdeus to superdea 
in MT presumably in reference to the holy Sapientia, however the text remains 
ambiguous with the reference to trinitas). 
To complete our references to the twelfth/thirteenth century translators of 
Dionysius and the creation of the `dionysian tradition' we need to finally mention 
Thomas Gallus and Robert Grosseteste. 
The work of Gabriel Thery in the middle of the twentieth century recovered the 
importance of Thomas Gallus (also known as Thomas of St Victor and Vercellensis) in 
the interpretative tradition of the Corpus Dionysiaca. 89 In regard to the corpus, Gallus's 
lasting achievement can be seen as the introduction of the affective Victorine tradition 
into the tradition of Dionysian interpretation. Drawing mainly on the translation of 
Sarracenus, he continued the tradition of glosses on the corpus producing glosses on the 
whole Dionysian body, completed in 1233. McEvoy's recent edition of the Glosses of 
Gallus on the Mystical Theology contains much previously unedited material of these 
glosses (he refers to it as the Expocisio - McEvoy 2003: 5). We shall refer to this below. 
Following the Glosses, Gallus completed an Extractio of the whole corpus in 
1238. In McEvoy's words `The Extractio constitutes a literary genre all of its own... It 
was, one might say, just the thing required by the busy university minds of his age, who 
were eager for doctrinal understanding but were largely untroubled by any kind of 
philological or antiquarian curiosity' (McEvoy 2003: 5). The result is a curious document 
that `translates' the Dionysian corpus into the Latin world of the thirteenth century and 
would have considerable influence over the next centuries 90 This was finally followed by 
a full Explanacio of the whole corpus produced between 1241 and 1243, the date of his 
89 Born in France sometime in the late twelfth century (hence 'Gallus', in Italy he was referred to as 
`Thomas Parisiensis') we know that he was a canon of St Victor and was a professor of theology at the 
University of Paris. In 1219, on the invitation of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Thomas and two other canons 
travelled from Paris to Vercelli in Northern Italy (Bicchieri's native town) to found an abbey and hospital. 
Thomas was subsequently elected prior in 1224 and abbot in 1226. Most of the next seventeen years were 
spent at Vercelli apart from a lengthy visit to England in 1238 (where he had discussions with Grosseteste, 
another translator of the dionysian corpus). Being finally deposed as abbot in 1243 as a casualty of the 
thirteenth century conflict between the Guelphs and Ghibelines. He may have been reinstated at the abbey 
before his death where his remains lie to this day. 
90 Reprinted in Dion 1: 710 -712 
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exile from Vercelli. This has not received a full modern critical edition despite the 
pioneering work of Thery. 91 
What are the distinctive qualities of Gallus's work? As stated above, Gallus is at 
the beginning of the second wave of Dionysian reception in the West following the first 
wave headed by Eriugena in the ninth century. Here, as has been pointed out (see 
especially Rorem 1993: 214-219 and McGinn 1998c) the affective interpretation of 
Dionysius begins to surface. Influenced by Augustine ( as passed down from Richard and 
Hugh of St Victor), Thomas also incorporated the influences of the newly inspired 
Cistercian movement, especially in Bernard's inspiration found in the Song of Songs. 92 
The final commentator and translator we shall refer to in this survey is the Englishman 
Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (c 1168 - 1253). As the University of Paris and its 
scholastic culture was growing throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries so too the 
University at Oxford was developing, where Grosseteste's contribution was significant 
(See McEvoy 2000). Callus's work in the twentieth century argued for a date of 1240-43 
for Grosseteste's translation (Callus 1947) which is now largely accepted (McEvoy 
2003: 56). Using the translations of Eriugena and Sarracenus, he used his own knowledge 
of Greek to further refine their work. Significantly, there is a uniformity of Latin word 
assignment, so that each Greek term tends to receive a constant Latin translation. As with 
our other authors, his translation was accompanied with a commentary and glosses. We 
shall use the translation found in Dionysiaca: R. 93 
Like Gallus, Grosseteste places importance on the `affective' interpretation of the 
Areopagite. However, of the two, Grosseteste had the deeper knowledge of Greek and 
this shows in his deeper understanding of the Greek inflections of the original text, in this 
91 Although much is to be found in J. Walsh's doctoral dissertation on Gallus (Walsh 1957) 
92 Although Leclercq suggests that the Dionysian corpus played only a minor role in the Cistercian reforms 
of the twelfth century. David Bell notes (1978: 265) that Thomas the Cistercian in his Commentary on the 
Song of Songs `does not seem to care for Pseudo-Dionysius... It is interesting to note the conspicuous lack 
of Dionysian ideas and terminology in Thomas's works... Thomas, like Bernard, remains Latin. ' The same, 
Leclercq claims, can be said of Bruno and the founders of the Carthusian order. 93 As McEvoy points out, the two commentators, Gallus and Grosseteste, as well as sharing the same 
intellectual resources and milieu were also companions and addressed questions to one another and it seems 
likely they may have met in 1238 during Gallus's visit to the church of Chesterton. 
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respect his translations sometimes refers back to the awkward , Greek-Latin isms' of 
Eriugena. 
Following Dondaine (1953) we can see that by the thirteenth century the 
University of Paris had amalgamated Eriugena's translation and commentary on 
Dionysius, as well as sections of the Periphyseos, with Sarracenus's and Anastasius's 
translations and the commentaries of Hugh of St Victor and Sarracenus to produce a 
Dionysian omnibus for use in the University. The translation and commentary of Thomas 
Gallus added a new dimension to the Dionysian corpus by its emphasis on the affective 
and the emphasis on the `ray of darkness' and `cloud of unknowing'. Dionysius's 
mystical union with God is now made through love (affectus) rather than intelligence. It 
is this thread of interpretation of the Dionysian corpus made by subsequent writers that 
creates what we term the theologia mystica. 
In subsequent printings of the Dionysian corpus into the early modern periods the 
work of Gallus and Grosseteste was combined with that of the other authors mentioned. 
Thus, the Strassbourg printing of the corpus of 1502-03 (Salisbury 1502) contains the 
Grosseteste (`Lincolniensis') and Sarracenus translations and commentary together with 
the Extractio of Gallus. As McEvoy comments: 
It cannot be too much emphasised that the entire later interpretation of the 
Mystical Theology was deflected into the path it actually followed through the 
combined influence of Thomas Gallus and Robert Grosseteste. These earliest 
Latin commentators provided the context within which not only the mystical 
theology of monastery and university but also the actual spiritual experience of 
countless souls was to be formed. (2003: 128) 
5.2 The Mystical Strategies of Dionysius 
Having elaborated what we mean by the `Dionysian corpus' we shall now use the 
Wittgensteinian approach of this dissertation to look at the Dionysian texts from this 
perspective. We shall not be looking for `occult entities' but rather examining the 
Sprachspiele, arguing for a `mystical strategy' or `performative discourse' within these 
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writings. In doing so we shall be concentrating on Dionysius's performative strategies as 
laying down the basic form of the theologia mystica as it will be inherited and used by 
Teresa in the sixteenth century. 
As we are particularly concerned here with the development of the tradition of 
theologia mystica in the Western tradition between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries we 
shall concentrate mainly on the Latin texts of Dionysius available to Western writers in 
this area, ie. the translations of Eriugena, Sarracenus, Grosseteste and Gallus as outlined 
above. 
In his striking essay on Dionysius in Herrlichkeit: Eine theologische Ästhetik (von 
Balthasar 1962) von Balthasar emphasises the unique nature of Dionysius's writing and 
how with him style is an essential element in understanding his process: 
With Denys we have a unique case in theology, indeed in all intellectual history. 
A man of the foremost rank and of prodigious power hid his identity not only 
from centuries of credulity but also from the critical acumen of the modern 
period, and precisely through that concealment exercised his influence. That for 
our modern, and above all German, scholarly world is unforgiveable. After their 
tank-formations have laid waste his garden, there is for them not a blade of grass 
left: all that remains is PSEUDO-, written in bold letters, and underlined with 
many marks of contempt. (von Balthasar 1984: 144) 
Von Balthasar reminds us of the special nature of the mystical text, and this Ur-text of 
the Western tradition in particular. The attempt, since Koch and Stiglmair, to discover the 
`real' Areopagite is not only ill-founded but also missing the point of the texts themselves 
and the role they have played in the Western tradition: `All these untenable hypotheses 
are signs of a certain spiritual `colour blindness' which prevents them, for all their 
individual scholarship (which Stiglmair, Pera, Honigmann and the rest doubtless have), 
from grasping the general flow of the Areopagitic handwriting'(von Balthasar 
1984: 146). 94 Within the fun that von Baltasar is clearly having with the `pseudo-nature of 
94 'Is one telling the Syrian monk in 500AD anything new', von Balthasar asks, ` if one proves to him that 
he was not converted by the speech on the Areopagus in 50AD? Or does not the whole phenomenon exist 
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Dionysius, there is also the concealed truth that he is picking up that as a mystical 
strategist the author of the Dionysian Corpus understands that he must adopt special 
strategies to get his reader `to do their own work'. These are the foundations of the 
subversive or `mystical strategies' that Teresa will eventually inherit. 
As his teacher Hierotheus did, von Balthasar argues, so Dionysius also engaged in 
a method of what we might term `indirect transmission' to get his message across. The 
text is indeed performative rather than informative : 
Hierotheus is the surpassing genius, his work "is like a kind of second sacred 
scripture which discloses itself immediately to those who are divinely inspired", 
his "vision, self-witnessed, of the spiritual revelations" and his "synoptic manner 
of teaching" presupposes a spiritual power that stands (presbytike) closer to God 
(cf. DN 111.2). (von Balthasar 1984: 150) 
Von Balthasar in this commentary limits himself to `unfolding his teacher's "synoptic" 
statements'(1984: 157). The `object' of the discourse, that is, our engagement with the 
material can only be `grasped' by a `circling movement' where we are `mutually 
implicated' in the method (see Ep. 8). 
The moment of Dionysius is a moment of `celebration' - it is a festival or dance 
(ef CH: 7.4, Ep. 8): 
The style strides along so consciously loaded, draped with so many sacred 
garments, that it makes any haste impossible and compels us not only to follow 
him in his train of thought but also to join with him in his mood of celebration. 95 
(Von Balthasar 1984: 172) 
on an utterly different level? ' This 'utterly different level' which contrasts a post-Cartesian scientism with 
an alternative hermeneutic lies at the heart of this thesis. For Balthasar, Dionysius's `identification of his 
task with a situation in space and time immeadiately next to John and Paul clearly corresponds for him to a 
necessity which, had he not heeded it, would have meant a rank insincerity and failure to respond to truth' 
(149) 'One does not see who Denys is, if one cannot see this identification as a context for his veracity, ' 
'And' he concludes `one can only rejoice over the fact that he succeeded in vanishing behind the 
Areopagite for a millennium, and that now afterwards, in the age of opening of graves, he has been brought 
out, he stubbornly hides his face, I suppose, for ever. ' 
95 Cf. Wittgenstein's deliberate `slowing the reader down' by the style of his writing. 
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Theology, as Dionysius `hymns' it, is as much `initiation' as `discourse'. This is the 
`indirect initiation' of Hierotheus, reflecting the myesthai of the classical initiation into 
the Dionysian cult (see DN: 1.8,3.1,3.2 CI-1: 2.5 and 1.5 where the whole of Christianity is 
described as a `mystery religion'). As von Balthasar points out, even the term thiasötes - 
that of the participant in the cult of Dionysius - is used by Dionysius in CH: 2.1,3.2 and 
EH: 1.1. Dionysius, following Plato and his neo-Platonic interpreters, makes a contrast 
between the rational philosophy that persuades by dialectic and the means of logos and 
reason and this latter kind of `initiation' that is formulated through the mythos (Louth 
1989: 25), cf. Ep. 9: 
The traditions of the theologians is twofold, on the one hand ineffable and 
mystical, on the other manifest and more knowable; on the one hand symbolic and 
presupposing initiation, on the other philosophical and capable of proof - and the 
ineffable is interwoven with what can be uttered. The one persuades and contains 
within itself the truth of what it says, the other effects and establishes the soul 
with God by initiations that do not teach anything. (Ep: 9, D: 1105)96 
We have returned again to the Wittgensteinian world of `saying' and `showing'. 
Theology in these texts does not so much `say' as `show' - this is the purpose of the 
discourse. This latter method, the method ofpathein, suffering, mythos, the `one that does 
not teach anything' is the one explicity used by Dionysius's master Hierotheus: 
Whatever he learned directly from the sacred writers, whatever his own 
perspicacious and laborious research of the scriptures uncovered for him, or 
whatever was made known to him through that more mysterious inspiration, not 
only learning (mathön) but also experiencing (pathön) the divine things. For he 
had a `sympathy' with such matters, if I may express it this way, and he was 
96 Louth also draws the parallel with Aristotle's distinction within the Eleusian mysteries, that the initiate 
does not learn (mathein) anything but experiences or suffers (pathein) something - (Aristotle, De 
Philosophiafrag 15) 
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perfected in a mysterious union with them and in a faith in them which was 
independent of any teaching. (DN: 2.9) 
Just as for the ancients in their Dionysian initiation, so his contemporary Christians 
`cannot grasp the breadth and length, the height and depth' of the revelation of Jesus 
Christ' (DN: 2.9, cf. Paul Eph: 3). 
Louth suggests that Hierotheus is being described as `some kind of experiential 
mystic' which immeadiately leads to the fruitless discussion on the nature of `mystical 
experience' we analysed in Chapter Two above. Fruitless and ultimately unable to be 
concluded precisely for the reasons we have already stated: `whether it is the individual 
experience of the mystic (maybe of some ecstatic kind) that is involved is not so clear' 
(1989: 25). Von Balthasar avoids this danger by concentrating on the discourse rather than 
any supposed originary experience (as is adopted in this thesis) and thus avoiding any 
supposed scientistic links to a post-Cartesian `mystical phenomenology' (the `occult 
entities' of Wittgenstein). 97 As stated above, no one can `prove' whether Hierotheus, 
Dionysius, or anyone else for that matter, was or was not a `mystic' or had `mystical 
experience'. What we can do (and do here) is concentrate on the performative role of the 
discourse and its relation to the `initiation' described by Dionysius, Hierotheus and von 
Balthasar (following Plato, Aristotle and St Paul). We shall see how this will later feed 
into the affective interpretation of Dionysius. 
How then is this initiation enacted? How does Dionysius, the initiator of theologia 
mystica initiate? 
Dionysius begins the Divine Names by stating that what he is about to set down, 
must, by necessity, transcend the `realm of discourse or of intellect' (DN: 1.1). The 
`hidden divinity' cannot be set down by means of `words or conceptions'. The heart of 
this revelation lying in the `sacred oracles' or `scripture' (DN: 1.4). He talks of a `divine 
enlightenment' `into which we have been initiated by the hidden tradition of our inspired 
teachers', `a tradition at one with scripture'. 
If such `divine names' transcend all conception and words, how can we speak of 
them? For `the union of divinised minds with the Light beyond all deity occurs in the 
97 1 am grateful to Gerard Loughlin for clarifying this point. 
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cessation of all intelligent activity' (DN: 1.5). Drawing from scripture, the names are 
primarily praised. The Trinity, for Dionysius, cannot be expressed, only the `aporias of 
unknowing' (see Sells in Chapter Seven below) can contain it. Thus Dionysius introduces 
his hyper- terms in DN: 2.4 ('supra-essential subsistence, supra-divine divinity, supra- 
excellent goodness, supremely individual identity') which will be reproduced at the 
beginning of the Mystical Theology. For God, for Dionysius, is `beyond every assertion 
and denial', for in the following chapters of the Divine Names, Dionysius does not try 
and describe the divine reality but rather plays with various models and pictures of the 
divine. As has been pointed out (See McGinn 1991) his first choice of names reflects the 
neo-platonic structures with which he works: good, light, beautiful, eros, ecstasy and 
zeal. 
It is perfectly possible, following the suggestion of Endre von Ivänka in his Plato 
Christianus (1964) to see the structure of the Divine Names as reflecting Neo-Platonic 
treatises on the Good (cf The Republic Books 4-6), the `neoplatonic triad' of Being-Life- 
Wisdom and the Constantian Triad of Wisdom-Power-Peace 98 As McGinn points out 
(1991: 161), the theological heart of the text seems to be how the utterly unknowable God 
manifests himself in creation in order that all creation may return to this unknowable 
source. On the level of thought - intellectus - the divine is utterly unknowable. This is 
the point of the aporia, the incomprehensibility, heralded by the strategy of 
deconstruction and unknowing leading to the necessary transformation required by the 
texts. When we look at the mystical texts of Teresa in Part Two we shall argue that she, 
following this tradition, accomplishes this by disorientation, contradiction, aporia and the 
humility of unknowing. 
Despite his neo-platonic credentials, Dionysius is primarily a Christian author (as 
von Balthasar makes abundantly clear) and these processes take place within specifically 
Christian engagement, in particular the Divine Liturgy and the message of the Scriptures 
(referred to by Dionysius as the `divine oracles'). The theologia mystica is born within 
this context and it would be misguided to try and divorce it from this context. Following 
" Von Balthasar presents his own schema based on the neoplatonic emanation and return of God 
(1984: 189) 
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the process of Dionysius, if knowledge of the Divine is not possible, how do we access 
the `supra-real'? 
Here, Dionysius relies on the other key strategy of the theologia mystica which 
will be explored in this thesis - the strategy of affectivity/embodiment. In DN: 4 
Dionysius introduces his discussion of eros and the erotic and how eros connects us to 
the deity. In McGinn's words: 
The Dionysian program is a cosmic one in which the divine Eros refracts itself 
into the multiple theophanies of the universe, which in turn erotically strive to 
pass beyond their mulitiplicity back into simple unity. (1991: 161) 
All movement in the hierarchy of creation, for Dionysius, comes from above and is 
`fundamentally erotic'. Not only do all things strive erotically for the Beautiful and the 
Good (DN: 4), but the Deity itself is Eros: `Divine Eros is the Good of the Good for the 
sake of the Good' (DN: 4.10, McGinn's translation). Using the Proclean procession of 
mone, (remaining), proodos (proceeding) and epistrophe (reverting), God in God's being 
as eros is able to proceed out to all creation and remain in the Godhead at the same time: 
It must be said that the very cause of the universe in the beautiful, good 
superabundance of his benign eros for all is carried outside of himself in the 
loving care he has for everything. He is, as it were, beguiled by goodness, by 
agape and by eros and is enticed away from his dwelling place and comes to 
abide within all things, and he does so by virtue of his supernatural and ecstatic 
capacity to remain, nevertheless, within himself. (DN: 4.13, translation McGinn) 
Thus, the `sympathetic' initiation described above is also an erotic initiation. Eros, is the 
occasion for the `special experience of knowing' (pathein) in contrast to the `knowing by 
mental effort' (mathein). 99 It is the arena of Hierothus's initiation: 
99 The sympatheia, as McGinn following Rorem (1982) points out, is a key term in late Neoplatonism in 
making the connection between the different levels of the `theurgy' possible: `sympathy for Dionysius is 
not so much an ontological bond by which material things are manipulated to acquire an access to the upper 
world as it is an affinity for `reading' the inner meaning of the hierarchies as manifestations of the 
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By some more divine inspiration, not only learning the things of God but 
experiencing them, and through this sympathy with them, if we may say this, 
having been consummated in initiation into mystical union and faith in them 
which cannot be taught. (DN: 2.9 translation McGinn). 
Or to put it in our terms above, it is a knowing which involves the libidinal or affect us as 
much as the intellectus. Within Dionysius's mystical game the strategy of deconstruction 
is complemented by the strategy of embodied, erotic affectivity. 
`What cannot be demonstrated' by the Church, McGinn suggests, is according to 
Dionysius `made present both on the material level of symbols used by scripture and in 
liturgy and also by extension, on the conceptual or intellectual level, where the negation 
of names and eventually the removal of both affirmation and negation bring the soul to 
union with the divine mystery' (1991: 173). This union, we suggest, being the erotic 
union engendered by eros through the affectus and the libido. This is the ex-stasis, the 
ecstasy: `Through ecstasy we pass beyond the human condition and become divinised' 
(McGinn 1991: 179). 
Letter Nine describes God as a drunken lover `standing outside all good things, 
being the suprafullness of all these things' (Ep: 9.5). The model here being St Paul, 
Dionysius's ecstatic teacher and erotic initiator: 
This is why the great Paul, swept along by his yearning for God and seized of its 
ecstatic power, had this inspired word to say: "It is no longer I who live, but 
Christ who lives in me" (Gal 2: 20). Paul was truly a lover and, as he says, he was 
beside himself for God (2 Cor: 5.13), possessing not his own life but the life of 
the One for whom he yearned (in eros), as exceptionally beloved. (DN: 4.13 
translation McGinn) 
Thearchy. ' (McGinn 1991: 172). Hence Dionysius's adoption of the phrase 'so as to speak' to suggest he is 
adapting a term from the Neoplatonic school. 
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Following Roques (DS: 2.1908-10) McGinn sees Dionysius's concept of union as based 
on the transcendentalisation of knowing into unknowing and yearning eros into ecstatic 
possession. The two processes we have identified as key to the `mystical strategy' of the 
theologia mystica are intimately connected. As we shall see, Dionysius's exposition of 
the unknowing-embodied strategy allows later Christian writers to mine the erotic side, 
especially through the medium of the exposition of the Song of Songs. 1 °° 
As McGinn points out, Dionysius here is standing in already established Christian 
tradition of equating the agape of the New Testament with the eros of the Platonic 
tradition, beginning, he suggests, with Origen's Commentary on the Song of Songs: 
The power of love is none other than that which leads the soul from earth to the 
lofty heights of heaven, and... the highest beatitude can only be attained under the 
stimulus of love's desire. (Prot, ed 63.9-11 in McGinn 1991: 120) 
McGinn's exposition of this topic is of a special clarity. However his device of dividing 
eros into what he calls EROS I, when referred to the Deity and eros ii when referring to 
the creature seems to defuse the potentially subversive nature of the erotic language 
which, as we suggest here, is one of the key reasons for adopting it in the mystical 
strategy. McGinn, as with so many commentators on mystical texts, finds it hard to resist 
the desire to `tidy up' and `smooth over' problems, subversions and other difficulties in 
the texts which, this thesis argues, are deliberately placed there to `work on' the reader. 
Thus, turning our Wittgensteinian lens on the Sprachspiele of the Dionysian texts, 
especially in their twelfth century interpretations, we can identify two `mystical 
strategies' of unknowing/deconstruction and the erotic/embodied/affective. The 
unknowing aspect delineates the limits of human knowledge of God, the affective allows 
the entry into union with the divine through the libidinal and affective. The two processes 
occur side by side and necessarily compliment each other. This insight was particularly 
seen by Thomas Gallus and developed by him and would continue throughout the 
subsequent history of the `mystical tradition' through the use made of Dionysius by 
100 On this, see especially Turner (1995a) 
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Gallus himself, Hugh of Balma, Gerson, De Osuna and eventually the Spanish mystics, 
Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross. A lineage we shall return to in Part Two below. 
5.3 Summary of Dionysius: The Mystical Strategies of the Theoloj is Mystica 
In summary, then, we can characterise the mystical strategies of Dionysius as fitting into 
a wider perspective (Weltbild) that by necessity embraces the strategies of deconstruction 
and embodiment. 
The overall orientation is summarised by von Balthasar thus: 
According to Denys the essence of each being is itself ecstatic towards God 
(something that so little threatens its individuality that this movement itself 
determines it at its deepest level); indeed, that this ecstasy of creaturely eros is 
itself an imitation of the ecstatic divine eros which out of love goes out of itself 
into the multiplicity of the world; that therefore mystical experience represents a 
philosophical and theological realization of that which is. (1984: 205) 
The mystical strategies we have proposed, therefore, are of the essence of Dionysius's 
approach to the theologia mystica. Theology, or the reading of mystical theology, is by its 
nature a matter of initiation into the erotic mystery of creation. Like the Dionysian rites, 
this is a secret initiation that must be hidden from scorn and derision of the unitiate: `If 
the profane were to see or listen to these rites of ours I think they would laugh heartily 
and pity us for our misguidedness' (EH: 7.3.1): 
Which to the man in the street appear quite extraordinary (multis monstruosas [E], 
prodigiales locutions [S]). Among uninstructed souls the fathers of unspeakable 
wisdom (secretae sapientiae patres [S]) give an impression of outstanding 
absurdity when, with secret and daring riddles (S: per quaedem occulta quidem et 
praesumpta aenigmata), they make known that truth which is divine, mysterious, 
and, so far as the profane are concerned, inaccessible (S: manifestant divinam et 
mysticam et inviam Immundis veritatem). (Ep: 9: 1) 
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In the Divine Names, Dionysius exhorts Timothy, his addressee to `guard these things in 
accordance with divine command and you must never speak nor divulge divine things to 
the unitiated' (DN: 1.8) - `Let such things be kept away from the mockery and the 
laughter of the unitiated' (S: et ipsa ab indoctorum risibus et delusionibus auferentes). 
Thus, Dionysius distinguishes the `knowing' that comes from disputation and the 
`exoteric sciences' of theology from the `knowing' that comes from the `mystical 
initiation'. Both , as we shall see 
later, are considered essential for good theological 
practice: 
Theological tradition has a dual aspect, the ineffable and mysterious on the one 
hand (S: hanc quidem secretam et mysticam), the open and more evident on the 
other (S: illam apparentem et notiorem). The one resorts to symbolism and 
involves initiation (E: eam quidem symbolicam et perfectivam). The other is 
philosophical and employs the method of demonstration (E: hanc vero 
philosophicam et approbativam). The one uses persuasion and imposes the 
truthfulness of what is asserted. The other acts by means of a mystery which 
cannot be taught. (Ep: 9.1, Dion: 638). 
This is the `divine enlightenment' (S: deifica lumina, Gk: Ocovpvixä cp(bia) into which 
according to Dionysius, we have been `initiated by the hidden tradition (occulta traditio) 
of our inspired teachers -a tradition at one with scripture' (DN : 1.4). 
Thus, for Dionysius, when we `say anything about God... we set down the truth 
`not in the plausible words of human wisdom but in the demonstration of the power 
guided by the Spirit (1 Cor: 2.4)' (DN: 1.1). For there is a `power by which, in a manner 
surpassing speech and knowledge, we reach a union superior to anything available to us 
by way of our own abilities or activities in the realm of discourse or of intellect (S: 
secundum quam ineffabilibus et ignotis [R: incognitos] ineffabiliter et ignote [R: 
incognite] conjungimur secundum meliorem nostrae rationabilis et intellectualis virtutis 
et operationis unitonem' (DN: 1.1). Which is why `we must not resort to words or 
conceptions concerning that hidden divinity (S: occulta Deitate) which transcends being, 
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apart from what sacred scriptures (S: ex sacris eloquiis) have divinely revealed' 
(DN: 1.1). 
For Dionysius the process of `initation' is beyond the `rational processes'. As we 
saw above, Dionysius will often resort to the strategy of aporia through his 6»cp- words 
to make this point: 
Mind beyond mind, word beyond speech, it is gathered up by no discourse, by no 
intuition, by no name, it exists as no other being (S: et intellectus non intelligibilis 
et verbum non dicible et irrationabilitas et non-inteligibilitas) (R: 
unintelligibilitas) et innominabilitas, secundum nihil existentium existens. (DN: 
1). 101 
As argued above, Dionysius deliberately dances around the nature of the mystical 
`initiation' or `knowledge'. It cannot be disclosed in the text, by its very nature: it is not 
to be learnt from theological disputation in the faculty of reason and intellect. How then 
is it communicated? As we have seen, Dionysius gives us enough clues as to where to 
look for this knowledge. His own teacher, Hierotheus, has been initated and in his 
description of this Dionysius points in the direction we must look: 
Whatever he learned directly from the sacred writers, whatever his own 
perspicacious and laborious research of the scriptures uncovered for him, or 
whatever was made known to him through that most mysterious inspiration, not 
only learning but also experiencing the divine things (S: non solum discens sed et 
patiens divina, E: non solum discens sed et affectus divina, P: verum etiam its 
animo affectus et permotus, Gk: xai na©thv tä ©sta). For he had `sympathy' (S: 
compassione, E: coaffectione, Gk: augna©sia; ) with such matters, if I may 
express it that way, and he was perfected in a mysterious union with them and in a 
faith in them which was independent of any education. (DN: 2.9) 
101 See also DN: 2.3 : over-good, over-divine, over-existent, over-living, over-wise (S: superbonum, 
superdeum, supersubstantiale, supervivens, supersapiens) 
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As we have seen above, this sympatheia is the erotic initiation of Dionysius (DN: 4.10). 
The eros as `Good seeking Good for the sake of the Good' (S: est divinus amor bonus 
boni propter bonum) and, following the essential understanding of the human person as 
persona ecstatica, eros brings us to our essential ecstatic being: `Eros brings ecstasy so 
that the lover belongs not to self but to the beloved' (S: Est autem faciens exstasim 
divinus amor). For Dionysius, God himself is enticed by eros `from his transcendent 
dwelling place and comes to abide within all things, and he does so by virtue of his 
supernatural and ecstatic capacity to remain, nevertheless, within himself (DN: 4.13). 
From the above we can see that Dionysius presents a synthesis of two strategies: 
deconstruction/unknowing and erotic/affective, in one overarching survey of the erotic- 
ecstatic nature of the human person. As von Balthasar points out, his text beguiles and 
plays with us as he stretches us beyond our intellectual and rational limits to make 
connection with the divine through the play of pathe - emotions and affect (Eriugena's 
affectus). The argument here has been that this vision of the ecstatic union and return of 
the self to God, this erotico-deconstructive strategy is a key aspect of the medieval 
tradition of theologia mystica. 
This erotico-deconstructive strategy (Dionysius's stulta sapientia: DN 7: 1, Gk 
µcwpäv aocpia - which is `alogos' and `anus) seems to be fundamental to the tradition 
of theologia mystica and it is this, it is argued, that is at the heart of the `mystical 
strategies' of Teresa of Avila's writings. We will now turn to these in Part Two of the 
dissertation. 
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Part Two: 
Applying the Witt2ensteinian Approach: The Mystical Strategies of the 
Theologia Mystica Illustrated by an Examination of the Writings of 
Teresa of Avila 
In Part One of the thesis we assessed various methods of viewing the mystical. We 
looked first at that of `modem mysticism' and challenged its ontological, experientialist 
and orientalist assumptions. We then surveyed various constructivist approaches and 
argued that although they resolved some of the problems with the approach of `modern 
mysticism' they still left out a certain degree of experiential content from the category. 
Accordingly, we then outlined the original strategy we would approach to the mystical in 
this thesis which would be based on the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. We argued that 
we would not be seeking to find quasi-ontological `mystical entities' in the texts ie. any 
originatory `experiences' that may `hide behind' the texts. On the other hand, whilst 
pursuing the Weltbild of the discourse we stated that we would not see that discourse as a 
cold contextualist narrative but rather analyse the discourse from its performative or 
participatory perspective. Accordingly, we resolved to concentrate on the 
transformational aspect of mystical discourse and how it leads, in a Wittgensteinian 
sense, from saying to showing to acting. In this respect we examined the foundational 
texts of Dionysius and saw how such strategies are adopted, in particular what we termed 
the mystical strategies of deconstruction/unknowing and embodiment/affectivity. 
In our second part we shall elucidate how these strategies are employed in Teresa's 
writings, referring them back to similar strategies in Wittgenstein's own writings. We 
shall begin by presenting the context within which Teresa was writing and how she 
inherits these strategies from the Dionysian tradition before surveying her use of those 
strategies. 
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Chapter Six: 
The Form of Laniuaze: `Mystical Strategies' in Teresa of Avila 
When a number of books in Spanish were taken away from us and we were not 
allowed to read them, I felt it very much because the reading of some of them had 
given me great recreation, and 1 could no longer do so since they were only 
available in Latin. Then the Lord said to me: "Don't be upset, for I will give you 
a living book". (Teresa of Avila V: 26.6) 102 
In this key passage in her Libro de la Vida ('Book of the Life', hereafter V) Teresa hints 
at some of the external and internal circumstances that led to her own writing career. In 
the passage we come across some of the key events that were influencing her: the 
prohibition of spiritual books in the vernacular following the Valdes decree of 1559, her 
own reliance on just such vernacular books of spirituality in her early life and finally the 
inspiration for her own writing found in the words she received: `I will give you a living 
book'. Central to her own vision of her `mission' is the next sentence: 
I wasn't able to understand why this was said to me for as yet I had received no 
visions. Afterwards, after only a few days, I understood very clearly. For what I 
saw presented to me gave me much to think about and recollect (recogerme), and 
102 Cuando se quitaron muchos libros de romance, que nose leyesen, yo send mucho, porque algunos me 
dava recreaciön leerlos, y yo no podia ya, por dejarlos en latin; me dyo el Seilort "No tengas pena, que yo 
to dare libro vivo". My translation from the Spanish of the Obras Completas de Santa Teresa de Jesus ed 
Efren de la Madre de Dios and Otger Steggink, 9' ed. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1997 and 
Santa Teresa Obras Completas, cd T Alvarez, 10th ed. Burgos: Editorial Monte Carmelo, 1998. The English 
translations of Teresa's works will be either my own or, unless stated, Kavanaugh and Rodriguez 1987. V= 
El Libro de la Vida (Book of Her Life), M= Las Moradas (The Interior Castle), CE = Camino de 
Perfection (Way of Perfection), Escorial Codex, CV =Camino, Valladolid Codex, CT = Camino, Toledo 
Codex, C= Meditations del amor de Dios, Exc = Exclamations. For a biographical sketch of Teresa see 
the author's Way of Ecstasy: Praying with St Teresa of Avila (Tyler: 1997). 
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the Lord showed me so much love and taught me in so many ways that I had little 
or hardly any need for books afterwards. (V: 26.6)103 
Applying the Wittgensteinian Blick developed in Part One and observing Teresa's 
communication as it stands we see that she, like Wittgenstein, is making a move from 
`saying' to `showing', or, in this case, a move from the intellectual book-learning of the 
letrados to the `vision' of `what the Lord presents' `in His love'. The key word here 
being recogerme -'to recollect myself', a crucial term that links Teresa with the main 
spiritual currents of her time and especially the writings of the `vernacular master' she 
refers to in the previous sentence and had already mentioned in Chapter Four of the Vida: 
When I was on my way, that uncle of mine I mentioned who lived along the road 
gave me a book. It is called The Third Spiritual Alphabet'°4 and endeavours to 
teach the prayer of recollection... And so I was very happy with this book and 
resolved to follow that path with all my strength... For during the twenty years 
after this period of which I am speaking, I did not find a master, I mean a 
confessor, who understood me, even though I looked for one. (V: 4.7)105 
As we analyse Teresa's sense of her own vocation as a writer we have a number of 
circumstances to `place before us' in Wittgensteinian fashion to help us make sense of 
her writings: 
a) The circumstances of 1559 which produced the Valdes Index and Teresa's 
reaction to it. 
b) The influence of `her master', Francisco de Osuna, and what she learnt from him 
on writing about `mystical topics', and 
103 Yo no podia entender por que se me havia dicho esto, porque aün no tenla visions; despuds, desde a 
Bien pocos dias, lo entendi muy Bien, porque he tenido tanto en qud pensar y recogerme en lo que via 
presente y ha ten (do tanto amor el Senor conmigo para ense; larme de muchas maneras, que muypoca u 
Iasi ninguna necesidad he tenido de libros. My translation 
104 By Francisco de Osuna, hereafter TA 
105 no sabia cömo poceder en oraciön ni cömo recogerme y as! holguemucho con 01 y determindme a sequir 
aquel camino con todas mis fuerzas (I did not know how to proceed in prayer nor how to recollect mysel f 
and therefore I was very delighted with it and determined to follow this way with all my strength) 
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c) The nature of her own approach to `saying and showing' through `that presented 
to her through recollection'. 
We shall deal with each of these in turn before considering how the theologia mystica of 
Dionysius reached her through the writings of de Osuna. Once we have established this 
we can turn in the next two chapters to those strategies in her texts themselves and make 
comparisons with similar strategies in Wittgenstein's texts. 
6.1 Alumbradismo, 1559 and the Valdes Index 
Pioneering work from the Spanish scholar Melquiandes Andres Martin (Andres Martin 
1975) developed and elaborated by North American scholars, in particular Gillian 
Ahlgren (Ahlgren 1996) and Alison Weber (Weber 1990), has restored the importance of 
understanding Teresa's writings within the context and constraints within which she was 
working, in particular the development of Spanish spirituality in the 16th century (what 
Andres Martin terms los recogidos) against the backdrop of the spiritual movement 
usually referred to as alumbradismo. As Ahlgren puts it: 
Though Teresa never used the term alumbrados, the effects of the movement 
were probably the most important influence on her literary objectives. The 
suspicions of prophecy and of women's religious experience which the movement 
had inflamed affected Teresa's credibility. (Ahlgren 1996: 29) 
Contemporary scholarship differs as to the role, nature and scope of the Alunibrados (See 
especially Marquez 1980), the term alumbrado (lit: `enlightened', 'illumined') seems to 
have originally been one of mockery and abuse used to denote `excessive piety and to 
suggest hysteria and hypocrisy and fraudulence' (Hamilton 1992: 28). At the beginning of 
the sixteenth century it began to be associated in Spain with a loose-knit group who were 
condemned at various times by the Church and State. The propositions for which they 
were condemned were first collected together in the Edict of Faith issued by the 
Inquisitor General, Alonso Manrique (Archbishop of Seville) on 2P September 1525. 
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The edict contained forty-eight propositions directed against 'alumbrados, dexados e 
perfectos' (lit: `the enlightened, abandoned and perfect' see Bataillon 1982: 166) which 
comprised of a collection of questionable and heretical statements held by and attributed 
to the group. As well as certain apocalyptic statements they included propositions such as 
`prayer must be mental and not vocal'; the denial of the necessity of any sacramental 
intermediary between God and humans - thus rejecting the efficacy of external works as 
well as the authority of the church to interpret scripture; contempt for the cult of the 
saints, the worship of images, bulls, indulgences, fasting and abstinence. Although the 
Edict condemned what appeared to be a homogenous and coherent group scholars such as 
Bataillon and Marquez have concluded that the `group' was a fragmentary grouping of 
various collections of people with differing motives, ideas and spiritualities. 
It was this emphasis on the importance of personal prayer that caused the most 
problems for Teresa as one of the thrusts of her own life and work was the restitution of 
personal prayer as central to the life of the average Christian. 
A key phrase used in the condemnations of the alumbrados was dejamiento (lit: 
`abandonment') which was used to describe the type of prayer advocated by the 
alumbrados. It is unclear what exactly was meant by the term however it seems to have 
arisen as a variant of the prayer of recogimiento (lit: `gathering together') popularised 
and taught by reforming Spanish Franciscan friars at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, most notably described in Francisco de Osuna's `Third Spiritual Alphabet' 
(TercerAbecedario Espiritual, hereafter TA) which we shall turn to shortly. 
The teaching of recogimiento, as Andres Martin points out, placed an emphasis on 
the importance of withdrawing from activity once or twice a day, usually to a dark room, 
for quiet contemplation with lowered or closed eyes. The teaching of dejamiento, often 
ascribed to Isabel de la Cruz, suggested that such a withdrawal was unnecessary and the 
contemplation could continue in all states and places - even allowing evil thoughts and 
temptations to arise. 
After the Edict of 1525 an inquisitorial process was initiated against Pedro Ruiz 
de Alcaraz and Isabel de la Cruz of Toledo (See Marquez 1980: 244-57) who were found 
guilty of the practices condemned. In 1529 Alcaraz was flogged, their property 
confiscated and they were condemned to `perpetual reclusion and habit'. From this time 
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any groups of laypeople, women and those associated with the Franciscan recogitorios 
were suspect of the heresy106. Thus, over the next thirty years, effectively culminating 
with the Valdes Index of 1559, four separate movements within Spanish society began to 
be conflated by the Inquisition: 
a) The `alumbrados'. 
b) Erasmianism 
c) Lutheran ism/Protestantism 
d) Remaining non-Christian elements, especially the threat of Jewish influence 
through conversos. 
It is notable that a number of the `alumbrados' groups were connected with converso or 
`New Christian' groups, a group to which of course, Teresa herself belonged. 
Contemporary commentators have been divided over whether the group were a 
`movement' of interior Christianity akin to Erasmianism (Bataillon 1982) or a native, 
heretical protestant sect with justification by faith as their basic doctrine (Marquez 1980). 
Hamilton, following Marquez, suggests their emphasis on the working of the Spirit in the 
individual, their pessimism about human nature, their interest in St Paul and their quest 
for greater simplicity in religion ally them to the movement of Catholic reform at the time 
of the Northern European Reformation, known as evangelism. It is clear, as Bataillon 
points out (1982: 166) that in the minds of the Inquisition, alumbradismo had to have 
somewhere a connection with the wider religious reforms of Northern Europe, even if, as 
appears likely, little such connection existed in reality. 
The condemnation of the alumbrados by the Edict of Seville in 1525 marked in 
many ways the beginning of the end of the wave of openness and `renaissance' within the 
mystical tradition in Spain (See Bataillon 1982: 699 - 737). Teresa of Avila, born in 
1515, as we shall see, was able to have access to many mystical works from the tradition 
of theologia mystica mentioned in the previous chapter. As we have seen above, in the 
period of unrest and unhappiness that she experienced after her profession at the convent 
of the Encarnacion in 1537 (including a period of physical collapse), she relates in the 
t06 For a full list of the condemned propositions see Marquez 1980: 250 
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Libro de La Vida how that during a stay at the house of her uncle, Don Pedro de Cepeda, 
she first came across de Osuna's TercerAbecedario Espiritual. The book remained `her 
guide' for many years to come as she found no spiritual director who could guide her as 
well as the book. `During all those years, except after communion, I never dared begin to 
pray without a book' (V: 4.9). 
As well as Osuna she read Bernardino de Laredo and the classical `mystical' 
writers such as Augustine, Gregory and Bernard. 107 However, as her own spiritual life 
grew and developed the political climate in Spain begun to change again. 
108 Teresa had 
been lucky enough to begin her spiritual learning in the `early sixteenth century spring' 
initiated by the reforming Cardinal Cisneros who positively encouraged the reading of 
spiritual books and approved the publication in popular editions of the writings of `the 
spiritual masters' as well as the writings of Gerson, de Balma and Herp. By these means 
the works of the medieval tradition of theologia mistica had been disseminated 
throughout Spain in the early sixteenth century. 
Following years of tension between the `Erasmians' and the Inquisition, events in 
Spain came to a head in 1559 when many works of the `Cisnerosian Spring' of the early 
16th century (including Erasmus and Luther) were condemned in the Valdes Index. Valid 
only for Spain, it contained many of the writings of the people who had already fallen 
foul of Valdes And the Inquisition: Carranza, Luis de Granada, Juan de Avila and the 
works of Erasmus in Castilian and Latin. As has been said it also incorporated many of 
the writers and works who had contributed to the Cisnerosian revolution at the beginning 
of the century: as well as Francisco de Osuna's Tercer Abecedario (but not the other 
Abecedarios), it included Herp's Theologia mystics and de Balma's Via Spiritus (de 
Bujanda 1984: 303- 592). 
As Hamilton puts it: 
By forbidding so many books published with the approval of Cisneros, the Index 
could also be regarded as the first official statement condemning his spirituality, 
107 References to all four are found in her works. 
10B There are many good analyses of the reasons for these changes. In English good analyses are found in 
Ahlgren and Hamilton and in Spanish, Andres and Marquez, all referred to above. 
172 
the coronation of the trials which had started in the 1520s and of which the 
alumbrados had been the first victims. (Hamilton 1992: 111) 
Some works remained uncensored such as those of Alonso de Madrid and Bernardino de 
Laredo. In total it listed some 253 titles including fourteen editions of the Bible. In 
addition to the mentioned titles it also created a wider sense of alarm and caution on a 
whole range of areas'09. In Ahlgren's words: 
In summary, the Valdes Index of Prohibited Books was not merely a list of books 
prohibited to the public; it was an edict intended to limit the scope of religious 
speculation and to define religious faith and practice very narrowly as the 
province of an educated elite whose task was not speculation but transmission of 
dogma. (Ahlgren 1996: 17) 
For Andres, the Valdes Index `tried to banish affective spirituality in its various 
manifestations, encouraging the traditional spirituality of the practice of virtues and the 
destruction of vices over other ways of spirituality considered mystical' (Andres 1976: 
1: 362). 
Commentators such as Ahlgren have noted the paradox that the period after 1559 
whilst being one of repression also encouraged a great flowering of `mystical literature' 
(Ahlgren 1996: 30). She suggests that Teresa of Avila employed four strategies to survive 
in the post Valdes climate: 
a) She was careful about the literary and theological sources she cited. 
b) She employed a series of rhetorical devices to justify her right to write as an 
`unlettered woman'. 
c) She practiced a form of self censorship in the spirit of Valdds: `her allusions to 
controversial subjects, such as her converso origins, permitted contemporary 
109 Other entries included books by known heretics, partial or whole translations of the Bible, books in 
Arabic or Hebrew or that tell of Muslim or Jewish practices, books regarding witchcraft and superstition 
and manuscripts that mention biblical tradition or the sacraments of the church. See Ahlgren 1996: 17 
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readers (especially those who knew her) to understand the subtext, but she never 
spoke openly enough to attract attention'. 
d) Finally, in exact language she explained `mystical phenomena as thoroughly and 
accurately as possible'. Her overall aim being to show how `charismatic 
experience did not have to be viewed as a potential danger to the institutional 
church but could instead be an important source of Roman Catholic identity'. 
As she notes: 
As the new mystical pathways opened in the first half of the century narrowed to 
a dogmatic and disciplined orthodoxy, so did the range of subjects appropriate for 
theological debate... If the works were to survive intact, certain topics had to be 
handled with extreme care, and authors used language to hide rather than reveal 
their intent. (Ahlgren 1996: 19) 
As Ahlgren points out this particularly applied to laypeople and especially women. ' 10 As 
most women did not read Latin, the Valdes prohibition of spiritual books in the 
vernacular posed a particular problem. However, as these ideological concerns impacted 
upon her Teresa was able to respond, largely, it is argued here, because of the `training' 
and `education' she had received from `her master' Fray Francisco de Osuna and his 
exposition of the theologia mystica in the Tercer Abecedario Espiritual. In this respect, 
we argue, her schooling in the mystical strategies of the theologia mystica were ideal 
preparation for the challenges of the environment within which her mature work was 
developed. 
6.2 Teresa and the TheoloRia Mystica 
One of the central arguments of this thesis is that Teresa is heir to, and knowingly uses, 
the techniques of what we have called the tradition of theologia mystica as defined at the 
end of Part One above. Although, as argued, she relies heavily on this tradition 
110 She notes that between 1550 and 1600 no books by female authors were printed from Alcala 
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throughout her works she only makes three explicit references to the theologia mystica in 
her work, these occur in Chapters Ten to Twelve of her Vida. It is worth while spending 
some time on these references and their place in the text of the Vida. 
The decision to write the text of the Vida coincided with Teresa's `re-formation' 
of the Carmelite houses in Spain. In 1561 the Inquisitor of Toledo, Francisco de Soto y 
Salazar suggested that Teresa present a description of her experiences and methods of 
prayer. The first draft was completed in 1562 and the final draft in 1565, which was then 
to be read by several learned letrados: Juan de Avila, her Dominican mentors and 
probably Balthasar Alvarez, one of her Jesuit mentors. 
In 1574 the work came under inquisitorial suspicion - due, amongst other things, 
to the vindictive malice of the Princess of Eboli, and the manuscript disappeared into the 
Inquisition's hands until after Teresa's death in 1582. It was later recovered by Ana de 
Jesus and edited by Luis de Leon. 
The context of Chapters Ten to Twelve of the Vida is that they are preceeded by 
Teresa's descriptions of how her life of prayer had gone astray once she had joined the 
Convent of the Encarnaciön. As she describes the sins into which her soul had fallen she 
makes a telling comment: 
And helping this was that as my sins grew, I began to lose the pleasure and gift in 
the things of virtue. (V: 7.1)" 
For Teresa, one of the most distressing things at this time in her life was the loss of the 
pleasure (gusto) of the life of prayer. Deprived of this gusto, this link to the affective- 
deconstructive which we described in the previous chapter, she became `afraid to pray' 
instead resorting to `vocal prayer'. She clearly practised the outward virtues `So that the 
nuns had a good opinion of me' whilst retaining this `inner dryness'. She contrasts at this 
time her outer shows of piety and holiness (including instructing others on prayer) with 
her own interior sense of alienation from the source of her being - God. This period of 
unrest and unhappiness with her spiritual life dated from her profession at the convent of 
111 Y ayudöme a esto que, Como crecieron los pecados, comenzöme afaltar el gusto y regalo en las cosas 
virtud. 
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the Encarnaciön in 1537. Significantly, from the point of view of our study, this period of 
physical collapse had coincided with a stay at the house of her uncle, Don Pedro de 
Cepeda, when, as we have seen, she first came across de Osuna's Tercer Abecedario 
Espiritual. As mentioned already the book remained `her guide' for many years to come 
as she found no spiritual director who could guide her as well as the book. `During all 
those years, except after communion, I never dared begin to pray without a book' (V: 
4.9). The experience of this time is one of recollection, dryness punctuated by another 
state of which she finds it difficult to speak (V: 4.8). This period ('of some twenty years' 
V: 8.2) she tells us was a time of neither `pleasure in God' nor `contentment with the 
world'(yo gozaba de Dios ni traia contento en el mundo) (V: 8.2) for she is adamant that 
prayer is the source of `delights/pleasures' (gustos V: 8.9) from the Lord, it is the place 
where `the Lord takes delight in a soul and gives the soul delight' - `entrar a regalarse 
con un alma y regalarla' (V: 8.9) -a theme we shall see reiterated at the beginning of the 
Moradas in Chapter Eight below. 
In this place of deconstruction - without intellectual concourse (V: 4.7,9.4,9.5, 
9.9) Teresa enters into a place to which she gives the name mfstica teologia: 
It used to happen, when I represented Christ within me in order to place myself in 
His presence, or even while reading, that a feeling of the presence of God would 
come upon me unexpectedly so that I could in no way doubt He was within me or 
I totally immersed in Him... I believe they call this "mystical 
theology. "(V: 10.1)' 12 
Teresa equates this `mystical theology' with an indubitable sense of the presence of God: 
The will loves; the memory appears to me almost lost; the understanding does not 
discourse, so it appears to me - it is not lost, but, as I say, it does not work - 
112 'Acaeciame en esta representaciön que hacla de ponerme cabe Cristo, que he dicho, y aun algunas 
veces leyendo, venirme a deshora un sentimiento de la presencia de Dios que en ninguna manera podia 
dudar que estaba dentro de ml o yo toda engolfada en EL.. creo lo llaman mistica teologla. ' 
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however it is amazed at how much it can understand, because God wants it to 
understand how little it can understand of what God represents to it. (V 10.1)' 13 
Using the classical scholastic/Augustinian typology of the memory-will-understanding 
Teresa presents here our deconstructive-affective strategy in clear terms. The pull of the 
text is as though she wants to declare the reason (entendimiento) ceases to work - the 
most extreme position of unsaying. Although her uncertainty allows her to interject the 
milder no discurre - `does not discourse'. Only the affective/ the libidinal can function at 
this point, in her short statement ama la voluntad ('the will loves'). The mystical 
strategies of the theologia mystica are clearly being employed here (See V: 12.5 too). As 
she describes in 12.5 this `stopping of the intellect' is not something that is done by 
voluntary action, but something received from God, `for otherwise we would be left like 
cold simpletons'. The intellectual should `delight in God' (13.11) rather than `wear 
themselves out in composing syllogisms'. 
Her next mention of the `mystical theology' in V: 11.5 is to distinguish it from the 
beginning stages of prayer (or as she calls it `mental prayer') which will form a small 
discourse from Chapter Eleven to Chapter Twenty Two - the famous analogy of the `four 
waters' (See Kavanaugh and Rodriguez CW I: 470). In Chapter Twenty Three she returns 
to her `mystical theology', this, she says, is distinguished by being the stage where we 
`enjoy' God's presence: 'lo mäs es gozar' ('the more to enjoy it') (V: 11.5). The 
beginning `mansions', as she will later call them in the Moradas, are places lacking in 
gustos y ternera114 - these are the special attributes of the teologia mistica (see V: 8.5, 
9.9.10.2 and 25.11). At this earlier stage the `understanding' continues to `work' and for 
this she recommends books such as Alonso de Madrid's Arte de servir de Dios 
(V: 12.2). The great delight in the Lord's presence in the soul (V : 14.2,14.9) reflecting the 
opening of the Moradas: 
1 13 `ama la voluntad, la memoria me parece estä casi perdida, el entendimiento no discurre, a mi parecer, 
mas o se pierde; mas, Como digo, no obra, sine estä como espantado de lo mucho que entiende, porque 
'ufere Dios entienda que de aquello que Su Majestad le representa ninguna cosa entiende. ' 
14 See discussion of these terms in Chapter Eight below. 
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This quietude and recollection is something that is clearly felt through the 
satisfaction and peace bestowed on the soul, along with great contentment and 
calm and a very gentle delight in the faculties. (V: 15.1)115 
Therefore in these times of quietude, let the soul remain in its repose, let them put 
their learning to one side... for he desires that the soul becomes an idiot (boba), as 
indeed it is in his presence as His Majesty humbles himself sufficiently to allow 
us to be near Him despite what we are. (V: 15.8). 
I believe it will never attain true poverty of spirit, which means being at rest in 
labours and dryness and not seeking consolation or delight ( consuelo ni gusto) in 
prayer - for those of the earth have already been abandoned - but seeking 
consolation in trials of love of Him who always lived in the midst of them. (V: 
22.11) 
Having suggested that Teresa is deliberately using the strategy of the theologia mystica, 
we shall spend the rest of the thesis illustrating how she does this. However before we do 
that, it is necessary to delineate where she is getting it from and the influence of 
Francisco de Osuna -a major influence on Teresa but a work that has not been studied in 
great deal by contemporary commentators. It is the argument of this thesis that it is 
precisely through this work that Teresa is schooled in the tradition of theologia mystica 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
Osuna is clearly writing within the medieval tradition of theologia mystica which 
he has studied carefully, in particular through the writings of Jean Gerson, one time 
Chancellor of the University of Paris. In addition, Osuna would influence Teresa, and so 
move the discourse of theologia mystica to another level through his development of the 
notion of recogimiento, partly as a reaction to the condemnation of alumbradismo in the 
Edict of Toledo and to defend a type of contemplative prayer that could not be classed as 
dejamiento. As with de Osuna, Teresa is always careful to avoid this word and in all her 
1 13 Esta quietudy recogimiento del alma es cosa que se siente mucho en la satisfacci6n y pa: que en ella se 
pone, con grandisimo contento y sosiego de las potencies y muy suave deleite. 
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works there is only one reference to it in Moradas 3.1.8: No hay duda sino que si 
persevera en esta desnudez y dejamiento de todo, que alcanzarä lo que pretende: `there is 
no doubt that if we persevere in this nakedness and dejamiento from all things, we shall 
attain what we aim for'. 116 
6.3 De Osuna, Reco2imiento and the Tradition of Theolojiia myslica 
What little we know of Osuna's life and background is largely due to the painstaking 
researchs of Pere Fidele de Ros in the nineteen thirties (Ros 1936). 117 After studies it 
appears that Osuna lived at the recolectorio of La Salceda, so important in the Observant 
reform and under the special patronage of Cisneros. Here Osuna explored recogimiento, 
probably in contact with alumbrado groups until 1523, which was eventually described in 
the TercerAbecedario Espiritual, one of a series of six `alphabets', 118 published between 
1527 and 1554 (after his death). 119 The alumbrados of La Salceda were connected with 
the group that formed around Isabel de la Cruz in nearby Guadalajara. 
One of the key elements of de Osuna's structure in the Tercer Abcedario is the 
division made in chapter six between the theologia speculativa and the theologia mystica. 
For de Osuna the theologia speculativa: 
116 See Astigarraga 2000: 688, my translation 
1" We will draw here on the following sources: Andres (1976,1982), Lopez Santidrian (1998), Ros (1936), 
Peers (1951) and Giles (1981). It seems that he was born around 1492 in Osuna in Andalusia where his 
family had been in service to the counts of Urerla. We know two facts about his childhood from his own 
references in the Abecedarios: that he was present at the capture of Tripoli by Navarro in 1510 and that he 
undertook the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostella sometime between 1510 and 1513. Andres (1982) 
speculates whether he belonged to a converso family but Santidriän (1998) thinks the family were probably 
`old Christians'. Comparing his life as a Franciscan at Salamanca with that of his contemporaries, Ros 
speculates that he may have entered the Friars Minor of the Regular Observance around 1513 and then have 
studied for a minimum of eight years humanities, philosophy and theology, the latter at Cisneros's newly 
founded University of Alcali. 
118 The 'spiritual alphabet' was a characteristic pedagogical tool during period. Osuna would certainly have 
been familiar with Alphabetum divini amoris attributed to Gerson until the 18'h century and customarily 
reprinted in his collected works. Other precursors of Osuna include the Suma de los ejemplos por ABC by 
Clemente Sanchez de Vercial (d. 1426) and Parvum alphabetum monachi in scola Dei of Thomas a Kempis 
119 Apart from the Spiritual Alphabets, other significant works include: Gracioso Convite (1530), Norte de 
los estados (1531), and two collections of Latin sermons: Sanctuarium Biblicum (1533) and Pars 
Meridionalis (1533) as well as the Latin works: Missus Est(1535), Pars Orientalis (1535), Pars 
Occidentalis (1536) and Trilogium evangelicum (1536). 
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Uses reasoning, argumentation, discourse and probability, as do the other 
sciences. It is called scholastic theology, which means it is of learned people 
(letrados) and if someone wishes to excel in it, he needs the learning tools 
required to excel in any science: a good mind, continual exercise, books, time, 
attentiveness, and a learned teacher to study under. (TA 6.2)120 
Whereas the other theologia, the theologia mystica, is unlike other sciences or learning 
for it is a `hidden' (escondida) theology that is totally unlike any other branch of learning. 
It is pursued not through learning, books and teachers but through `pious love and 
exercising moral virtues'. No book can teach it, including this one: 
I do not presume to teach it in this alphabet nor can any mortal do so, for Christ 
reserves to himself the ministry of secretly teaching the hearts where that theology 
lives hidden like divine science, more excellent by far than the other theology 
known as speculative. (TA 6.2) 
We are back in the world of Wittgenstein's Tractatus that we explored in Part One: the 
world of `saying and showing' where the book can indicate something but cannot say it: 
I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and 
of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the 
important one. (Wittgenstein LF: 90) 
Both Wittgenstein and de Osuna, we contend, are `delineating a world from within'. They 
are both presented with the challenge of presenting in words something that cannot be 
said in words, therefore they must use words to `show' rather than `say'. For 
Wittgenstein, the twentieth century logician, this will be a question of using logic to 
reveal the limits of logic, for de Osuna, the sixteenth century friar, the book will take us 
120 Usa de rezones y argumentos y discursos y probabilidades seg: in las otras ciencias; y de aqul es que se 
llama teologla escolästica y de letrados, la cual, si alguno quiere alcanzar, ha menester buen ingenio y 
continuo ejercicio y libros y tiempo, y velar, trabajar teniendo ense1 ado maestro, lo cual tambien es 
menesterpara cualquiera de las otras ciencias. my translation 
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to the `feet of Christ' at which point Christ alone can reveal God's love in the secrecy of 
our hearts. A classic strategy, this thesis argues, for the theologia mystica (and already 
shown in Dionysius's `showing' described in the previous chapter). This `hidden 
theology' will work on the affect and the heart (el corazön) to transform the reader. 
In this same chapter (TA: 6.2) de Osuna refers to the source from whom he 
receives the theologia mystica: Gerson's De Mistica Theologia (Hereafter GMT) which 
he quotes frequently and with which he was clearly very familiar. 12' Both Gerson and 
Hugh use the `strategies' of the theologia mystica to develop their approach to this 
`theology of showing'. Yet although de Osuna is clearly influenced by the deconstruction 
of the Dionysian school (see, for example TA: 21.5) this is not the deconstruction of a 
writer such as Eckhart or Tauler, as we shall see in the following chapter. Rather de 
Osuna, like Gerson, is an heir to what we have already called the `affective 
Dionysianism' arising from the Victorine interpretation of Dionysius, especially from 
Thomas Gallus. 
For de Osuna, like Gerson before him, the Dionysian `unknowing' is a `delectable 
knowing' (sabroso saber) (TA: 6.5). It is not simply a strategy of unknowing but a 
`delectable unknowing'. Indeed, Osuna is always at pains to play on the similarity of the 
two words saber and sabor in Spanish: 
It is called wisdom because it allows us to know how God tastes. `E dicese 
sabidurfa porque mediante ella saben los hombres 6 que labe Dios'- (TA 6.2). 
Osuna, like Gerson and Gallus before him, emphasises the libidinal, sensual aspect of the 
Dionysian unknowing. This is no austere and rarified unknowing but something 
altogether more sensual: 
(The theologia mystica) is also called the art of love (arte de amor) because only 
through love is it realised, and in it love is multiplied more than in any other art or 
instruction. (TA: 6.2) 
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The Dionysian unknowing is not about `thinking of nothing' (TA: 21.5) but developing 
the `savour for the things of God'. 
If we apply the Wittgensteinian Blick to the language games of Osuna we see that 
he is employing the two now familiar `language games', or what we can better term 
`performative discourse', of the tradition of affective Dionysianism: of unknowing and 
affectivity/embodiment. For Osuna, this affective-deconstructive strategy is repackaged 
as the Spanish mystical concept of recogimiento. For recogimiento, we would argue, is 
nothing less than the combination of these two strategies within the wider context of 
Spanish spiritual developments at the time. Also, when we examine Osuna's influence on 
Teresa, we see that recogimiento means for her too the combination of these two 
strategies of eluciation. Both strategies being deployed to present the move from `saying 
to showing to acting' as elaborated in Chapter Four above. 
As Osuna puts it in Chapter Twenty One of the Tercer Abecedario when 
explaining the nature of recogimiento: 
There are words and works in the spiritual as well as the material. Spiritual words 
are the thoughts and reasonings we form in the heart and interior works are the 
most intense, living attention to God alone... Therefore, Our Lord does not 
respond in this matter with words but with works, seeing that the recollected only 
pay attention to them. (TA 21.6) 
As with Wittgenstein, there is a move in Osuna from saying to showing to acting. A 
similar movement which Teresa inherits and we shall explore further in Chapter Eight 
below. 
In his monumental study of `la mistica espanola' between 1500 and 1700 (Andres 
Martin 1975) Melquiades Andres Martin stresses the continuity within the Spanish 
mystical tradition and its origins in the reform movements at the end of the fifteenth 
121 The other important text on the theologia mystica that he quotes is Hugh of Balma's Viae Sion Lugent 
which had recently been translated into Spanish in Toledo as the Sol de Contemplativas. In the late Middle 
Ages it was often ascribed to Bonaventure and reprinted as Bonaventure's DeTheologia Mystica. 
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century, especially the tension between conventualismo and observantismo. These 
movements were often contradictory and unclear and Andres notes: 
This reform movement oscillated between the study of theology, revivified by the 
Dominicans, and a certain anti-intellectualism, which would initially invoke a 
certain anti-verbosity, within the Franciscans and Augustinians, and much later 
affective prayer (oraciön afectiva) which placed more value on experience and 
love over study and intellect. (Andres Martin 1975: 2)122 
Of particular importance to this nascent movement at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century were the reforms initiated within the Franciscan movement. We have seen that to 
aid their reform Cisneros permitted the publication in Castilian of numerous of the 
medieval books on `spirituality' including many of those representing the tradition of 
theologia mystica outlined above. Beginning with the Seville edition of the Obras de 
Bonaventura of 1497 followed by the Incendium Amoris and Liber meditationum from 
the presses of Montserrat. Subsequently we find editions of Augustine, Bernard and 
Richard of St Victor rapidly being produced. The Ejercitatorio de la vida espiritual of 
Garcia de Cisneros of 1500 (which was to have such an impact on the young Ignatius 
Loyola) and, finally the Viae Lugent Sion of Hugh of Balma published in Toledo as the 
Sol de Contemplativos. 
One strand that is very apparent in this whole nascent Spanish movement which 
Andres terms `the recogimiento movement' is `the meditation that seeks love and 
knowledge of God through the will called the "affective prayer" (oration afectiva)' 
(Andres Martin 1975: 27). 123 A clear manifestation of the affective influence from the 
tradition of theologia mystica. Indeed, Andres cites in particular the influence of Hugh of 
Balma's Viae and Bonaventura's Itinerario in this respect who delineate a process where 
`an action characteristic of the will in order to know God when the action of the intellect 
122 My translation. `Este movimiento de reforma oscila entre ei estudio de la teologia, avivado por los 
dominicos, y un cierto anti-intelectualismo, que Ilamaria mejor inicialmente anti-verbosismo, entre los 
franciscos y agustions, y mäs tarde oracidn afectiva por valorar mas la experiencia y ei amor que ei estudio 
y ei entendimiento. ' 
183 
is suspended' (Andres Martin 1975: 27). Such a process is cited in Mombaer's Rosetum of 
1494 (XIX Prologue) where it is called meditation afectiva. '24 Such descriptions of 
meditation afectiva are found in addition in the works of Juan Wessel Gansfort (Escala 
Meditatoria, 1483), Gomez Garcia (Carro de dos Vidas, 1500) and Garcia de Cisneros 
(Exercitatorio de la Vida Espiritual, 1500) which would be later taken up by Alonso de 
Madrid (Arte de Servir Dios, 1521), Francisco de Osuna (Tercer Abecedario, 1527), 
Bernabe de Palma (Via Spiritus, 1531) and Bernardino de Laredo (Subida de Monte Sion, 
1St ed 1535) in the first great flowering of Fransciscan mystical writing. 
The recogidos, as Andres calls this movement, thus have certain central 
characteristics in common (Andres Martin 1975: 55): 
a) the universal call to Christian perfection 
b) the validation of external works, rites and ceremonies 
c) the importance of interiority 
d) following Christ in his humanity and divinity 
e) relation of the active and contemplative lives and relative importance of the 
latter. 
f) annihilation and quietude 
g) importance of `consolaciones' and `gustos' ( see Chapter Eight below) 
h) the role of love 
i) the role of the will 
j) love without previous knowledge 
k) knowledge of affect 
Much of this we shall recognise later in Teresa's own `mystical strategies'. The 
movement of recogimiento thus places the heart and the oration afectiva at the centre of 
its concerns. An oration we argue here, that is directly formed from the late medieval 
schools of affective Dionysianism whose characteristics we have already surveyed. It 
emphasises the importance of the `unknowing' as well as the affectivity of embodiment: 
123 My translation: 'la meditation que busca el amory el conocimiento de Dios por la voluntad 11amamos 124 Mombaer Rosario de Ejercicios Espirituales y de santas meditations 
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The mysticism of the recogimiento is one that pertains to the whole of the person: 
person and spirit, memory, will and understanding. It does not divide the body 
and the soul, interior or exterior, not deprecating the latter as had been the case 
with the alumbrados and the Erasmians. (Andres Martin 1975: 13) 
This is nowhere better expressed than in the First Letter of de Osuna's Tercer 
Abecedario: 
Always walking together - the Person and the Spirit... 
The meaning of our letter is that wherever you go carry your thought 
(pensamiento) along with you, for no one should go divided in themselves. Do not 
allow the body to travel one path and the heart another. (TA 1.1,1.2)125 
Recogmiento then, according to Andres Martin, is primarily a way of `contemplativa 
afectiva' centred on love `sin pensar nada' ('Without thinking of anything') without any 
necessary prevenient or concomitant understanding. Although, at various times in his 
work, Andres Martin seeks to present a systematic presentation of recogimiento (notably 
in his introduction and conclusion) as with the `modern mysticism' we investigated in 
Part One, we would argue that his proposal suffers from the same ontological problems. 
Although the terms recogimiento and recogidos are useful we will in this chapter 
continue working with the concept of `mystical strategy' rather than looking for what we 
argue are fictive `mystical' (or `recognitive') entities - for the reasons given in Part One 
above. 
Although Andres Martin would like to see a clear distinction between the prayer 
of the recogidos and that of the alumbrados it is unlikely that such a stark division 
existed (as we shall see in the following section). According to Andres the seperation 
proper between recogidos and alumbrados begins in 1523 in Pastrana between Francisco 
de Ortiz (recogido) and Pedro Ruiz de Alcaraz (alumbrado). Whether such a clear 
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distinction existed between the two forms of prayer remains a moot point (see below). 
Whatever the reality of the prayer of dejamiento of the alumbrados, it was officially 
condemned by the Franciscan order in 1524 and, as we have seen, by the Inquisition in 
1525. The publication of Osuna's TercerAbecedario in 1527 is clearly a reaction to this 
condemnation. We turn now to a more detailed study of the mystical strategy of that 
work. 
6.4 Strategies of Osuna's TeoloLia MTstica and Gerson's Theo "o is Mtrstica 
Compared 
From the point of view of our study of the mystical strategies of Teresa's writing and by 
way of an intermediary between the theologia mystica of the medieval tradition as 
exemplified by the Victorine interpretation of Dionysius, an exploration of the writing of 
Francisco de Osuna is clearly important. It is also the first systematic account of 
recogimiento prayer, so remains an essential text for understanding this phenomenon 
As we have seen in his text de Osuna is careful to relate his system to the Corpus 
Dionysiacum and its interpretation, especially through the Victorines (in particular 
Richard of St Victor) and Gerson, as well as the writings of Gregory Nazianzan, Bernard 
and Bonaventure. Of these he continually refers back to the Corpus Dionysiacum: 
That you may not be able to understand Saint Dionysius does not mean he cannot 
be understood at all, for Gerson and many other holy theologians have 
comprehended him and offered advice and caution against the wiles of the devil 
who strives the harder to deceive us the more we penetrate sublime matters. (TA: 
21: 5) 
its My translation: Anden siemprejuntamente la Person y Espiritu: El sentido de nuestra tetra sera quo 
doquiera que vayas lleves tu pensamiento contigo y no ande cada uno por su parte divididos; as[ que el 
cuerpo ande en una parte y el corazön e otra. 
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One of the most frequently cited authors by Osuna is Gerson, 126 whose Theologia 
Mystica was one of the central manuals on the theologia mystica at the Universities of 
Salamanca and Alcalä. Gerson acts as the crucial link between the medieval exegesis of 
the Dionysian mystical strategy we discussed in the previous chapter, with the Spanish 
Fransciscan writings on recogimiento and teologia mistica of the early sixteenth century. 
In the Tractatus Primus Speculativus of Gerson's De Mystica Theologia, the Chancellor 
begins by asking: `whether it is better to have knowledge of God through penitent 
affectus or investigative intellectus? ' (GMT: 1, Prol. 1). 127 After much discussion Gerson 
makes it quite clear that he will employ, what we term in this dissertation, `unknowing 
and affective strategies' within his discourse. Thus in Section 27 he declares: 
Thus we see that it is correct to say that as contemplatio is in the cognitive power 
of the intelligence, the mistica theologia dwells in the corresponding affective 
power. (GMT: 1.27.7)128 
Therefore `knowledge of God through mystical theology is better acquired through a 
penitent affectus than an investigative intellectus' (GMT: 1.28.1). In this passage Gerson 
contrasts a theologia mystica that depends upon strategies of unknowing and affectivity 
to the intellective or speculative knowledge acquired through the theologia speculativa. 
Clearly Gerson's strategy differs from Dionysius's in his emphasis on the purification of 
the affectus `through the fervour of penance in compunction, contrition and prayer' 
(GMT: 1.28.2) for Gerson makes fine distinctions between the `purified affectus' and the 
`sordid ie. unpurified affectus' (sordidis affectibus) corrupted by the `sensual habits of 
adolescence' (qui corruptos adhuc habent sensus ab adolescentia) - for Gerson the eros 
of affectus is not an unqualified force for the good as it was in the original text of 
Dionysius, it may be tainted by the `sordid affectus' of youth. 
126 Others include Gregory the Great, Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Nazianzen 
as well as the Victorines, Thomas Aquinas, Bernard and Bonaventure 
127 My translation: an cognitio Dei melius per penitentem affectum quam per intellectum investigantem 
habeatur 
128 et cognoscamus quoniam, appropriate loquendo, sicut contemplatio est in vi cognitive intelligentie, sic 
in vi affective correspondente reponitur mistica theologia 
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He rests with Hugh of Balma's definition of the theologia mystica as `extensio 
animi in Deum per amoris desiderium': `The extension of the animus in God through the 
desire of love' supplemented by the definitions: `sursum ductiva in Deum, per amorem 
fervidum et purum', `a raising movement in God, through fervent and pure love' 
(GMT: 1.28.5) and `cognitio experimentalis habita de Deo per amoris unitive 
complexum , `cognition experienced of God through the embrace of unitive love' and, 
following Dionysius DN. 7: `Theologia mystica est irrationalis et amens, et stulta 
sapientia, excedens laudantes': 'The mystical theology is irrational and beyond mind and 
foolish wisdom, exceeding all praise'. He later returns to this in GMT: 1.43.2, `mistica 
theologia est ' cognitio experimental is habita de Deo per coniunctionem affect us 
spiritualis cum eodum': `theologia mystica is an experimental cognition of God through 
the union of the spiritual affectus with him' -` as the blessed Dionysius states this takes 
place through ecstatic love'. 
Therefore, for Gerson, the theologia speculativa resides in the potentia 
intellectiva whilst the theologia mystica resides in the potentia affectiva. Therefore, 
speculative theology uses `reasoning in conformity with philosophical disciplines' 
(GMT: 1.30.2). Theologia mystica, on the other hand, needs no such `school of the 
intellect' (scold intellectus). It is aquired through the `school of the affect' (scold 
affectus) and (following Gerson's importance attached to the purfication of the affect) 
through the exercise of the `moral virtues' that `dispose the soul to purgation' 
(GMT: 1.30.3). This is acquired through the `school of religion' (scold religionis) or 
`school of love' (scold amoris). The acquisition of the theologia mystica does not 
therefore require great knowledge or extensive study of books. Therefore, the mystical 
theology may be acquired by `any of the faithful, even if she be an insignificant woman 
or someone who is illiterate' (`a quolibet fideli, etiam si sit muliercula vel ydiota ) 
(GMT: 1.30.5). Concurring with St Bernard, Gerson suggests speculative theology can 
never be complete without mystical theology but the contrary can be the case: we all 
must acquire this `affectivity' to reach right relationship with God. Therefore `the 
language of mystical theology is to be hidden from many who are clerics or learned or 
who are called wise in philosophy or theology, so it can be conveyed to many who are 
illiterate and naive, provided they have faith' (GMT: 1.31.1). At this point, as with 
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Dionysius, Gerson employs the strategy of concealment for the `language of mystical 
theology' is `to be hidden from many who are clerics or learned or are called wise in 
philosophy or theology' (GMT: 1.31: 1) lest they `tear apart with the teeth of dogs what 
they do not understand'. As he states at the end of section 42: `To explain these matters 
an endless succession of words could be added, but for experts these few words will 
suffice, for the inexpert no words will ever suffice for full comprehension' (GMT: 1.42.9). 
It is an `irrational and mindless wisdom' ('irrationalis et amens sapientia' 1.43: 3) going 
beyond reason and mind and translating into the affectus. 
We are once again in the place of the Wittgensteinian Blick at the interface of 
`saying and showing' and we find this symbiotic relationship between the unknowing of 
intellect ('they all agree that they have come to know that they know nothing' GMT: 
1.34.3) and the `wisdom' of the affectus. The affectus, once purified, possesses all the 
passionate force of Dionysius's ecstatic eros: `Love takes hold of the beloved and creates 
ecstasy, and this is called rapture because of the manner in which the mind is lifted up' 
(GMT: 1.36.1) and again `love ravishes, unites and fulfills' (GMT: 1.35.3). 
In conclusion, for Gerson, `the school of prayer (scold orandi) is more 
praiseworthy, other things being equal, than the school of learning/letters (scola litteras)'. 
Accordingly where we see the distinction in Osuna between theologia speculativa and 
theologia mystica (which has such an influence on Teresa) we argue here that this is a 
clear reflection of Gerson. Thus, in the key Chapter Six of the Tercer Abecedario where 
Osuna introduces recogimiento ('Frecuenta el recogimiento por ensayarte en su uso) we 
find the following passage reflecting Gerson's distinction. As we have seen above, Osuna 
gives the teologia mistica the following qualities: 
Some call it (recogimiento) `teologfa mistica', with which they mean to say 
"hidden", because the good master Jesus teaches it in the secret hiddeness of the 
heart. (TA: 6.2) 129 
129 unos la llaman teologia mistica, que quiere decir escondida, porque en el secreto escondimiento del 
corazön la ensen"a el buen maestro Jesüs 
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Osuna distinguishes this `mystical theology' from the `speculative theology' in terms 
clearly borrowed from (amongst others) Gerson: 
This (theology) has two forms: one is called `speculative' or `investigative', 
which is the same thing, the other is called `hidden', which is treated of here and 
which gives the title to this third alphabet. I do not presume to teach it here, as no 
mortal can, for Christ alone reserves this teaching only for himself, in secret and 
in the hearts in which this hidden theology dwells as divine science and 
something much more excellent than the other theology of which I spoke first... 
This theology (the mystical theology) is said to be more perfect and better and 
than the first, so says Gerson, as the first serves as an introduction leading to the 
second. (TA: 6.2)130 
The teaching must remain hidden as, for Osuna, Christ alone is the teacher, Osuna cannot 
present it directly, it can only be presented through indirect transmission. 
The first (speculative) theology makes use of the intellectus and reason to prepare 
the ground for the second, affective, mystical theology precisely as it had done for 
Gerson. Again we see the affective-deconstructive strategy of the theologia mystica. By 
the process of unknowing we move into the affective: 
The first theology, called speculative, has recourse to reasoning, argumentation, 
discourse and probability, as do other sciences. It is called scholastic theology, 
which means it is of learned people and if someone wishes to excel in it, he needs 
the learning tools of any science: a good mind, continual exercise, books, 
attentiveness, and a leaned teacher to study under. The hidden theology we are 
describing, however, is not attained by those tools as much as through pious love 
and exercising moral virtues to prepare and purge the soul. (TA: 6.2) 
130 la cual aün es en dos maneras: una se llama especulativa o escudriuladora, que es ei mismo, y otra 
escondida, que es la que se trata oa la que se intitula este tercero alfabeto; no que en el presuma yo 
ensenarla, pues ninguno de los mortales la ensenö, porque Christo guard6 para st este ofrcio de enseº3ar en 
secreto a los corazones en que viviese aquesta teologia escondida como ciencia divina y mucho me s 
excelente que la otra teologla de que hablamos primer... Esta teologla se dice me s perfecta o mejor que la 
primera, segün dice Gerson, porque de la primera como de un principio se servir. 
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Here Osuna seems to be following Gerson's teaching on the `purgation of affection' 
required for the theologia mystica. The undifferentiated eros of Dionysius is replaced by 
the `purified moral affection' of Gerson acquired through pious love and the `exercise of 
the moral virtues'. However, the essential unknowing-affective `mystical strategy' 
remains the same: `It happens even more in men than in animals that where knowledge is 
small, affection and love are greater'. 131 In a reference to Gerson's theologia mystics 
Osuna sees the relation of mystical and speculative theology as that between gold and 
gold inlaid with precious stones (TA: 6.3). This is followed by quoting Gerson's reference 
to the affectus/amor as being like the heat that sets the water to boil in the kettle and 
makes it `spill over itself and be carried beyond itself': 
Thus the soul not yet enkindled by the loving heat (calor amoroso) of theologia 
mystica seems listless and self-contained, but when the spirit of love is conceived 
in the fervour of the heart in some way the soul goes jumping outside of itself or 
flying above itself. 132 
Crucial in Osuna's affective mystical theology is the notion of `taste' of God rather than 
knowledge. In this passage he plays on the word saber which can mean both taste and 
`know'. `Ydfcese sabiduria porque mediante ella saben los hombres a que sabe Dios'. In 
Osuna's words, the `mystical theology' is a sabroso saber- literally, a `tasty knowledge'. 
Osuna then goes on to develop this in his notion of the spiritual gustos, or `taste/delight' 
of God, a key term later taken up by Teresa. He concludes the section by stating that 
`This exercise is known as profundity with respect to the depth and darkness (oscuridad) 
of the devotion for it originates in the depths of man's heart, which are dark because 
human understanding has been deprived of light'. 
131 'Yporque muchas veces acontece aun en los animales, cuanto mds en los hombres, que adonde hay 
menos conocimiento hay mayor afecciön y amor. 
132 See Gerson, GMT: 1.29.7 : 'The water in a vessel, which when it is brought to a fire grows warm, at the 
beginning remains within the vessel, but when it gets very hot and boils seems in a way not to be able to 
contain itself. Because of the heat, the water rises from itself and is carried away. Likewise the mind, when 
it has not yet grown warm with love, maintains itself within itself. Once the spirit, however, has been 
conceived in the love of devotion, it surpasses in a certain manner itself, as if it were leaping and taking 
flight beyond itself'. 
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The notion of the gustos and sabroso saber of the theologia mystica is taken up in 
Chapter Twelve of the Alphabet: `No entiendo, mas gustando, penses alcanzar reposo': 
`Not by thinking, but more by tasting, think to attain rest'. His statements here build on 
the previous ones made in Chapter Six, developed within the framework of Gerson's 
writings, especially in the theologia mystica: 
Even though the understanding may discover and analyse numerous sublime 
matters there is good reason for you to believe that complete, fulfilling repose is 
not to be found through functions of the intellect (por la operaciön intelectiva) 
and that ultimately the least part of what we do not know exceeds everything we 
do know. (TA: 12.1) 
For Osuna, `study steals away everything' and he quotes Ecclesiastes 1: 18 `Cuanto mds 
letrados son, anan mäs indignados , `the more learned one is, the more angry one is' : 
If having found nothing to satisfy or correspond in magnificence with their 
knowledge and persumption they go about with sad, flushed faces revealing the 
anger in their spirit: they are dissatisfied with books, murmur against the authors, 
yearn for and search out new treatises, thumb through some, then others, grow 
weary and weighed down with books, pile labour upon labour. Burdened with 
fetters, burdened with fear. So long as you increase in cleverness and knowledge, 
you will need more and more books, as they say the cleverer you become, the 
heavier arms you need. Such people fail to realize that a multitude of books is no 
more than great spiritual dissolution, excessive work, lack of rest, a burden for the 
memory, food that will not fill the stomach and cosmetics to cover up deficient 
knowledge so as to deceive the stupid into believing that since they posssess the 
books, they must surely understand them. (TA : 12.1 cf. GMT: 1.34) 
Osuna's diatribe against book-learning here is in contrast to the more nuanced approach 
to the `unknowing' of the high medieval tradition and caught in Hugh of Balma's Viae 
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Lugent Sion. There the `anti-intellectual element' was sufficiently tempered for his texts 
to be employed on both sides of the Tegernsee debate regarding Nicholas of Cusa in the 
fifteenth century. Osuna, here perhaps going further than Gerson, who equally 
preferences the affectus to the intellectus, takes Gerson's points to present a more radical 
championing of the affectus which will shape the later Spanish writers such as Teresa: 
`The good religious must first seek kindness and devout discipline, then knowledge and 
insure that his knowledge, like weeds growing among the wheat, does not choke 
devotion' (TA: 12.2). Quoting Gregory, Bernard and Richard of St Victor, Osuna finds 
this `way of love' through the `tasting of the divine goodness': 
No-one is to think that he loves God if he does not wish to taste him, for the fruit 
of love is the enjoyment of what is loved , and the more 
it is loved, the more it is 
enjoyed (porque elfruto del amor es el gusto de lo que es amado, y mientras mds 
se ama, mejor se gusta). Accordingly, Richard says about joyful love: `Love is a 
sweetness of intimate flavour, and the more ardently one loves, the more sweetly 
it tastes; and love is the enjoyment of hope' (`el amor es una dulcedumbre de 
sabor intimo, y cuanto con mäs ardor ama, tanto mäs suavemente gusta, y el 
amor es gozo de la esperanza ). (TA: 12.2) 
Once again, Osuna employs the mystical strategy of the theologia mystica going beyond 
Gerson's `moral purification' into an altogether more sensual and libidinised sense of 
eros. An approach we shall see mirrored in Teresa of Avila. Throughout the medieval 
theologia mystica there is an oscillation from the purity of a `purged moral affectus' to an 
altogether more libidinal and embodied eros which we will return to in Chapter Eight. 
We must `taste what we understand' `gustando lo que entiendes' to attain the wisdom we 
are looking for - the `theologia mistica' or as Osuna also calls it; the recogimiento. In this 
affective version of the theologia mystica, the influence of Bernard is very apparent, and 
Osuna quotes his comments with approval: 
I wanted a vital juice (un zumo vital) to be infused through every vein and into the 
very marrow of my soul so that it might be freed from every other desire and 
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know that One alone... If the spur of intimate love does not penetrate your soul 
with divine desire as deeply as before and if the new desire aroused in you is less 
ardent than other affections it awakened, then you must doubt if the supreme 
Lover yet possesses the intimate breast of your desire. (TA: 12.5) 
As Osuna comments: `the absence of pleasure once enjoyed is evidence of your failing', 
themes we shall return to when we consider Teresa's use of the `strategy of affectivity' 
below. 
Concluding his chapter, Osuna once again (as he has so many times in this 
chapter) quotes Gerson directly from the Theologia Mystica in seeing that this `spiritual 
savour' is not confined to the intelligentsia (indeed, following from his comments in 
Section One it would seem that they are the least equipped to receive it) but referencing 
Gerson again, this knowledge is open to ( and perhaps preferenced to? ) the `little woman 
and the fool' `aunque sea mujercilla e idiota' (TA: 12.7, cf GMT: 1.30: 5). 
The effects of Osuna's affective-unknowing strategy utilising the spiritual gustos 
are described in Chapter Twenty One of the Tercer Abecedario: Intimamente asoseiga y 
acalla tu entendimiento: `Intimately calm and quiet your understanding'. Again, at the 
beginning of this chapter there is a passage that mirrors a similar passage in Gerson and 
points forward to the writings of Teresa. Here it concerns a theme that has already been 
mentioned but is further clarified here: reposo, or the rest or repose of the soul: 
Ultimately security and repose in the heart will not be attained perfectly through 
speculative meditation (por meditation escudrinando) but through recollection, 
which quiets the heart... we shall find that all natural movements are directed to 
quietude and that all things work to that end. Nothing moves except for the 
purpose of finding that repose which all things seek as their ultimate end. 
(TA: 21.1 cf. GMT: 1.40-42) 133 
133 'It is necessary that our spirit, when it is united and joined to the highest perfection through perfect love, 
thereby reaches a state of quietude, fulfilment and stability (quietetur, satietur and stabilitatur). Thus 
matter is fashioned in form as a rock is placed in a centred position, and as anything reaches a state of rest 
when it obtains its end. ' GMT: 1.42.2 
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This sense of `quietude, repose or rest', developed by Gerson and adopted by Osuna will 
be used later by Teresa and most memorably by John of the Cross in the final stanza of 
the Cantico Espiritual. For both Gerson and Osuna, the sweetness of the spiritual element 
(Osuna's gustos) brings spiritual relief and repose. Needless to say by now, this repose is 
found through love and affect us rather than understanding: 
The silence of love is marvellous and most admirable and praiseworthy, that 
silence wherein the understanding is profoundly quieted, receiving the sublimely 
contenting knowledge of experience. We clearly realize that when lovers are 
present to each other they fall silent and the love that unites them supplies the 
want of words. (TA: 21.3) 
When Teresa comes to this point in the Vida and Mansion Four of the Moradas, she 
concerns herself a great deal with the nature of this `quietening' of the mind. Osuna deals 
with this in 21.5. Here he specifies that the `docta ignorancia' is not about `not thinking' 
but placing thinking in the service of the `mystical theology' of the affect. 
To conclude this passage and `in support of the entire Third Alphabet' (TA 21: 6) 
Osuna assembles a series of quotations from `several authentic doctors' to support his 
arguments. There are no surprises by now amongst the authors quoted: Gerson, Richard 
and Hugh of St Victor, Gregory Nazianzan, Dionysius, Isaac of Stella, Hugh of Balma 
(attributed to Bonaventure), Augustine and Bernard. In the end the text, despite all his 
attributions and descriptions, leaves with the exhortation to engage in recogimiento ( as 
he reinvents the theologia mystica) without really telling us what it is. The practice, as he 
reiterates many times, can only be comprehended by the practitioner: it remains a `hidden 
art' (ars escondida). In view of what we have argued as to the performative nature of the 
theologia mystica this is perhaps unsurprising. 
6.5 Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to examine some of the key elements that we are 
arguing forms part of the `mystical strategy' of Teresa's writings. To examine the 
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writings that are presented before us using the Wittgensteinian Blick we have placed 
particular emphasis on certain aspects of them: 
a) The context within which Teresa is writing, especially the constraints placed 
upon her writing by the controversy of alumbradismo and the reactions within 
Spanish society to that crisis. 
b) The influence on her writing of the strategies of her `master', Francisco de Osuna, 
whom we know that Teresa read and re-read for over twenty years. Although she 
only explicitly cites it one or two times, we argue here that it has great implicit 
impact on her text, perhaps more than many other commentators have given credit 
for. 
c) The clear link provided by Gerson between de Osuna and the Medieval tradition 
of Affective Dionysianism. We have argued here that Osuna inherits the 
Affective Dionysianism of the late Medieval period and employs it to describe the 
new practice of recogimiento currently achieving popularity in early sixteenth 
century Spain. 
Accordingly, using our Wittgensteinian Blick we have seen how Osuna uses two what we 
call `performative strategies' to approach the move from saying to showing implicit to 
him in the theologia mystica. Those strategies being the strategy of unknowing and the 
strategy of affectivity. In analysing these strategies we have explored the links between 
Gerson and Osuna at length for two reasons: 
1. Very little study of the text of Osuna, and its relation to Gerson, has been 
undertaken in the English language and, as has been demonstrated above, it can 
be very productive, revealing the underlying influences to Osuna's text. 
2. We have used the exposition of Osuna and Gerson in this chapter to support the 
argument that there is a distinctive and known mystical strategy of theologia 
mystica in late medieval Western Christianity to which Teresa is knowingly heir. 
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At the beginning of the chapter we heard how Teresa in the Vida expressed her desire to 
write down something of the favours she had been granted by the love of God. It is the 
argument in this thesis that Teresa specifically uses these two strategies to develop the 
interface of `saying and showing' within her writing. It is contended that like Osuna she 
understands that the task of the theologia mystica is not the same as the rational task of 
the theologia speculativa but is something much more along the lines of the performative 
strategies employed by Wittgenstein to get across his philosophical points. For both 
parties, Wittgenstein and the followers of recogimiento - Teresa and de Osuna, the aim of 
the strategy is to `change the aspect' of the reader. In the case of Wittgenstein, to resolve 
certain philosophical problems as a prelude to a more ethically engaged life. In the case 
of Teresa to enable the `change of aspect' which is contemplative prayer, to be taught 
more readily. A contemplative prayer she realised was so important for her reform yet 
under such suspicion from the ecclesiastical authorities of mid-sixteenth century Spain. In 
this respect, and in this climate, it has been argued, she uses the strategies of theologia 
mystica which we have seen had been so intricately constructed by her previous 
`masters', notably Gerson and de Osuna, to achieve this end. 
Consequently, in the following two chapters we shall concentrate on each of these 
strategies in turn and see how Teresa uses them to make her argument. Remembering, of 
course, that like Osuna she always sees the two strategies as operating in tandem. As we 
look now in greater depth at the two strategies in Teresa we shall also bring back our 
other `conversation partner', Wittgenstein, to show parallels in the `mystical strategies' of 
both writers. 
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Chanter Seven: 
Unsaying and Unknowing in Teresa of Avila and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
The understanding cannot set eyes on God because of the radiance emanating 
from his countenance when he descends from his mountain of glory to 
communicate with us in this vale of tears wherein we live. (Francisco de Osuna 
TA: 21.6) 
So far in this thesis we have argued for an approach to Teresa's writings that, drawing on 
our Wittgensteinian methodology, highlights her `performative discourses of unknowing 
and affectivity/embodiment'. In the previous chapter we laid out some of the background 
to Teresa's writings, in particular arguing that she is heir to a form of writing we term the 
`tradition of theologia mystica'. In the next two chapters we shall demonstrate how she 
employs these two strategies in her writings. In a reflexive move, we shall also cross 
reference her `mystical strategies' with those of Wittgenstein to suggest that the two use 
similar `mystical strategies' in their writings. We shall begin in this chapter by looking at 
the `mystical strategy of unknowing'. This will begin with a consideration of `the strategy 
of unknowing' itself, in particular contrasting it with Sells's `mystical language of 
unsaying' before moving into the strategy itself. 
7.1 Sells's Mystical Languages of Unsayini! 
At the beginning of the thesis we reviewed several current approaches to the mystical, 
including those of Kripal and Sells. In the earlier chapter we looked carefully at Kripal's 
writing but it is now time to compare and contrast Sells's approach with the one adopted 
here. 
Sells's classic text on the apophatic, The Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Sells 
1994), suggests that from the sixth century onwards, clearly influenced by neo-Platonic 
writers such as Plotinus, the three Western monotheistic faiths have practiced a highly 
developed form of apophatic language, or what he calls `the mystical language of 
unsaying'. This language, he argues, reaches its greatest development in the High Middle 
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Ages (he cites Marguerite Porete, Meister Eckhart and Ibn Arabi as the highest 
developments of the form) only for it to diminish until 1492, `a convenient end-date for 
this common world, the year Jews and Arabs were expelled from Spain, the colonial age 
began and the civilisation held in common by Jewish, Christian and Muslim cultures 
began to break apart into increasingly separate spheres' (Sells 1994: 221). Sells's 
apophasis evolves as a response to what he terms `the aporia - the unresolvable dilemma 
- of transcendence' (1994: 2), that is to say, the dilemma that arises when we try to give 
names to that which is beyond names: `any statement of ineffability, "X is beyond 
names", generates the aporia that the subject of the statement must be named (as X) in 
order for us to affirm that it is beyond names'. 
In response to this aporia Sells suggests three responses are possible: 
1. Silence. 
2. To distinguish between ways in which the transcendent is beyond names and the 
ways it is not. Here we have the classic Western medieval scholastic distinction 
between God as God is in God's Self and God as perceived in God's creatures. 
3. The third response, which is the one explored by Sells, is to maintain the tension 
of the aporia and develop a form of performative discourse that realises that every 
assertion of the nature of the transcendent must be accompanied by another that 
denies it. 
This `mystical language of unsaying' is primarily a mode of discourse rather than an 
`apophatic theory': 
In those writings, the effort to affirm transcendence leads to a continuing series of 
retractions, a propositionally unstable and dynamic discourse in which no single 
statement can rest on its own as true or false or even meaningful. In such 
discourse, a rigorous adherence to the initial logical impasse of ineffability exerts 
a force that transforms normal logic and semantic structures. (Sells 1994: 3) 
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For Sells, it is primarily a `discourse of double propositions' `in which meaning is 
generated through the tension between the saying and the unsaying' (1994: 12). To 
achieve its ends it uses paradoxes, contradictions and coincidences of opposites. 
It cannot be denied that Sells is developing an interesting thesis here, not least in 
the far reaching effects of the Dionysian corpus on medieval Muslim, Christian and 
Jewish theologies. However, to use Sells's ideas in our study here we have to reflect on 
some of his theses. 
One of the central theses of the book, which is unsurprising considering Sells's 
background as a scholar of Islamic mystical texts as well as Christian ones, is that there 
may have been a common core of influence between Sufi texts, such as the ones of Ibn 
Arabi that he explores, and the writings of such `masters of apophasis' as Porete and 
Eckhart. Thus in analysing the `Mirror of Simple Souls' Sells makes comparisons 
between the `stages' of Porete's spiritual journey and the Sufi `stages', especially of 
perplexity (hairat) and annihilation (fand): 
The term `annihilated soul' - which I can find used nowhere else in previous 
Christian literature - its combination with the reversion to the precreative state, 
and the reference fusions that take place at the point of mystical union show a 
multifold affinity to Sufi thought that can hardly be dismissed as pure 
coincidence... They also suggest that at this particular moment in the history of 
Western mysticism, Sufism and European Christian mysticism were part of a 
larger multireligious cultural entity. (Sells 1994: 134) 
This notion of a fused Sufi-Christian `multireligious entity' whilst interesting means that 
Sells does tend to suggest the apophatic is a distinctive language typical of this 
`multireligious cultural entity'. Here we seem to be returning to the `cross-credal 
ontological entity' of `modern mysticism' that we critiqued in Chapter Two. 
In contrast to this approach ( which comes close, in our opinion to the notions of 
`modem mysticism' discussed in Part One), when looking at the texts of Teresa of Avila 
this thesis adopts a more Wittgensteinian Blick of placing the texts before us and seeing 
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how she uses the apophatic without wanting to draw any conclusions about `occult 
entities' such as this `multireligious cultural entity'. 
The other point to be noticed about Sells's account of the apophatic is his 
reference to Wittgenstein's use of apophatic language which he simply dismisses: 
Wittgenstein's statement in the Tractatus that unsayable things do exist, followed 
by the statement that this previous statement `must be thrown away' is a 
classically apophatic move, but one that comes as a kind of postscript, rather than 
being inscribed within the Tractatus as a whole. (1994: 220) 
This thesis has argued that `Wittgenstein's deconstruction' is an essential part of his 
project: to show what cannot be said. So in this respect we would disagree with Sells's 
analysis of Wittgenstein's apophasis. As we will demonstrate in the following chapter, 
Wittgenstein's apophasis is very much at the centre of the Tractatus rather than a `kind of 
postscript'. 
However, if we take the starting point for Sells's apophasis as the need to respond 
to the `aporia of transcendence' then in this respect he is right to dismiss Wittgenstein's 
apophasis as it is not the apophasis of someone who is self-consciously trying to justify 
`God-talk' of the transcendent. 
When we turn to our other interlocutor, Teresa of Avila, we find that she too is 
not so concerned with justifying notions of the transcendent deity, certainly not as part of 
any explicitly philosophical or theological scheme. Rather, her `apophasis' if we can call 
it such, is, as we have seen, part of the tradition of theologia mystica inherited from 
Osuna (and thence from Gerson and the Parisian schools) as opposed to what they see as 
the theologia speculativa. As we saw in the previous chapter, Teresa has to be careful 
how much knowledge she reveals of this tradition because of the demands of the 
Inquisition and the Valdes Index and it is telling, as we have seen, that in her writings the 
term theologia mystica (or in Castillian mistica teologia) occurs only four times, and all 
within the early Vida (V 10.1,11.5,12.5 and 18.2). By the time she comes to the later 
works, especially Las Moradas it seems she deliberately does not use the term. 
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Thus, this thesis argues that we will not find in Teresa the `apophasis of unsaying' 
analysed by Sells, and more suggestive it would seem of the Sufi mechanisms of writers 
such as Ibn Arabi, but rather something more akin to the `unknowing' - the theologia 
mystica - of Osuna and Gerson. This, we argue, has more affinity to the `affective 
Dionysianism' of the West than the severe and rather pure apophasis (or fanä) of the Sufi 
tradition. Which is not to say that Teresa does not use apophatic strategies, but rather they 
are strategies that are part of the affective Dionysianism of Gerson and Osuna than the 
fand -apophasis of the Sufi tradition. 
If, as suggested, Teresa is not attempting to respond to the philosophical problem 
of the aporia of transcendence in her writing why then would she be employing a 
`strategy of unknowing' in her texts and how would she do this? To throw light on this 
question it is worth looking at how she describes the Mistica Teologia in La Vida. 
7.2 The Strategies of Teresa's Mistfca Teolocia 
As we saw in the previous chapter in The Book of Her Life (Libro de La Vida) Teresa 
describes the events of her life up to her fiftieth year (1565). Here, as we saw, Teresa 
uses the term teologia mistica when she wants to directly refer to her experience in the 
early chapters (Chapters Ten to Twelve) of the book. As she tells us, she enters into a 
place to which she gives the name the place of mistica teologfa: 
In these passages, it is argued, Teresa is not so concerned with responding to the 
aporia of the transcendent as described by Sells but with describing the `unsaying' that 
she experiences in prayer: `the mind, though it is not lost, does not reason'. These bold 
statements of unknowing are at this point undeveloped and it will only be later in Las 
Moradas that she will return to the theological and philosophical problems raised by 
these statements, to which we will return in the next chapter. As suggested at this point 
she is more concerned with enunciating the ternura of the soul that comes with the 
unknowing and is displaying her debt to Osuna, Gerson and their affective Dionysianism. 
Yet, as with Wittgenstein, she is attempting in her work to describe experiences to people 
who have themselves `already had the thoughts that are expressed in it' (Tractatus: 
Preface) and she states time and again `it will be very obscure to anyone who has not had 
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the experience' (V: 10.9). Throughout, her description of the mistica teologfa is 
accompanied by gustos, ternera, deleites and gozos: ' in the further stages of prayer the 
chief thing is joy (gozar)'. Prayer, she tells us, is like a garden set out `for the Lord's 
pleasure' (se deleite el Senor) (V: 11.6), a theme that will stay with her and return at the 
beginning of the Moradas. As this statement brings forth the encompassing metaphor of 
the Castle in Las Moradas so at this point in the Vida it brings forth the famous image of 
the `four waters' that water the soul seeking God. However, as will be made clearer in the 
Moradas, Teresa is aware of the danger of advocating a way that abjures the way of 
thinking totally. She recognises that she cannot deny the role of thinking (see V: 12.4) but 
on the other hand it is clear that her way requires `unknowing' or at least `suspension of 
the intellect': 
Learning is, I think, an invaluable help in this exercise, particularly when it goes 
with humility... In the `mystical theology' the understanding ceases to work 
because God suspends it... We must not cease to work with it (the understanding) 
or we shall find ourselves stupid and apathetic and the result will be neither the 
one thing or the other. (V: 12.5) 
There is a tension here, which, we suggest, can only be understood by the Affective 
Dionysianism of Osuna and Gerson - yes, there is unknowing, but also, there is the 
`giving of delight' the `strategy of affectivity' that is necessary for the unknowing to 
proceed: `For when the Lord suspends it and makes it still ( the entendimiento), He gives 
it something to amaze it and keep in occupied' (V: 12.6). 
At the stage of writing the Vida in her fifties, then, the necessity of delight and 
enjoyment are central to her understanding of the mystical union. This is no Sellsian 
`language of unsaying' but something quite different and more akin, it is argued, to the 
`performative strategies' of Wittgenstein's texts that lead us from the Cartesian solipsism 
of the `head' to contact the embodied desire of the body. 
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7.3 Strategies of Unknowing in Teresa of Avila and Ludwig Wittgenstein Compared 
Having argued in the previous section that what we find in the Vida is not so much a 
Sellsian `mystical language of unsaying' but rather Teresa's version of Osuna's theologia 
mystica we are now in a position to describe her particular form of what we have termed 
`unknowing'. True to its roots in affective Dionysianism we have highlighted its 
connection with desire and affectivity. However, this thesis argues that if we are to 
understood how Teresa is operating in her works, especially the more mature Moradas 
we would be better looking at Wittgenstein's strategies of unknowing and how these 
reflect Teresa's. Accordingly, for the remainder of this chapter we shall demonstrate 
some of the parallels between their respective `performative discourses' as further 
support to the argument that Teresa's `strategy' in her writing can be better compared to 
the `performative discourse of theologia mystica' rather than a Sellsian `mystical 
language of unsaying'. 
7.3.1 Witt2ensteinian Strategies of Unknowing and Deconstruction 
Anything your reader can do for himself leave to him (Wittgenstein VB: 1948) 
I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if 
possible... to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. (Wittgenstein PI: Preface 
vi) 
As has been stated throughout this thesis, it is not possible to make a direct comparison 
between Teresa and Wittgenstein. Even if this were possible it would probably not be 
desirable - one is the twentieth century linguistic philosopher seeking to express the 
nature of meaning in his writing, the other a sixteenth century Carmelite sister trying to 
describe the nature of the soul's journey to God. However, what we can say, and is being 
argued for here, is that both writers in coming across the blocks to their expression; in the 
case of Wittgenstein the limits to meaning in logical form of language, and in the case of 
Teresa the limits to expression of the `spiritual' nature of the self, adopt similar strategies 
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of elucidation. What we can call `strategies of elucidation' or `performative strategy'. In 
all such `strategies of elucidation' style is as important as content, none more so than in 
the use of a subversive or deconstructive strategy. Wittgenstein clearly states that he does 
not want to spare his readers the trouble of `thinking for themselves' (PI: viii). As we 
have seen Wittgenstein says of his later philosophy: 
I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and 
having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her key. (OC: 532) 
For as we seen, this `new way of doing philosophy' no longer produces the systematic 
treatise but rather a sequence of numbered remarks designed to beguile and interact with 
the reader so that the discourse would have the desired performative effect on the person 
who engaged with it: 
They point or gesture towards ends that are somewhat alien to our current 
preoccupations. In fact they are written in the form of "striking similes" and 
"arresting moments" - they have a "poetic quality" their function is to change our 
"way of looking at things" (PI 144). (Schotterl997: 1) 
Teresa's writing, likewise, initially strikes one as `scatter shot' and perhaps incoherent, as 
de Certeau puts it in his Mystic Fable: 
Rugged, rough-and-tumble sentences, torn by opposing impulses (I know, I don't 
know etc) punctuated with pues and porque, oral markers, sometimes of a 
hammering affirmation, sometimes of an appeal to the "sisters" who are right 
there, close by. (de Certeau 1992: 195) 
Yet, like Wittgenstein, is there perhaps `method in the madness'? Is Teresa deliberately 
fooling us with her `scattershot' language? 
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If we look at Wittgenstein we can see certain `strategies of unknowing' which resemble 
those of Teresa, both having the aim to subvert and elude their readers' expectations - in 
both cases, the goal is `pure performance'. For Wittgenstein, our words become tools, 
instruments to challenge and wake us up, he refers to them as `the levers in the cabin of a 
locomotive' or `tools in a toolbox'. Throughout his writings he uses them carefully and 
develops and traces his strategic elucidations with care and caution. Teresa, on the other 
hand, is using her performative discourse to urge her readers - primarily but not solely 
her sisters - to act through prayer to reach closer union with God in their lives. As we 
saw in Chapter Four, Schotter (1997: 14) isolates four `linguistic strategies' adopted by 
Wittgenstein: 
1. To arrest or interrupt ('to deconstruct') the spontaneous, unselfconscious flow of 
our ongoing `mental' activity. These strategies provoke us into examining 
whether there is `more to it' than we expected. We are shocked into `standing 
back'. 
2. To use certain `instructive forms of language' that provoke us to give 
`prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily made us 
overlook' (PI: 132). They are `instructive gestures' which point and show. 
3. To suggest new ways of thinking by the use of carefully selected images, similes 
and metaphors which can help the process giving `first form to such sensed but 
otherwise unnoticed distinctions, thus to make reflective contemplation of their 
nature possible' (Schotter 1997: 15). 
4. To use the comparison of different `language games' to present `an order in our 
knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one of 
many possible orders; not the order' (PI: 132). 
We also saw that as part of this subversive linguistic toolkit, Genova (Genova 1995: 130) 
isolates four `subversive stategies' used by Wittgenstein: 
1. Talking to himself 
2. Contradicting himself 
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3. Avoiding arguments and conclusions 
4. Refusing orientating structures 
To these four what we call `performative strategies of unknowing' we add two more: use 
of humour and ordinary language, to suggest six strategies of unknowing (U1 - U6) 
within Wittgenstein's texts: 
U1: The Direction of Locution 
U2: Contradiction 
U3: Avoiding Conclusions: Humility 
U4: Disorientation 
U5: Humour 
U6: Use of Ordinary Speech 
All six, it is argued here, are knowingly used by both Wittgenstein and Teresa to `change 
the aspect' of the reader. This, we argue, is part of the `mystical strategy' common to 
both - along with the `affective/embodied strategy' we shall investigate in the next 
chapter. We shall accordingly turn to each strategy in both writers, beginning with 
Wittgenstein. 
U. 1. The direction of locution 
Nearly all my writings are private conversations with myself (VB: 1948) 
Throughout his corpus Wittgenstein talks to himself. As Genova points out, the 
boundaries between self and others breaks down: `most times he talks to a host of 
imagined interlocutors who are fragments of himself and others' (1995: 130). Several 
positions are stated and explored, sometimes all at once. The alternating narrative voice is 
both disconcerting and liberating, it is almost at times as though he had written the script 
of a play or film rather than a philosophical treatise (see Derek Jarman's comments on 
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this aspect of Wittgenstein's work used in the making of his own film Wittgenstein, 
Jarman 1993). 
He conducts dialogue with imaginary others and with himself, including `the 
author of the Tractatus' who takes on the third person: 
PI: 113 "But this is how it is-------" I say to myself over and over again. I feel as 
though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I 
must grasp the essence of the matter. 
PI: 114 (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of propositions 
is: This is how things are. " -------- That is the kind of proposition that one repeats 
to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of a thing's 
nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through 
which we look at it. 
Central to Wittgenstein's approach is his relationship with the reader, us, and how we are 
going to react to his remarks. Even the punctuation and arrangement of the script are 
important, as he states: `I really want my copious punctuation marks to slow down the 
speed of reading. Because I should like to be read slowly (as I myself read)' (VB: 1948). 
As we shall also see with Teresa we are invited into an imaginary conversation with the 
narrator. He constantly asks us questions, challenges us, asks us to undergo thought 
experiments, a technique also found in Teresa. Fundamental to both is our own 
experience: how we write interpretation depends upon the pages of our own experience: 
in both cases we are understanding something that is already there. In the case of 
Wittgenstein, `all that is the case' (T: 1), in the case of Teresa, the Moradas that present 
themselves when we begin to look at and consider ourselves in a prayerful fashion. 
Wittgenstein's `technique', then, as a philosopher, can be said to be one of 
constructing a series of `reminders' to us. We have the answers all along, his task is to 
nudge us in the right direction so `the fly can escape the fly bottle'. His written style 
therefore consists of series of these nudges and winks: 
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If it is asked: "How do sentences manage to represent? " - the answer might be: 
"Don't you know? You certainly see it, when you use them? " For nothing is 
concealed. 
How do sentences do it? - Don't you know then? For nothing is hidden. 
But given the answer: "But you know how sentences do it, for nothing is 
concealed" one would like to retort "Yes, but it all goes by so quick, and I should 
like to see it as it were laid open to view". (PI: 435) 
The direction of locution, then, helps Wittgenstein in his task of letting his work be a 
`series of reminders'. His work, like Teresa's, is essentially dialogic (Incandela 1985: 
463) - `it needs someone else and invites response'. We have to struggle to understand 
what Wittgenstein is trying to put across, the answers will not come easily or lightly. 
U. 2. Contradiction 
We have already seen from Sells above the role of contradiction in the creation of the 
aporias of apophasis. Likewise, Wittgenstein enters into this game with his own 
contradictions and cross examples (See, for example, OC: 400- 405, PI: 352 or his debates 
with `the author of the Tractatus' eg. PI: 113 - 115). Again, as opposed to the proponent 
of the Weltanschauung, the proponent of the Weltbild can only suggest and cajole. She 
cannot declaim. As with the writers of mystical and psychotherapeutic discourse, 
Wittgenstein can never present a complete and water-tight system. It flows with the 
stream of life, sometimes hardening into the channel, sometimes fluid with the stream - 
'now losing her spectacles, now her key. ' The method of elucidation acts through games, 
strategies and reminders, some of which will contradict each other. Its special function 
requires a special form. This is the form of Wittgensteinian analysis or, for that matter, 
mystical discourse. 
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U. 3 Avoiding Conclusions: Humility 
There is accordingly no fixed end point for the discourse: world, language and discourse 
are endless. His writings contain no final conclusion, rather: 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which bring itself in question. (PI: 133) 
We do not need to win an argument, rather our aim is to bring peace to ourselves and our 
interlocutors. 
As Anthony Kenny points out (Kenny 1959: 235) the Philosophical Investigations 
contains 784 questions, only 110 of which are answered and seventy of these are meant to 
be wrong! The arraigning of questions is clearly a positive strategy by Wittgenstein to 
elicit the change of Weltblick that he seeks. In Zettel: 457, for example, he quotes 
Augustine with approval: `quia plus loquitur inquisition quam inventio': ` because the 
search says more than the discovery' and perhaps Augustine is the `missing link' for both 
Teresa and Wittgenstein. Both were profoundly influenced by reading the Confessions 
and both Teresa's Vida and Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations hold more than a 
passing desire to confess. As we saw earlier, for Cavell (1976: 71) the style of the 
Investigations is that of Augustine's Confessions, the problems of the Investigations 
contain: 
What serious confession must: the full acknowledgement of temptation(s) ("I 
want to say... "; "I feel like saying... "; "Here the urge is strong... ") and a 
willingness to correct them and give them up ("In the everyday use... "; "I impose 
a requirement that does not meet my real need... "). (Cavell 1976: 71) 
As we know from Monk, Wittgenstein at many times in his life made a `full confession' 
and the confessional mode was familiar and attractive to him (See Monk 1990: 367 - 
371). The `voices of temptation and correctness' (Thompson 2000: 14) are familiar from 
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U. 1 above - they hover before us and may lead us in the right direction or against where 
we want to be. 
Hauerwas in his comments on Wittgenstein in `Aquinas, Preller, Wittgenstein and 
Hopkins' (Hauerwas 2004: 98) suggests that the Philosophical Investigations is `a form of 
training in humility'. He quotes Wittgenstein's remarks with approval: `The edifice of 
your pride has to be dismantled. And that is terribly hard work' (VB: 1937). For 
Hauerwas, pride is clearly an aspect of the self that stops us `seeing how things really 
are'. It obstructs the Ubersichtliche Darstellung. 
Wittgenstein's aim, as Incandela points out (Incandela 1985: 460) was `not 
explaining or setting out a position as much as he was confessing temptations - not for 
others to believe, but for them to test by their own lights, to engage in self-scrutiny, and 
only then to accept or reject them'. This can only happen if the author has the humility to 
step to one side, the ladder, as it were `is pulled up' once it has been used: 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the 
ladder after he has climbed up it. ) 
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright (dann 
sieht er die Welt richtig). (T: 6.54) 
As Kallenberg comments: 
The use of the adverb `rightly' (richtig) here to modify the verb `to see' (sehen) 
was deliberate: Wittgenstein's aim was that the reader attain a correct manner of 
viewing rather than secure a correct picture of reality, because, as he would 
summarize some years later, "the search says more than the discovery". 
(Kallenberg 2001: 22) 
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As with Teresa we shall see that humility within the author can allow this process of self 
reflection in the reader to happen. It may be better to see his later writings rather than 
`confessions' but as `collections of reminders' (See Fann 1969: 107): 
The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular 
purpose. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would never be possible to 
debate them, because everyone would agree to them. (PI: 127) 
The philosophers who seek to construct a Weltanschauung or over-riding theory will 
need to produce arguments, proof and reasoning. For the philosopher who seeks the 
Weltbild the `collection of reminders' will be sufficient. As he reminds Drury we must 
avoid trying to become professional philosophers trying to chum out academic research 
papers when we have nothing new to say to one another. 
U. 4 Disorientation 
For a philosopher there is more grass growing down in the valleys of stupidity 
than up on the barren heights of cleverness. (VB: 1949) 
Throughout Wittgenstein's texts we are forced to lose our way. We wander around trying 
to find a coherent way, but do not achieve it. The text is alive and constantly changing. 
As we have seen, Wittgenstein himself would worry endlessly about the order of his 
sentences, experimenting, as with a kaleidoscope, with differing versions of the 
propositions. In Schotter's words he seeks to arrest or interrupt `the spontaneous, 
unreflective flow of our ongoing, routine activities' (2006: 4) so that he may give 
`prominence to distinctions which our ordinary form of language easily make us 
overlook' (PI: 132). As we have seen the works are constructed in ways that make them 
difficult to read as parts of a systematic treatise. They are full of exclamation marks, non- 
sequiturs, blind alleys. `Think of... ' `Imagine... ' `It is like... ' `Suppose... ' and similar 
expressions pepper the text. As well as odd or unusual scenes or thought experiments. 
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Take, for example, the opening paragraphs of the Philosophical Investigations where we 
are confronted with no less than five differing thought-experiments describing four 
different situations of `Sprachspiele', vis: 
" The description of Augustine's encounter with ostensive definition from his 
account of his childhood in The Confessions. (PI: 1) 
9 The person sent shopping with a slip marked `five red apples' who has the 
shopkeeper perform strange activities much like a Two Ronnies comedy sketch 
(who says Wittgenstein has no sense of humour! ). (PI: 1) 
" The activities of two builders who utter the monosyllabic `slab', `block', `pillar' 
and `beam'. (Memories here surely of Wittgenstein's time as a builder-architect 
constructing his sister's house in Vienna in the nineteen twenties). (PI: 2) 
" `Moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules' - descriptions of 
board games. (PI: 3) 
" An actor interpreting a script `in which letters are used to stand for sounds, and 
also as signs of emphasis and punctuation'. (PI: 4) 
For the start of the last major work by one of the leading thinkers of the twentieth century 
it makes for an odd and disconcerting experience. No wonder some people question 
Wittgenstein's grasp of form, or indeed reality in these last seemingly confused and 
confusing jottings. Yet, as has been argued throughout this thesis, Wittgenstein knows 
exactly what he is doing and if we return to our proposal of the importance of the 
Überblick in Wittgenstein's writings as argued above, then the message becomes very 
clear. As he says in PI: 5: 
We may perhaps get a sense of how much this general notion of the meaning of a 
word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision 
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impossible. - It disperses the fog if we study the appearances of language in 
primitive kinds of application in which one can have an overview (übersehen) of 
the aim and functioning of words. 134 
The aim of the disconcerting thought experiments is to pull the reader from their habitual 
way of viewing the world, disconcert her and re-orientate her so that she `sees the world 
aright': 
His acceptance of the new picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a 
given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of 
pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things (Anschauungsweise 
geändert). (PI: 144) 
U. 5 Humour 
Humour is not a mood but a Weltanschauung. (VB: 1948) 
Wittgenstein famously once said that he wanted to write a work that consisted entirely of 
jokes but didn't have the necessary sense of humour to do it! Humour is an essential part 
of Wittgenstein's strategy of moving us into the Überblick, and in this he shares the 
attribute with Teresa: 
Humour is not a mood (Stimmung), but a Weltanschauung. (VB: 1948) 
The examples are numerous: 
PI: 250: Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest? 
PI: 268: Why can't my right hand give my left hand money? 
134 
my translation 
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The philosophical Blick he is trying to achieve in his writings can use humour as much as 
anything else. As we saw at the beginning of the thesis, by stating that `philosophy leaves 
everything as it is' Wittgenstein was as much trying to change nothing as to change 
everything. Which is exactly, as he realised in his later writings, how humour works. It is 
a fundamental change of aspect. So with humour, the whole can be changed by a certain 
comical `aspect seeing': 
What is incomprehensible is that nothing, yet everything has changed. (RPP2: 
474) 
Thus, humour and `getting the joke' can be just as much part of the process of `changing 
aspect' as logical argument or rational discourse. In this respect, humour is a central 
plank or tool of Wittgenstein's strategies: 
What is it like for people not to have the same sense of humour? They do not 
react properly to each other. It's as though there were a custom amongst certain 
people for one person to throw another a ball which he is supposed to catch and 
throw back; but some people, instead of throwing it back, put it in their pocket. 
(VB: 1949) 
U. 6 Ordinary Speech 
It is wrong to say that in philosophy we consider an ideal language as opposed to 
our ordinary one. For this makes it appear as though we thought we could 
improve on ordinary language. But ordinary language is all right. (BB: 28) 
One of the key components of the Wittgensteinian Blick is to redirect our gaze away from 
the abstract entities of theoretical speech t6 the ordinary that lies before us. As we have 
seen he is not concerned with developing a new body of systematic theory (PI: 109,126) 
but `putting everything before us' so nothing is either explained or deduced. Ordinary use 
and ordinary speech is of vital importance to his Blick 
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When philosophers use a word ---- `knowledge', `being', `object', `I', 
`proposition', `name' ---- and try to grasp the essence of a thing, we must always 
ask ourselves: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is 
its original home ---- 
We bring the words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI: 
116)135 
By such means the Wittgensteinian Blick brings us back from `one or another piece of 
plain nonsense' (PI: 119) to clearer understanding of the way we relate to the world. For 
philosophy can `in no way interfere with the actual use of language, it can in the end only 
describe it' (PI: 124). 
Again, Wittgenstein reminds us how we use language in ordinary life (cf. the 
opening pages of the Philosophical Investigations) as a solution to our problems. As we 
shall see in the next section, Teresa is also very clear that her sisters should use `ordinary 
language' when they talk to each other and the faithful, especially when talking about 
things of God. She, of course, is working within the context of the letrados/espirituales 
debate, yet, like Wittgenstein, she seems to be able to sniff out `metaphysical claptrap' 
and is all for plain speaking when talking of `things of the spirit'. 
As with Teresa, there is a suspicion that this language may be `too coarse and 
material' (PI: 120), but as Wittgenstein says `How can another be constructed? ' and 
`How strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have! ' (another 
example of U5! ). 
Therefore his `clear and simple language games are not preparatory studies for a 
future regularization of language' (PI: 130) but rather a means to enable to say `now I can 
go on'. 
We have, then six performative strategies by which Wittgenstein deliberately disconcerts 
us and leads us into `unknowing': 
iss My translation. Anscombe translates Sprache with 'language game' rather than `language' - which 
seems to me to introduce an unnecessary level of' Wittgensteinian' terminology (see Chapter Three) 
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U. 1 The Direction of Locution 
U. 2 Contradiction 
U. 3 Avoiding Conclusions 
U. 4 Disorientation 
U. 5 Humour 
U. 6 Ordinary Speech 
As with Wittgenstein, I will suggest that these six `strategies' best achieve Teresa's 
programme of unknowing. In both cases the two authors do not want to impose dogma or 
a certain way of thinking on the reader but leave the reader to `do what they can 
themselves'. For Wittgenstein this is the resolving of `one or other piece of philosophical 
nonsense', for Teresa it is the individual soul's journey to God occurring in a place of 
freedom. Both are natural rebels, but they are rebels that respect the importance of the 
system they find around them and, in Wittgenstein's phraseology `use the ladder' they 
find around themselves to achieve what they want, `before throwing away the ladder'. 
7.3.2 Strategies of Unknowing in Teresa 
We have already argued that in Teresa's writings, rather than a Sellsian `Language of 
Unsaying' we have something more like a Wittgensteinian `Strategy of Unknowing'. 
When examining the `unknowing' of Teresa we have to remind ourselves once again of 
the climate of odium theologicum within which she was writing (See Llamas Martinez 
1972 and Rivers 1984). As a woman presuming to teach men, a daughter of converso 
stock and someone whose teachings came perilously close to that of alumbradismo she 
was suspect on many counts. We remember the famous quote from the Inquisitor Fray 
Alonso de la Fuente, made in 1589, some seven years after her death: 
The author of the said book passes it off and recommends it as a doctrine revealed 
by God and inspired by the Holy Spirit; but if in fact the author was that nun 
whose name is on the title page, it is a matter praeter naturam for her to have 
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written something taught by an angel, because it exceeds a woman's capacity. In 
any case it could not have been a good angel, but a bad one, the same one that 
deceived Mohammed and Luther and the other leaders of heretics. This being the 
case, the so-called miracle of the nun Teresa of Jesus, that her body is today intact 
and uncorrupted, is a fabulous business, either the work of Satan or the invention 
of heretics. (Llamas-Martinez 1972: 396) 
Within this climate it appears to us now that Teresa deliberately used her own `vulgar 
style of substandard written Spanish' (Rivers 1984: 120) to survive. Indeed, within the 
context of the theologia mystica her `anti-rational' style makes complete sense. Her style, 
as Rivers points out, deliberately avoids the syntax and style of the newly developing 
Romance Spanish then popular with Renaissance Spanish humanists such as Luis de 
Granada and Juan de Valdes: 
Teresa's written Spanish is in fact hard for us to read and understand in a wholly 
rational way; it is comparable, within an American context, to something 
composed by a writer of Black English, who deliberately tries to avoid the 
academic sound of white bourgeois correctness. (Rivers 1984: 121) 
Just how important style was for Teresa can be seen by observing the differences between 
the various versions of the Camino (See Weber 1990: 78 -80). The original text, begun 
between 1562 and 1566, her next literary venture after the Vida, is conserved in an 
autograph manuscript in the Escorial (Herafter CE) which was then amended by Garcia 
of Toledo. Between 1566 and 1569 Teresa recopied this manuscript incorporating 
Garcia's corrections as well as reorganising chapters and headings, this is known to us as 
the Valladolid codex (Hereafter CVA). As copies of the Camino proliferated Teresa 
planned a version for publication using CVA as its basis. This third version is named the 
Toledo codex (Hereafter CT), clearly, as Efren de la Madre de Dios and Otger Steggink 
put it `to reach the general public' (1962: 181), one instance that we have where Teresa 
intended her writings to circulate beyond the sisters of the reform to have a wider reading 
public. As Weber remarks: `The revisions of the Way of Perfection allow us to observe, 
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with particular clarity, not only the degree to which Teresa's stylistic decisions were 
deliberate but also the extent to which style was, for Teresa, a pragmatic issue' (Weber 
1990: 80). 
As Ahlgren points out, Teresa criticises the Valdes Index in no less than four 
places in the Camino, albeit indirectly (Ahlgren 1996: 89). She famously, remarks, for 
example, that `even they (The Inquisition) cannot take the Our Father and the Hail Mary 
away from (the sisters)' (CE: 21.8). To which Garcia remarks `she seems to be reproving 
the Inquisitors for prohibiting books on prayer'. 136 
`In sum', as Weber puts it, `Teresa repeatedly denies possessing any literary skill, 
much less theological certainty or authority. Disorder, digression and imprecision - these 
are the tactics that disguise a charismatic text as women's chatter' (Weber 1990: 108). 
Like Wittgenstein, dressed as his `old woman', it seems that Teresa too would deceive us 
that the mess and disorder in her writing is just confusion and chaos. As we saw with 
Wittgenstein, so with Teresa, once we start to examine her style we realise that there is 
`method in the madness'. Might she not be doing something else here? 
The argument in this thesis is that taking her cue from Osuna and the division 
between theologia mystica and theologia speculativa, she is engaging in her own form of 
`unknowing' all the better to teach the truths of theologia mystica and in particular 
recogimiento. We turn now to her ways of doing this. 
U. 1 The Direction of Locution 
After Teresa's death in 1582 the Discalced Carmelites, on the recommendation of St John 
of the Cross, approached the converso Augustinian friar and professor of Hebrew at 
Salamanca Univerity, Fray Luis de Leon, to edit her texts for publication. Luis, as a 
theologian with a humanistic bent and from converso origins who had spent five years in 
the prisons of the Inquisition himself, knew something of the dangerous climate within 
which such mystical texts would be received and engaged in his task with perception and 
insight (See Rivers 1984: 122). The first edition was published with remarkable speed in 
136 'Raced bien, hijas, que no os quitarän ei Pater nöster y ei Avemaria' `Parece que reprehende a los 
Inquisidores que prohiben libros de oraciön' 
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1588 with a dedicatory letter to Ana de Jesus, Prioress of the Discalced in Madrid and 
close friend of John. Luis begins his letter by stating: 
I never knew, or saw, Mother Teresa of Jesus while she lived on earth; but now 
that she lives in Heaven I do know her, and I see her almost continuously in two 
living images of herself which she left us - her daughters and her books. (Peers 
CW III: 368) 
From the beginning Luis recognized how `alive' Teresa's texts were and how dependent 
they were on the `oral community' of Carmelites that she had created: 
I believe that your reverences are important witnesses, for you are quite similar 
models of excellence: I never remember reading her works without imagining that 
I am listening to Your Reverence's voices, nor, conversely, do I ever hear you 
talk without feeling that I am reading the words of the Mother. Those who have 
experience of this will know that it is the truth. (Peers CW III: 372) 
For Luis, Teresa's writings must be understood within the context of the oral community. 
Like Wittgenstein's, they benefit from being read aloud and strive to repeat the patterns, 
rests and pauses of speech with which she was familiar. The texts are peppered with 
`erss', `umms' and `puess' as she seeks at headlong pace to transcribe the oral to the 
written. Take, for example, this breathless interruption to the exposition of the `Prayer of 
Quiet' in Mansion Four of the Moradas: 
God help the mess I've got in to! I've already forgotten what I'm writing about as 
business and poor health have forced me to put this work on one side until things 
were better, and as I have a bad memory everything will come out confused as I 
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can't return to read it all over again. Perhaps everything I say is confused - that's 
what it feels like anyway. 137 (M: 4.2.1) 
Writing on Teresa's style in 1941 (and possibly having in mind passages such as the 
above) the Spanish critic Menendez Pidal wrote: 
St Teresa does not really write, but speaks through writing; thus the excitement of 
her emotional syntax constantly overflows the restrictions of ordinary grammar. 
(Pidal 1942: 135) 
Like Wittgenstein she is not adverse to giving snatches of reported dialogue and will 
often introduce more than one narrative voice into the text: 
0 Lord, Lord! Are You our Model and Master? Yes, indeed! Well then, what did 
Your honour consist of, You who honoured us? Didn't you indeed lost in being 
humiliated unto death? No, Lord, but You won it for all. (CVA: 36: 5) 
She presents us the reader with open questions: 
And supposing my Lord that there are others who are like myself, but have not 
realized this?. -. 0h God help me sisters! If we only knew what honour really is 
and what is meant by losing it! (CVA: 36: 3) 
Why do we serve the Lord in so doubtful a way...? Who is plunging you into 
those perils? (CVA: 18.9) 
Like Wittgenstein, too, she puts questions in her interlocutors' mouths so that she can 
answer them: 
137 /Välame Dios en lo que me he metido! Ya tenia olvidado lo que tratava, porque los negocios y salud me 
hacen dejarlo al major tiempo; y como tengo poca memoria irä todo desconcertado, por no poder tornarlo 
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But why, you will say, does the Prioress excuse us? Perhaps she would not if she 
knew what was going on inside us. (CVA: 10.7) 
What do you think His will is, daughters? That we should be altogether perfect, so 
as to be one with Him and with the Father, as in His Majesty's prayer. See how 
far we are from attaining this! (M: 5: 3) 
As De Certeau suggests, when we read passages such as these later ones from the 
Moradas where she has perfected her craft it is almost as though we can see the sisters 
round us, pressing nearer to hear what she has to tell us (See also M: 6.4,3.1,4.1,4.2). 
Her discourse, then presupposes and arranges a community of discourse -a 
Wittgensteinian Sprachspiel in a Lebensform. 
U. 2 Contradiction 
In his dedicatory letter Luis de Leon also defended Teresa's habit of `failing to carry her 
argument to its conclusion, but introducing other arguments which often break the thread 
of her sense' (Peers CW III: 373). Throughout her writings Teresa is not concerned to 
reproduce the classical Latin style of the new Renaissance humanism. Hers is a `rough 
and ready' style whose directness is its appeal. 
As befits the stulta sapientia of the theologia mystica Teresa, like Osuna, 
frequently employs paradox to shift meaning to the point where it begins to break down. 
The soul in the third degree of prayer in the Vida is: 
Rejoicing in this agony with ineffable joy... the state is glorious folly... a 
heavenly madness... delectable disquiet... So delectable is this distress that life 
holds no delight which can give greater satisfaction. (V: 24) 
Pidal writes of her style in a similar vein as Luis de Leon: 
a leer, y an quizäs se es todo desconcierto cuanto digo. Al menos es lo que siento. 
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Her incessant ellipses; confused grammatical arguments; enormous parentheses, 
which cause the reader to lose the train of thought; lines of reasoning that are 
never completed because of interruptions, verbless sentences. (Pidal 1942: 135) 
The argument in this thesis is that Teresa deliberately writes in this confusing way as a 
true daughter of the theologia mystica of de Osuna and Los Recogidos. The 
understanding, as for Osuna, must be thwarted to allow the soul's direct access to God 
through recogimiento. The tumbling morass of sentences, adverbs, meandering 
constructions and exclamations only helps to serve that purpose. Rivers again: 
She refuses to accept the analytical or linear sequentiality of linguistic discourse, 
and she strives for simultaneity, for saying everything all at once, as it actually 
happens, "writing with many hands". (Rivers 1984: 127, see, for example, CV: 
20: 6) 
U. 3 Avoiding Conclusions: Humility 
The whole groundwork of prayer is based on humility and that the more a soul 
lowers itself in prayer the more God raises it up. (V: 22.11) 
In an important essay on Teresa's Moradas published in 1983 (Flasche 1983) Hans 
Flasche points out the importance of the verb parecer - 'it seems, it appears' in Las 
Moradas. Parecer, he writes, `is one of the most important words in Saint Teresa's 
lexicon' (Flasche 1983: 447). She uses the verb repeatedly in all her texts creating a 
deliberate atmosphere of incertitude and provisionality which can only assist in the 
`disguising' of Teresa's intentions with regard to her exposition of the `mystical 
theology'. Pictures and suggestions are `offered' to the reader as possible solutions and 
answers she has found: once again we have the familiar `stammering, broken voice' of 
Teresa. In the Moradas, for example, it appears frequently: 'Pareceme que aun no os veo 
satisfechas': `It seems to me that you're still not satisfied' (M: 5: 1). 'Pareceme que estäis 
con deseo de ver que se pace esta palomica': `It seems to me you have a desire to see 
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what this little dove is doing' (M : 5.4). `Pareceme que os estoy mirando cömo decIs': `It 
seems to me that I can see you asking' (M: 6.6). Once again the rhetorical strategies we 
identified above are coming into play. Accompanying this studied incertitude is Teresa's 
continual insistence that as an unlettered `mujercilla' she is not qualified to talk on such 
lofty matters: 
For the love of God, let me work at my spinning wheel and go to choir and 
perform the duties of religious life, like the other sisters. I am not meant to write: I 
have neither the health nor intelligence for it. (Peers CW: 1. xxxix) 
Frequently she tells us she is unqualified and useless to the task: 
God help me with what I have undertaken! I've already forgot what I was dealing 
with, for business matters and poor health have forced me to set this work aside 
just when I was at my best; and since I have a poor memory everything will come 
out confused because I can't go back to read it over again. And perhaps even 
everything else I say is confused; at least that's what I feel it is. (M: 4.2.1 
immeadiately followed by a Parece: `It seems to me I have explained the nature 
of consolations in the spiritual life') 
It is notable that these linguistic devices become more evident when Teresa talks of the 
more `inexpressible' elements of prayer such as in the Fourth Mansions quoted above. 
The phrase `little woman' or `stupid woman' was a typical theological attack on women's 
inadequacy when it came to questions of doctrine or theology. Bartolome de Medina had 
denounced her as `mujercilla' saying that her nuns would be better off `staying in their 
convents and praying and spinning' (Weber 1990: 36). 
As Weber shows in her classic exposition of this tactic, Teresa's defense was to 
`embrace stereotypes of female ignorance, timidity, or physical weakness but disassociate 
herself from the double-edged myth of woman as seducible/seductive' (1990: 36). For 
example in Vida 11: 14: 
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As for a poor woman (mujercita) like myself, a weak and irresolute creature, it 
seems right that the Lord should lead me on with favours (regalos), as He now 
does, in order that I may bear certain afflictions with which He has been pleased 
to burden me. But when I hear servants of God, men of weight, learning and 
understanding (de tomas, de letrados, de entendimiento) worrying so much 
because He is not giving them devotion, it makes me sick to listen to them... 
They should realise that since the Lord does not give it to them they do not need 
it. 
As Weber remarks `With disarming modesty she concedes to women's intellectual 
inferiority in a way that frees her to explore a new theological vocabulary' (1990: 38): 
I shall have to make use of some comparison, for which I should like to apologise, 
since I am a woman and write simply what I am ordered to writer. But this 
spiritual language is so difficult to use for anyone who like myself has not gone 
through studies, that I shall have to find some way of explaining myself, and it 
may be that most of the time I won't get the comparison right. Seeing so much 
stupidity will provide some amusement for your Reverence. (V: 11.6) 
As Weber comments: 
In these passages, and in many others, Teresa concedes to women's weakness, 
timidity, powerlessness and intellectual inferiority but uses the concessions 
ironically to defend, respectively, the legitimacy of her own spiritual favors, her 
disobedience of letrados, her administrative initiative, her right to `teach' in the 
Pauline sense and her unmediated access to scripture. (Weber 1990: 39/40) 
For both reader and writer, then, humility is required. The opening sections of the 
Moradas stress the need for `humility', not just morally but intellectually. Only by this 
stulta can the means be prepared for God to impart sapientia. 
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U. 4 Disorientation 
In Luis de Leon's letter to Ana de Jesus mentioned above he points out that he does not 
feel it is necessary to amend the style with which Teresa presents her writing: 
I have neither amended them verbally nor adopted the considerable changes 
which copies now in circulation have made in the text of them either through the 
copyists' own carelessness or out of presumption or error... If her critics had a 
real understanding of Castilian, they would see that that of the Mother is elegance 
itself. For even though, in certain passages of what she writes, before she 
completes the sentence that she has begun, she contaminates it with other 
sentences and breaks the train of thought, often beginning anew with 
interpolations, nevertheless she inserts her digressions so skilfully and introduces 
her fresh thoughts with such grace that the defect itself is a source of beauty, like 
a mole on a lovely face. (Peers CW: 111.373) 
As we have seen Luis, her first editor, recognised at the outset that, as with Wittgenstein, 
the meaning of Teresa's message was inextricably bound up with the medium of the 
message: that rag-tag bag of flooding prose full of errors, inconsistencies, puess, buts and 
errs. The very same style that makes the whole work come alive for the reader. 
Exclamations litter Teresa's text, as do lengthy repetitions and interpolations in the text. 
In the Vida in particular the sentences tumble out making it difficult for the reader, and 
the translator, to keep up: 
At first these things did me harm - so it appeared (me parece) -, and it shouldn't 
have been her fault, but mine; for afterwards my own wickedness was bad 
enough, together with the servants we had, whom for every wrong they were able 
to assist; that if one had given me good counsel, to benefit me; rather self-interest 
blinded them as did desire me. And because I was never inclined to much wrong - 
because I naturally abhorred bad things -, but to the pastime of pleasant 
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conversation; yet, placed in the situation, I was in the hand of danger, and would 
be placing my father and brothers in it as well. (V 2.5) 138 
Teresa seems to recognize that in order to maintain the vitality of the spiritual world she 
is trying to convey to her reader she must also retain the rough edged inconsistency of 
speech in real time. Like Wittgenstein's texts, her texts `show' as much through what 
they do not say as through what they do say. Accordingly, Teresa will often use pictures, 
metaphors and images to `disorientate' the discursive intellect and take it to places it 
would rather not go. We shall see this in the following chapter when we discuss her later 
work the Moradas. 
As we have seen above, Teresa frequently uses the `rhetoric of incompetence', 
second cousin to Wittgenstein's contradiction. Thus in Moradas 1.2.7 we find the 
following passage: 
138 My translation. This is a very difficult passage to translate and should really be left as it stands: `Al 
principio danäronme las cosas dichas -a to que me parece -, y no devla ser suya la culpa, sino mia; 
porque despues mi malicia para el mal bastava, junto con tener criadas, que para todo mal hallava en 
ellas buen aparejo; que si algunafuera en aconsejarme bien, por ventura me aprovechara; mas el interese 
las cegava, coma a mi la afeciön. Ypues nunca era inclinada a mucho mal -porque cosas deshonestas 
naturalamente las aborrecia -, sino a pasatiempos de Buena conversaciön; mas puesta en la occasion, 
estava en la mano el peligro, y ponla en el a mi padre y hermanos'. 
Kavanaugh/Rodgriguez and Allison Peers both give two varying translations which at times verge on the 
ungrammatical like my crude translation above. I give both in full to illustrate the problems and pitfalls of 
translating Teresa: 
`These things did me harm, I think, at the beginning, and it wasn't her fault but mine. For afterward my 
malice was sufficient, together with having the maids around, for in them I found a helping hand for every 
kind of wrong. If there had been one of them to give me good counsel, I perhaps would have benefited by 
it; but self-interest blinded them as my vanity did me. I was never inclined to great evil - for I naturally 
abhorred indecent things - but to the pastime of pleasant conversation; yet, placed, in the occasion, the 
danger was at hand, and my father's and brothers' reputation was in jeopardy as well. ' ( Kavanaugh and 
Rodriguez CW 1: 59) 
`At first, I believe, these things did me harm. The fault, I think, was not my friend's but my own. For 
subsequently my own wickedness sufficed to lead me into sin, together with the servants we had, whom I 
found quite ready to encourage me in all kinds of wrongdoing. Perhaps, if any of them had given me good 
advice, I might have profited by it; but they were as much blinded by their own interests as I was by desire. 
And yet I never felt the inclination to do much that was wrong, for I had a natural detestation of everything 
immodest and preferred passing the time in good company. But, if an occasion of sin presented itself, the 
danger would be at hand and I should be exposing my father and brothers to it., (Peers CW I: 15) 
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These interior matters are so obscure for our minds (tan oscuras de entender) that 
anyone who knows as little as I will be forced to say many superfluous and even 
foolish things in order to say something that's right. Whoever reads this must 
have patience, for I have to have it in order to write about what I don't know. 
Indeed sometimes I take up the paper like a fool ('una cosy boba'), 139 for I don't 
know what to say or how to begin. (M: 1.2.7) 
Following Gerson and Osuna, the `fool' (or `little woman') is the one who is wise in the 
`theologia mystica'. '40 Again, Teresa refers to these things `tan oscuras de entender' - is 
this another reference to the dark and obscure knowledge of Dionysius's `theologia 
mystica' which we have already analysed in Chapter Five? Perhaps, she implies, all of us, 
writer and reader alike, must become fools before we can enter the strategy of the 
`mystical theology'. 
U. 5 Humour 
The soul sometimes laughs to itself when it sees seriously religious and prayerful 
persons make a big issue out of some rules of etiquette which it has already 
trampled underfoot (V: 21.9) 
As is attested by many of her contemporaries and is clear from her writing, humour was 
always an important part of Teresa's armoury in her struggles to establish the Discalced 
reform. Although examples of this abound throughout her work perhaps the clearest 
examples are in the Libro de Las Fundaciones ('Book of the Foundations', hereafter F) 
describing in open fashion the recent events around the founding of her convents in 
Spain. As Weber points out (Weber 1990: 126) the topics dealt with had to be done so 
with tact and care as many of the protagonists were still alive and the tension between the 
Discalced reform and the Carmelites of the Mitigated Rule remained high. Interestingly 
enough, with reference to U. 6, she describes her style in the prologue to the book as tan 
139 cf Osuna and Gerson on the `fools and women' '40 cf Wittgenstein doing philosophy `disguised as an old woman' see above 
228 
pesado ('too heavy') and suffering from too much groserfa ('coarseness'). Weber 
describes the history as `picaresque': 
She slyly reveals that in her determination to do God's work she must rely on her 
charm, ingenuity, and, at times, deception in order to outwit unenlightened souls, 
be they landlords, town councilmen, or archbishops. (Weber 1990: 128) 
A few examples will suffice: 
" Chapter Thirty One describes the difficult foundation at Burgos. Here the 
Archbishop, Don Cristobal Vela was initially enthusiastic, encouraging the sisters to 
come prior to his granting a licence for the foundation. 14' Teresa describes the 
struggles to get to Burgos, the rivers in full spate and her own illness. Having finally 
arrived Teresa describes how the Archbishop does not want them there and tells them 
if they do not have an income and a house of their own they should leave to which 
Teresa comments: `The roads of course were charming and it was such nice weather! ' 
(F 31: 21). 
" Chapter 19 describes the foundation of Salamanca with the full vigour of the 
picaresque. The house they had chosen (which still presently stands on the Plaza de 
Santa Teresa) had previously been occupied by students and Teresa's description of 
the first night herself and an elderly sister, terrified of the evicted students returning 
on Hallowe'en is a masterpiece: 
`When my companion found herself shut up in the room, she seemed to be a little 
calmer about the students, though she did nothing all the time but look about her 
fearfully, first in one direction then in another... "What are you looking for? " I asked 
her. "Nobody can possibly get in here. " "Mother", she replied, "I am wondering what 
you would do all alone if I were to die here. "... So I said to her: "Well, sister, I shall 
consider what is to be done if the occasion arises: now let me go to sleep". ' (F: 19: 5) 
14' His uncle was Teresa's godfather, see Peers Cw 111: 184 fn 2 
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One of the most interesting depictions of humour occurs in Chapter Six which begins 
with Teresa back with her favourite topic of the Vida and the Moradas - vis. the 
spiritual life and how progress can be made in prayer. Almost immeadiately she 
reaches the `point of unknowing': `I wish I knew how to explain myself here, but it is 
so difficult that I do not know if I shall be able to do so' (F6: 2). However in this 
chapter she touches on the controversial subject of raptures and ecstasies, so easily 
associated with the Alumbrados (See the previous chapter). The chapter also deals 
with the controversial topic of the relationship between spirituality and sexuality and 
the proximity of sensual with spiritual delights. She gives clear guidelines that 
prioresses should beware these prolonged `swoons' or `raptures' and not encourage 
them in their sisters. To make her point with humour she refers to an incident that 
took place at Medina del Campo with a choir nun, Alberta Bautista and lay sister Ines 
de la Concepcion (See Peers CWIII: 30 fn 1). In their desire to experience ecstasy they 
asked for frequent communion from their confessor: `the result was such an increase 
in distress that unless they communicated daily they thought they were about to die' 
(F: 6.10). Teresa realizes how unhealthy this attachment has become but has to deal 
with an obdurate confessor who refuses to believe this can cause anything but good 
for the sisters. Let Teresa complete the story herself 
I started to talk to the nuns and to give them many reasons, sufficient, in my 
opinion, to prove to them that the idea that they would die without this particular 
help was pure imagination. But the notion was so deeply rooted in their minds 
that no argument could eradicate it and it was useless to reason with them further. 
So, seeing that it was in vain, I told them that I had those very desires myself and 
yet I should stay away from Communion, so that they might realize that they 
ought not to communicate except when all the nuns did so together: we would all 
three die together, I said. (F: 6.11) 
Potential heretics, timid and difficult nuns, wavering clerics, Teresa encounters each with 
humanity and warmth allowing her humour to pepper the narrative and convince us, her 
readers, of the correctness of her remedies and solutions. 
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Perhaps the key to her use of humour in the Fundaciones lies at the beginning of 
the prologue where she stresses the need for humility (humildad) in the enterprise (see 
U. 3 above). Humility, humour and grounded or ordinary language: all three rotate around 
each other to produce the necessary effect on the reader. As we read the accounts we 
realize that she is gently laughing at us the reader - with all our pomposities, obsessions 
with prayers, worldly concerns and judgemental attitudes. Yes, we can laugh at the 
targets of her humour in the Fundaciones, but we must always remember that her 
comments are directed equally at us, her readers. 
U. 6 Ordinary Speech 
As we have seen Teresa herself is conscious of her style, she calls it `my rough style 
rather than that of those more elegant' (mi grosero estilo que por otros elegantes) 
(CVA: 16: 9) full of `imperfection' and `poverty' (CVA: Prologue). As Peers points out in 
his 1953 essay Saint Teresa's Style: A Tentative Appraisal (Peers 1953) the key note in 
her style is down-to-earthiness and naturalness. Here again she appears to be a disciple of 
Osuna and the simple direct style of the theologia mystica of the Tercera Abecedario. 
She states that the manner of writing (like talking) adopted by nuns should be: 
Simple, frank and devout, rather like that of hermits and people who live in 
retirement. They must use none of the newfangled words - affectations, as I think 
people call them - which are current in a world always eager for new-fangled 
things. In all circumstances let them give preference to common expressions 
rather than to unusual ones. ('Method for the visitation of convents of the 
Discalced Carmelite nuns' in Peers CW: 3.251) 
As Peers points out, she avoids learned words (Peers 1953: 84) and her text is notable for 
the lack of precise theological terms especially concerning `mystical theology'. Indeed, 
as we have seen, the word `mystical theology' is only used a handful of times in the Vida 
before it is dropped not to be used again in her work. The humility of ordinary language 
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is close to the humility of humour and central to the effect she wants to produce in her 
readers. 
In his study The Vernacular Mind of St Teresa (Rivers 1984), Elias Rivers points 
out how Teresa's `vernacularism' was a part of the sixteenth century Spanish humanist 
movement which deliberately sought to communicate to `ordinary people' through 
Castilian rather than Classical Latin. Rivers suggests that in this, as we have seen before, 
the simple Latin of Augustine's Confessions, an influential text on the young Teresa, was 
clearly an important influence (Rivers 1984: 117): 
Teresa of Jesus knew very little Latin, and she deliberately refused to imitate the 
new style of classical Spanish prose; in a true patristic spirit, she invented her own 
vulgar style of substandard written Spanish, a style that is clearly anti-academic 
and even anti-rational. (Rivers 1984: 120) 
Thus, in her prose we find that `classical' Castilian spellings are twisted and subverted, 
often using more phonetic spelling than grammatical. Thus she uses ylesia and yglesia for 
iglesia ('church'), naide for nadle ('no-one'), relisiön for religion ('religion') as well as a 
host of diminutives and familiarisations of words: mariposita (a little butterfly), 
pastorcito (little shepherd boy), avecita (little bird). Peers suggests that she creates words 
of her own invention `charging them with emotional content which another language can 
only approximately express' (Peers 1953: 85): un disgustillo (V: 12) 'a little annoyance' / 
`a little feeling of frustration'; estos temorcillos (V: 31) `these little fears'; centellica 
pequenita (V: 15) `the tiniest of tiny sparks' - this latter being her appropriation of the 
classical phrase scintilla from the theologia mystica to describe the point at which the 
soul meets the divine. 
Her conversational and immeadiate style, Rivers suggests, is deliberate and 
intentional: 
She learned to read Spanish fluently as a young girl and knew that she had an 
advantage there that she could never have in the official Scholastic language of 
the Western Church, with its exclusively male priesthood. Her Spanish was not 
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structured, as Louis of Granada's and John de Valdes's was, by a familiarity with 
written Latin, whether ecclesiastical or neo-classical. When she wrote, she 
neglected, or perhaps deliberately avoided, the normal spelling and syntax of the 
Spanish texts that she had voraciously read. (Rivers 1984: 121) 
Marcos (1997: 153) suggests that she deliberately uses the `avulgarizaciön intencionada' 
of the `estilo de ermitanos'. If this is the case, Teresa in her `rough speech' is deliberately 
positioning herself in her writings with her beloved espirituales of the recogimiento 
movement such as Pedro de Alcantara rather than the sophisticated letrados with their 
more polished and scholastic Latin rhetoric. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has argued that Teresa's prose style in her writings is deliberately 
provocative and unusual. She sets down her writing in determined contradistinction to the 
refined and elegant Latin and Castilian prose of `Golden Age' Spain. Her intention, we 
have argued, derives from her knowledge and familiarity with the medieval tradition of 
theologia mystica and in particular its exposition by Francisco de Osuna. From him she 
has learnt that the language of prayer manuals has to respect the limits of intelligent and 
rational order ('What can be said, cannot be shown. What cannot be said, can be shown'). 
She sees language as a particular tool to be `used' to convey the spiritual message she 
wants to get across. Her Sprachspiel may be considered coarse, vulgar or stupid, but she 
is happy with this as it serves the purpose she wants, to `change the aspect' of her reader: 
Your behaviour and language must be like this: let any who wish to talk to you 
learn your language; and, if they will not, be careful never to learn theirs: it might 
lead you to hell. It matters little if you are considered coarse (groseras) and still 
less if you are taken for hypocrites: indeed, you will gain by this, because only 
those who understand your language will come to see you. (CVA: 20: 4-5) 
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As with Wittgenstein her texts `show' as much as they `say', and they `show' through her 
grammatical and linguistic devices in the text. Just as Wittgenstein uses his aporias, 
strange stories and constructions to create the necessary Überblick, so too Teresa uses 
similar devices to convey the nature of spiritual transformation through recogimiento. 
Unlike some of the mystical writers examined by Sells, Teresa is not intending to launch 
us into a full blown aporia of unknowing. Rather she is using her text, as does 
Wittgenstein, as a `guide to the perplexed' -a way of prodding and prompting us, 
through hints, sarcasm, humour and ordinary language to see all that lies before us 
already that our lack of vision had blinded us to. Like Wittgenstein, she helps remove the 
scales from our eyes so that we may have a clearer vision of `all that is the case'. 
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Chapter Eight: `A Transformational Process': Strategies of Affectivity 
and Embodiment in Teresa of Avila and Ludwig Wittgenstein 
A religious question is either a "life question" or (empty) chatter. This 
Sprachspiel, we could say, only deals with "life questions". (Wittgenstein BEE 
183: 202) 142 
When I see people very diligently observing the sort of prayer that they have and 
very wrapped up in it when they have it (for it seems that they will not let the 
thought move or stir in case they lose a small morsel of the gusto or devotion that 
they have had), I realise how little they understand of the road to the attainment of 
union. They think that the whole business lies in such things. 
No, sisters, no! The Lord desires works and that if you see a sick woman to whom 
you can give some help, never be affected by the fear that your devotion will 
suffer, but take pity on her: if she is in pain you should feel pain too; if necessary, 
fast so that she may have your food, not so much for her sake as because you 
know that the Lord desires it. (Teresa of Avila M: 5.3) 
Having demonstrated in the previous chapter how Teresa of Avila and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein both use what were termed `strategies of unknowing' in their writing, which 
were also characterised from the interpretation of Dionysius as `mystical strategies', this 
chapter will now review the other `mystical strategies' mentioned in Chapter Five - 
namely, the use of the text to direct the reader from what the Victorines called the 
intellectus to the affectus. 143 As has been made clear throughout this dissertation a direct 
comparison between the two writers is not simple or perhaps desirable, for reasons 
elaborated already. However, using the example of writers such as Pound (2007) this 
thesis aims to create a space where the one writer can `interrogate', or fall into 
142 biy translation. Eine religiöse Frage ist nur entweder Lebensfrage oder sie ist (leeres) Geschwätz. 
Dieses Sprachspiel - könnte man sagt - wird nur mit Lebensfragen gespielt. ' 
143 See Chapter Five above. 
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conversation with, the other. Whilst this was important in the previous chapter it is 
particularly so in this one, for although the `strategies' being detailed here can be found, 
we argue, in both writers, the origins, aims and results of the strategies are different in 
both cases. 
In the case of Wittgenstein, we argue, applying his own search for the Sprachspiel 
to his own writings, the move is from the disembodied Cartesian `I' to the embodied self 
of the final philosophy (See in particular Kerr [1997] for a good analysis of this). 
However, following themes developed in Chapter Three when we considered his 
Nachlass, we will use a study of his unpublished writings, especially the so-called 
Geheime Tagebücher and the Koder Tagebuch to demonstrate how this `move towards 
embodiment' is evident in these works, in this respect Wittgenstein has occasionally been 
misinterpreted by his commentators. Some of this, as Baum (1992) and others have 
argued, seems to stem from a fear to engage with the notion of Wittgenstein as an 
embodied being - both humanly and sexually. The second aspect of the `embodiment' of 
Wittgenstein's writings is to take seriously his description of religious faith as `a 
passion', and as he clearly states in the quotation that heads this chapter, the need to see 
religion as essentially tackling Lebensfrage or else talking rubbish. Out of this, we argue, 
flows his views on the religious life as an ethical life, inspired no doubt by his reading, 
amongst others, of Tolstoy in the World War One trenches. In this respect, and in the 
perspective of the later remarks in the Tractatus wherein Wittgenstein deals with das 
Mystische, this chapter argues that the key moment in the young Ludwig's development 
was his experiences on the Eastern Front in the latter stages of the First World War. 
Accordingly, we will spend some time in this chapter analysing his remarks during this 
period to relate them to the `strategy of embodiment' which will emerge in his 
subsequent writing. 
In the case of Teresa, on the other hand, the chapter argues that her own 
Sprachspiel of embodiment has its roots directly in the Victorine theologia mystica which 
we explored in Chapter Five. Here we see her appreciation of the need for an affective 
embodiment of prayerful strategy, leading as we see in the quote at the beginning of the 
chapter to the necessary Obras for us to function as rounded human beings. As with the 
strategy of unknowing, both have differing objectives but what is remarkable about their 
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texts is that both undergo the same process of movement which we characterised in 
Chapter Four as that from saying to showing to acting; for both, the end of all 
philosophical/theological speculation is action. As Wittgenstein so well sums in up in his 
notebook of 1946, five years before his death: 
One of the things Christianity says amongst others, I believe, is that all sound 
doctrines are useless. You have to change your life (Or the direction of your life). 
It says that all wisdom is cold; and that you can no more use it for sorting out your 
life than you can forge iron when it is cold. 
The point is that good teaching need not necessarily grab you; you can follow it 
as you would a doctor's prescription. - But here you need something to grab you 
and turn you round. - (ie. this is how I understand it. ) Once you have been turned 
round, you must stay turned round. 
Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. 
(VB: 1946). 
In both Teresa and Wittgenstein, this chapter argues, we see a style of writing that aims to 
grab the reader and turn them round. Although `sound doctrine' and `good teaching' is 
important for both of them they both appreciate that their writings must somehow be 
more than a `prescription we follow from the doctor'. For Wittgenstein, the aim of this 
process is to `see the world aright' and as we shall see, live in right relationship to it too. 
In the case of Teresa it is to draw us closer into what she believes is God's action on earth 
and our place in the building up of God's kingdom here on earth. Both embody a 
transformational strategy that re-turns us to the community out of which we arise. 
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8.1 Transformational Strategies in Wittgenstein and Teresa 
In Chapter Four above we characterised the essential move in the later writings of 
Wittgenstein as that from `saying to showing to acting'. In the previous chapter we 
showed how Wittgenstein's `performative discourse of unknowing' facilitated the move 
from `saying to showing', or more specifically from a particular Weltanschauung to the 
Weltbild of `aspect seeing' manifest in his later philosophy. This chapter will 
complement the last by presenting the Wittgensteinian `strategies of embodiment' that 
allow the move from `showing to acting'; in this respect we are characterising 
Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy as essentially `transformational'. As we saw in 
Chapter Three the notion of Wittgenstein's philosophy as somehow `therapeutic' in that 
`it gets something done' is one that has gained increasing ground in recent years, it is out 
of this strand of interpretation that the argument arises. 
However, rather than `therapeutic' we argue in this chapter for a 
`transformational' interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, by this is meant the basic 
idea that philosophy (or indeed speculative thought) cannot be an end in itself but must 
necessarily entail a movement from contemplation to action. But perhaps even here 
Wittgenstein once again subverts even the lineal pattern of the doctorate student, as `im 
Anfang war die Tat': has not action been there all along, right at the beginning? Indeed, it 
only seemed that thought had come first, philosophy is indeed a `battle against the 
bewitchment of our understanding by the medium of language' (P1: 109). 144 He suggests 
in Zettel (Z: 540) that these sorts of expression are `pre-linguistic', that `the language 
game is based upon them', ' it is a prototype of a way of thinking and not itself the result 
of thought': 
What, however, should the word "primitive" say? Certainly, that the relationship 
is pre-linguistic: that a Sprachspiel rests upon it, that it is the prototype of a way 
of thinking and not itself the result of thought. (Z: 541)1'5 
144 Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unsres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer 
Sprache. My translation 
s 'Was aber will hier das Wort primitiv'sagen? Doch wohl, dass die Verhaltungsweise vorsprachlich ist: 
dass ein Sprachspiel auf ihr beruht, dass sie das Prototyp einer Denkweise ist und nicht das Ergebnis des 
Denkens' My translation 
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As he states at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, he regards this pre- 
linguistic `primitive form of language' as pre-dating all that comes after it: 
A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. (PI: 5) 
Wittgenstein's approach, then, can be characterised as a `transformational epistemology' 
which has as its goal the transformation of the interlocutor through participation in the 
linguistic strategies of performative discourse. He is not simply concerned with acquiring 
knowledge of ourselves, the world or others, but rather that our engagement with the task 
presented will transform us ontologically `in our sensibilities, in the things we notice and 
are sensitive to, the things we seek and desire etc. '(Schotter 1997: 1). 146 In this respect, 
this chapter argues, he shares a common aim with Teresa in her own `transformational 
strategies', for Schotter, Wittgenstein's `transformational methods' are practical, not 
utopian, they are embodied and 'lay'. 147 What we are left with is a much more active 
transformational mode of understanding that is not built upon `occult ontological 
entities'. Our `mystical strategies' are simply this - strategies to be explored, to `make 
connections' (Zwischengliedern) rather than referring to ontological entities - whether 
supposed `mystical states', `mystical phenomena' or `mysticism' itself. 
As we have seen, although Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (see 
PI: 109,124) states that philosophy `leaves everything as it is' by the time of the last 
writings, especially On Certainty, Wittgenstein is supplementing the `way of seeing' - 
the Ubersichtliche Blick - with a `way of acting': 
146 See also Kerr 1997: 158 where he states Wittgenstein in his later work `strives to show that neither 
feeling nor reason but action is the foundational thing. ' Whilst completing this thesis Kerr's most recent 
publication appeared ( Kerr 2008), in this text he reiterates his view that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is 
to be seen as a call to `work upon oneself. 
147 'In being multidimensional, indeterminate, fluid, flexible, unfinished, contested, changeable, and still 
developing, the kind of knowledge involved must, in itself, be amenable to disciplinary confines: that is, 
these practices must be continuous with, and work from within, our ordinary everyday practices, without it 
being necessary, so to speak, to step outside them. Hence, theoretical explanations are not only 
unnecessary, but inimical to what is required' (Schotter 1997: 7) 
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Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end 
is not certain propositions striking us immeadiately as true, ie. it is not a kind of 
seeing on our part, it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game. 
(OC: 204) 
The frame of reference of the mystical discourse in the `way of life' is essential: 
What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say -forms of life. (PI: 226) 
We have moved `out of the head' to find understanding and meaning in the wider arena 
of games. Our aim is not to `refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our 
words in unheard-of ways' (PI 133), there is not one `philosophical method' but 
`methods, like different therapies' (gleichsam verschiedene Therapien). 
As we saw above it is possible to interpret Wittgenstein here as encouraging a 
move from the Cartesian `I' to a more embodied self. Fergus Kerr in his Theology after 
Wittgenstein (Kerr 1997) spells out perhaps more than the most the consequences of this 
approach for Christian theology and spirituality. Wittgenstein's dethroning of the 
Cartesian `I' presents a spirit `unlike anything I know in Western thought and in many 
ways opposed to aims and methods of traditional philosophy' (Malcolm quoted in Kerr 
1997: 187). What Malcolm is suggesting, Kerr observes, `is a radical questioning of the 
whole way of thinking about the self, and hence of others, of the world and of the divine, 
which has captivated Western Christian culture for a long time'. In essence, 
Wittgenstein's later project is about `subverting the entire metaphysical tradition which is 
constituted by rancour against the physical and historical conditions of human life. ' (Kerr 
1997: 188, my emphasis). It has been the argument throughout this thesis that this 
Wittgensteinian `anti-metaphysic' so well described by Kerr was preserved through the 
Middle Ages in the performative discourse of theologia mystics especially in its 
deconstructive embodiment, or in Wittgensteinian terms, in the move from saying to 
showing to acting. 
Thus, the Wittgensteinian move from Weltanschauung to Weltbild under the 
Übersichtliche Darstellung - from mind/body Cartesian dualism to a post-enlightenment 
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suspicion of the Cartesian `I' - mirrors the strategies of `mystical discourse'. The mystical 
strategies we have already identified - those of unknowing and embodiment - are held 
alike by the contemporary post-enlightenment discourse of Wittgenstein and the pre- 
enlightenment discourse of theologia mystica; with the `post-modern' critique of 
Cartesian dualism we return to a `pre-modern' notion of self. Both discourses share 
similar stategies and as we have seen for both `style' is as important as `content'. This, 
we shall see, is particularly emphasised by Teresa in the embodied libido of her works. 
As Monk points out in his biography and is well depicted in Jarman's film 
Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's life encapsulated a slow (and often painful) process of 
embodiment; unsure of his own sexuality he latterly was able to sustain physical 
relationships with others. From the later writings the embodiment of his discourse 
becomes clearer: `The delightful difference of temperature of the parts of a human body' 
(VB: 1931) and in the letter to Drury: `The thing now is to live in the world in which you 
are, not to think or dream about the world you would like to be in. Look at people's 
sufferings, physical and mental, you have them close at hand, and this ought to be a good 
remedy for your troubles' (Rhees 1987: 95). 
This embodiment accompanies a desire to distract our attention from the search 
for `occult entities' that `occupy our heads'; from concern with the `purely mental' 
Wittgenstein wants us to touch, smell, taste, see and hear. All our senses are activated as 
we enter his text. 
Likewise with Teresa, her texts are a feast for the senses and all the time she is 
telling us to touch, taste, sense, feel and smell. In this respect she resembles her older 
contemporary, St Ignatius of Loyola, who in his Ejercitos encourages his retreatants to 
make a similar movement. Teresa was in good contact with the emerging Society of Jesus 
and had a Jesuit confessor, so such influence would appear plausible. 
Both Teresa and Wittgenstein, we argue here, are in their own ways inviting their 
readers to move `out of the head' into embodied practices - this is the key 
`transformational strategy' of both Teresa and Wittgenstein. 
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8.2 Wittgenstein's Hard Road to Embodiment 
The so-called Geheime Tagebücher of 1914-16 and the Koder Tagebuch from the 
nineteen thirties both illustrate the points that are being made in this chapter, that is, that 
Wittgenstein's approach to life and philosophy can only be understood through the need 
for embodiment and what he terms the passion of religious belief. It is notable that both 
works are not available in English translation and in this chapter we will work from the 
Bergen Electronic Edition (BEE). 
The Tagebücher first came to light in 1952 in the possession of Wittgenstein's 
sister, Margarethe Stonborough, shortly after Wittgenstein's death (see GT: 162). 
Wittgenstein, during his last visit to Vienna in 1950, had suggested they should be 
destroyed but fortunately this did not occur. They were subsequently deposited in the 
Wren Library at Cambridge and classified by von Wright as `Notebooks 101-103' in 
the Nachlass (See PO: 486). The Tagebücher were first translated and published in 
English as Notebooks 1914 -16 by Elizabeth Anscombe in 1961. In her preface 
Anscombe suggested that the Notebooks were being published `as an aid to students of 
the Tractatus' (NB: v) which seemed to justify quite a radical editing of the work that has 
come in for a lot of later criticism. Although she states that `very little has been left out' 
the subsequent publication of the complete Notebooks, both in the Nachlass and Baum's 
edition show, as we shall see, just how much Anscombe had decided to omit. She had 
once remarked that, `if by pressing a button it could have been secured that people would 
not concern themselves with his personal life, I should have pressed that button' (LPE: 
xiv); yet her desire to `clean up' Wittgenstein's works has inevitably led to a distortion of 
the impact of his writings, not least in the questions investigated here around embodiment 
and desire. 
If we read the preface to the 1977 edition of Vermischte Bemerkungen (published 
in English with the title Culture and Value in 1980) von Wright states that the criteria for 
publishing his collection were as follows: 
In the end I decided on the only principle of selection that seemed to me 
unconditionally right. I excluded from the collection notes of a purely "personal" 
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sort - ie. notes in which Wittgenstein is commenting on the external 
circumstances of his life, his state of mind and relations with other people - some 
of whom are still living. Generally speaking these notes were easy to separate 
from the rest and they are on a different level of interest from those which are 
printed here. (CV: preface) 
Subsequent commentators, some of whom have already been mentioned in Chapter 
Three, whilst acknowledging the sterling work of von Wright et al in the publication of 
Wittgenstein's notebooks have also recognised that von Wright's hidden hermeneutic 
may have distorted a balanced reading of Wittgenstein's work - especially the notion that 
his `philosophy' can be extracted from his `life'. As we saw in Chapter Three, the 
groundbreaking biographies of Monk and McGuinness raised the question of a 
reintegration of Wittgenstein's life and writings to enable an understanding of his 
philosophy (See especially Klagge 2001 for an extended discussion on this). 
Accordingly, as we approach the question of Wittgenstein's strategy of embodiment here 
we have no hesitation in reuniting the published version of his notebooks by Anscombe, 
von Wright et al with the `personal' notes, often unpublished and only available through 
study of the Nachlass, in this respect the work done in this chapter is original. 
With respect to the First World War diaries considered here it became clear that 
once the Nachlass was in the public domain there was not only a fuller `notebook' but 
also an encrypted, so-called `secret notebook'. This had a simple encryption of replacing 
a with z, b with y and so on. Thus the first edition of what became known as the `Secret 
Notebook' was first published, through the efforts of Baum and Pascual in Spanish, 
Catalan and German in the Spanish journal Saber in 1985. This eventually appeared in a 
German- Spanish edition published by Alianza in Madrid in 1991. For Baum, the 
publication of the work showed the importance of understanding Wittgenstein's context 
and interpretation through `Christian Form of Life with Religion as one of the chief 
matrices for understanding his work' (GT: 175). To date, as has been pointed out, no 
English translation has yet appeared. 
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8.2.1 The Tagebücher 
To illustrate the point, the importance of embodiment and the passion of embodiment to 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, we will concentrate on the diary entries from 1916. 
Wittgenstein, serving as an ordinary soldier for the Austrian army on the Russian front, 
was moved on 21st March of that year from a place of relative security to great danger in 
the 4th battery of the 5t' Field Howitzer Regiment ( See McGuinness 1988: 238). 
The placement was one of the worst experiences of his life and the diaries detail 
his struggle to make sense of it all. On 21st April he finds himself in battle for the first 
time, at this time he remained in solitary duty on the observation post. On 4th June the 
Austrian offensive was followed by an equally severe Russian offensive. Wittgenstein 
clearly acquitted himself well during this hellish time and was awarded a silver 
Tapferkeitsmedaille Second Class on 6th October. His decoration recommendation stated: 
Ignoring the heavy artillery fire on the casement and the exploding mortar bombs 
he observed the discharge of the mortars and located them... On the Battery 
Observation Post, Hill 417, he observed without intermission in the drumfire, 
although I several times shouted to him to take cover. By this distinctive 
behaviour he exercised a very calming effect on his comrades. (McGuinness 
1988: 242) 
Although not at Wittgenstein's battalion, the Russian offensive was ultimately successful 
north of Wittgenstein's location. The Austrian army was thus plunged into a chaotic 
retreat of which Wittgenstein was part in July so that by then his unit was seeking shelter 
in the Carpathian mountains. 
By the time Wittgenstein was withdrawn from the frontline in August he had been 
continuously in the firing line for five months. Of the notes made at this time 
McGuinness comments: `they testify to a change in his thinking as great as that which he 
himself saw in his countenance... It was as if he had bridged - or was about to bridge - 
some gap between his philosophy and his inner life' (1988: 245). From this point 
onwards there is no separation between the remarks on logical form and remarks on 
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religion, ethics and the general Lebensfrage which we cited at the beginning of the 
chapter: `Yes my work has broadened out from the foundations of logic to the essence of 
the world' (NB 2.8.16). Both of his biographers, Monk and McGuinness suggest that at 
this point in his life, having pushed himself hard on the logical boundaries of language 
both in Cambridge with Russell and on his own in his retreat in Norway before the 
outbreak of World War One, it was as though he `sought embodiment' and needed the 
experiences of the trenches to bridge gaps between how he experienced his thought and 
how he experienced his life. In this respect his experiences on the Eastern Front in 1916, 
are, we argue, central for understanding the move in his philosophy from the 
disembodied exploration of logical form to the embodied researches of the later (or 
perhaps better `post-1916') Wittgenstein. 
Anscombe gives us the first entry for 15`h April 1916 as follows: 
We can only foresee what we ourselves construct. 
But then where is the concept of a simple object still to be found? 
This concept does not so far come in here at all. 
We must be able to construct the simple functions because we must be able to 
give each sign a meaning. 
For the only sign which guarantees its meaning is function and argument. (NB: 
71 e) 
As they stand these bald statements do show resemblance to the Tractalus especially 
5.556, but how much richer do they become when we add the coded entries from the full 
notebook: 
In eight days we go into the Firing Line. May I be fortunate enough to wager my 
life in a challenging position! (BEE: 103) 148 
I48 In 8 Tage gehen wir in Feuerstellung. Mächte es mir vergönnt sein, mein Leben in einer schweren 
Aufgabe aufs Spiel zu setzen! ' All the quotes that follow are from the Bergen Electronic Edition, my own 
translation. Many have not been published in English before. 
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The `pure' philosophising of the Tractatus seems to have arisen from a distinctively 
embodied context. One that includes Glaubensfragen, prayers and entreaties to God: 
Now comes inspection. My soul shrivels up. God give me light! God give me 
light! God give light to my soul! (BEE: 103: 29.3.16) 149 
The following day he adds: 
Do your best. You cannot do more: and be cheerful... Help yourself and help 
others with all your strength. And at the same time be cheerful! But how much 
strength should one need for oneself and how much for others? It is hard to live 
well!! But it is good to live well. However, not mine, but Thy will be done. (BEE: 
103: 20.3.16) 150 
The fervent and passionate quality of his entries at this time are almost certainly a result 
of the two works which he carried with him throughout all his time in the War: Tolstoy's 
Gospel in Brief and Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov. The former, as we have seen, he 
had come across in a strange fashion towards the beginning of the war whilst stationed at 
Galicia, here he had entered a bookshop to find that the only book in the shop was the 
Tolstoy Gospels. He would carry it with him for the rest of the war, so much so that he 
became known as `The Man with the Gospels' (See Monk 1990: 115, McGuinness 
1988: 220): `He read it and re-read it, and thenceforth had it always with him, under fire 
and at all times' (Letter from Russell to Lady Ottoline Morrell, LR: 20.12.19). It had a 
profound impact upon him and was somehow able to open up his heart to the possibility 
of religious belief and service of others in the world. As he later wrote to von Ficker `If 
you are not acquainted with it, then you cannot imagine what an effect it can have upon a 
person' (Letter from Wittgenstein to Ludwig Ficker, LF: 24.7.15). 
'49 Jetzt Inspektion. Meine Seele schrumpft zusammen. Gott erleuchte mir! Gott erleuchte meine Seele! 
150 Tu dein Bestes! Mehr kannst du nicht tun: und sei heiter... Hilf dir selbst und hilf anderen mit deiner 
ganzen Kraft. Und dabei sei heiter! Aber wieviel Kraft soll man fier sich , und wieviel 
fair die anderen 
brauchen? Schwer ist es, gut zu leben!! Aber das gute Leben ist schön. Aber nicht mein, sondern Dein 
Wille geschehe! 
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Monk suggests (Monk 1990: 116) that the Gospel in Brief had a galvanising 
impact on Wittgenstein, turning his philosophy from `an analysis of logical symbolism' 
to `the curiously hybrid work which we know today, combining as it does logical theory 
with religious mysticism'. Monk sees this period as one of increasing `seperation 
between body and spirit', which would make sense if he understands `mysticism' in 
terms of the `modern mysticism' we defined in Chapter Two. Yet, if, as has been argued 
throughout this dissertation, we dispense with the illusion of `modem mysticism' and 
concentrate, in Wittgensteinian fashion on the Sprachspiele of the `mystical performative 
discourse' then it is possible to interpret Wittgenstein's remarks in the diaries as a 
growing sense of embodiment and, as Monk puts it, `duty' towards the world and fellow 
people. Yes, there is no doubt that Wittgenstein found the encounter with his fellow 
soldiers feauchterlich, but the reading of the diaries presented here suggests a desire to 
struggle with this situation, knowing that here, rather than in the logical abstract 
symbolism of Cambridge, he will find what he is looking for, in embodied life. 
's' On 5th 
September 1914, shortly after reading The Gospel in Brief, he writes `I am on the path to 
a great discovery, But will I reach it?! ' (5.9.14), followed by `I feel more sensual than 
before. Today I masturbated again'. 152 Rather than a separation of mind and body, even 
Monk recognises that for Wittgenstein, from this point onwards `sensuality and 
philosophical thought were inextricably linked - the physical and mental manifestations 
of passionate arousal' (Monk 1990: 117). Despite later getting hold of the Eighth Volume 
of Nietzsche's collected works, including The Anti-Christ, it seems as though his original 
inspiration from Tolstoy was not shaken. So much so that he could write on 8t' December 
1914: 
Christianity is indeed the only sure way to happiness but what if someone spurned 
that happiness?! Might it not be better to perish unhappily in the hopeless struggle 
"' Which would surely also explain his immeadiate desire after the war to dispense with his immense 
fortune and live in the hardest and demanding conditions of an ordinary primary school teacher in Upper 
Austria. Indeed, much of the later life of Wittgenstein after 1916 is marked by this need to `be embodied' 
and to act ethically 
ist Ich bin auf dem Wege zu einer grossen Entdeckung. Aber ob ich danhingelangen werde ?! Bin 
sinnlicher als früher. Heute wieder onaniert. 
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against the external world? But such a life is senseless. But why not lead a 
senseless life? Is it unworthy? (BEE 103) 153 
In his exposition of Tolstoy, Sontag (2000) notices the similarites between Tolstoy's 
relation to Christianity and the position Wittgenstein will ultimately adopt to philosophy. 
Both want to `leave everything as it is' and allow the scriptures/ordinary language to 
speak for themselves. Tolstoy, like Kierkegaard, feels that Christianity must be stripped 
down to its essentials leaving each person to make their own decision on its truth 
uninfluenced by the rhetoric and opinions of the Churches. `Truth' Sontag notes `can be 
found in simple language, as it was for Wittgenstein too' (Sontag 2000: 125). Yet Sontag, 
like Monk, is still keen to talk about Wittgenstein's `mysticism' without explaining what 
this may be, apart from something akin to our `modern mysticism'. Wittgenstein, he says 
`adds a mysticism that is missing in Tolstoy'. A statement which we hope by now the 
arguments in this dissertation have shown as questionable, if only because of the 
incomprehensibility, and sheer un-Wittgensteinian notion, of `adding' `mysticism' as a 
quasi-ontological category to something. Rather, as has been argued throughout this 
dissertation, if we want to discover the filiations between Wittgenstein and Tolstoy we 
would be better off looking at the Sprachspiele and Weltbild within the two writers, and 
also how they relate to the Lebensformen expressed through our threefold progression of 
`Thinking-Seeing-Acting'. 
If it was not a case of Wittgenstein `finding mysticism' (whatever that means) in 
Tolstoy, what then did he find there? 
Reading the first lines of Tolstoy's Gospel again it is not surprising that it had 
such an explosive impact on Wittgenstein, after the logical searching of Cambridge, 
Norway and the pre-war years. The words could have been Wittgenstein's own: 
Reason without faith had already brought me to despair and to a denial of life, but 
when I once really examined into the life of humanity, I became convinced that 
153 Gewiss, das Christentum ist der einzige sichere Weg zum Glück Aber wie, wenn einer dies Glück 
verschmähte?! Könnte es nicht besser sein, unglücklich, im hoffnungslosen Kampf gegen die äussere Welt 
augrunde zu gehen? Aber ein solches Leben ist sinnlos. Aber warum nicht ein sinnloses Leben führen? Ist 
es unwürdig? 
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despair cannot be the destiny of man, and that people have lived, and are now 
living by faith... 
I tried to arrange my life after the lives of those who believe, tried to become one 
with them, to fulfill the same rules of life and laws of conduct, imagining that in 
this way the idea of life would be revealed to me also. (Tolstoy 1895: xv) 
It is perhaps not too fanciful to compare the effect these sentences had on the young 
Wittgenstein to the effects de Osuna had on the young Teresa. Both were in turmoil, 
loneliness and despair at the time - physically, psychologically, emotionally and 
spiritually. Both found in their `masters' a person who writes for the need of personal 
transformation, commitment and, most of all, engagement with the world. In the case of 
Tolstoy through the adoption of a life of faith, in the case of Osuna, through the `path of 
the heart' embodied in the theologia mystics rather than the theologia speculativa. In this 
sense we can understand Tolstoy's work as an example of theologia mystica (in contrast 
to theologia speculativa - something which he is at pains to dismiss in his book) rather 
than an example of `modern mysticism' which we critiqued in Chapter Two: 
At first I sought counsel and a solution to my difficulties from priests, monks, 
bishops and learned theologians (cf Teresa's letrados). But I often noticed in them 
a want of frankness, and still more frequently flagrant self-contradictions in their 
explanations and interpretations. (Tolstoy 1895: xvi) 
Having turned his back on the theologia speculativa with its hair-splitting, creeds and 
dogmas, Tolstoy rather find what he is looking for in `such people who carried out in the 
works of their lives the teaching of Christ'. 
Where Tolstoy (and probably Wittgenstein) would differ from Teresa and de 
Osuna is in the role of the Church in living out this faith. For Teresa and Osuna it is 
absolutely central, for Tolstoy the truth is received directly to the individual without any 
intermediary. 
So then, the Wittgenstein who approached the Front in Spring 1916 was not the 
young logician who had left Cambridge some two years earlier, his own questing spirit 
249 
and the encounter with Tolstoy had led him to see the necessity for a form of knowledge 
that was not just `head knowledge' (intellectus) but rather the embodied knowledge of 
which Tolstoy talks about. With this in mind the entries from his arrival on the Front 
begin to fall into place. 
As he approaches the batteries he writes: 
Tomorrow or the day after we will be in the firing line. Therefore, Courage! God 
will help. (BEE: 18.4.16.103 5v) 154 
God improve me! Then I would be become more joyful. Today will probably be 
in the Firing Line. God help me. (BEE: 20.4.16.103 5v) 155 
This did indeed prove to be the beginning of the firing after which he writes: 
Have been a few days in the Firing Line. The whole day is taken up with heavy 
physical work, no time to think. God help me; I have a monstrous amount to 
suffer. I have asked today to be put in the Observation Tower. Half the people 
here hate me because no-one understands me and because I am no saint! God help 
me! (BEE: 23.4.16) 156 
Now I am almost always with people who hate me. And this is the one thing that I 
have never been able to come to terms with. The people here are wicked and 
heartless. It is virtually impossible to find even a trace of humanity in them. God 
help me to live... God be with me! Amen. (BEE: 27.4.16) 157 
154 Morgen oder übermorgen in die Feuerstellung. Also uN Gott wird helfen. 
155 Gott bessere mich! Dann werde ich auch froher werden. Heute wahrscheinlich schon in Feuerstellung. 
Gott helfe mir. 
156 Seit ein paar Tagen in neuer Stellung. Den ganzen Tag über schwere körperliche Arbeit; ausserstande 
zu denken. Gott helfe mir. Ich habe ungeheuer viel zu leiden. Habe heute angesucht, auf den 
Beobachtungsstand zu kommen. Beim Halbzub hasst mich alles, weil mich keiner versteht. Und weil ich 
kein Heiliger bin! Gott helfe mir! 
157 So bin ich jetzt fast immer umgeben von Leuten, die mich hassen. Und dies ist das Einziges, womit ich 
mich noch nicht abfinden kann. Hier sind aber böse, herzlose Menschen. Es ist mir fast unmöglich, Bien 
Spur von Menschlichkeit in ihnen zu finden. Gott helfe mire zu leben... Gott sei mit mir! Amen 
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Finally, Wittgenstein, from his new position on the watchtower finds himself in the 
mortal danger he has long sought: 
Afternoon during reconnaissance I was shot at. Thought of God. Your will be 
done! God be with me! ' (BEE: 29.4.16)158 
Again during the firing today returned to the insight: People only need God. 
(BEE: 30.4.16)159 
It is very difficult! God protect me and stand by me. Amen. Would that this bitter 
cup passed me by. 160 However Your will be done. ( BEE: 3.5.16)161 
Which climaxes in the entry for 4.5.16: 
Tomorrow I will perhaps be sent to the Observation Post, at my own request. 
Then the War will finally begin for me. And - perhaps - Life too! 
Perhaps the nearness of Death will bring light into my life! May God enlighten 
me! I am a worm however God wants me to be a human being. God stand by me. 
Amen. 162 
The `nearness of death' and his constant prayer seemed to slowly affect his attitude to his 
fellow soldiers with whom he had tried so hard to get on. On 8th May he writes 
The people I am with are not so much nasty as terribly limited. This makes 
relations with them almost impossible as they almost always misunderstand me. 
1S8 Nachmittags bei den Aufklären. Wurden beschossen. Dachte an Gott. Dein Wille geschehe! Gott sei mit 
mir. 
1S9 Gehe heute während eines Feuerüberfalls wieder zu den Aufklären: Nur Gott braucht der Mensch. 
160 Cf. Matthew 26: 39 
161 Habe es schwer! Gott beschütze mich und stehe mir bei. Amen. Möchte der schwerste Kelch an mir 
vorübergehen. Aber Dein Wille geschehe. 
162 Komme morgen vielleicht auf mein Ansuchen zu den Aufklären hinaus. Dann wird für mich erst der 
Krieg anfangen. Und kann sein - auch das Leben! Vielleicht bringt mir die Nähe des Todes das Licht des 
Lebens. Möchte Gott mich erleuchten. Ich bin der Wurm, aber durch Gott werder ich zum Menschen. Gott 
stehe bei mir. Amen. 
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They are not stupid, but limited. Within their circles they are clever enough. But 
they lack character and with that a breadth of understanding. "The right-believing 
Heart understands everything". (BEE: 8.5.16.103 10v)163 
A study of these diaries reveals two aspects of Wittgenstein's character and philosophy 
that are central to the exposition presented here. First, the need to understand his logical 
investigations within the context of which they are written. Out of these terrible 
experiences on the Eastern Front during the Brusilov Offensive of spring/summer 1916 
would not only arise the final sections of the Tractatus, including the passages on das 
Mystische which we discussed in Part One, but also the major shift in Wittgenstein's 
consciousness that produces the unique fusion which is his later philosophy. If, as we 
suggested in Chapter One, we want to try and understand what Wittgenstein understands 
by das Mystische in Tractatus 6 we cannot ignore the context out of which they arose - 
his experiences on the Front and in particular the `nearness of Death which will bring 
some light'. Thus many of the passages that will later form the end of the Tractatus arise 
from these very notebooks: 
The solution of the problem of life is to be seen in the disappearance of this 
problem. NB 6.7.16 
Cf. Tractatus 6.521: 
The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. 
(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that 
the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what 
constituted that sense? ). 
Again: 
'63 Die Leute, mit denen ich beisammen bin, sind nicht so sehr gemein, als ungeheuer beschränkt. Das 
macht den Verkehr mit ihnen fast unmöglich, weil sie einen ewig missverstehen. Die Leute sind nicht 
dumm, aber beschränkt. Sie sind in ihrem Kreise klug genug. Aber es fehlt ihnen der Charakter und damit 
die Ausdehnung. 'Alles versteht das rechtgläubige Herz. 
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Death is not an event in life. It is not a fact of the world 
If by eternity is understood not infinite temporal duration but non temporality, 
then it can be said that a man lives eternally if he lives in the present. NB 8.7.16 
Cf Tractatus 6.4311: 
Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. 
If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then 
eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. 
Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has not limits. 
Secondly, the influence of Tolstoy, in particular the importance of Menschlichkeit and the 
`return to the ordinary', finding God in the everyday, and especially in the muck, slime 
and profanity of the Front. Wittgenstein is at this point no longer seeking enlightenment 
through books or transcendentalism, but rather in the ordinary living out through the 
everyday in embodiment. He neither repudiates nor denies the sexual either and it is 
noteworthy that during this period he is sustained by letters from his beloved David 
Pinsent, who is killed during the war and to whom he will eventually dedicate the 
Tractatus, with the epigram from Kürnberger: `Whatever a man knows, whatever is not 
mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words'. 
Finally, there is no doubting the depth and authenticity of Wittgenstein's religious 
faith at this point in his life. Despite attempts to downplay it, it is clear from reading the 
passages above that this is a passionate faith (he would later appreciate this point in 
Kierkegaard) which admits of no middle way. Here again the influence of Tolstoy (and 
Dostoyevsky) is manifest. It is a faith that does not transcend the world but a faith that 
brings us into the world, with all its mess, human relationships and tragedy. Ultimately 
the goal is to live and to `Lebe Glücklich! Live Happily! ' (NB 8.7.16): 
The happy life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it is the only right life. 
(NB 3 0.7.16) 
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Some commentators (See Chapter Three) have argued that Wittgenstein's faith and 
attitudes expressed in the War Diaries were a `flash in the pan' which he did not sustain 
throughout his life. Yet, the argument in this chapter has been that the events of 1916 
mark a watershed in Wittgenstein's life, which ultimately find expression in the 
`mystical' final two sections of the Tractatus. In this respect they form the springboard 
out of which the later `interactional' philosophy, famously expressed in the Philosophical 
Investigations, arises. This we characterised in Chapter Four as the move from `saying to 
showing to acting'. The position is clearly stated in two diary entries from Nachlass 
notebooks 125: 1942. Interestingly enough, again written during bombardment in war, 
but now the Second World War. This time Wittgenstein had asked for a simple job (he 
became porter at Guy's Hospital, London) in an area of aerial bombardment in London. 
As in World War One he showed great courage under continual bombardment and was 
able to encourage the younger doctors and nurses who were inexperienced in such things. 
This notebook entry was written during a brief break with John Ryle's family in Sussex 
(see Monk 1990: 434): 
3.1.42. 
Every word stands in a field of relationships, at a distinctive point of the speech- 
field (Sprachfeld): if then we choose this word rather than another we are 
choosing one place in the field rather than another, one group of relationships 
rather than another. (BEE: 125 2v)164 
Our words, our speech, cannot be extracted from our life and our meaning in words 
comes from the Sprachfeld - the series of relationships within which we dwell. Again, 
from the same notebook: 
164 'Jedes Wort steht in einem Feld von Beziehungen, an einem bestimmten Punkt des 
Sprachfeldes: wer also geneigt ist dies Wort zu wählen und nicht jenes, wählt einen Ort des Feldes 
statt eines anderen, eine Gruppe von Beziehungen statt einer anderen. ' 
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9.2.42 
I am not interested in an unmediated understanding of a Truth, but the 
phenomenon of unmediated understanding. Not a particular seelische 
understanding but understanding in the affairs of people. Yes, it is as though the 
idea-picture of experience is led into particular channels so that we can now see 
one experience laid together with another. (like an optical instrument brings 
together light from different sources in a particular way to produce a picture) 
(BEE 50r). '65 
The complexity of `ordinary life' in the `affairs of people' will finally reach its fullest 
exposition in the Investigations. Yet, as these unpublished remarks show, Wittgenstein 
was keen to make his readers realise the need for embodiment in the `field of 
relationships' which constitutes the Sprachfeld. 
`Bring der Mensch wieder in das richtige Element ; `Bring the person into the 
right element' he writes on 18.5.42 `und alles wird sich entfalten und gesund erscheinen', 
`and everything will unfold and appear well' (BEE: 125 58r). 
As with his philosophical life so with his personal life Wittgenstein realised at this 
later period the need of what he had expressed in the Koder diary in 1930: 
I often feel as though there is something in me like a lump which, if it melted, I 
would then be able to cry or find the right word (or perhaps a melody). But this 
`something' (Is it the Heart? ) feels like leather and cannot melt. Or am I perhaps 
too cowardly to allow the temperature to rise enough for this to happen? There are 
people who are too weak to break. I belong to this type. The only thing in me 
which might break sometime, and this I am anxious about, is my mind. (BEE: 
183: 3/ 26.4.30)166 
165 'Mich interessiert nicht das unmittelbare Einsehen einer Wahrheit, sondern das Phänomen des 
unmittelbaren Einsehens. Nicht (zwar) als einer besondern seelischen Erscheinung sondern als einer 
Erscheinung im Handeln der Menschen. Ja; es ist, als ob die Begriffsbildung die Erfahrung in bestimmte 
Kanäle leitete so dass man nun die eine Erfahrung mit der andern auf andere Weise zusammensieht (Wie 
ein optisches Instrument Licht von verschiedenen Quellen auf bestimmte Art in einem Bild 
zusammenkommen lässt) 
166 `Oft fühle ich dass etwas in mir ist wie ein Klumpen der wenn er schmelzen würde mich weinen liesse 
oder ich fände dann die richtige Worte (oder vielleicht sogar eine Melodie). Aber diese Etwas (ist es das 
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Parallel to the openness to the possibilities of embodiment held in these entries we find 
that the heartfelt declamations of faith presented in the War diaries are still there, again, 
the influence of Tolstoy and his Gospel in Brief remain apparent. Thus on 15.2.37 we 
find him writing: 
As the insect buzzes to the light, so I return to the New Testament (BEE: 
183: 168) 167 
As Monk points out (Monk 1990: 364) the turn of 1936/37 was again a key moment in 
Wittgenstein's life as he tried the first formulation of his later thoughts in the Broivn 
Book which he had taken with him to Norway. As would finally be the case with the 
beginning of the Investigations his thoughts returned to Augustine. (who, as we have 
seen, was such an important influence on Teresa) whose Confessions he was re-reading 
and wanted to emulate. Monk writes that for Wittgenstein `All philosophy, in so far as it 
is pursued honestly and decently, begins with a confession' (Monk 1990: 366). As we saw 
in the previous chapter, the true path of philosophy must pass through humility and 
unknowing: 
The edifice of your pride is broken down. And that is terrible work. (V13: 1937) 
The remarks he wrote at this time, which would basically form untouched the first 188 
paragraphs of the Investigations (about a quarter of the book) were written, as Monk 
points out, `at a time when he was most ruthlessly honest about himself - when he made 
the most intense efforts to "descend into himself' and admit to those occasions on which 
his pride had forced him to be deceitful' ( Monk 1990: 367); both in his personal life and 
Herz? ) fühlt sich bei mir an wie Leder und kann nicht schmelzen. Oder ist es dass ich nur zu feig bin die 
Temperatur genügend steigen zu lassen? Es gibt Menschen die zu schwach zum Brechen sind Zu denen 
gehöre auch ich. 
Das Einzige was vielleicht ein Mal an mir brechen wird und davor fürchte ich mich manchmal ist mein 
Verstand ' 
167 Wie das Insekt das Licht unschwirrt so ich ums Neue Testament' 
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in his public life, such as the time he struck school children when he worked as a school 
teacher in Upper Austria after the First World War. His desire for confession and 
humility led him to return to the village he had taught in and ask forgiveness from his 
former pupils (movingly described in Monk 1990: 370-1). 
This period of confession was still linked with his entreaties to God and in the 
private notebooks we see the clearest expression of these thoughts: 
God! Help me come into a relationship with you in which I can be happy with my 
work. I believe that in every moment God can demand eve thing from you! Is 
really conscious of you! So I ask that he gives you the gift of life! (BEE: 16.2.37, 
183: 202)168 
From this point too comes the quote about Lebensfragen with which we headed this 
chapter. 
It is clear that even in 1937, twenty years after the incidents on the Eastern Front, 
Wittgenstein still somehow felt the need to engage with the theistic, however, and 
perhaps more importantly from the point of view of this thesis, that engagement took the 
form of seeing: 
1. The inextricable link between the ethical and the philosophical 
2. The need for confession, as the true source of philosophy 
3. The proposal of a linguistic strategy that returned the reader to the `relationships 
of everyday life', and 
4. A linguistic strategy with transformative power. 
As he makes clear in one of his later attempts to codify his philosophy - the so-called Big 
Typescript of 1932 (BT), for the `later' (we argue post -1916) Wittgenstein, the aim of 
168 'Gott! Lass mich zu dir in ein Verhältnis kommen, in dem ich fröhlich sein kann in meiner Arbeit! 
Glaube daran dass Gott von Dir in jedem Moment alles fordern kann! Sei Dir dessen wirklich bewusst! 
Dann bitte dass er Dir das Geschenk des Lebens gibt! ' 
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philosophy is to produce transformative change through working on affect as much as 
intellect: `a resignation, but one of feeling and not of intellect' is required for `work on 
philosophy is - as work in architecture frequently is - actually more of a kind of work on 
oneself. On one's own conception. On the way one sees things' (P0: 161/2). 
Again, as has been argued throughout this dissertation, it is precisely this process 
of affective change that we have already observed in the tradition of theologia mystica 
and to which we return now. 
8.3 Teresa's Transformational Strategies 
As with Wittgenstein, when we consider transformational strategies of embodiment in 
Teresa we need to ask ourselves the following questions: 
1. How far can our Wittgensteinian methodology help in investigating Teresa's 
writings? 
2. If we suggest linguistic strategies in her writings where does she get them from? 
3. What is she hoping to achieve through these strategies? 
In brief we can give preliminary answers as follows: 
a) It should be clear by now that our Wittgensteinian methodology gives us an 
appreciation of the linguistic strategies of her writing. That we are not looking for 
anything like an ontological mystical entity in her writings but rather concerning 
ourselves with how her mystical text acts as a `performative strategy'. 
b) Secondly, as has been argued throughout this dissertation, these strategies, what 
we term `mystical' strategies, derive from the tradition of theologia mystica which 
she has imbibed primarily, but not exclusively, from her reading of de Osuna. 
c) Her aim in doing this is to help move her reader, through `unknowing' and 
`embodiment' to a deeper relationship with God, which, for her, is a sine qua non 
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for the Christian life of prayer and action. As with Wittgenstein she is 
encouraging a change of affect as much as a change of intellect. 
As with Wittgenstein, we will argue here, that like Osuna she embodies a notion of 
`thinking-seeing-acting' in her writing. That is to say, a process that goes in tandem with 
the strategy of unknowing that moves the reader from thinking to seeing to action. 
A constant theme in this thesis is how we interpret Wittgenstein's writings as 
giving us a blueprint or guide to a form of life. We have argued that the primary goal of 
his philosophy is not to make grand sweeping speculations but to change our way of 
being through the movement from saying to showing to acting. 
Similarly, we argue now, Teresa's writings are to be seen in the same light as a set 
of manoeuvres, or indeed to use the language of her contemporary, Ignatius of Loyola, a 
set of exercises to move us from one position to another. As with Wittgenstein, we argue 
that her writings are to be read as a `manual' for ontological transformation. 
8.3.1 Teresa's Language of Embodiment 
I would like to know how to explain myself here and it is so difficult that I do not 
know if I shall be able to do so... I am quite sure, however that souls who are 
deceived in this way will understand if only they will believe me. I know some, 
souls of great virtue, who have been in such a state for seven or eight hours and 
everything appeared to them to be rapture (arrobameinto), and every virtuous 
exercise affected them in such a way that they immeadiately relinquished control 
of themselves, because they thought that it was not right to resist the Lord; and 
little by little they might die or become fools if a remedy is not procured. What I 
understand to be the case here is that when the Lord begins to caress (regalar) the 
soul, our nature, being so fond of pleasure/delight (deleite), abandons itself 
completely to this pleasure (gusto) such that it would not move, or lose what it has 
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gained, for anything in the world. For, in truth, it is much more pleasureable than 
anything of the world. (F: 6: 2) 
169 
Gustos, gozos, regalos, deleites and sabors pepper Teresa's works. On the one hand, as 
Allison Peers argues (Peers 1944: xxi), they can be seen as manifestations of her `rough 
hewn style', the homely style of ascetics and hermits that we analysed in the previous 
chapter; a desire to avoid the hifalutin terms of a spiritual elite (the letrados) for more 
simple homely words which her audience will respond to. The words themselves are 
ambiguous and Teresa's use of them opens up a whole new `epistemology of delight' for 
her exploration of the supernatural and mystical. In her use of the erotic and spiritual, the 
blending of eros and agape, the human and divine, the key style and tone, as we may 
have become accustomed to by now, is ambiguity. Before we analyse her use of the terms 
it is useful to review them. 
Gusto is a favourite of Teresa's. Despite attempts to `tidy up' her prose both Peers 
(1944) and Kavanaugh and Rodriguez (1987) convey something of the ambiguity in their 
translations. In all the word appears one hundred and eighty-five times in her works, 
fifty-two in the Vida, twenty in the Fundaciones, nineteen and twenty-two in the Camino 
Valladolid and Escorial codex respectively, thirty-two in the Moradas and thirty-three in 
the Meditaciones. As her writing and style evolves so does her subtlety and use of the 
word. 
The term first appears in Chapter Three of the Vida where Teresa contrasts her 
new (enforced) life in the Augustinian convent of Santa Maria de Gracia with her 
previous life of sensuality: Mirava mäs el gusto de mi sensualidady vanidad quo lo biers 
que me estava a mi alma (V: 3.2): `I looked more to the pleasure of sensuality and vanity 
than to what was good for my soul'. 
170 Thus at its earliest appearance gusto is associated 
with the dubious sensual pleasures she has described in the previous two chapters: 
169 my translation 170 my translation 
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I began to dress in finery and to desire to please and look pretty, taking great care 
of my hands and hair and about perfumes and all empty things in which one can 
indulge, and which were many, for I was very vain. (V: 2.2) 
This process led eventually to some sort of sensual dalliance with one of her cousins. 
This struggle between the `things of God' and the `contentos y gustos y pasatiempos 
sensuales' (V: 7.17) continues throughout the early stages of the young girl's journey to 
discover herself. Teresa herself was clearly a lady of some sensuality and she found in 
prayer a difficulty to reconcile the two `so inimical to each other'. At this stage in the 
Vida, and in her writing about these experiences, Teresa contrasts the gustos and 
contentos with the mercedes, the greater `favours' that the Lord will give her in prayer 
(V: 7.17). Yet already by Chapter Eight she talks of the gustos `bestowed by God'; one of 
her first uses of the term as a description of that which occurs in prayer rather than that 
which is connected purely with the sensual appetites. Of these gustos ('delights' 
[Kavanaugh and Rodriguez V: 8.9], `consolations' [Allison Peers V: 8] ), as she now 
begins to call them, she will tell us more later. But she makes clear, and this will be a 
constant theme throughout her writing, one of the purposes of prayer is gusto - delight, 
sensuality, sensousness - and `The Lord' will indeed `take delight' (regalarla) by 
entering the soul. This new description of prayer in terms of sensuality and delight 
climaxes towards the end of La Vida in passages such as the famous description of the 
soul caressed by the Golden Cherub in the Vida 29: 13 (and so memorably immortalised 
by Bernini's great statue of `Teresa in Ecstasy' at Santa Maria della Vittoria in Rome). 
However before this point we find this memorable passage from V: 27: 
In this other case, nothing: even that little bit of just listening, which it did in the 
past, is all gone. One finds everything already cooked and eaten, there's nothing 
to do but enjoy, (gozar), like someone who without learning or working to know 
how to read, or even studying at all, would suddenly find all knowledge already 
known in itself, without knowing how or where, for he hadn't even ever worked 
even to learn the ABC's. (V: 27: 8) 
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. ý. 
As we have seen above, Teresa's ambiguous use of gusto is often accompanied by 
regalo. Of the two terms it is perhaps the more ambiguous. Although Peers translates it as 
`comfort of the soul' in the passage from the Fundaciones with which we began this 
section he adds the following note: 
The real meaning of this ubiquitous word here is `show signs of affection for'; 
and `pet', `caress', `fondle' though hardly seemly in the context, would not, as far 
as the actual sense is concerned, be too strong. (Peers CW: iii: 27) 
What we see in the passage from the Fundaciones with which we began this chapter is 
some of Teresa's most mature reflection and use of the terms. Peers is not the only one to 
feel unease with her sensual and ambiguous language here, a strategy that she will 
employ in those other two mature works, the Moradas and the Meditaciones. Further on 
in this passage Teresa describes how love will cause the novice `sense pleasure' (gusto en 
el sentido). Graciän, one of the first of her reader-editors, substituted this with sensible en 
el sentido which perhaps is less ambiguously sensual than gusto en el sentido. However, 
her later editor Bänez restored the original. Such problems arise throughout the 
manuscript and suggest the problems her first readers had with her sensual language (see 
Peers 1944: 27, De la Madre de Dios and Steggink 1997: 693 -695). Despite, or perhaps 
because of this ambiguity regalo remains one of her favourite words for describing things 
of God and occurs frequently in her works, especially her later works. 
Like regalos and gustos, deleites, gozos and sabor again occur with abundance 
throughout her works. Deleites appears one hundred and eight times, almost as many as 
gustos, and gozos eighty-two times. Together with sabor Teresa frequently uses them to 
convey the right mixture of the sensual and spiritual that she hopes to achieve. By these 
means, we argue in this chapter, she is able to initiate the necessary transformation of 
affect so central to her `mystical strategy'. Before we look at this in greater detail in the 
Meditaciones de Amor de Dios and the Moradas we will review again Teresa's debt to 
the tradition of theologia mystica as manifest in the works of de Osuna and illustrate the 
similarities of their approaches. 
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8.3.2 Strategies of Embodiment in Dc Osuna 
As with the strategies of unknowing that we discussed in the previous chapter we can 
find a strong precedent for Teresa's approach to affectivity in the writing of Francisco de 
Osuna. It is a constant theme in the Tercer Abecedario Espiritual, as we would expect 
from a writer who begins his treatise with the phrase `Anden siempre juntamente - la 
persona y espiritu' - `Always walking together - the person and the spirit' (TA 1.1), in 
which he emphasises the importance of what would today be called a `holistic' approach 
to the spiritual life where the body and the spirit are given equal respect: 
The meaning of our letter is that wherever you go carry your mind along, for no 
one should go divided unto himself. Do not allow your body to travel one path, 
the heart another. (TA: 1.2, see also TA: 8.4) 
Like Teresa, De Osuna's approach to spirituality is very much an embodied one. The 
primary concern of the Abecedario is the teaching of the prayer of recogimiento, so 
important for Teresa. Yet the theme of the gustos and the importance of spiritual desire or 
yearning is a key theme of the book. Chapter Twelve is dedicated almost totally to it: `No 
entendiendo, mas gustando, pienses alcanzar reposo' - `Not by understanding much, but 
by tasting much, think to obtain repose'. The title itself reveals how Osuna makes a 
connection between the two strategies proposed in this thesis - that of unknowing and 
that of embodiment. Early on in the treatise he had spoken of the importance of desire in 
the search for God (TA: 4.3,11.5) and in Chapter Twelve he explicitly connects this with 
the unknowing and emphasises the role that the gustos play in this. fie begins with the 
classic statement of unknowing which we have already explored: 
Even though the understanding may discover and analyse numerous sublime 
matters, there is good reason for you to believe that complete, fulfilling repose is 
not to be found through functions of the intellect and that ultimately the least part 
of what we do not know exceeds everything we do know. (TA: 12.1) 
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Knowledge, for Osuna, is derived not from `knowing' (saber) but from `tasting' (sabor), 
in particular tasting the delights of the gustos espiriluales, the spiritual delights. This 
gusto espiritual is `so excellent that it is almost impossible for a person who has 
experienced it not to praise it... We should realise that he who tastes spiritual food 
hungers to taste and enjoy more' (TA: 12.6). Here Osuna gives a quote purportedly from 
St Bernard from De interiori domo `Quanto amplius delectaris... ' However, as Lopez 
Santidridn points out (1998: 351), this is a misattribution, the passage is from a twelfth 
century Cistercian manuscript that transcribes a passage from Richard of St Victor's 
Beniamin Maior, thus once again relating this tradition of deleite and gusto to the 
Parisian school of theologia mystica and the `Affective Dionysianism' we explored in 
Chapter Five. 
Osuna continues by justifying the use of pleasure as a marker of spiritual 
progress, dismissing those who object for `not differentiating among the types of 
pleasure' and classing them all together. He calls on Gerson to justify his approach 
which is, as we saw previously, the emphasis on the importance of experience over 
understanding. At this point Osuna employs a quote from Proverbs 8.31 which we shall 
see later is of fundamental importance to Teresa. The original verse from Proverbs reads: 
The Lord created me at the beginning of his work 
The first of his acts of long ago. 
Ages ago I was set up, 
At the first, before the beginning of the earth... 
When he established the heavens, 
I was there, 
When he drew a circle on the face of the deep... 
When he marked out the foundations of the earth. 
There I was beside him, like a master worker. 
And I was daily his delight 
Rejoicing before him always. 
Rejoicing in his inhabited world 
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And delighting in the human race. (Proverbs 8: 31) 
De Osuna transcribes this thus: 
Our souls would delight in an increase of consolation, and, as we delighted in 
God, he would grant the petitions of our hearts, for it is said that his delights are 
to dwell in the sons of man so they will cause them to delight in him. ' (TA: 
12.4) 171 
Thus by combining his exposition of the ancient Jewish texts with the medieval tradition 
of theologia mystica inherited through Gerson and the Victorines, Osuna provides the 
materials that Teresa will later incorporate into her mature mystical writing (see also TA: 
4.3). `If you enjoy God' (Si gustas en Dios) he says `you have in your soul the greatest 
possible sign of God's supreme love and so you should not let anyone frighten you by 
saying it is self-love'. `There is nothing', he says, `which is more delightful than spiritual 
consolation'. In passages such as this we can see why the young, confused Teresa of 
Avila took such great comfort from the work and found the confirmation of the spiritual 
journey she was seeking from her confessors and only finding in De Osuna's book `her 
master'. Los gustos are for Osuna `a foretaste of heaven on earth' (TA 5.3): `God gives 
the soul spiritual pleasure as a promise of future glory', `When you receive it do not be 
curious about where it comes from but open your hearts to the Lord's gift and accept it'. 
It is not over fanciful to see how passages such as this spoke to the young Teresa, with 
their affirmation of passion and integration of the life of the heart with the life of the 
mind, in a similar way that the passages from Tolstoy we reviewed earlier spoke to the 
young, confused Wittgenstein. Both seemed to find an integration of their intellectual 
`unknowing' with the embodiment that it had become impossible to avoid. 
171 As well as Prov 8.31, Osuna also makes reference here to Ps 103: 27 and Prov 5.19 
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8.4 Teresa's Use of the Strategy of Embodiment 
We are now in a position to return to Teresa's language of gustos, regales, delcttes, 
contentos and sabor and see how she uses the material she has inherited from the 
medieval tradition in her own writing. To do this we will take two examples from her 
writings, from the Meditations and the Moradas. 
8.4.1 Strategies of Embodiment in The Meditaciones Sohre Los Cantares 
As Kavanaugh and Rodriguez make clear in their introduction to their translation of the 
Meditaciones, a commentary on the sensual Hebrew poem The Song of Songs, it is 
unclear how Teresa would have had access to a translation of this text into the vernacular. 
Although the Council of Trent had not forbidden the use of scriptures in the vernacular to 
lay people, as we have seen above the Valdes Indices of 1551,1554 and 1559 did, 
especially for `idiots and mujercillas'. Kavanaugh and Rodriguez suggest various ways in 
which Teresa could have had knowledge of these scriptures (1980: iii. 209) including: 172 
a) She would have read the verses in Latin in the church office. Despite her lack of 
knowledge of Latin she says: 
For a number of years now the Lord has given me great delight (dado un regalo 
grande) each time I hear or read some words from Solomon's Song of Songs. The 
delight is so great that without understanding the vernacular meaning of the Latin, 
my soul is stirred and recollected more than by devotional books written in the 
language I understand. And this happens almost all the time, and even when the 
Latin words were translated for me into the vernacular I did not understand the 
text any more. (C: Prol: 1) 
172 See Also Kavanaugh and Rodriguez 1980: 212-213 for a summary of the manuscripts available of the 
work and the origins of its composition. 
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b) She may have used a translation from one of the Spanish offices then available: `And 
so you can see, my daughters, in the Office of our Lady which we recite each week, how 
much its antiphons and readings is taken from this Song of Songs'. (C: 6.8) 
c) She may have asked some letrado or confessor to translate for her or she may have got 
the passages from a spiritual book. 
Green (1989), following writers such as Swietlicki (1986), suggests that Teresa had been 
shown Luis de Leon's translation of The Song into the vernacular (for which he was 
ultimately arrested by the Inquisition) by Martin Gutierrez (Green 1989: 114). 173 If true, 
this opens up the possibility of Luis's kabbalistic knowledge indirectly influencing 
Teresa's interpretation of the Song. 174 On the advice of her confessor, Diego de Yanguas, 
the original manuscript of the Meditaciones was burnt, however sufficient copies survive 
for us to reconstruct the original (See Peers CW: ii. 352-356 and Kavanaugh and 
Rodriguez CW: ii. 211-214). 
The Meditaciones presents seven extended meditations on seven lines from the Song of 
Songs: 
Let the Lord kiss me with the kiss of his mouth, for your breasts are better than 
wine. (Cant 1: 1) 
Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth. (Cant 1: 2) 
173 Although this is disputed by other commentators, eg see Howells 2002: 179 
174 It is now widely accepted that Luis, a converso, had extensive knowledge of both the Christian and 
Jewish kabbalistic interpretations of the Song of Songs. Benito Arias Montano, librarian to El Escorial, 
supplied Luis with prohibited books from the Netherlands - the Escorial, of course, holding one of the 
finest collections of books on esoterica, kabbala and Islamic mysticism in Western Europe (Green 
1989: 124 ff). Kottman (1972) has argued that Luis's commentary on the Song of Songs relates to that part 
of the Zohar known as The Greater Holy Assembly, see also Swietlicki (1986). Regarding Teresa's 
knowledge of such matters, it is harder to draw definite conclusions. Both Swietlicki and Green argue for 
deliberate knowledge in Teresa's work, in this they stand out. However it may well be that some aspects of 
the Hekhalot/Zoharic tradition did linger within the oral tradition of the conversos (see Green 1989: 119). 
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Your breasts are better than wine, and give forth the most sweet fragrance. (Cant 
1: 2-3) 
I sat down under the shadow of Him whom I desired and his fruit is sweet to my 
taste. (Cant 2: 3) 
The King has brought me into the wine cellar and ordered charity within me. 
(Cant 2: 4) 
Sustain me with flowers and surround me with apples for I am dying of love. 
(Cant 2: 5) 
The lines themselves (translations of Teresa's Spanish versions) are corruptions of the 
original lines of the Song of Songs, however the explicitly erotic nature of the original is 
still clear from Teresa's transcriptions. In contrast to the Moradas and Vida, Teresa is at 
her most explicit in the Meditaciones and it is perhaps the clearest example of the 
importance of embodiment to her writing - this could be what prompted de Yanguas to 
advise Teresa to bum the manuscript. 
The combination of the strategies of unknowing we saw in the previous chapter 
with this strategy of embodiment is most explicit in `chapter' five, the commentary on I 
sat down under the shadow of Him whom I desired and his fruit is sweet to my taste (Cant 
2: 3). 175 
Here Teresa contrasts the unknowing of the `shadow' of the Lord with the 
knowledge that comes from the taste of the Lord. In the previous chapter she reflects de 
Osuna's play on sabor/saber (which we have already discussed) when she writes: 
175 The work was not included in Luis de Leon's original edition of Teresa's work, perhaps because of his 
own trouble with the `Song' and was first edited and published by Jerome Gratian in Brussels in 1611. Ile 
divided it into seven `chapters' and gave each a heading (Rodriguez and Kavanaugh 1980: ii. 212-213). 
Kavanaugh and Rodriguez suggest a date of composition of between 1566/1567 for a possible first draft, 
written in Avila and 1572/1575 for a possible second draft. 
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Oh my daughters! May our Lord give you an understanding or, to put it better, a 
taste (for there is no other way to understand), of the joy of the soul when it is in 
this state. 176 
As with Osuna she emphasises the gustar of the Lord rather than the entender. This is 
made more explicit in Chapter Five: 
While the soul is enjoying the delight (deleite) which has been described, it seems 
to be wholly engulfed and protected by a shadow, and, as it were, a cloud of the 
Divinity, whence come to it certain influences and a dew so delectable (tan 
deleitoso) as to free it immeadiately, and with good reason, from the weariness 
caused it by the things of the world. (C: 5.4)177 
The similarity to the Victorine passages we discussed in Chapter Five, such as Gallus's 
contrast between the `ray of dazzling darkness' and `cloud of unknowing' in his 
transcription of Dionysius, with this passage is striking at this point. 178 Is Teresa making 
an explicit reference here? The stylistic resemblance to the passages of Affective 
Dionysianism we have discussed seems hard to resist here. She continues: 
So she says that His fruit is sweet to the throat. For here all is enjoyment/taste 
(Porque aqui todo es gustar) without any labour of the faculties, and in this 
shadow of the Divinity (which is well termed `shadow' for with clarity we cannot 
see it as we are below this cloud), this splendid sun; sent through the medium of 
love -a sign of the proximity of His Majesty, of whom it is not possible to speak. 
(C: 5.5) 
176 lOh hijas mias! Deos nuestro Sen"or a entender o, por major decir, a gustar (que de otra manera nose 
puede entender) que es del gozo del alma cuando estä asi. (C: 4.7) 
` Parece que estando el alma en el deleite que queda dicho, que se siente estar toda engolfada y 
amparada con una sombre y manera de nube de la Divinidad, de donde vienen inf uencias at alma y roci6 
tan deleitoso, que bien con raz6n quitan el cansancio que le han dado las cosas del mundo. 
171 See also The Cloud of Unknowing Ch. 8 
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Here, again, we see echoes of Part One of Dionysius's De Theologia mystica and the 
stammering as he comes near to the ineffable breakdown of words. Both 
Kavanaugh/Rodriguez and Peers `tidy up' this passage to make it seem neater and more 
coherent. The original passage possesses the `rugged, rough-and-tumble' quality noted by 
de Certeau above. The translation presented here tries to revive that quality, which we 
feel brings it closer to the verbal disintegration of certain passages in Dionysius's 
Theologia mystica: 
Y ansi dice "que sufruto es dulce para su garganta ". Porque aqua todo es gustar 
sin ningün travajo de las potencies, y en esta sombre de la Divinidad (que bien 
dice sombre, porque con claridad no la podemos acä ver, sino debajo de esta 
nube), estä aquel sol resplandeciente; envia por medio del amor una noticia de 
que se estä tan junto Su Majestad, que no se puede decir ni es posible. (C: 5.5) 
Many of our linguistic strategies from the previous chapter are present here, especially 
the Paraceme, the uncertain humility with which she approaches the subject and the 
`roughness' of the prose which threatens, as with Dionysius, to break down at any 
moment into gibberish. 
The theme of the necessary connection between the wisdom of the gustos in the 
taste/enjoyment of God and the need for `unknowing' of the intellect remains throughout 
the Meditations. Thus, in Chapter Six we find the following passage when Teresa is 
talking about the Virgin Mary: 
She (Mary) did not act as do some letrados (whom the Lord does not lead by this 
mode of prayer and who don't have the beginnings of espiritii), for they want to 
be so rational about things and so precise in their understanding that it doesn't 
seem anyone else but they with learning can understand the grandeur of God. If 
only they would learn something from the humility of the most Blessed Virgin! 
(C: 6.7) 
This is followed by an analogy exactly the same as that used by Gerson and Osuna: 
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For my own part I think His Majesty is here enamelling gold which Ile has 
already prepared for this process by His gifts and has tested, by a thousand ways 
and means which the soul that has reached this state can describe... This soul, 
which is the gold in question, remains all the time motionless and as inert as if it 
were really gold; and the Divine Wisdom, well pleased to see it so, since so few 
love Him with such strength, continues to set in the gold many precious stones 
and much elaborately worked enamel. (C: 6.10) 
She expounds this passage in C: 6.10 by bringing together the soul's `loving' with its 
`lack of understanding': 
The King's most intense love, which has brought the soul to this high state, must 
have joined this soul's love to itself in such a way that the intellect (el 
entendimiento) does not deserve to understand; but these two loves become one 
again. (C: 6.10) 
As Howells (2002: 88) points out the Meditaciones occupies an important transitional 
period in Teresa's writings from the earlier works such as the Vida where the emphasis is 
more on union rapture, to the later works such as Moradas where union is expressed 
more in terms of service to humanity. As he says: 
It is typical of Teresa's approach to allow that both kinds of union are compatible: 
`union' was always a flexible term for her, meaning a number of different states, 
and now the new union is simply added to these as the highest state. (Elowells 
2002: 88) 
This `union through action' - the embodied transformation which we are describing in 
this chapter - is, as for Wittgenstein, an embodiment that leads to: 
1. An inextricable link between the theological and the ethical 
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2. The need for self knowledge, as the true source of contemplation 
3. A strategy that returns the reader to the `relationships of everyday life' and 
4. A strategy with transformative power to make a difference in those relationships 
As with Wittgenstein, in these later passages in the Meditaciones, and as we shall soon 
see in the Moradas, we have transition from thinking about God, to experiencing God to 
acting upon the experience of God. In Meditaciones: 7, written perhaps just two years 
before the Moradas, she describes it with reference to the `flowers' mentioned in Chapter 
Two of the Song of Songs: 
Sustain me with flowers and surround me with apples, for I am dying of love. 
(Cant 2.5) 
As she comments in C 7.3: 
I understand by these words that the soul is asking to perform great works 
(grandes obras) in the service of our Lord and of its neighbour. For this purpose it 
is happy to lose that delight and satisfaction (deleite y contento)... For in the 
active - and seemingly exterior - work the soul is working interiorly. 
Thus, the strategy of embodiment and delight has been necessary to lead us to the `good 
works' to our fellow humans. With Wittgenstein we saw how a strategy of embodiment 
led us away from the solipsistic fiction of the Cartesian `I', here, as with Wittgenstein, the 
divisions between an `interior' and `exterior' `I' are broken down. Teresa does not use 
the philosophically precise language of Wittgenstein, but through her poetical conceit of 
the flares she suggests the same strategy. An example again of Teresa using a striking 
metaphor to convey a complex philosophico-theological statement. This is confirmed in 
C 7.4 where, as with Wittgenstein, she stresses the importance of self examination of 
motivation for action -just as we saw in Wittgenstein's `confessions': 
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Someone preaches a sermon with the intention of benefiting souls, but he is not so 
detached from human considerations that he doesn't make some attempt to please, 
or to gain honour or credit; or he has his mind set on receiving some canonry for 
having preached well. There are also many things people do for their neighbour's 
benefit - many things - and with a good intention, but with much care not to lose 
anything through them and not to displease. (C: 7.4) 
Thus, as she makes clear in the final sections of the Meditaciones, her strategy of 
embodiment and delight has as its end or goal, personal transformation leading to re- 
engagement with the world. Just as Wittgenstein's philosophical exercises enable the 
solipsistic fly to escape its fly bottle so that we re-enter the world of relationships; so 
Teresa's mystical exercises allow the self-contented, self-seeking Christian to escape the 
prison of their attachment for service of others. 
So I say that much good is done by those who, after speaking with His Majesty 
for several years, when receiving His gifts and delights, want to serve in laborious 
ways even though these delights and consolations are thereby hindered. I say that 
the fragrance of these flowers and works produced and flowing from the tree of 
such fervent love lasts much longer. (C: 7.7) 
8.4.2 Strategies of Embodiment in Las Moradas 
As already stated, the Meditaciones, written between 1566 - 1575, act as a transitional 
stage between Teresa's early thought in the Vida to the later work of the Moradas. 179 In 
this respect the Moradas takes the themes of the Meditaciones and develops them into 
their final stage. 
Following conversations reported with Jeronimo Graciän (see Peers CW: ii. 188) 
and others Teresa tells us that she began work on the Moradas on Trinity Sunday (2'' 
June), 1577 in Toledo. Some ten years after the first draft of the Meditaciones and five 
years before her death, she was at this point sixty two and her reform of the order was 
179 Lit. 'The Mansions' or `El Castillo Interior' ('The Interior Castle'), hereafter M 
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going badly. 180 As well as conflict between the Discalced and Carmelites of the Ancient 
Observance, Teresa's health was poor at this point (she writes of headaches, nausea and a 
`great noise in her ears' in M: 4). The most high profile casualty of this conflict was St 
John of the Cross who was imprisoned in Toledo at this time. From this time we also 
have the famous description of her by the new papal nuncio in Spain, Felipe Sega, who 
took up his post in June 1577: 
A troublesome, restless, disobedient and stubborn female, who under the guise of 
devotion invented bad doctrines, running around outside the cloister against the 
order of the Tridentine Council and prelates, instructing like a teacher in defiance 
of what St Paul taught, who ordered women not to teach. 18' 
In July, seemingly as a result of Sega's appointment, she left Toledo and completed the 
work at San Jose, Avila on November 29th the same year -a remarkably short six months 
required for completion. Due to crises within the order both at Toledo and Avila, 
commentators suggest that she spent a mere three months in actual writing. This included 
being re-elected Prioress of the Encarnaciön in October (which was later reversed by 
Tostado - commisary general of the Spanish Carmelites appointed 
in 1576) and the 
appearance of a scurrilous pamphlet denouncing both Teresa and Graciän (See 
Kavanaugh and Rodriguez CW: ii: 265). 
As well as the original autograph held in the convent of the Discalced sisters in 
Seville there are several copies. The Toledo copy bears the date 1577 which seems to 
have been the copy made as Teresa wrote. The Discalced sisters of Cordoba hold a copy 
in Graciän's hand while the University of Salamanca possesses P. Ribera's copy (1588). 
Graciän described her decision to write the Moradas in a conversation recorded after the 
event: 
180 For more detail see Efren de la Madre de Dios y Otger Steggink, Tiempo y vida de Santa Teresa, 
Madrid: Catölica, 1977: 701-805 
'a' `Femina inquieta, andariega, desobediente y contumaz, que a titulo de devocibn inventaba malas 
doctrinas, andando fuera de la clausura contra el örden del concilio tridentino y prelados, enserlando como 
maestra contra lo que San Pablo enserib, mandando que las mujeres no enseflasen' in Francisco de Santa 
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Being her confessor and speaking with her once in Toledo about many things 
concerning her spirit, she said to me: "Oh, how well that point is written in the 
book of my life, which the Inquisition has! " And I said to her, "Well, since we 
can't recover it, write down what you remember, and other things, and write 
another book, and explain the basic doctrine without identifying the person who 
has experienced what you say there". 
182 
Suggesting, that like the Vida, the dialectic of concealment with the Inquisition was 
present in the work from its inception, Weber notes, referring to the often times 
ramshackle rhetoric of the Moradas: `A bride is hidden in Teresa's castle: the dangerous 
language of erotic spirituality is concealed by a proliferation of competing images. Eier 
avowed incompetence constitutes in reality a rhetoric of obfuscation' (Weber 1990: 99). 
For Weber, the `bride' of the Interior Castle, both `concealed and protected' by Teresa's 
rhetoric is erotic spirituality itself, so dangerous in open expression in Spain of the 1570s 
(Weber 118 -122). 
Following the arguments of this thesis we agree that Weber is right to see a 
sensual or erotic side in the Moradas. The argument of this chapter, and of the whole 
thesis however, is that Teresa, true heir of the masters of the theologia mystica, sees the 
need to activate the affectus if contemplative transformation is to be effected in the 
listener. However, as we have already seen from our consideration of the Afeditaciones, it 
would be a mistake to see Teresa as understanding this process as an end in itself. As 
with the Meditaciones, the end of the sensual self-examination of the affecius is to return 
us to the world, our responsibilities to our fellow human beings and the possibilities that 
arise from our human relationships with each other. For Weber, the erotic is an end in 
itself for Teresa, and although as she says `Teresa, who found herself on the frontiers of 
contemporary orthodoxy, nevertheless felt the idea of spiritual marriage so crucial that 
she was willing to continue to take risks' (Weber 1990: 121). It is not so clear from her 
Maria Reforma de los descalzos de Nuestra Senora del Carmen de la primitiva observancia, lreclra por 
Santa Teresa de Jesus ( Madrid 1644-55). 1: 556 
182 Quoted in Ahlgren (1996: 6 1) from Graciän, Anotaciones al P Ribera in Antonio de San Joaquin Ailo 
Teresiano, diario histörico, panegvrico moral, en que se descruben las virtudes, succesos y maravillas de 
la seräphica y mystica Doctora de la Iglesia Santa Teresa de Jesus, Madrid 1733-69,7: 149 
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description just why Teresa should go to these great lengths and what was she hoping to 
achieve by them - the third question we raised at the beginning of section 8.3. 
One of the attractions of interpreting Teresa's writings through a Wittgensteinian 
`strategy of embodiment' presented here is that, unlike Weber's notion of `concealed 
erotic spirituality' this question is answered. As we have seen, Teresa, using her heritage 
and understanding of the theologia mystica inherited from de Osuna, is able to couple a 
strategy of unknowing with a strategy of embodiment which will lead, as in the 
Meditaciones, to Obras and responsible action in the world for others. 
Weber has argued that Teresa deliberately obscures the erotic spirituality of the 
Moradas - `like a bride in the castle'- all the better to protect it from the Inquisition. She 
suggests that in the fifteen sixties when Teresa wrote the Meditaciones it was possible to 
be more explicit about the `erotico-maternal' matrix that she describes there in the Song 
of Songs. By 1577 the situation had become more difficult, exemplified by Gracidn's 
order for Teresa to burn the text of the Meditaciones in 1580 (See Weber 1990: 117). As 
remarked already, none other than Luis de Leon had been imprisoned between 1572 and 
1575 for publishing his vernacular version of the Song of Songs. Weber also mentions the 
beatas of Llerena, burnt at the stake in 1579 for reporting, amongst other things, erotic 
visions of Christ's humanity and his union with his followers (See Llorca 1980: 103-121, 
Weber 1990: 120). 
While accepting that Weber's thesis reveals something of the tension that went 
into the writing of the Moradas it is argued here that the work may have been more than 
an attempt to `conceal or hide erotic spirituality'. As we have seen throughout this thesis, 
from Dionysius through the Victorines, Gerson and Osuna a mystical strategy (the 
theologia mystica) runs throughout the Western Christian tradition. As we have argued, 
this tradition possesses several strategies, that of embodiment being one of them. 183 We 
have already shown how Teresa uses these strategies in her writings. In passages such as 
those examined in the previous section we have seen her using the strategies of 
163 Using a Wittgensteinian approach this dissertation has examined two strategies of the theologia mystica: 
that of unknowing and embodiment. However, we do not wish to suggest that these are the only strategies 
of the tradition of theologia mystica. The argument here is that these two are clearly visible and their 
influence from one set of writers to another can be clearly traced, as has been done here. It seems from the 
authors surveyed here that this `thread' forms an essential component of the tradition of theologia mystica. 
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embodiment and unknowing with clear references to the `ray of darkness' and `cloud of 
unknowing' of Dionysius. Accordingly, if as we suggest Teresa was familiar with these 
strategies, we should see this also happening in the Moradas, being aware, and taking up 
Weber's suggestion, that she was more cautious in this work than any other preceeding 
work not least because, by now, she knew the perils associated with writing in the climate 
of sixteenth century Spain. 
Therefore, we argue here that the Moradas is better interpreted, from our 
Wittgensteinian perspective, as using linguistic strategies of unknowing and embodiment 
to lead the reader to personal affective transformation for engagement in Obras in the 
world. There is insufficient space here to give a full exposition of the Moradas but we 
will draw out some of the main passages that support this interpretation. 
8.4.2.1 The First Mansions 
If we see the Moradas along the lines that are being suggested here then in the very first 
paragraph of the `first mansion' we see laid out the strategy we have presented in this 
chapter: 
While I was beseeching our Lord today to speak for/through me (por n))184 as I 
was unable to find a thing to say (no atinaba a cosa que decir), 
185 or how to begin 
to comply with this obedience, what I will say now presented itself (ofrecic )186 to 
begin with this starting point: that we consider our soul to be like a castle, totally 
of diamond or very clear crystal, where there are many abodes ( aposentos), 
187 as 
in heaven there are many mansions. Now if we consider it carefully, sisters, the 
However, we acknowledge there may be other, equally important threads. that future studies will reveal. 
Weber's concentration on the strategy of concealment is a good candidate and needs more follow up. 
184 Peers gives `through', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez give `for' 
185 Peers gives `I could find nothing to say', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez, `I wasn't able to think of anything 
to say' 
186 Peers: `a thought occurred to me', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez: ` there came to my mind' 
187 Peers `a rather more pretentious word than the English `room': dwelling place, abode, apartment'. 
Kavanaugh and Rodriguez, `Teresa uses the Spanish words moradas, aposentos y pietas in approximately 
the same sense; they refer to rooms or dwelling places within the castle... Most people today think of a 
mansion as a large stately home, not what Teresa had in mind with the term moradas. 'Dwelling places' 
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soul of a just person (el alma del justo)188is nothing else but a paradise where lie 
says he takes his delights (El tiene sus deleites). 
189 Well then, what do you think 
such an abode would be like where a King so powerful, so wise, so pure, so full of 
good things, takes his delight? I cannot find anything with which to compare the 
great beauty and capacity of the soul; and truly our intellects will no more be able 
to grasp this than they can comprehend God, no matter how keen they are, for He 
Himself said that He created us in his own image and likeness. (M 1.1.1)190 
Our intellects (nuestros entendimientos) cannot grasp that which we seek - whether it be 
the nature of God or the nature of the soul (Teresa boldly implies that epistemologically 
they present the same situation to the intellect). Rather than presenting an intellectual or 
conceptual notion of the soul, something `presents itself' o her (ofreciö, lit `offers itself', 
it is not `thought' as Kavanaugh and Rodriguez and Peers translate it nor is it an `idea' as 
other translators present it eg Benedictines of Stanbrook translation 1906). Teresa seems 
quite precise in her language that the image or trope of the Castle offers itself or presents 
itself rather than is thought, for, as she says, our intellects and understanding cannot grasp 
what is being presented. Rather, it is talked about in terms of being `enjoyed' (se deleita) 
by `the King'. The dialectic of affectivity lies at the heart of this epistemology, just as it 
did in the Meditaciones. The true nature of ourselves, our relation to God, and God in 
God's self are described in terms of affectivity and delight. Just as de Osuna quoted 
Proverbs 8: 31 in his chapter on the sabrosa saber, so again Teresa makes allusion to the 
same passage when she describes the soul as the place `wherein our Lord takes delight'. 
turns out to be a more precise translation of Teresa's moradas than is the classic `mansions' and more 
biblical and theological in tone. 
188 Peers: `the soul of the righteous man' , Kavanaugh and 
Rodriguez: 'the soul of the just person' 
189 Peers : `He takes His delight', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez: `He finds His delight' see also V14: 10 and 
Excl 7, allusion to Proverbs 8: 31 
190 'Estando hoy suplicando a nuestro Senor hablase por mi, porque yo no atinaba a cosa gtte decir ni 
cömo comenzar a cumplir esta obediencia, se me ofrecio lo que ahora dire, par comen-ar con algiln 
fundamento: que es considerar nuestra alma como un Castillo todo de un diamante o muy claro crystal, 
adonde hay mucho aposentos, asi comp en el cielo hay muchas moradas. Que sl bien lo consideramos, 
hermanas, no es otra cosa el alma del justo sinn un paraiso adonde dice El tiene sus deleites. Pues lqud tal 
os parece que sera el aposento adonde un Rey tan poderoso, tan sabio, tan limpio, tan lleno de todos los 
bienes se deleita No hallo yo cosa con que comparar la gran hermosura de un alma y la gran capacidad; y 
verdaderamente apenas deben Ilegar nuestros entendimientos, por agudos quefuesen, a comprenderla, as! 
coma no pueden Ilegar a considerar a Dios, pues El mismo dice que nos crid a su imagen y semejan. a. 
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As with Osuna, so with Teresa, knowledge is obtained from `tasting' the delights of the 
gustos espirituales, this will become apparent as the reader moves through the `castle'. 
Within the context of the linguistic strategies of unknowing presented in the 
previous chapter the passage is revealing. Teresa presents a series of metaphors, one after 
another, for the soul - each one is piled one after the other: a castle, totally of diamond 
or other clear crystal, of many abodes, like the heavenly mansions, a paradise where fie 
takes His delights, and like God Him/herself and the effect certainly leads to spatial and 
emotional disorientation. ' 91 This spatial instability continues throughout the chapter and 
indeed the whole book. As she states in M: 1.1.3, the aim of this disorientating metaphor 
is to illustrate the `favours' which the Lord will grant: 
It is necessary that you keep this comparison in mind. Perhaps God will be 
pleased to let me use it to explain something to you about the favours He is happy 
to grant souls and the differences between these favours. (M: 1.1.3) 
The recipients will be `delighted and awakened' (se regalarän y despertarän NI: 1.1.4) 
by these favours for the castle itself is not just beautiful but `full of delight' (deleitoso 
1.1.5) to those who enter it. It defines itself in terms of `delight'. 
As well as the necessity for delight the first part of the mansion frequently 
mentions `self knowledge' (el propio conocimiento M: 1.1.8,1.2.8192, M: 1.2.9,1.2.13 $93) 
this, as we have seen, is not the `head knowledge' of ideas and thought, but more an 
`experiential knowledge' closely connected to the libidinal springs of delight, the afJectus 
of the Victorines. `Without experience' (si no hay experiencia M: 1.1.9), she says, it is 
difficult to understand what she is talking about. Experiential reflection is a necessary 
component of her presentation - her `offering'. 
Self-knowledge, humility and delight: all the components of our strategy of 
unknowing/embodiment are presented in these dense first pages of the Aforadas. The 
final element of Teresa's strategy - the `mystical strategy as transformational' is brought 
191 In 1.2.1 more metaphors are introduced: `this pearl from the Orient, this tree of life'. In 1.2.8 it is a 
`palmetto fruit'. 
12 `Oh but if it is in the room of self knowledge! How necessary this room is - see that you understand me 
- even for those whom the Lord has brought into the very dwelling place where He abides' NI 1.2.8 
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out towards the end of the first mansions. Here she notes that the soul `will not be able to 
enjoy' (M: 1.2.14) the pleasures of the Lord if there are impediments in our outer life such 
as `possessions, honour or business affairs'. 
To proceed further, `to enter the second dwelling place', the seeker `must give up 
unnecessary things and business affairs' (M: 1.2.14). Only by transforming our `outer' 
attachments can `inner' attachments be altered. In Wittgenstein's terms, only by a new 
`Form of Life' can we be liberated from the `flybottle' in which we find ourselves. As 
with Wittgenstein (and Augustine), a confessio is necessary to prompt a `change of life'. 
In M: 1.2.16 she describes the necessity of each individual sister making `a good 
beginning', observing faults and that which leads us from the interior transformation to 
the exterior. This leads inevitably to her final paragraphs: 
Let us understand, my daughters, that true perfection consists in love of God and 
neighbour (my emphasis); the more perfectly we keep these two commandments 
the more perfect we will be. (M: 1.2.18) 
She concludes her impressive opening chapter by giving an example to illustrate the 
embodied, practical, ethical action she is recommending. In this case that sisters, 
especially superiors, must be careful about admonishing one another and how they 
upbraid others for not keeping convent rules, for `much discretion is necessary'. 
The first mansion, as has been said, is a tour de force of mystical strategy, combining as 
it does all the elements of unknowing and embodiment which we have presented in this 
thesis. The movement in the chapter from the opening passages saturated in metaphor and 
scriptural allusion, the subtle use of strategies of unknowing and embodiment, and the 
final presentation of a practical `case study' will be typical of how she proceeds 
throughout the book. Each chapter will contain all three elements and, seemingly to 
emphasise the point, each chapter will end with a very practical example to illustrate the 
points that have been made. Mansion Four, for example, having discussed the `prayer of 
quiet' and `raptures' give some guidelines at the end for how to deal with nuns who 
193 'self-knowledge is the most important thing for us' 
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appear to be suffering from such raptures but are simply physically ill. This is done with 
humour (see previous chapter), discretion and discernment: 
Since (these sisters) feel some consolation interiorly and a languishing and 
weakness exteriorly, they think they are experiencing a spiritual sleep ( which is a 
prayer a little more intense that the prayer of quiet) and they let themselves 
become absorbed. The more they allow this the more absorbed they become 
because their nature is further weakened, and they fancy they are being carried 
away with rapture (arrobamiento). I call it being carried away in foolishness 
(abobamiento) because it amounts to nothing more than wasting time and wearing 
down one's health... By sleeping and eating and avoiding so much penance the 
person got rid of the stupor. (M: 4.3.11) 
This recurring structure is typical of the Moradas and marks it out, we argue here, as her 
most mature expression of all the elements of the theologia mystica that she has inherited 
from de Osuna. 
8.4.2.2 The Remaining Mansions 
As already stated, space does not permit a line by line account of the Moradas. Indeed it 
could be argued that the main themes are sketched out in the first mansions and then 
developed throughout the book: the strategies are constantly present throughout the work 
and numerous more examples than are enumerated here can be cited to support the 
interpretation. As is clear, each chapter takes the same general form of the first chapter 
and encourages the reader to move, through unknowing, self-awareness and affectivity 
towards that transformed place which will allow the necessary Obras as we return to 
embodied existence in the world around us. 
In overview, the Moradas takes the basic form of three mansions which prepare 
the self in the way described for transformation. True to her roots in de Osuna and the 
theologia mystica she does not describe this transformation, but through the sort of verbal 
strategies we have explored suggests how this may come about for the person. Thus, after 
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the preparations of the first three mansions, the fourth is essentially the `mansion of 
transformation' where the change can occur. Thereafter the final three mansions discuss 
the consequences of the transformation with particular emphasis on the move from 
`rapture' to `works'/obras. We recall the quote with which we began this chapter: 
When I see people very diligently observing the sort of prayer that they have and 
very wrapped up in it when they have it (for it seems that they will not let the 
thought move or stir in case they lose a small morsel of the gusto or devotion that 
they have had), I realise how little they understand of the road to the attainment of 
union. They think that the whole business lies in such things. 
No, sisters, no! The Lord desires works and that if you see a sick woman to whom 
you can give some help, never be affected by the fear that your devotion will 
suffer, but take pity on her: if she is in pain you should feel pain too; if necessary, 
fast so that she may have your food, not so much for her sake as because you 
know that the Lord desires it. (M: 5.3) 
Thus, in the second and third mansions she emphasises (M: 2.1.7 cf Vida: 4.2,11.10 -15) 
that the gustos cannot be strived for: `souls shouldn't be thinking about consolations 
(regalos) at this beginning stage'. Our non-thinking extends towards not desiring the 
regalos. Once again she emphasises that this is an experiential process and we `cannot 
begin to recollect yourselves by force but only by gentleness' y cömo no ha de jr a 
fuerza de brazos el comenzarse a recoger, sin con suavidad' (M: 2.1.10). As always with 
this experiential learning `it is very important to consult persons with experience' (cf. 
Dionysius and the initiation of Hierathus). In these second mansions Teresa talks of the 
disturbance of the intellect: `Here the intellect (entendimiento) is more alive and the 
faculties (potencias) more skilled. The blows from the artillery strike in such a way that 
the soul cannot fail to hear' (M: 2.1.3). The devils `represent the esteem one has in the 
world, one's friends and relatives, one's health a thousand other obstacles'. The power of 
intellectual representation is clearly a block to recogimiento, and in Teresa's language, is 
used by the devil for that purpose. The dangers of the intellect are clearly delineated here. 
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In so far as the intellect is to be used it is to remind the person of the importance of 
persevering with recogimiento (M: 2.1.4) it must not be used as a critical tool in itself. 
Even in these early mansions, the intellect is there to serve the function of helping the 
soul find gustos, mercedes and regalos within recogimiento, rather than striving after 
intellectual comprehensions. We are being prepared `para gozar su gloria' - `to enjoy his 
glory' (M: 2.1.11). 
Regarding the third mansions, she characterises the people at this stage of the journey as 
being: 
Fond of doing penance and setting aside periods for recollection (horas de 
recogimiento); they spend their time well, practising works of charity towards 
their neighbours; and are very balanced in their use of speech and dress and in the 
governing of their households. (M: 3.1.5) 
Clearly the entendimiento is well developed! To pass this level, which she compares with 
the rich young man of Mt 19 : 16-22, we must pass into the place of unknowing and 
delighbgusto: 
Let us prove ourselves, my Sisters, or let the Lord prove us, for He knows well 
how to do this even though we often don't want to understand it. (M: 3.1.7) 
The action required `must not be fabricated in our imaginations but proved by deeds' 
(M: 3.1.7): the person must move from interior reflection to embodied action. As she says 
in M: 3.1.9 a certain humility of intellect is required for this process to work: `The Lord 
will give you understanding of them so that out of dryness you may draw humility - and 
not disquiet, which is what the devil aims after'. 
The possession of the entendimiento is also connected with worldly success: 
After these years, when it seems they have become Lords of the world or at least 
clearly disillusioned in this regard. His Majesty will try them in some minor 
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matters, and they will go about disturbed and afflicted that it puzzles me and 
makes me fearful. (M: 3.2.1). 
She helps these people by `compassion'/'sentimiento' and not `contradicting their reason' 
(3.2.2). The process of unknowing is not initiated through the intellect but the affect. For 
these people `their reason is still very much in control. Love has not yet reached the point 
of overwhelming reason' (M: 3.2.7). 194 She exhorts us to `let us abandon our reason 
(dejemos nuestra razön) and our fears into His hands' (M: 3.2.8). 
This `letting go of the reason' and the move to the affect will occur in the all-important 
fourth mansions of transformation. At the beginning of this mansion (4.1.1) she once 
again returns to the dilemma that she had encountered in the Vida: how can the theologia 
mystics be explained: what literary mechanisms, or indeed strategies can be employed to 
do this. ' 95 
Her solution is to take Wittgenstein's path: from saying to showing to acting. She 
cannot explain the process: 
As these mansions are much closer to where the King lives, they have great 
beauty and there are things so delicate to see and understand there, which the 
understanding does not have the capacity to grasp them, although something 
might turn out to be well put and not at all obscure to the inexperienced; those 
who have experience, especially a lot of it, will understand very well. (M: 
4.1.2)196 
As we saw with Wittgenstein, she appeals to those `who may have had these thoughts 
already' (cf. T: 3) and she will demonstrate by showing rather than saying. The 
unknowing of the theologia mystica will be maintained although the gustos will be an 
:' porque sit razä muy en sf; no estb aiin el amorpara sacar de razön' X95 `Although I think I now have a little more light about these favours the Lord grants to some souls, 
knowing how to explain them is a different matter' M: 4.1.1 
196 'Como ya estas moradas se llegan mäs adonde estä el Rey, es grande sit hermosura y hay cosas tan 
delfcadas que very quo entender, que el entendimiento no es capar pars poder dar trara cdmo se diga 
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important part of that transformative process when eventually, in the later mansions as we 
should expect, they too will fall away as the importance of embodied existence in the 
Obras takes hold. 
Consequently, as well as delineating the nature of the `mystical strategy' as an 
unknowing-affective strategy Teresa goes into greater depth here than she has ever done 
before to map this affective territory. Following Weber's suggestions, Teresa must know 
of the dangers here (The Meditaciones had not long been burnt) so she treads very 
carefully in defining her `pleasures of the Lord' ('gustos') in such a way as to retain their 
affective power but to protect her from unwelcome attention (and suppression) from the 
Inquisition. 
She distinguishes these gustos from the `contentos': 
The contentos appear to me that what we can call we have acquired from our 
meditation and petitions to our Lord, which proceed from our natural nature, 
although in the end God helps this. (M: 4.1.4) 197 
The `contentos' are, for Teresa associated with the entendimiento (intellect) and their 
reception is linked with the work of the intellect described in the first three mansions. 
During this fourth mansion, the move to the unknowing-embodied strategy is emphasised 
and with it the move from the `contentos' to the `gustos' (delights): 
For we obtain them (the contentos) through thoughts (con los pensamientos), 
assisting ourselves, using creatures to help our meditation, and tiring the intellect 
(cansado el entendimiento). (M: 4.2.3). 
siquiera algo que venga tan aljusto que no quede bien oscuro para los que no tienen experiencia; que 
quien la tiene muy bien lo entenderä, en especial si es mucha. ' 
97'los contentos me parece a mise pueden llamar los que nosotros adquirimos con nuestra meditacidn y 
peticiones a nuestro Senor, que procede de nuestro natural, aunque en fin ayuda para ello Dios' 
Kavanaugh and Rodriguez translate this passage as `the term consolations, I think, can be given to those 
experiences we ourselves acquire through our own meditation and petitions to the Lord'. Teresa, 
significantly, does not use this language of `naming experiences', here as in many other passages 
Kavanaugh and Rodriguez show that they are tending towards an epistemological bias based on `modem 
mystical' experientialism, see Chapter Three above. 
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For Howells (2003: 94) the process is defined by a `developed knowledge or familiarity 
with the field of prayer', as opposed to `learning that comes from books'. Which she 
describes as a distinction between `having experience of something' and `having 
experience in something': 
Experience is the skill brought by one who knows not just something about the 
object under view but how to orient and position oneself in relation to this object 
in order to grasp it accurately. (Howells 2003: 94) 
As Howells makes clear in his footnote here he understands the problem with a `modem 
mystic', `experiential' (or indeed Jamesian) interpretation of Teresa: 
In modern English, feelings suggest a merely emotional sense, whereas Teresa's 
emphasis is on the sensory, epistemological value of these feelings, which the 
translators judge is better rendered as "experience". The problem is that Teresa's 
distinction between feelings and experience is then lost. (Howells 2001: 182) 
We would go further, in accord with the general thrust of the thesis, by arguing that on 
such interpretation hangs Teresa's use of the language of theologia mystica to describe 
the affective changes she is asking her reader to respond with. This, as with Wittgenstein, 
is done through showing rather than saying. A movement that seems akin to 
Wittgenstein's increasing familiarity with the `Field of Language' which ultimately 
comes from Lebensformen. Only precisely this sort of knowledge can effect 
transformation, not `head knowledge' or `book knowledge'. 
In this vein Teresa now makes very clear (M: 4.1.5) that the unique locus of the 
mystical knowledge is not the `understanding' but the `heart' (el corazön). At this point 
she again dissembles claiming: `I don't know much about these passions of the soul' 
(estas pasiones del alma) `for I am very stupid' (muy torpe). Again we hear the 
`stuttering, broken voice' of the strategy of unknowing using the Wittgensteinian 
strategies of contradiction and humility (that voice with which are so familiar now from 
Dionysius to Gerson to Osuna). To proceed on the spiritual journey, she says, we must 
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`not think much but love much' `no estä la cosa en pensar mucho, sino en amar mucho' 
(4.1.7 cf. F: 5.2 `and so do that which best stirs you to love'). This love, this `amar' is 
seen in deeds rather than thoughts. 
In M: 4.3 she returns to her earlier thought in the Vida and her earlier reading in 
relating what she is presenting to the prayer of recogimiento. As with Osuna, there is a 
clear statement that the recogimiento is connected with `unknowing': `Don't think this 
recogimiento is acquired by the intellect (entendimiento) striving to think about God 
within itself, or by the imagination (fmaginaciön) imaging Him within itself (4.3.3). 198 
However such `unknowing' is accompanied by the increase of the affective and cannot 
exist on its own: `love must already be awakened' (M 4.3.4. ). The entendimiento cannot 
be stopped without this: 
When His Majesty desires the intellect to stop, He occupies it in another way and 
gives it a light so far above what we can attain that it remains absorbed. Then 
without knowing how the intellect is much better instructed than it was through 
all the soul's efforts not to make use of it. (M: 4.3.6) 
Thus the intellect moves into unknowing as the affect is quickened by the encounter with 
God. `Without any effort or noise the soul should strive to cut down the rambling of the 
intellect (el dicurrir del entendimiento) but suspending either it or the pensamiento' ( M: 
4.3.7). Teresa seems here to be treading the fine path between ending the discursive 
intellect and recognising the danger of an alumbradismo like quietism. Her compromise - 
'cutting down the rambling' without suspending it seems to suggest a way out. She has 
moved from Osuna's total reliance on the affect at the expense of the intellect. However, 
although this is what she states in M: 4.3 there are enough contradictory statements, as 
we have seen above, to suggest an alternative reading and that her position is not so far 
from Osuna's ( and possibly the alumbrados) as she would have us believe. 
The soul must `enjoy' the new place without trying to understand it (M: 4.3.7). 199 
198 Two explicit references to Osuna in this chapter in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 show that she is clearly thinking of 
Osuna at this point 
199 goza sin ninguna industria 
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As we have seen, Teresa ends the fourth mansions with spiritual advice warning sisters 
who experience a sort of `spiritual stupor' which she calls being carried away with 
`foolishness' - abobamiento. Although there is an element of tongue-in-cheek Teresa is 
of course strengthening her anti-alumbrado credentials by these sort of remarks whilst 
using the strategy of humour we described in the previous chapter. Unlike the Vida which 
contained lengthy accounts of these practices, visions, levitations, locutions etc, the 
Moradas presents the considered views of a spiritual master on how such phenomena 
should be treated. 
The final three mansions of the Moradas are thus concerned with showing how the living 
out of the transformation she has described is effected through action in the world. What 
she is proposing is union with God through action in the world. 
Again, she emphasises that `the intellect is not capable of understanding' the 
`riches treasures and delights (1a riqueza y tesoros y deleites M 5.1.1) of the fifth 
mansions. As we would expect by now, although they cannot be grasped by the intellect 
they can be `enjoyed' (gocen). 
Yet from this point on she emphasises `service of the Lord' (el servicio de nuestro 
Senor) as much as `self-knowledge' (M 5.3.1). Through a virtuous life one affects others 
and so ultimately does God's work. She returns once again to her earlier theme, the 
importance of love of neighbour as much as love of God: 
The Lord asks of us only two things: love of His Majesty and love of our 
neighbour. These are what we must work for... The most certain sign, in my 
opinion, as to whether or not we are observing these two laws is whether we 
observe well the love of neighbour... The more advanced you see you are in love 
for your neighbour the more advanced you will be in the love of God. (M: 5.3.7- 
8) 
Out of this she concludes her fifth mansion (with the customary practical example of holy 
living) to the exhortation on `Good works' we have already quoted above. This, for her 
`is the true union with His will' (M: 5.3.11). 
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These final mansions enshrine the movements we noticed earlier in Wittgenstein's 
transformative philosophy of embodiment. That is: 
1. An inextricable link between the theological and the ethical 
2. The need for self knowledge, as the true source of contemplation 
3. A strategy that returns the reader to the `relationships of everyday life', and 
4. A strategy with transformative power to make a difference in those relationships. 
All this takes place within the threefold Wittgensteinian path of Saying-Showing-Acting. 
For Teresa this is based on an epistemology of affect, coupled with the path of 
unknowing. Thus by the time of the sixth mansions Teresa talks of the vista of the soul 
with God200 - not `seen in a way that can be called seeing, even by the imagination' but 
the encounter is determined and defined by desire and `enjoyment' `que todo su deseo es 
tornarla a gozar': `(the soul's) whole desire is to enjoy it once again' (6.1.1). Knowledge 
and vision are gone, only desire remains. 
The first chapter of the sixth mansions looks back on the `trials' of the previous 
mansions (and the previous forty years of Teresa's life, see M: 6.1.7) again couched in 
these terms of the incomprehension of the intellect when faced with the stirrings of the 
affect (and, also, often the body): porque no estaba el entendimiento capaz' : `for the 
understanding had no capacity to comprehend' M: 6.1.9. Looking back on her 
experiences she sees that intellectual comprehension was of little help in dealing with it: 
In sum, there is no remedy in this tempest but to wait for the mercy of God. For at 
an unexpected time, with one word alone or a chance happening. He so quickly 
calms the storm that it seems there had not been even as much as a cloud in that 
soul, and it remains filled with sunlight and much more consolation (consuelo). 
(M: 6.1.10) 
200 Peers translates as `sight', Kavanaugh and Rodriguez as `meeting' - from the sense of the first passage 
of 6.1 `sight' would seem a more appropriate translation 
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The process was one of suffering and difficulty, `having seen itself totally incapacitated' 
to `make it understand its nothingness' (nuestra nonada M: 6.1.11). At such times, for 
Teresa, `the best remedy is to engage in external works of charity' (6.1.13). 
The gustos that led us to this place our now transcended, as we have seen, to 
allow the fullness of the life of `action in union'. 
Having clearly moved from the intellectual discernment of the earlier mansions 
much of the rest of these mansions are given over to the question of discernment within 
the realm of unknowing and the affect. Thus in M: 6.3 she talks of locutions received, 
often `when in darkness of intellect' (M: 6.3.5 oscuridad del entendimiento) and how 
they are to be discerned from God, the devil or `melancholy' (Teresa's term for what we 
would now refer to as `mental illness'). 
As Teresa points out in M: 6.7.13, the gustos of the `prayer of quiet' are not an 
end in themselves and although she uses the mystical strategies we have delineated they 
are for her a `means to an end', in this case `the prayer of union' or `vista' that she 
mentions at the beginning of the sixth mansions. These moments of union involve the 
theological entrance into relation with Christ, the Trinity and the Mother of God. 
Throughout it all, however, the faculty of the intellect has to be circumvented and the 
Strategy of Unknowing remains: 
You will ask how if nothing is seen one knows that it is Christ, or a saint, or His 
most glorious Mother. This, the soul will not know how to explain, nor can it 
understand how it knows, but it does know with the greatest certitude. (M: 6.8.6. ) 
Teresa stipulates throughout a `divine unknowing' - the Dionysian stulta sapientia we 
described in Chapter Five - this, for Teresa, is the `realm of the supernatural' (see M: 
6.9.18). She concludes these extraordinary sixth mansions by suggesting two aspects that 
remain from the states she has mentioned here: the one is pain, the other is 
`overwhelming joy and delight' `muy excesivo gozo y deleite' (M 6.11.11). Even through 
it all, and the discussions of the supernatural unknowing of these states she returns to the 
epistemology of delight. Although mixed with pain, as we shall see in the seventh 
mansions, that delight remains to the end, long after the pain has dropped away. The pain 
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of this union is that which achieves the `true union' rather than the `delightful union'. As 
Howells makes clear (Howells 2003: 106/7) this `true union' - the union with God in the 
world, is achieved by transcending the gustos and so reaching true embodied service in 
the world. For Teresa, unlike Wittgenstein, this can only be achieved through 
identification with Christ. At this point we have one of the clearest contrasts between 
Teresa's approach and Wittgenstein's. Wittgenstein can allow for the possibility of this 
Lebensform, but his job is to provide a vision of it through a Weltbild. Teresa, on the 
other hand, is able to choose the Christian Weltanschauung which enables the self to be 
`grabbed and turned round' by the passion of union with Christ. 201 
Therefore the final seventh mansions present both the strategy of embodiment/affect 
combined with the newer `true union' of action in the world. This, of course, all happens 
through her theological eyes in union with Christ in Trinitarian perspective. 
Thus, at the beginning of the seventh mansions, Teresa repeats her phrase from 
the first page of the first mansions and reflecting Proverbs, when she states that the soul 
is the place where `The Lord finds his delight' `almas con que tanto se deleita el Seilor' 
(M: 7.1.1). However, in contrast to the earlier mansions she seems to imply that in this 
`spiritual marriage' ('el matrimonio espiritual'), as was the case implied with the raptures 
and the prayer of union in the previous mansions, there is here a passing over of the 
strategies of affect and unknowing `for all the faculties are lost'. There is a vision of the 
Trinity and a `certain representation of the truth'. At this point Teresa has moved 
completely into the theological realm -a realm of `theological' not `intellectual' 
knowing. (eg. M : 7.3.8, what Howells refers to as the `mystical knowing' of Teresa, see 
Howells 2003). It is a time of quiet `like the building of Solomon's temple when no 
sound was heard' (M: 7.3.11). `There is no reason for the intellect to stir or seek 
anything... the faculties are not lost here, but they do not work, remaining as though in 
amazement'. The theological content is at its strongest here which fits with Teresa's 
theological strategy of returning us to Christ through the processes of the theologia 
mystica. Yet, as commentators such as Howells point out (Howells 2003: 117) Teresa 
must `work hard' to bridge philosophico-psychological divides in her picture of the self 
201 See footnote, p. 132 
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with theological imagery and thought, centred around the resemblance of the self to 
Christ's own union of two natures - the divine and the human. Needless to say, 
Wittgenstein's anthropology never moves in this direction and does not have such 
tensions as these to deal with. 
Yet although Teresa insists that the soul has now `gone beyond delight' she 
persists in using the language of delight to describe this place: M: 7.3.13 `Here one 
delights (se deleita) in God's tabernacle'. To the end she seems happy to use paradox as a 
linguistic strategy to show rather than say what she is trying to express in these last 
mansions. Yet, as has been stressed repeatedly, for Teresa, the end point of her theologia 
mystica are the `good works, good works', `Obras, Obras' which will enable action in 
the world: 
This is the reason for prayer, my daughters, the purpose of this spiritual marriage: 
the birth always of good works, good works ... I repeat it is necessary that your 
foundation consist of more than prayer and contemplation. If you do not strive for 
virtues and practice them, you will always be dwarfs. (M: 7.4.6) 
Weber was right to state that at the heart of the Moradas lies an `erotic spirituality', 
however, as Teresa makes clear in this final chapter such erotic spirituality, and by 
implication the strategy of unknowing and concealment, have ultimately, for her, to be 
directed towards `good works' and the `practice of virtues'. This is her means for 
discerning the authenticity of the spiritual path that has been followed: `Let us desire and 
be occupied in prayer not for the sake of enjoyment but so as to have this strength to 
serve' (7.4.12). 
Yet, despite it all, and though the end of the journey is clearly the creation of good 
works, twice in the epilogue Teresa exhorts her sisters to `delight in the castle' (M: EpI 
and 2a gozar de esta castillo). Even though ultimately the strategy of affect must fade 
away Teresa clearly intends it as a key strategy in bringing her daughters (allied with the 
strategy of unknowing) to the place of theological union with the Trinity that she herself 
underwent. She concludes with the reflection of those verses from Genesis and Proverbs 
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with which she began and which we have seen re-echo throughout the lines of the 
Moradas, forming as it were a counterpoint to the strategy of desire throughout the castle: 
Although no more than seven dwelling places were discussed, in each of these 
there are many others, below and above and to the sides, with lovely gardens and 
fountains and labyrinths, such delightful things (cosas tan deleitosas) that you 
would want to be dissolved in praises of the great God who created the soul in His 
own image and likeness. (M: EpI) 
Teresa's remarkable achievement in the Moradas is to blend the linguistic strategies of 
the theologia mystica, to which she was heir, with theological imagery to present a 
radical proposal of how the Christian should act in the world through `embodied 
unknowing' in selfless action. The final result is a sophisticated text which reflects the 
Wittgensteinian tripos of saying-showing-acting giving the text an unprecedented 
experiential force in the literature of Western Christian spirituality. In this respect it is a 
supreme example of mystical writing carefully using `mystical strategies' developed, we 
have argued, over the previous three hundred years. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter has argued that for both Wittgenstein and Teresa `mystical strategies of 
unknowing' are accompanied by `mystical strategies of embodiment/affectivity'. As with 
the former strategy explored in the previous chapter, this latter strategy has differing aims 
with respect to both authors. Wittgenstein is employing it to enter into a deeper embodied 
expression of the Lebensform. Sought whilst he is writing the Tractatus, we have argued 
that he only really achieves it, and with it concludes the Tractatus with its final `mystical' 
paragraphs, through his war experiences of 1916 as recorded in his Notebooks. This sense 
of an `embodied philosophy' remains with him until the end of his life. Thus, as we saw, 
in the `Big Typescript' of 1932 we find him describing the purpose of philosophy as 
requiring: `a resignation, but one of feeling and not of intellect' for `work on philosophy 
is - as work in architecture frequently is - actually more of a kind of work on oneself. On 
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one's own conception. On the way one sees things' (PO: 161/2). The idea of a 
disembodied philosophy that does not engage us, body, heart, mind and soul, is anathema 
to Wittgenstein. 
For Teresa, on the other hand, embodiment, desire and affect are aspects of the 
theologia mystica which she has received from Osuna and needs to use to convey the 
correct approach to the spiritual life that she wants to induce in her readers. Her use of 
subversive and sometimes shocking language is not, as we have argued, to present some 
form of `erotic spirituality' (pace Weber) as an end in itself, but rather that she sees that 
transformational change can only be achieved in her interlocutor by the `seizing' of the 
affect in order to `turn her around'. The embodied language of deleites, gozos and regales 
in the Moradas, we have argued, is a deliberate strategy to effect that change in her 
readers. 
In this respect then, this chapter has argued, as the previous one, that both Teresa 
and Wittgenstein can be said to both be using similar strategies in their desire to `turn 
their reader round' in the `passion of desire'. Both, we have contended here, recognise 
that `wisdom is passionless but faith by contrast is a passion' and it is exactly to awaken 
that passion which leads to true wisdom that they adopt the strategies that they do. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
"There is indeed that which is unutterable. This makes itself manifest, it is the 
mystical" (T 6.522) (but not a "bluish haze surrounding things" and giving them 
an interesting appearance [as Wittgenstein once said in conversation]). (Paul 
Engelmann in LPE: 98) 
If you and I are to live religious lives, it mustn't be that we talk a lot about 
religion, but that our manner of life is different. (Wittgenstein to Drury quoted in 
Rhees 1987: 114) 
9.1 Summary 
It is now time to draw together the main arguments of the thesis and to highlight its 
conclusions. We began the dissertation with a quote from Wittgenstein's conversations 
with Drury and we begin these conclusions with another, together with some 
recollections of Wittgenstein's friend and fellow architect, Paul Engelmann. Together the 
two quotes encapsulate some of the key arguments of this dissertation. Namely: 
1. That we find in Wittgenstein's writings a method of looking at `the mystical' by 
means of employing his essential division between `saying and showing'. The 
`mystical' for Wittgenstein is unutterable, but, it can however be manifest through 
showing. 
2. The `perspicuous view' suggested by Wittgenstein enables us to `see connections' 
in discourse as we relate them to a `form of life'. We shall, in his words, `see a 
new aspect'. 
3. Consequently, if we look at religious texts and life we are as much concerned 
with acting as with thinking. For Wittgenstein, `a religious form of life' must be 
embedded in action. 
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At the beginning of the dissertation we posed the dilemma of how the words mysticism, 
mystical and the mystic were to be meaningfully employed in academic discourse, 
especially in relation to the Christian tradition. To this end we reviewed the use to which 
the words had been put, primarily in the last century and argued that an essentialist view 
of `the mystical' had arisen that suggested `the mystical' was an ontological, cross-credal, 
experientialist category, what we termed `modern mysticism'. Applying a 
Wittgensteinian Blick we argued that such a `perspicuous view' frees us from the `bluish 
haze' of `modem mysticism' and allows us to concentrate on mystical discourse rather 
than the `occult entity' of mysticism. In our analysis of James, Vaughan, Inge and 
Underhill in Chapter Two we demonstrated how such an `occult entity' can pervade our 
talk of the mystical. Whilst reviewing contemporary developments on the academic 
discourse of `the mystical' in the same chapter we analysed a `constructivist approach' 
from writers such as Katz. This, we suggested, was moving in a more helpful direction, 
however, as critics like Forman point out, it misses the necessary `psychological content' 
of the discourse in its desire to `make an idol of no idols': in Wittgensteinian terms, it 
`says' but does not `show'. Central to the notion of `mystical strategy' in this thesis has 
been the sense of holding the balance between saying and showing. It has been argued 
that forms of our approach have been adopted by other writers, notably Sells and Kripal, 
however, in Chapters Two and Seven we argued for a differing approach from these two 
writers. In the case of Sells we wanted to distinguish our `mystical strategy of 
unknowing' from his `mystical language of unsaying' as we saw the latter as 
concentrating more on a theological or theoretical claim to the apophatic nature of God, 
common, so Sells argues, to medieval Islam, Judaism and Christianity. Our `mystical 
strategy of unknowing', on the other hand, was not another theoretical system but a 
practical strategy that led the reader, through methods outlined in Chapter Seven, to a 
place of greater openness to the transcendent. 
On the other hand, we contrasted the `mystical strategy of embodiment' with 
Kripal's `mystical erotics' on the grounds that although the writer analysed in depth here, 
Teresa of Avila, uses eros in her work, it is rather to lead the reader to embodied action 
rather than to the erotic itself (again, as an `occult entity'). In Chapter Eight we also noted 
how commentators such as Weber want to find an `erotic spirituality' in the writings of 
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Teresa. Rather we interpret Teresa's writings as using a `strategy of affect or 
embodiment' to effect a certain transformational change in her reader. 
To demonstrate the proposals we examined the writings of Teresa of Avila in Part 
Two of the thesis. The perspective we took on her writings was as part of a tradition of 
mystical discourse that we termed the theologia mystica. We argued that this form of 
discourse arose in the Parisian re-appropriation of the writings of Dionysius especially in 
the Latin commentaries of Victorine writers such as Thomas Gallus. We identified the 
two `mystical strategies' of unknowing and embodiment as central to this tradition which 
has been termed by Rorem amongst others as `Affective Dionysianism'. 
We further argued that this tradition of discourse reaches Teresa through the 
writings of the recogido Franciscan, Francisco de Osuna, whom Teresa had read as a 
young woman and called `her master'. We demonstrated in Chapter Six how de Osuna 
inherited his style of writing from, amongst others, Jean Gerson, and developed an 
approach to devotion that contrasted what he termed the theologia mystica from the 
theologia speculativa. 
To illustrate how Teresa employs this theologia mystica in her writing we argued 
that she adopts various `mystical strategies' to achieve this. In this, we argued, she is 
working along Wittgensteinian lines by `showing' as well as `saying'. At the heart of her 
texts, we argued, was a strategy of unknowing coupled with a strategy of embodiment. 
To illustrate how she did this we compared her `strategies' with Wittgenstein's to show 
how both use similar strategies to `do the work' of their texts. 
As we have made plain throughout this dissertation, a direct comparison of the 
two is neither possible nor desirable. Yet, the argument here has been that a study of the 
Austrian's philosophical approach reveals much of the linguistic strategies of a `mystical 
writer' such as Teresa. Not least, that when we approach such a `mystical writer' we 
should specifically not be looking for cleanly polished theories and theses. As we have 
seen, Wittgenstein was concerned throughout his life with a) the boundary of what can be 
said and what can be shown and b) how he could express this in his writing. As his 
writing developed he realised increasingly, it has been argued, that for philosophy to lead 
to action, or as Cavell has called it, `therapy', it cannot use the traditional methods of 
theoretical treatises and discourse. Rather, as his later writings show (although as we 
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argued in Chapters Three and Eight it is also apparent in the early Tractatus) the style of 
writing must change to reflect the new purpose or way of doing philosophy. Similarly, 
when we turn to a `mystical' writer such as Teresa we should not expect a theoretical 
Denkweise but an equally unsystematic and arresting style that forces us to reappraise our 
relation to ourselves, the transcendent and the world around us. This arresting style, we 
have argued here, is the `mystical strategy' of the theologia mystica. In this respect, we 
can conclude that Teresa can best be interpreted as a master of `practical theology' (See 
Chapter One) whose primary concern is not theoretical speculation on, for example, the 
nature of the Trinity, but rather provoking practical transformation in the lives of her 
readers. In this, we have argued, she is a true heir to the great Medieval tradition of 
theologia mystica. 
Schotter (1996) sees the revolutionary nature of Wittgenstein in the following three 
aspects: 
1. He orientates us to a new task 
2. Introduces us to a new set of methods relevant to its pursuit 
3. `Opens up a strange new creative space, a relational space in which we can 
originate new forms of life, new living connections and relations between aspects 
of our lives not before noticed'. (Schotter 1996: 404) 
The argument of this thesis has been that both Wittgenstein and Teresa, by differing but 
similar means challenge conventional ways of seeing to open up a new `creative, 
relational space' where new `connections and relations between aspects of our lives' can 
be opened up. Wittgenstein uses the tools of linguistic philosophy to subvert that very 
genre into a `new way of seeing', whereas Teresa uses the tools of the venerable tradition 
of theologia mystica to present an equally subversive `way of looking' that changes our 
way of viewing, our way of being and ultimately our way of acting in the world. Both of 
them were unconcerned with generating `grand theories'. In the case of Wittgenstein his 
work often explicitly challenges this notion which he sees as being all-pervading in the 
Western twentieth-century world: 
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It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of 
any possible interest to us to find out empirically "that contrary to our 
preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such" ---- whatever that may 
mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous medium. ) And we may not 
advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. We must do away with all explanation and description alone must 
take its place. (PI: 109) 
Teresa, on the other hand is not concerned with the theorising of the letrados and the 
theologia speculativa but rather the `change of life' that can occur through the theologia 
mystica. 
9.2 Family Resemblances 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to. 
The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer being tormented by 
questions which bring itself into question. 
Instead we now demonstrate a method by examples; and one can break off the 
series of examples. 
But more correctly, one should say: Problems are solved 
(uneasiness//difficulties//eliminated), not a single problem... 
- But then we'll never get finished with our work! 
Of course// certainly // not, because it doesn't have an end. (P0: 195) 
Once you have been shown how to enjoy this castle, you will find rest in 
everything - even those which give you the most trouble -, with hope you will 
return to it, which no one can take from you. 
Although no more than seven dwelling places were discussed, in each of these 
there are many others, below and above and to the sides, with lovely gardens and 
fountains and labyrinths, such delightful things that you would want to be 
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dissolved in praises of the great God who created the soul in His own image and 
likeness. (M: Ep. 2.1) 
For Wittgenstein, as we have seen, philosophical problems arise from a certain sense of 
unease or discomfort about particular propositions, phrases, twists in the fabric of our 
language: 
The philosopher strives to find the liberating word, that is, the word that finally 
permits us to grasp what up until now has intangibly weighed down our 
awareness. 
(It is as if one had a hair on one's tongue; one feels it, but cannot grab it, and 
therefore cannot get rid of it). (PO: 165) 
It was the contention at the beginning of this thesis that the terms: the mystical, the mystic 
and mysticism present such an intangible discomfort. They cause problems in use and we 
tie ourselves up in knots using them. Throughout the thesis we have made a 
Wittgensteinian case against the following uses of the words: 
1. Seeing `mysticism' as a cross-credal ontological category that is somehow possessed 
by a religion such as Christianity. 
We have given numerous examples of this, arising, as argued, with people such as 
James, Underhill, Inge and Vaughan and continuing to be used in this way by many 
Academics. 202 We have argued that the `myth' of `mysticism' as an `occult entity' 
arises from an error of our speech. We want to talk about `it' as an entity and so want 
to suppose it is a distinctive category. It is however, we have argued, a manner of 
speaking that can beguile us. 
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2. To talk about the `mystical experience'. 
Taking the cue from writers such as Lash we have argued that the notion of a discreet 
`mystical experience' is equally meaningless. To ascribe an experiential existence to 
such an entity is likewise an error of the use of our language. 
3. To refer to individuals as `mystics'. 
Just as we must be cautious of how we use the terms `mysticism' and `mystical 
experience' we have equally argued that it is meaningless to talk about so-and-so as 
`being a mystic'. If the first two categories are empty then this third one is equally so. 
Having warned, in Wittgensteinian fashion, against the use of these terms in quasi- 
ontological fashion we have also wanted to argue against a pure constructivism that 
removes any process from `mystical language'. To illustrate the point here we have 
argued that the `mystical language game' can best be compared to a Wittgensteinian 
choreography between `saying and showing'. From this choreography arises the third 
necessary aspect of the `mystical language game' - ethical action in the world. 
Applying this approach to Teresa of Avila it has been demonstrated how we can 
acquire an innovative and original sense of her works which involves seeing them as a 
language game which is part of the wider `language game' of the tradition of what we 
have termed theologia mystica. In concentrating on this language game, pace the 
constructivists, we have not wanted to concentrate on `destroying the idol' of mysticism 
by `creating a new idol' of `no idols' (cf. P0: 171). Rather, in Wittgenstein's approach 
we have argued that we see the light and shadow of the play of mystical speech as the 
agent of `mystic speech' works on the edge of language and meaning. 
By necessity this `mystic speech' will be broken, stammering, un-theoretical and 
contingent: there is an incompleteness to the `mystic speech act' which is a necessary part 
of its existence. Throughout this thesis, in the case of Wittgenstein, Dionysius and 
202 See, for example, the following phrase from a recently published book Mystics of the Christian 
Tradition ( Fanning 2002: 5): `among the seemingly myriad differences of Christian denominations and the 
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Teresa, we have had numerous examples of well-meaning translators and executors 
trying to `tidy up' the rough and tumble of `mystic speech'. On the contrary we have 
argued that this `broken-down nature' is intrinsic to the very nature of mystic speech. In 
examining Teresa's writings in this way we hope to have demonstrated that we should 
not look for perfection and smoothness in those writings. The very coarseness and 
inconsistency is what makes them alive and gives them the `passionate intensity' as they 
grapple with the transcendent. 
The other main theme of the thesis has been how the investigation of the Christian 
tradition of theologia mystica throws light on Wittgenstein's own religious search. Rather 
than bracketing him as a `modern mystic' (pace Sontag) we have argued that this study 
has demonstrated how his religious faith, or as he put it, his `religious point of view' can 
best be understood as belonging to the tradition of theologia mystica as `mystical speech 
act'. In his use of aporia, unknowing, embodiment and humility he is about the same 
`game' as writers such as Teresa to `turn his reader around' to see the world aright. For 
Wittgenstein, as we have demonstrated, `seeing the world aright' is about seeing beyond 
the dominant Western Weltanschauung of positivistic scientism to a Weltblick that `sees 
connections' within ourselves, those around us and the world we inhabit. Although we do 
not want to conclude that Wittgenstein is `a mystic' we want to suggest that Wittgenstein 
is engaging in the same linguistic strategies - what we term in this thesis `mystical 
strategies' - as writers such as Teresa of Avila. In this respect, one of the key arguments 
of this dissertation has been that one of the central `family resemblances' between 
Wittgenstein and Teresa is their shared preoccupation with `making pictures' to stimulate 
a `change of aspect' in our way of seeing and acting in the world. Accordingly we 
conclude that their writing is fundamentally transformational in purpose. As Wittgenstein 
put it: 
I wanted to put this picture before your eyes, and your acceptance of this picture 
consists in your being inclined to regard a given case differently; that is, to 
competing claims of the world's faiths, it is in mysticism that they meet on a common ground'. 
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compare it with this series of pictures. I have changed your Anschauungsweise 
(way of viewing). (Z: 461) 
9.3 Conclusion 
Finally, returning to the original research question: 
Can a new approach to problems of `the mystical', as expressed in the Christian 
tradition of medieval `mystical' writers such as Teresa of Avila, be revealed by 
adopting an approach based on the philosophical writings of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein? 
We affirm that this is so for the following six reasons: 
First, the interpretation of `Wittgensteinian methodology' based primarily on the notion 
of the Übersichtliche Darstellung ('Clear Overview') and the importance that 
Wittgenstein gives for a distinction between Weltanschauung and Weltbild allows us to 
see `mystical speech' as essentially a device for enabling the reader to move from Saying 
to Showing to Acting. 
Secondly, mystical speech stands in incomplete relation to the reader allowing the reader 
to move into the action or space sought by the writer. This we have termed a 
performative strategy, rather than an informative one which deliberately does not develop 
a systematic body of theory or learning. What at first sight appears `unsystematic and 
incoherent' (whether in Wittgenstein or Teresa) upon investigation proves to be part of a 
wider strategy of transformation. 
Third, we have argued that this `performative strategy' of mystical writing is developed 
in the Western tradition through the re-appropriation of the writing of Dionysius in the 
twelfth/thirteenth centuries creating a `mystical tradition' which we term `theologia 
mystica'. In particular, we have concentrated on two `mystical strategies': `strategies of 
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unknowing' and `strategies of affectivity/embodiment'. However, we have also suggested 
other strategies may be present (eg. a strategy of concealment) which may need further 
exploration in these writers or other proponents of `mystical speech'. 
Fourth, we have argued that Teresa of Avila receives this method from writers such as de 
Osuna and finds it is ideally suited to the particular circumstances under which she has to 
write in the mid sixteenth century. 
Fifth, that by comparing the linguistic strategies of Teresa and Wittgenstein to 
demonstrate how they both reveal these `mystical strategies' we can see how they both 
adopt similar strategies for the ends that they wish to achieve. We have highlighted in 
particular their mystical strategies of unknowing and embodiment. 
Finally, for both Teresa and Wittgenstein, we have argued that affect is as important as 
intellect for effecting transformational, ethical change in the life of their readers. Their 
writings can only be understood correctly, we have argued, if they are understood as 
proposing affective as well as intellective change in the reader. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to generate `a new aspect' on the `mystical writing' of 
Teresa of Avila and, by extension, on the wider Western tradition. Also, that this thesis 
has demonstrated that it is possible to take an `agnostic' view towards the `occult entities' 
of `mysticism' without losing the very power and passion of that writing. 
In that we contend there is a clear Sprachspiel of theologia mystica in the Western 
medieval Christian tradition it is to be expected that similar `strategies' will be found in 
many writers of this genre. As well as Dionysius, the Victorines, Gerson, de Osuna and 
Teresa many other authors, we suggest, will reveal these sort of `mystical strategies'. In 
Chapter Six Hugh of Balma was mentioned and his translation into Spanish during the 
`Cisnerosian Spring' of the early fifteen hundreds. As part of the research for this thesis 
we endeavoured to trace the mystical strategies of this work which we found exhibiting 
the same characteristics outlined here. Lack of space and the need for coherence meant 
that this material had to be put aside. However it is clear that there is much here that 
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echoes the main theses and which merits future research and elucidation. Similarly, it was 
originally hoped that this study would embrace the writings of Teresa's contemporary 
John of the Cross. This research also had to be put on one side in the interests of 
coherence and clarity of the central thesis. However, as with de Balma, it is clear that 
John (who also owes a debt to Osuna) is also using the `mystical strategies' of 
unknowing and affectivity for his own purposes. Once again we suggest that this would 
also merit future research. 
The thesis began by locating its discussion within the emerging disciplines of 
pastoral/practical theology and the academic study of Christian Spirituality. By 
deliberately taking an engagement between a philosopher and a theologian both known 
for being `on the edge' of their disciplines the study has demonstrated how fruitful such a 
dialogue can be and how the liminal status of a discipline such as the academic study of 
Christian spirituality will allow such fruitful exchanges to occur. 
In conclusion then, we reiterate that by taking the view of a philosopher such as 
Wittgenstein and applying it to a `practical theologian' such as Teresa new avenues are 
revealed for elucidating a discourse that may at first sight be perplexing or confusing. By 
these means a `strategy' such as the `mystical strategy' described here is clarified and 
revealed in its ingenuity and appropriateness for the task of bringing about affective 
transformation in the reader. 
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